

F O U R T H E D I T I O N

THE SOVIET REGIME

Communism in Practice

W. W. Kulski



THE SOVIET REGIME

Communism in Practice

W. W. Kulski

This fourth edition of a classic work, entirely revised, describes the structure and functioning of the Soviet regime and the post-Stalinist changes of the last ten years.

Soviet sources (laws, Party documents, views of Soviet leaders and writers, and other materials) are analyzed to provide the American reader with a picture of life today under the Communist system. Government and the Communist Party, courts and public administration, housing, schooling, farming, work and compensation for work, labor unions, travel, art and literature, marriage, social insurance, inheritance, and other aspects of life are described as they exist under heavy regulation in the U.S.S.R.

The pronouncements of the 22nd Party Congress and other developments in the Khrushchev era offer an opportunity for appraisal of the changes in the Party policy since the Stalinist period. Professor Kulski utilizes this opportunity to the fullest extent. He has also amplified the bibliography to include recent Soviet books and new books in English on the U.S.S.R.

OTHER BOOKS BY W. W. KULSKI

International Politics

*Peaceful Co-Existence: An Analysis
of Soviet Foreign Policy*

Handbook on Communism (co-author)

The Ethic of Power (co-author)

The Soviet Regime

Communism in Practice

W. W. KULSKI

*Professor of International Relations
Syracuse University*



1963

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 1954, 1956, 1959, 1963
by SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS
SYRACUSE, NEW YORK

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CATALOG CARD 63-21982

This is the fourth edition
of this volume.

First printing December 1963

Manufactured in the United States of America
by The Heffernan Press Inc., Worcester, Mass. and
Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., Binghamton, N.Y.

TO MY DEARLY BELOVED WIFE,
COURAGEOUS, FAITHFUL, AND LOVING COMPANION
OF ALL MY JOYS AND SORROWS

Preface

THE FIRST edition of this book, published in 1954, was written during the last years of Stalin's life and completed shortly after his death. It remains an exact mirror of the Stalinist regime. The truth of that first edition has since been confirmed either by the explicit denunciations in the post-Stalinist period of former crimes and abuses or by the implicit admissions in the form of repeal of the most repulsive or harshest features of his legislation. The present value of that edition is not only historical; it provides the necessary yardstick for measuring the significance of post-Stalinist departures from his kind of regime.

The second edition was published in 1956 at the height of collective leadership of Stalin's successors. The third came out in 1959, two years after the defeat of Khrushchev's foes and at the time of his uncontested ascendancy to the position of supreme leader.

The present one will see the public light just over ten years since the ruthless dictator died. Ten years is long enough for a tentative appraisal of the present post-Stalinist regime. It is perhaps too short for predicting future developments, a temptation that a great many people cannot resist. These ten years have been associated with Khrushchev's buoyant personality as the preceding thirty had been deeply marked by the somber genius of Stalin.

This is a thoroughly revised edition and brings an up-to-date picture of the Soviet regime today.

I owe a debt of gratitude to Chancellor William P. Tolley, Syracuse University, who made possible the first publication of this book. I want to extend my warm thanks to Mr. Richard G. Underwood, Director of Syracuse University Press, and to Mrs. Arpena Mesrobian, Assistant Director, for their friendly assistance in carrying out the publication of this fourth edition.

W. W. KULSKI

Syracuse, New York
July, 1963

Contents

Introduction	1
--------------------	---

Part One: Cultural Isolation and Conformity of the Educated Man

<i>Chapter One: The Party and the West</i>	7
Analogy between the postwar situation and the Decembrist movement	7
Wartime relaxation of controls—Isolationism and nationalism	8
Traditional distrust of the West	9
Fear of nonconformity—Western standards of the nineteenth century opposed to the West of the twentieth century	11
The “morbidity” of Western culture—Party approach to philosophy ...	11
The “decay” of Western music, art, and literature	13
Art and literature remain under Party control	18
“Proletarian” architecture	30
Party orientation versus objectivity in Soviet science	31
The issue of Soviet cultural isolationism	32

<i>Chapter Two: Russian Nationalism</i>	38
The gospel of Russian nationalism	38
Missionary spirit—Ex oriente lux	40
Rewriting Russian-Tsarist history—Denial of Western influence on Russian thought—Slavic solidarity	41
Glorification of prerevolutionary Russia	45
“Servility” toward the West	48
The Party moral outlook	50
Cosmopolitanism—Russian nationalism versus internationalism	51
Non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union—The cases of Tadjiks, Kazakhs, Turkmenians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Jews	54
The Communist appeal to colonial nations	59

Part Two: The Citizen and the State

<i>Chapter One: The State and the Party</i>	63
Soviet elections	64
The Soviets—The Supreme Soviet of the USSR	72
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR—The Council of Ministers	75
Reorganizations of State administration	77
Party-State control—The new Constitution	83
Political monopoly of the Communist Party	86

Elitist nature of the Party—Hierarchical concept of the Party and of Soviet society	87
The basic duty of a Party member is iron discipline, not knowledge of Marxism—Predominant role of the intelligentsia	89
The amended Charter adopted at the 22nd Congress	91
Party members' duties and rights	91
Admission of new Party members—Expulsion from the Party	94
The organization of the Party and of State administration	96
The national Party organization—The Congress	101
The 21st Party Congress	102
The 22nd Party Congress	111
The Central Committee	112
Periodical renewal of the Party committees—Party control over the Armed Forces and mass organizations	114
The new Party Program	117
The multinational State—The Union Republics	127
The great Russian nation—The first among the "equals"—"Bourgeois" nationalism of non-Russians	133
Local government—The citizen and public administration	135
The procurators	138
 <i>Chapter Two: The "Freedoms" of the Individual</i>	 144
The Soviet concept of the relationship between the State and the individual	144
Political security of the regime—Committee of State Security—The militia and its auxiliaries	149
Personal freedom	151
"Inviolability" of private homes and private correspondence—"Freedom" of circulation—Flight abroad and collective family responsibility	153
Reform of criminal legislation	156
General principles of criminal law	157
Crimes against the State	162
Military crimes	166
The aggravation of penalties	167
Criminal procedure	169
Non-judicial proceedings—Laws against "parasites"—Comradely courts	175
"Freedom" of expression	179
"Freedom" of assembly and association	181
"Freedom" of conscience	183
 <i>Chapter Three: Courts, Civic Duties, Family, and Youth</i>	 188
Role, organization, and flexibility of the courts	188
Courts martial	192
The Supreme Court—Control of the courts—Responsibility of judges ..	193
Attorneys at law	195
Civil cases—The procurator and the courts	196
Duties of Soviet citizens—Military service	198
Legal enforcement of public morality	200

CONTENTS

xi

Family, marriage, divorce, inheritance	201
The Party ideal of the family	206
Youth organizations	206

Part Three: The Worker and Social Stratification

<i>Chapter One: Workers' Responsibilities Under the Proletarian</i>	
Dictatorship	213
Dictatorship of the proletariat	213
Labor-duty	215
One-man command—Permanent Production Conference	216
Working day and week	221
Night and overtime work	223
Juveniles and women	224
Former serfdom of Soviet employees	226
The labor book and passport	228
Legal termination of employment	229
Compulsory transfer to another job	231
Disciplinary and criminal responsibility for infractions of labor discipline	232
Pecuniary responsibility	242
Protection of socialist and private property	245
Rewards—Socialist competition	249
<i>Chapter Two: Wages, Salaries, Bonuses, Social Stratification</i>	
The norm of output	256
Wages and salaries	258
Bonuses and personal salaries	270
Social stratification through differentiation of income	272
Taxes and State loans	275
Titles of rank	278
The new upper and middle classes	281
Housing	285
Education and social stratification	291
School reform	295
School discipline and educational ideals	304
Sources of skilled and unskilled manpower	308
<i>Chapter Three: Trade Unions, Labor Disputes, Social Insurance 312</i>	
Trade Unions	312
Collective agreements	317
Labor disputes—Labor-Disputes Commissions	319
Annual vacations	322
Administration of labor protection and social-insurance legislation	323
Contributions to the social-insurance fund	324
Temporary disability (sickness or accident) insurance	325
Disability insurance	328
Old-age insurance—Pensions for surviving dependents and the funeral allowance	329

Maternity assistance	331
The two pyramids: industrial might and social stratification	333

Part Four: The Peasant and Collective Farming

<i>Chapter One: Nature and Organization of Collective Farms</i>	337
The "allied" class—The Charter of Collective Farms	337
Membership in the collective farms	341
Land: national property—Former State monopoly of agricultural machinery	342
State regulation of work—Labor-days—Socialist competition—Material incentive	344
No State social insurance for peasants	350
Other discrimination against peasants	351
Government of collective farms: general meeting, chairman, management board, control commission—Abuse of power by local officialdom	353
Brigades	362
Bonuses	364
Machine-Tractor Stations	365
<i>Chapter Two: Collective Farms and the State</i>	372
Contributions in kind	372
Distribution of collective farm income	377
Rural taxation	379
Protection of socialist property	380
Restricted jurisdiction of courts	381
The subsidiary establishment	382
Communist distrust of the "new" peasantry	389
Modern serfdom of Soviet peasants—The passport system	392
Amalgamation of collective farms	395
The collective farm: universal pattern for all Communist countries	398

Part Five: Conclusion

Evaluation of the post-Stalinist regime	403
<i>Addendum: The Wage Reform</i>	411
<i>Bibliography</i>	417
<i>Index</i>	435

The Soviet Regime

Communism in Practice

Introduction

*Rare and happy are the times when we may think
what we please, and express what we think.*

—Tacitus, *The History*, Book I, 1

THE IDEA for this book came several years ago from conversations with people in England and in America concerning the ideological struggle between the Western political democracies and the Soviet Union. Often I saw people's emotions rule their judgment of the Soviet regime; seldom did I find much knowledge of Soviet practice. Almost everyone seemed to feel his ignorance excused by the famous statement of Sir Winston Churchill that the Soviet Union is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.

But the Churchillian epigram discloses only a part of the truth. It is true that the deliberately secretive policy of the Soviet Government makes it impossible for an outsider to state with certitude what are the inner political friendships and animosities within the supreme council of the Soviet State and the Soviet Communist Party—the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party. Even a capable intelligence service might be able to collect only fragmentary information about the Soviet Armed Forces, the location of plants, or other data the Soviet Union withholds from public knowledge. But the nature of the regime is no secret. And knowledge of that is decisively important in the present intense ideological struggle because it provides the answer to those who hesitate between political democracy and the Soviet regime.

Anyone who reads Russian is provided in this country with a wealth of authentic Soviet materials. These supply completely adequate information not only about the basic principles of the Soviet regime, but also about many details which reveal how those principles work out. This work is intended to provide a reference book which will give indirect access to Soviet sources. To avoid the reproach of intending to make propaganda of any sort, I have limited myself to Soviet sources only, refraining from the use of foreign commentaries and secondhand accounts. I wanted the reader to hear Soviet legislators, politicians, and authors speak directly.

To make Soviet authorities speak on their own regime, I embodied

many quotations in this book. Their authenticity may be checked easily by referring to the Soviet sources cited, all of which are available in this country, particularly at the Library of Congress. Anyone who reads the whole book will find that all the quotations form a logical whole. This fact guarantees that they were not lifted out of context and thus distorted. In order to render quotations faithfully, I have frequently preferred literal translations to those which would sound better in English but might seem to alter the original meaning. All translations are mine, except those of the Soviet Foreign Languages Publishing House and those from A. Ya. Vyshinskii, *The Law of the Soviet State*, quoted by permission of the Macmillan Company.

The reader will notice some repetitions in Soviet statements on the same subject. Repetition conveys the very spirit of a totalitarian regime, which deliberately follows the policy of hammering the same ideas into the minds of all its subjects by constantly repeating the same slogans. The technique is the same as that of commercial advertising or of the unison singing of war songs by primitive tribesmen. The reiterated and monotonous rhythm of the same slogans over and over aims at overcoming mental resistance.

In the talks which lay behind the inception of this book I observed various attitudes, equally uninformed and emotional, towards the Soviet regime. One of them was that of the believing Communist who approaches Moscow in the spirit of a Moslem pilgrim to Mecca. He believes in the Soviet credo with a religious enthusiasm and thinks that every problem in his mind has been or is being solved by his elders, the Soviet Communists. He supplements his ignorance of Soviet conditions by the warmth of an irrational faith in the renovation of mankind by the Soviet prophets. He is usually inaccessible to rational arguments. But if his faith has left him with some ability to make rational inquiries, this book may help him. If he remains a Communist after reading it, I will have rendered him the small service of making known to him what he has blindly believed in.

A different attitude is that of the Westerner who has been frustrated by the shortcomings, real or imaginary, of Western political democracy. In every society there are intellectuals who see the defects of the regime under which they live. Even if their criticism is well founded, they forget that human beings and human regimes are inescapably imperfect. Actually, their criticism is helpful in the survival of Western democracy because nonconformists initiate progress and strengthen a society where free discussion is tolerated. But some of the nonconformist intellectuals who have seen by direct observation the shortcomings of their own Western environment are prone to

express their dissatisfaction by contrasting the defects of political democracy with idealized conceptions of the Soviet Union, about which they know little or nothing. They voice their indignation over defects in Western societies by glorifying the unknown—the Soviet regime. They believe in a seemingly easy solution—the substitution of the Soviet regime for the Western. But they never seem compelled by intellectual honesty to inquire whether the Soviets truly offer a regime which would calm their moral and social anxieties. Thus they become members of the Communist Party, or sympathizers, for purely negative, though often nobly misguided, reasons.

A poor European peasant longing for an economically sufficient plot of land or a European industrial worker dissatisfied with low wages and inflation may also express his discontent in the negative form of voting for Communist candidates. He does not vote for the Soviet regime or practices of which he is blissfully ignorant. He cannot go to the Soviet Union and see for himself the Soviet peasant attached to the village like a medieval serf and ruthlessly exploited by the State. He cannot see the Soviet industrial worker forced to labor at piece rates and constantly to raise his output, poorly paid, deprived of the protection of free trade unions and subject to an iron discipline enforced by the State manager. If the European peasant or worker could know these things, he would certainly hesitate before voting for local Communists. However, he knows only Communist slogans, not Soviet practices.

People of good faith who embrace the Soviet credo out of dissatisfaction with Western life should begin to learn the truth about the USSR. This book may help them. Moreover, they should ask themselves a fundamental question about the problem of ends and means. The totalitarian mind accepts all the means which promise the achievement of its ends. A political democrat is ready to compromise some of his ideal ends for the sake of renouncing means which would involve the sacrifice of human lives or freedom. This is the major moral issue dividing any totalitarian, be he Communist or Fascist, from a genuine democrat, who abhors any concentration camps, even those reserved for his adversaries.

The contemporary dilemma of mankind may be stated briefly: Is it worth-while to inflict death and untold suffering on individual human beings for a dream of future happiness of mankind? People who refuse to embrace means which contradict their moral standards and who respond to the appeal of charity, the greatest of virtues and the only one to which the rule of the golden mean does not apply, cannot hesitate in answering this question. No end and no dream of future

human happiness could make them feel free to use any and all means. Soviet experience proves that the means may become ends in themselves, while the millennium of future happiness recedes beyond human vision and reach.

There are still other Soviet sympathizers whose kindliness toward the Soviet Union springs from a different source—personal frustration and a feeling of not being adequately rewarded by Western society. They transform personal grievances into a social protest, which often takes the form of advocating the unknown Soviet alternative. These people may not find a remedy in this book, because their problems belong to psychoanalysis.

Another example is that of the Western agnostics who have lost their original faith, religious or other, and who suffer from being agnostics, lonely creatures lost in an immense and puzzling universe. They grasp the Soviet credo as a means of salvation which would open the gate of a quasi-religious life. But they hardly know the practice of their new church—the Marxist-Leninist. Once they see this practice with their own eyes, as André Gide did, they are repelled by its horrors and miseries and realize that their religious nostalgia does not lead to Moscow.

Finally, there are the vast majority of Westerners who reject Soviet Communism because of their fragmentary knowledge of it. These do not need to be reconverted, but their negation of the Soviet credo would have a firmer foundation and their battle against Communism would become more effective if their attitudes were less merely emotional and more rooted in actual knowledge of the Soviet Union.

I had all those people in mind when I was proceeding with my research. I hope that my book may be useful to Western society. However, I realize that the ideological struggle with Leninism in the underdeveloped areas is much more difficult than in the West. Leninism is much less dangerous to the West through its adulterated Marxist doctrine than it is through its appeal to the neglected majority of mankind living in the underdeveloped areas. There it seems to offer a drastic solution to the problems of rural overpopulation and the social inertness of the native ruling classes. Soviet standards of living are low by comparison to those of America or Western Europe, although the gradual increase in the production of consumer goods warrants the expectation that Soviet living standards will rise gradually if this does not seriously hamper the process of industrialization. At present, however, the quick tempo of Soviet industrialization, which absorbs most of the attention of the Communist leaders, may be

assured only by relatively low standards of living. But these same Soviet standards are not low in comparison with the Asiatic.

The Soviet regime cannot afford to grant political freedoms to its subjects, because these freedoms would spell its end and perhaps also the physical end of its present leaders. But the concepts of political democracy and of respect for individual freedoms are relatively unimportant in the underdeveloped areas of the world where they do not have the support of tradition. In many of these areas the famous English saying that a free government is better than a good government is meaningless since the people have never known either free or good government. Some of the inhabitants, alert to the widespread misery of their countrymen and to rural overpopulation, may be attracted by the Soviet experiment. They may observe with interest the rapid transformation of a Russia once mostly rural into a great industrial power. Overlooking or accepting as inevitable the ruthless means the Soviet Communists employ, they may concentrate on the economic results. Having little or no experience of political democracy, they may be attracted by the effectiveness of Soviet methods for economic transformation despite the terrible price paid by the living Soviet individual. No amount of knowledge of the Soviet regime can discourage them. The answer to the Soviet challenge in the underdeveloped areas lies elsewhere.

If the West does not want to lose the friendship of those areas, it must offer an alternative to the Soviet formula of economic and social reconstruction by totalitarian means.

It should provide all possible economic and technical assistance to those underdeveloped countries where the local non-Communist elites earnestly proceed with the necessary social reforms and truly want to lead in the economic development. The close cooperation of the West with those elites in peacefully carrying out what now is called the revolution of modernization is the only available alternative to a Communist revolution.

The only social reality is the living individual conceived of as a useful member of his society, for society is nothing but a complex of relationships among individuals. The state, the nation, the party, or any other human group is a fiction if visualized independently of its members and if imagined as some sort of organism living its own life. It acquires real meaning only in the minds of the individuals who are its members. But if an ideology endows the state, the nation, or the party with its own fictitious life and opposes it to the living individuals, that fiction becomes dangerous. The Soviet experiment proves

this statement. The Soviet State and the Communist Party have been deified, endowed with their own life, and opposed to the welfare of individuals. In fact, a few individuals, the ruling politicians, act as the priests of those divinities, hide behind the altars of the twin gods, and exact on their behalf untold sacrifices from the living generation. I have tried to peer behind the façade of the Soviet State and the Communist Party and to ask the most important, though possibly indiscreet, question: How fare the many under the rule of the few? Therefore, I have analyzed the various aspects of the Soviet regime from the point of view of the welfare of the Soviet subject.

I wrote this book sympathizing deeply with those millions of Soviet people who are the subjects of a few ruling politicians, and in particular with those Russian intellectuals who have been effectively prevented by Party censorship from freely communicating with the West and from making their full contribution to the common treasure of our civilization as their ancestors did brilliantly in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I hope that the day will come when Russia will again see the dawn of liberty and will reenter the fold of our civilization.

I trust that this book may have some permanent value greater than that of a reference book on the Soviet regime. Many fundamental features of that regime will be found in any totalitarian regime of the past or the future. The basic anatomy of totalitarianism is the same whether its name is Communism, Nazism, or Fascism, or whatever might be its future name. My hope, too, is that this book will find its way to the young generation, whose age warrants a search for a better world. They should avoid the pitfall of believing that a better world is being built in the Soviet Union. Ignorant enthusiasm for Leninism may become the source of bitter disappointment and cynicism.

Part One: Cultural Isolation and Conformity of the Educated Man

CHAPTER ONE

The Party and the West

ON DECEMBER 26, 1825, an attempt at revolution in Russia took place. Planned by Army officers and without much popular support, it failed but left a legacy to succeeding generations. Memories of the Decembrists inspired several generations of Russians and led to the revolutions of this century.

ANALOGY BETWEEN THE POSTWAR SITUATION AND THE DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT

This early revolutionary effort, which aimed at much more than the palace coups known to eighteenth-century Russian and had the purpose of initiating profound reforms instead of merely replacing one emperor with another, owed much to Western influence and to the impact of the Napoleonic wars.

A Soviet history textbook presents the Western impact on the Russian troops in the following terms:

After coming home from the foreign expeditions the young officers felt particularly deeply the sharp contrast between bourgeois Europe and Russia of the serfs. In bourgeois Europe factories and workshops were being built, trade was expanding, science was flourishing, the populations enjoyed definite freedoms. They saw in Russia of the serfs the horrible backwardness of the national economy, the slavery of the serfs, a general ignorance, and the licentiousness of the despotic power. . . .¹

This contact with the West planted the seeds of dissatisfaction in the minds of many Russian officers, who had been the mainstay of the Tsarist regime. Hardly two years after the battle of Waterloo, the

officers of the Imperial Guards formed the first secret society. Its members wanted a profound change in Russia but were divided as to its scope. Their views ranged from the program of a constitutional monarchy through the emancipation of the serfs to the distribution of land among the peasants and the proclamation of a republic. Although differing as to their programs, although poorly organized and lacking in popular support, the Decembrists have remained in Russian history not only as the actors in the opening scene of the Russian revolutionary movement, but also as the first to raise the banner of revolt against an absolutist government in Russia. They bear testimony to the effects of Russian-Western contact.

The Second World War offered to many Soviet citizens their first opportunity to emerge from enforced isolation and to see Western ways of life for themselves. Of course, there are no means of discovering how deep and lasting the Western impact was at this time.

But a totalitarian regime cannot take chances. The Soviet leaders, trained in historical thinking because they are Marxists, could not overlook the existence of an analogy between 1815 and 1945. The intellectual isolation of Russia had to become watertight. A quarantine was imposed in 1946.

The officially imposed rupture with the West in the field of exchange of ideas had to be accompanied by a new propaganda of contempt for Western civilization and of glorification of everything Russian. The Russian had to acquire the feeling of national pride and cultural autarchy; he had to be convinced that it was the West and not he that needed cultural guidance.

WARTIME RELAXATION OF CONTROLS—ISOLATIONISM AND NATIONALISM

The strict intellectual censorship imposed after the last war may have had another cause. The war had brought about some relaxation of controls. After it, the regime was forced by its very nature to reimpose strict censorship of thought. One of the most important members of the former Political Bureau, the late A. A. Zhdanov, was the chief exponent in the years 1946 to 1948 of the new Party line on intellectual censorship and isolationism.

Thus, a country which wanted to flood the outer world with its own ideology was frightened by the prospect of a free exchange of ideas, refused to accept an open ideological battle, and took refuge in cultural isolationism. Although the Soviet regime had never been inclined to allow its subjects to have free intellectual intercourse with foreign countries, the policy of intellectual isolationism reached its

peak only in the postwar years, beginning with 1946. Stalin was perhaps predestined by his prerevolutionary life to preside over this policy. Unlike the other old leaders of the Bolshevik Party, he had never lived for any appreciable length of time in a foreign country, and his mentality was home-grown. His lack of firsthand knowledge of the West was compensated for in his mind by national self-assurance. It was he who, in 1917, challenged the view that Russia could not successfully build a socialist society without a simultaneous socialist revolution in the West. "It is not impossible," said he, "that Russia is precisely the country which will lead the way toward socialism."² He added a challenge to the West: "It is necessary to reject the obsolete view that only Europe may show us the road. There is a dogmatic and a creative Marxism; I am for the latter."³ For him the "creative" Marxism was independent of the Western interpretation, a homemade brand produced by the Bolshevik Party.

Many years of his regime, however, could not eradicate from Russian minds that attraction toward Western ideas which had influenced the Russians for at least two centuries, if not longer. The last war, moreover, forged a new link between Russia and the West; both fought together against common enemies. Comradeship-in-arms left behind a certain sympathy for Westerners, especially for the Americans and the British. The Party was compelled to begin its anti-Western campaign by denying any merit to the Western war effort. The official slogan was that the Soviet Union routed Germany and Japan practically singlehandedly.

TRADITIONAL DISTRUST OF THE WEST

Russia first entered the fold of Christendom through a different gate from the Western countries. Her geographical location inclined her to adopt Christianity from Byzantium, with which she had lively political and commercial relations. A Christian conversion at that time had political meaning, for it conferred upon a converted state the right to expect an equal treatment that could hardly be conceded to a pagan nation. Probably this consideration combined with geographical location to play a major role in the choice made by various Slavic nations between Rome and Byzantium. Those Slavs who had Catholic Germans or Italians for neighbors chose Rome, while those who gravitated to the orbit of the Byzantine Empire preferred the Eastern Greek Orthodox faith. Thus, Russia embraced the Greek Orthodox religion in 989, and she was bound to inherit Byzantium's distrust of Rome and the West. Maintaining lively cultural relations with Byzantium, she could not escape the Byzantine impact; the Russians, like

the Greeks of Byzantium, looked upon Westerners as Christian heretics who dared to challenge Byzantine claims to the direct succession from the Roman Empire and who did not leave favorable memories after their temporary stay in the Byzantine Empire during the Crusades.

The other contribution to the same feeling of distrust was the Tartar invasion, which menaced the security of Europe and whose permanent victim was Russia. Subjugated and subject to the Tartar control for two centuries (the thirteenth to the fifteenth), Russia felt that Western Christians forgot her in her miserable plight. No one tried to rescue her, while her immediate Catholic neighbors, the Poles, detached in that period large territories which had been Eastern Slavic before the Tartar conquest. From the Polish point of view it was a missionary act of expanding the frontiers of the Western civilization in Eastern Europe. From the Russian, it was an act of Western perfidy, performed at a time when Russia was helplessly dominated by the Tartars.

When Russia, devastated culturally by the Tartars, emerged finally in the fifteenth century as a free and united country, she could realize that the West had made enormous strides in the meantime and now possessed a rich and imposing civilization. Looking at the Western countries, she could justifiably feel culturally much inferior. This feeling of inferiority, combined with the conviction that Russian Greek Orthodoxy, but not Western Catholicism or Protestantism, adhered to the true version of Christianity, did not help in establishing confident relations with the West. When one adds the many Russian wars waged with immediate neighbors belonging to Western civilization—the Teutonic Knights, the Poles, or the Swedes—one may realize that the West did not have the best of reputations in Russia.

Even after having joined the Western cultural stream in the eighteenth century, Russia continued at times to feel grievances. She felt cheated by her allies at the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) of some fruits of victory which she thought due her because of her important contribution to the victory over Napoleon. In our time the Soviet regime could not easily forget the foreign intervention in its Civil War. Soviet propaganda exploited on the morrow of the last war this accumulation of grievances against the West. Referring to Pushkin's poem which addressed bitter reproaches to the Western "orators" who had criticized Russian policy in Poland, *Pravda* wrote in 1949:

The orators' reaction to Russia's feat in liberating Europe from Napoleon's chains was black ingratitude. Now, at the price of greatest sacrifices, the country of victorious socialism has saved European and World Civilization and rescued the peoples from

Hitlerite slavery. What has been the reaction of modern bourgeois "orators" who write on orders from the instigators of a new war? Malicious, belittling streams of filthy slander and unbridled threats. Those blackmailers and slanderers might be answered in Pushkin's immortal words: "Ye're bold of tongue—but see, would you in deeds but try it?"⁴

FEAR OF NONCONFORMITY—WESTERN STANDARDS OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY OPPOSED TO THE WEST
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

In spite of recent overtures toward an exchange of cultural experiences, the Soviet people at large are still kept carefully isolated from the impact of Western culture. The political animosity of the Soviet regime toward the Western Powers need not have necessitated writing off modern Western culture. After all, since ancient times rival nations have not hesitated to assimilate the features of the civilization of their opponents. There must be another reason for the Soviet cultural isolationism.

Every civilization seems to move forward by alternate stages. One may be called classical, where the values and standards are well established and largely uncontested. The other may be called romantic, where the accepted values are subject to discussion and revision until new standards are generally accepted and a new classical period begins. At least since the beginning of this century the West is passing through such a romantic period.

This process creates a delicate problem for a conformist and totalitarian regime. To participate fully in a romantic upheaval, it would have to tolerate nonconformists. The logic of the totalitarian system itself has eventually led the Party to the suppression of nonconformity in any field of human thought. After all it is so difficult to draw a line.

The Party had to impose universal conformity by reverting to the intellectual values and standards of the previous classical period of Western civilization in which Russia participated. This policy produced the rather amusing spectacle of a so-called revolutionary Party imposing the cultural pattern of a bygone era which was also a period of flourishing capitalism.

THE "MORBIDITY" OF WESTERN CULTURE—PARTY
APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

The Stalinist Party line discovered only morbidity in the present stage of Western civilization. Soviet critics dismissed Western philosophers with wholesale denunciation:

Philosophy of contemporary imperialist bourgeoisie is degraded and emaciated. It vegetates today by leading a repugnantly dirty existence which reflects the whole depth of the vileness of the degenerated bourgeoisie. Stultifying human conscience with the poison of hatred of mankind, of racialism and cosmopolitanism, exciting war psychosis and the anti-communist hysteria, propagating mysticism and irrationalism, justifying the most brutal examples of the oppression of everything that is leading and progressive—these are the most typical symptoms of that philosophy. . . .⁵

What was the purpose of this violent attack on the Western philosophers? "One of the most important tasks of the people who work on the ideological front consists in the decisive struggle against the rotten bourgeois ideology. . . . Our philosophers should prove that contemporary bourgeois reactionary sociologists are the worst enemies of the Soviet people and of all other peoples of the world, the instigators and propagandists of a new war, and violent opponents of progress whose standard bearers are the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy."⁶ Therefore, a Soviet philosopher who showed courtesy toward his Western colleagues was considered practically a traitor to his country. He had to suppose that Western thinkers wrote only for the sake of undermining the Soviet Union and of disseminating hatred against it.

The Party forced Soviet philosophers and sociologists to become its cheap political propagandists. A Soviet book could not be "scientific" unless it abided by the contemporary Party interpretation of dialectical and historical materialism. Not to mention any other philosophical approach than the Marxist, it could not be guided by a free interpretation of Marxism but had to follow the "contemporary achievements" in this respect, those achievements being the Party statements *ex cathedra*.

The scientific history of philosophy is the history of the rise and development of the scientific materialist outlook and its laws; because materialism developed in the struggle against idealistic trends, the history of philosophy also represents the history of the struggle between materialism and idealism. . . .⁷

The net result is still visible. One may select at random any topic, take several Soviet books and articles, and discover that all of them indulge in the repetition of current Party slogans and often of the same coined phrases. This way is safest for the authors, but it subverts true learning, as Western thought might have withered away but for

the rebellious fresh air brought about by the Renaissance. An intellectual who wants to contribute anything valuable to human knowledge cannot at the same time be an agitator for a political party.

THE "DECAY" OF WESTERN MUSIC, ART, AND LITERATURE

The Western process of revising values is perhaps most visible in music and the fine arts. Nonconformity to past standards is general in both fields. The conservative Communist Party, which remains piously attached to the standards of the nineteenth century, could not but react vehemently. The former period of the Bolshevik regime, when a composer or artist was allowed to experiment as he liked, was closed before the last war. Now they must imitate the nineteenth-century academic painters or the so-called classical composers. Therefore, the Soviet Union had here again to isolate herself to safeguard her citizens from "pernicious" Western influences.

There are in the West many people who heartily dislike modern painting or sculpture or who cannot appreciate modern music; these people might agree with Soviet artistic views. The crux of the problem, however, is not which kind of painting or sculpture or music is better or more enjoyable—that is simply a matter of taste. The true problem consists in the fact that the Central Committee of the Communist Party, i.e., a group of professional politicians, impose *their* taste upon painters, sculptors, and musicians, and upon the whole Soviet population.

When the Party had to legislate for Soviet musicians, it formulated unequivocally its dislike of modern Western music. Soviet composers were warned that they should carefully avoid Western atonality and should follow in the footsteps of the Russian composers of the nineteenth century, whose creations were part and parcel of what was then contemporary Western music. The Central Committee of the Party took as an example of the decadent Western influence upon the Soviet composers an opera written by V. Muradelli, *Great Friendship*, and proceeded, in its resolution adopted on February 10, 1948, to castigate Muradelli and a few other deviationists among his colleagues in order to show clearly that the era of cultural cooperation with the West was over, even with music. This resolution is perhaps the most interesting among the several the Central Committee adopted in the period 1946 to 1948 because it concerns an art which is hardly susceptible of being used as a weapon of political propaganda. A symphony or a concerto cannot be Marxist or anti-Marxist, cannot favor or discriminate against the Soviet regime. When the terms of socialist realism are used for music, the word *socialist* loses any sense, unless

one refers to compositions such as operas or choral music where the words may convey a political image. Actually the Central Committee attacked the form of modern Western music and imposed its own concepts upon the Soviet composers, who then had to take the lead from the professional politicians. One may agree or disagree with the Central Committee's taste and their preference for the so-called classical music up to the end of the nineteenth century. It is impossible, however, to share their view that a professional politician knows more about the beauty of music and its form than does a professional musician.

The Central Committee had harsh words for *Great Friendship*:

. . . The main defects of the opera consist foremost in its music, which does not produce any impression and is poor. It does not provide the listener with one melody or air to be remembered. It is confused and disharmonic, founded on complete dissonances and on combinations of sounds which pierce the ears. Particular lines or scenes which pretend to be melodious are suddenly interrupted by a disorderly uproar which is completely alien to a normal human auditive sense and which produces on the listener the most depressing impression. . . . Trying to be "pseudo-original," the composer Muradelli simply forgot the best traditions and experience of classical opera in general and of Russian classical opera in particular, although the latter is distinct by its internal content, its wealth of melodies and the width of its diapason, by its national character, and by its refined, beautiful and clear musical form. These qualities of Russian classical opera made it the best opera in the world which is the genre of music beloved by, and accessible to, the large popular masses.⁸

The Central Committee denounced the formalism of Muradelli:

. . . the failure of Muradelli's opera is due to the false formalist trend which is full of pitfalls for a Soviet composer. . . . This kind of music reflects faithfully the spirit of the contemporary modernistic bourgeois music of Europe and America which is a symptom of the emaciation of the bourgeois culture, a complete negation of musical art and leads that art into a blind alley. . . . The formalist trend in Soviet music has bred among some Soviet composers an infatuation with the complex forms of the instrumental symphonic textless music and inconsiderate attitude toward such musical genres as opera, choral music, popular music for small bands or popular instruments, and vocal choruses, etc.⁹

The Central Committee expressed its preference for musical genres

which use voices, probably because only these genres allow Party propaganda to convey its slogans to the audience. The Party promotes for similar reasons programmatic music which helps in the formation of association of ideas by means of familiar sounds.

"The estrangement of some Soviet composers from the people," continues the resolution—

has gone so far that they spread a rotten "theory" about the people's failure to understand the music of several contemporary Soviet composers. According to this argument, the people have not allegedly grown up thus far to the level required for the comprehension of their complex music, but will appreciate it after a few centuries; it is not necessary to worry, they say, if some compositions do not find listeners. This thoroughly individualistic and anti-people theory has made it possible for some composers and music connoisseurs to isolate themselves from the people and criticism by the Soviet society and to cloister themselves in their own shells. . . . All this means that the survivals of the bourgeois ideology supported by the influence of the contemporary decadent Western European and American music have not yet disappeared among some of the Soviet composers. . . . The Central Committee resolves to declare the formalistic trend in Soviet music to be anti-people and to be capable, in fact, of leading to the liquidation of music . . . and to call upon the Soviet composers to fill themselves with the consciousness of the high requirements expected by the Soviet people from musical compositions, to reject everything that weakens our music and hampers its development, and to reach a level of creative work which will promptly lift Soviet music and will result in creating, in all fields of music, compositions having full value, with high qualities and becoming to the Soviet people.¹⁰

The Central Committee did not take its intervention into music lightly. A few weeks before the adoption of its resolution it held a meeting of Soviet composers and four leading politicians, the late A. A. Zhdanov and three others who were then members of the Central Committee—V. V. Kuznetsov, P. H. Pospelov, and M. A. Suslov. The best-known Soviet composers, conductors, and musical critics were instructed to be present at the meeting. The musicians were asked to listen piously to the lesson given to them by A. A. Zhdanov concerning the best manner of producing truly Communist music and were allowed to follow Zhdanov's exposé with their acts of contrition and promises never to sin again. The chapter of Soviet music's participation in modern and Western trends was for the time being closed.

A. A. Zhdanov used an effective threat to enforce the Party line among the composers—withdrawing of Party support. Since the Party governs the State, and the State controls all the resources, a Soviet composer who refused to follow the Party line would starve to death. No wonder that V. Muradelli, A. J. Khachaturyan, D. D. Shostakovich, and V. Ya. Shebalin, who were present at the meeting, “admitted that they had been guided in their composition by false concepts and ideas.”¹¹

The Party used pseudolearned terminology to disguise its preference for the artistic and musical standards of the nineteenth century and its repudiation of the search for new values. “Formalism” was denounced, while “socialist realism” was advocated. Formalism meant anything the Central Committee disliked—art for art’s sake, seeking new forms of artistic expression, or anything currently popular in the West. Socialist realism is art which depicts Party-favored subjects in a form understandable to the man in the street. A painting showing with almost photographic exactitude collective farmers happily harvesting the socialized fields and using modern agricultural machinery is socialistically realistic. If the machinery were not included in the painting, it would not be socialist.

Western art and music were excommunicated as sheer formalism:

What may one say about formalistic innovations? Is it not true that decadence in Western Europe is some eighty years old? . . . It swings around, remaining on the same spot, and is subject to a progressive degradation. This is particularly visible in a field of art such as painting. It is difficult to say that a single one of the so-called “better” artists after Picasso or Matisse has added anything to either of the two. . . . Where is the innovation? It is an old and obsolete school. The difference between the imitators of Matisse and Picasso, on the one hand, and the original founders of the school, on the other, consists in the fact that the imitators are simply artistic illiterates. If one would ask them to depict nature, they would be unable to do so.¹²

The typical Stalinist view concerning Western art was presented very clearly in the following manner:

The contemporary bourgeois art is experiencing a deep crisis which is indissolubly related to the general crisis of the capitalist regime. . . . Once upon a time the bourgeoisie represented a progressive force; nowadays even mentioning former progressive trends in the bourgeois outlook, for instance, materialism in the bourgeois philosophy of the eighteenth century or realism of the

bourgeois art in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, evokes a cheap anger among the present ideologists of bourgeoisie.¹³

One may note the homage the Soviet author paid to bourgeois art of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This opinion, formulated in Stalin's lifetime, would not be repudiated today.

The Soviet picture of Western literature was not flattering, either.

The ideological teachers of the Western-European decadence were the Epigoni of subjective idealism—Nietzsche, Bergson, and Freud. Opposing those moral ideals which had guided the classical realism and romanticism, they dehumanized literature. Those "teachers"—Nietzsche, Bergson, and Freud—proclaimed: "Down with any laws of social progress! Down with any social morality! Down with the human being! Down with reason! Long live the subconsciousness, bestial instincts, zoological individualism, mysticism and eroticism!" All this was accompanied in literature by the unavoidable debasement of the form. One may see it in the examples of Proust, Joyce, Dos Passos, Céline, and Sartre. Western European literature has been indulging, with complete frankness, in these two forms of literary degeneration which have been almost blended with each other—zoological naturalism and "clever" symbolism which consists all too frequently in sublimating the lowest human instincts. . . .¹⁴

The vilification of Western literature had the practical aim of preventing Soviet people from reading it, forbidding Soviet literary journals to reprint Western works, and sheltering the Soviet Union against the nonconformist wind blowing from the West. The Central Committee of the Party disclosed this aim in its resolution of August 14, 1946, concerning the Leningrad literary journals—the *Leningrad* and the *Zvezda*: "The journal [*Zvezda*] was publishing writings which cultivated the spirit of servility toward the contemporary bourgeois culture of the West, a spirit alien to Soviet people. . . . The *Leningrad* committed a gross error by publishing several works permeated with the spirit of servility for everything foreign. . . ."¹⁵

Continuing its attack on Western art, the Party banned foreign plays with its resolution of August 26, 1946:

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that the Committee of Arts has been following an incorrect line by including in theatrical repertoires plays written by foreign bourgeois playwrights. The publishing house "Art" published, according to the instructions of that Committee, a collection of one-act plays of contemporary English

and American playwrights. Those plays are examples of the low value of the trivial foreign literature which openly preaches the bourgeois views and morality. . . . Our theaters' presentation of foreign bourgeois plays is equal to surrendering the Soviet stage to reactionary bourgeois ideology and morals, and to attempting to poison the consciousness of the Soviet people with an outlook hostile to Soviet society and to revive in the same consciousness and in life the survivals of capitalism. Wide distribution of these plays among theatrical workers and their actual staging represent the greatest political mistake committed by the Committee of Arts. . . .¹⁶

A simple-minded reader of the resolution could imagine that the Central Committee banned foreign plays which attacked the Soviet Union or denounced Communism. But the Central Committee had in mind all foreign plays and actually included in its resolution the titles of several plays which Soviet theatres had staged to its displeasure, and which were simply nonpolitical dramas and comedies, most of them without any pretensions of offering any deep thought. The resolution mentions such "counterrevolutionary" plays as Morrison's *Murder of Mr. Parker*, Pinero's *Dangerous Age*, Maugham's *The Circle* and *Penelope*, Tristan Bernard's *Mon Café*, Labiche and Delacourt's *La poussière dans les yeux*, Kaufman and Hart's *The Man Who Came to Dinner*, Durand's *La fameuse Marie*, and Augier and Sandeau's *La vendetta Méxicaine, ou les rêves du grand-père*. Emile Augier, a defender of standard nineteenth century morality (which is also that of the Soviet Union), who died in 1889, and his contemporary Jules Sandeau, who died in 1883, could never have dreamed that their innocent plays would be interpreted almost a hundred years later as calculated to undermine the Soviet system and the "socialist Fatherland."

ART AND LITERATURE REMAIN UNDER PARTY CONTROL

When freed from the influence of Stalin, the new rulers brought about certain modifications of previous policy. A review of these alterations of policy yields so far the following results.

Two celebrated Soviet composers, A. Khachaturyan and D. Shostakovich, published in December 1953, articles in which they asserted the right of a creative artist to independence and originality. Their articles could not have been printed without the assent of the Party. They could have announced a relaxation of the complete conformity which had been imposed in the period 1946 to 1948. It was possible to assume that the new leaders of the Party had realized the absurdity

of ordering composers, writers, and artists to create according to the whims of professional politicians. But Khachatryan's and Shostakovich's articles did not usher in an era of free thought.

Overoptimistic hopes for a notable relaxation of intellectual censorship in literature (novels, poetry, and drama), the plastic arts, and music were rather quickly dashed after the articles appeared. *Pravda* published on January 6, 1954, an editorial which emphasized anew the need for the surveillance of individual artists through the professional associations which are expected to enforce the Party line:

The unions of writers, artists, composers and architects, and theatrical associations, all of which include our artistic intelligentsia, are called upon to play a great role in consolidating the indestructible communion of artistic creation with the people's life. Who but the cultural unions should decide collectively all those diverse questions which arise out of experience in artistic creation? Every artist should find within the fold of his organization answers to questions which trouble him and support in his creative search and effort.¹⁷

Thus, a poet, a novelist, a playwright, a painter, or a composer is told to take the lead from his professional association and indirectly from the Party. This was exactly the situation in Stalin's lifetime. Assuming that a composer is of the stature of Shostakovich, what will his work gain by the censorship of the composers' union? His colleagues who are the most influential and most vocal are trusted by the Party but may be musical mediocrities at the same time. It is absurd to assume, as *Pravda* does, that a multitude of average musicians, painters, or poets is in its sum total more talented and more inspired than one individual of genius.

Pravda made it clear that control should extend not only to artistic substance but also to style. Criticizing some professional unions, the editorial said: "The whole problem is reduced usually to the appraisal either of the contents alone or of the form only, as though it were possible to examine an artist's intentions without paying due attention to the artistic means through which these intentions will be expressed."¹⁸ Thus the *fiat* of the Party continues to remain the decisive factor concerning the style of Soviet creations.

The 20th Congress did not pay much attention to literature and fine arts. Khrushchev tried to convey the idea of a balanced interpretation of the Stalinist socialist realism—a literary writer should refrain from loading indigestible portions of sugar in his presentation of Soviet life, but should also carefully avoid painting an accurate image of that life with its shadows and miseries. He asked the writers to

walk on a tight rope between the two perils. With Stalin there was only the danger of not being sugary enough.

Khrushchev warned that Soviet writers should avoid like hell-fire the influence of bourgeois ideology. Their function is to instill the Party outlook:

The Party has waged and will wage as before a struggle against the untrue presentation of the Soviet reality, against attempts at varnishing it or vice versa at defaming or discrediting what the Soviet people have conquered. The creative action in literature and arts must be permeated with the spirit of struggle for Communism, must instill cheerfulness and strong convictions in human hearts, and develop the socialist consciousness and comradely discipline.¹⁹

The Secretary-General of the Union of Soviet Writers, A. A. Surkov, made it clear that the 1953-54 period of relaxation was over:

. . . During the struggle against varnishing and the denial of conflicts some writers have shown the tendency to see everything around them only in dark shades and to present the reality only in black or at best, gray colors. Some of them have been inclined to find an escape from the current great topics by plunging into intimate [personal] experience, by idealizing petty Philistine feelings, by magnifying, under the guise of criticism, the survivals of capitalism, by creating all sorts of "thaws" and other rotten images of the ways of life. . . .²⁰

The post-Stalinist leadership allowed in 1953 and 1956 for a more lax interpretation of the Party 1946-48 Resolutions. But it always reaffirmed the fundamental correctness of these Resolutions as representing the Party line for writers, artists, and composers. It also sharply tightened the reins after each relaxation, fearing that conceding some freedom to creative thought might lead to claims of a greater freedom. The Party could not assume such risks if it wanted to retain its political monopoly and its power of regimentation. However, the periods of relaxation resulted in novels, plays, and literary articles which dared mildly to criticize the Soviet reality, to mention its darker aspects, and to indulge in such formerly forbidden themes as personal emotions. Ehrenburg's *Thaw*, which was hailed by some people in the West as a harbinger of a liberal spring in the USSR, was not followed by any spring but by the reaffirmation of Party control. Moreover, its message was equivocal; Ehrenburg contrasted Stalin's regime (winter) with the post-Stalinist time (thaw) as though he wanted to write an apology for Stalin's successors and

create popular enthusiasm for them. He did it in a rather naïve manner; for instance, lovers, who could not understand each other during the winter, suddenly found their love reciprocated in early spring. Personal feelings were manipulated to coordinate them with the political events. His novelette was certainly not a nonconformist work but rather a political tract, written to sell the new leadership to Soviet readers.

The same cannot be said about V. Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone*. This novel was published in 1956 by installments in one of the Soviet literary magazines. The author developed two themes: the struggle of a lonely individual against the vested interests and hostility of the Soviet bureaucracy, and the author's vehement protest against the Soviet social stratification. He dwelt in detail on the misery of a worker's life and contrasted it with the luxury in which the Soviet bureaucrats and managers lived. The reader of this book²¹ learns from a Soviet writer, hence an eyewitness, how a regime claiming to represent the socialist idea has forgotten social justice, how it remains indifferent to the basic needs of manual workers while it pampers the new upper class which is its mainstay.

Was it due only to an oversight of the censors that this clearly written message found its way to the printing presses? Whatever the reason, soon thereafter the author was violently denounced and his novel proclaimed a slander on Soviet "reality." Khrushchev himself denounced the author, who was eventually forced to repent and promise to write a new "expurgated" version.

Later, in 1958, the Pasternak incident removed any hopeful illusions about the post-Stalinist appearance of relaxation. The distinguished Russian poet was forced to refuse the Nobel prize awarded him, while he was denounced by the Soviet press for his remarkable novel *Doctor Zhivago*. The incident showed once again that freedom of expression cannot coexist with Party rule.

Relaxation might have been expected in music, which evokes moods but can hardly convey precise ideas, especially political, unless assisted by words as in operas and choral compositions. Nevertheless, the prevailing Party policy does not seem to visualize any substantial degree of liberalism even in this area of creative art.

Pravda of April 2, 1956, carried an article by the official spokesman of the Union of Soviet Composers, Tikhon Khrennikov, who announced the Party line for the benefit of his colleagues in view of the approaching second Congress of Composers. Referring to the famous 1948 resolution on music, he wrote: "The Party Central Committee, expressing the views of the Soviet society, submitted the formalistic distortions

in music to a severe criticism. . . ." He appealed for constant vigilance for fear that any relaxation would result in "a formalistic recidivism in the musical art," because "various prejudices and esthetical survivals have not yet been overcome in the composers' milieu."²²

After reminding his colleagues of the 1948 resolution on Muradelli's opera *Great Friendship*, Khrennikov insisted, as the late Zhdanov had done in 1948, on the importance of writing operas and on melody: "Music finds its way to the listeners' hearts, first of all, through melody." He confirmed Zhdanov's fundamental view that music should be understandable to large masses and refuted the concept of writing in different ways for various audiences, depending on their musical culture:

Such [untrue] views are, for instance, the opinions that we could examine the problems of innovations independently of social tasks of music, or the snobbish arguments that the composer has the right to create music only for a determined fraction of the population because, they say, there are differences in the musical-educational background between this fraction and the listening masses.²³

After denouncing "musical modernism" he indicated the road to the future:

We must develop Soviet arts on the foundations of the indestructible principles of Marxist-Leninist esthetics and in the uncompromising struggle against all revisionist attempts and the antiquated ideas and concepts of the old world.²⁴

The "antiquated ideas of the old world" are simply the contemporary Western trends in music. This road to the future of Soviet music looks like the old Stalin-Zhdanov highway towards conformity and nineteenth century musical standards.

The Party Central Committee adopted in June, 1958, a resolution on music in which it amended the former Resolution of 1948. While the latter had castigated by name several Soviet composers as formalists—Prokofiev, Shostakovich, and Khachaturyan, for example—the Central Committee took in 1958 a more cautious attitude. It repeated the accusation that those composers had indulged sometimes in formalistic errors but withdrew the former global charge that they had been formalists in all their works. It paid a tribute to their patriotism and talents. Yet it emphatically reaffirmed the basic correctness of the Party line as laid down in 1948. Modern music with its atonalities remains taboo for Soviet composers. The Central Committee wanted only to pay amends to distinguished Soviet composers for its own

former brutal attack on them but told the Soviet musicians, as Stalin had done in 1948, that the modern Western form remained forbidden.

A new reassertion of the old Party line came in December, 1962, and the following months. Khrushchev and other Party leaders visited an art exhibit in December, in Moscow, and discovered there to their amazement abstract painting and sculpture. They could no longer repress their indignation, already aroused by the liberties taken by several writers. They realized that the post-Stalinist alternate sequence of relaxation and strengthening of censorship had brought about confusion in the minds of writers and artists, who no longer knew what was forbidden and what was permissible. The constant talk about peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems led some writers and artists to believe that the borrowing of Western esthetic ideas did not contradict the Party line. They felt that the Party, so eager to cut itself off from its Stalinist past, would obligingly close its eyes to some indulgence in nonconformist writing and abstract art. The Party leaders saw the risks which were involved in this drift towards a greater freedom of expression.

This drift was mainly their own fault. They knew no measure in denouncing and degrading Stalin. They removed his body from the Lenin Mausoleum and erased his name even from the famous city of Stalingrad now renamed Volgograd. Soviet writers could feel entitled to their own conclusion, namely that everything enforced by the fallen idol, including socialist realism, was now discarded. They could even wonder whether there was a clear Party line regarding literature and arts.

The anti-Stalin campaign at the 20th and 22nd Congresses could be interpreted as a wholesale denunciation of three decades of Soviet history. But then indiscreet questions could arise: Where were Khrushchev and other Party leaders at that time? Why did they not protest against Stalin's crimes? If Stalin was a monster, as Khrushchev had him depicted, where was any guarantee that his successors were infallible? And if they were fallible, why should they be unquestioningly obeyed? What was their right to dictate the content and form of art? If the three decades of Soviet history were a tragic mistake, perhaps the present decade was too? If it was permitted to depict some of the horrors of Stalin's regime, was it permitted to write frankly about the shortcomings of today? If Stalin often was wrong, as Khrushchev said, perhaps his and Zhdanov's line regarding art also was mistaken, and the borrowing of esthetic ideas from the West was, after all, correct.

Khrushchev reacted with his usual vivacity. He spoke severely to

writers and artists, first at a joint meeting with Party leaders held on December 17, 1962, and again at a second meeting that took place on March 7 and 8, 1963. He and his lieutenant, L. F. Il'ychev, who played the role of a second Zhdanov, firmly reasserted the old Stalinist line as formulated in the famous resolutions adopted in 1946-48 by the Central Committee. At this time, as before, the Party leaders included in their upbraiding literature, plastic arts, music, and motion pictures. Khrushchev's and Il'ychev's speeches were accompanied by a nationwide press campaign that lasted for several months and by the loud denunciations of "deviationists." The strong voice of the Party was heard again and complied with. Il'ychev said: "The opinion of [the Soviet people] has proved to be almost unanimous, as one should have expected [*sic*]." The usual unanimous chorus acclaimed the Party line; however, the press printed also a few—very few—dissenting letters from readers.

Khrushchev's and Il'ychev's speeches were very interesting for their ideological, esthetic, and political views.²⁵ They threw light on the state of mind of Party leaders.

The two Party spokesmen had first to elucidate some of the questions arising out of the anti-Stalin campaign. Khrushchev approved of such novels about the evil Stalinist years as the heart-breaking story by A. Solzhenitsyn: *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, but did not encourage the publication of more such novels. He mentioned that the Soviet magazines and publishing houses were being flooded with manuscripts depicting life in the Stalinist prisons, camps, and places of exile. But he warned that "this is a very dangerous and difficult topic." He reiterated the same warning by saying: "Mothers [he meant the Party] are right in not letting their children use sharp tools before the children learn how to use them." Then he proceeded to explain why this subject was ticklish by giving a new evaluation of Stalin's record, much more favorable than his own severe indictments made at the 20th and 22nd Congresses. It was wrong, he said, "one-sidedly to concentrate only on facts of illegality, arbitrariness and evil use of power," because the Stalinist period was also that of the transformation of the Soviet Union into a mighty state that victoriously withstood the terrible test of war. Those writers who noted only the evil aspects of that time made an error. He enumerated Stalin's merits: his contributions to the October Revolution and the building of socialist society, and his implacable struggle against the opposition groups within the Party and their leaders such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii, and the bourgeois nationalists. "Stalin was [he said] in the last years of his life a very sick

man suffering from hyper-suspiciousness and a persecution mania. . . . In spite of everything the Party renders unto Stalin what is due to his contributions to the Party and the Communist movement. We feel even now that he was devoted to Communism and that he was a Marxist. This may not be denied."

"One not infrequently hears the question [he continued] why were the violations of legality and evil abuses of power not discovered and stopped in Stalin's lifetime? Was it possible? . . . They ask whether the Party knew, for instance, of the arrests. Yes, they did. But did they know that the arrested persons were not guilty of anything? Nay, this they did not know. They believed Stalin and could not entertain the thought that those repressive measures could have been taken against honest people devoted to our cause. . . . We learned about Stalin's evil abuse of power and about his arbitrariness only after his death and the unmasking of Beria. . . ." As if to prove his innocence, Khrushchev exclaimed: "When Stalin was being buried, many, including myself, had tears in our eyes."

This excuse, that Stalin's closest collaborators did not even suspect that their Party colleagues were exterminated for no reason whatsoever, does not sound very convincing. After all, Khrushchev himself was very active during the mass purges and could not possibly have been unaware that hundreds of thousands who were shot and millions who were deported could not all be guilty of treason and other grave crimes.

As a matter of fact, Il'ya Ehrenburg, the well-known older writer, had proposed a more plausible explanation. His views were thus summarized by Il'ychev: "While writing about the years of the cult of the individual, I. Ehrenburg put forward the so-called 'theory of silence' which allegedly was at that time the rule of conduct for Soviet people. . . . Many allegedly were aware of the evil abuses of power by Stalin but they could see no other way except to live 'gritting their teeth.' Everyone tried only to save himself. . . . One might think that all those who knew of those deviations from Leninism were only saving their own skins and thus helping the evil to become greater." This theory, quite charitable for the present Party leaders, was not officially adopted. Its defect was that it depicted them as cowards though not as accomplices. It is not surprising that Ehrenburg, who became bolder in his old age, took a thorough thrashing from both Khrushchev and Il'ychev. The latter Party spokesman told him: "You, however, did not remain silent at that time, Il'ya Gregoryevich, but praised and praised [Stalin] to the utmost of your talent as a publicist. . . . After Stalin's death . . . you wrote of him as a man

who 'loved men, knew their weaknesses and strengths, felt compassion for the tears of a mother who had lost her son in the war, understood the labor of a miner or a mason, knew the dreams and feelings of millions, embodied their hopes, will, happiness and the deep desire for peace. . . .' We all wrote and spoke in this vein without any hypocrisy. We believed and wrote. But you, it now seems, did not believe and still wrote." Were there many in the audience who really believed that Ehrenburg, who never was a high-ranking Communist and seldom saw Stalin, was the only one to know the truth?

Both Khrushchev and Il'ychev castigated the deviations committed by Soviet literary writers and artists. The sins were exactly the same of which Zhdanov had accused them fifteen years before: formalism, abstract art, individualism (writing about personal feelings unrelated to social topics), nonmelodious music, the depicting of shortcomings of Soviet life, pessimism, liking of Western art and music or claiming that not everything in the West was decadent and bad.

Il'ychev violently denounced "formalistic tricks, abstract daubing, decadent petty poems written to the accompaniment of hysterical guitar music." Khrushchev did not mind being vulgar: "I regret to say that certain artists [and writers] deliberately judge the reality by the smell of toilets, depict human beings as ugly creatures, paint their canvases with dark colors which convey to people only the mood of despondency, depression and helplessness. They describe the reality according to an aprioristic, distorted and subjective image that they themselves have constructed on the foundation of their sickly concepts." He could not resist repeating his standard joke about modern painting as "a dirty daubing which any ass may paint with his own tail," and calling modern works of art "ugly deformations" and "nauseating concoctions."

He reiterated Zhdanov's prescription concerning music: "If one has to state it briefly, we are for a melodious music . . . and are opposed to any sort of cacophony. . . . We cannot approve the view that cacophony is true music. . . . One cannot consider that the attraction to jazz music is a healthy [phenomenon]. . . . You should not think that we are the opponents of any jazz music . . . but there is this sort of [jazz] music which makes one feel sick and brings about a stomach-ache. . . . Music where there is no melody only irritates. They say that this effect is due to the lack of understanding. In fact, there is some jazz music which cannot possibly be understood and is too disgusting to be listened to." He firmly denounced the twelve-tone music as a music "of noises." He went farther than Zhdanov ever had done and roundly condemned foreign modern

dances: "What is called fashionable dance is nothing but some sort of obscene frenzy; Devil only knows what it is. They say that similar indecent exhibitions can be seen at the meetings of the Quakers' sect. I cannot tell because I have never attended a Quakers' meeting." He assured his audience: "The Communist Party fights and will continue to fight against abstract art and all other formalistic deformations. We may not be neutral regarding formalism." He reaffirmed that the only literature and arts which the Party would support would have to abide by the standards of socialist realism (optimism, depicting the Soviet heroes, propagating Communist ideals, and conveying the message in a manner that the man in the street could easily understand).

He also upbraided two movie producers for the picture *Lenin's Outpost*. This movie ventured to insinuate that contemporary Soviet young people were not sure of the sense of their lives and did not believe that their elders had all the answers. This was by implication subversive of the authority of Party elders. Khrushchev was bitter. The young heroes of the film "do not like or respect anyone; they not only do not trust their elders but positively hate them. They are dissatisfied with everything. . . . [The producers] wanted to inculcate in children's minds the idea that their fathers could not be their teachers of life, and that there was no sense in asking them for advice."

The writers and artists of the capital were the principal target of criticism, and among them in particular Il'ya Ehrenburg, E. Evtushenko, V. Nekrasov, K. Paustovskii, A. Voznesenskii, V. Kataev, and E. Neizvestnyi. They were guilty of defending abstract art, finding attractive aspects in the Western life, refusing to cover up the darker sides of Soviet reality, and committing indiscretions abroad. Two took a special beating, both mainly for their memoirs: Ehrenburg and Evtushenko. The latter had, in addition, imprudently published his memoirs in a Parisian weekly.

Ehrenburg was openly saying heretical things. For instance, he said that Lenin did not want to impose his taste on others and tolerated literary forms which he disliked. Ehrenburg also claimed that "we should not dispute artistic tastes," and that "creations of any artist have an equal right to exist." He mockingly criticized Soviet arts of the last thirty years as a photographic art or at best as an imitation of the Bolognese school of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Yet those were the years of socialist realism.

Khrushchev announced that foreign travels of writers and artists would henceforth be better screened, while he complained, having in mind Evtushenko, Voznesenskii, Paustovskii, and Nekrasov: "There

are cases where the foreign trips of literary writers not only do not bring any benefits but positively harm the interests of our country. . . . If an unstable man is covered abroad with flatteries, if they call him 'the symbol of a new epoch' or something of the kind, he will forget wherefrom, whereto and why he has come and will begin to talk nonsense."²⁶

Both he and Il'ychev came to the rescue of conformist writers and artists. Il'ychev said that those who were true socialist realists were being ostracized by their colleagues and called "retrogressive and conservative" and "without any principles." Khrushchev exclaimed: "It is necessary to put an end to the attempts at pasting the label 'varnisher' on those writers and artists who depict the positive aspects of our life. How should we call those others who seek in life only what is bad and paint everything in black colors? Evidently, they should be called tar-smearers."

Il'ychev called to account other "bad boys" of literature and the arts: "They say in particular that the criticism of formalism and abstract art might result in the stagnation of creative work, in the repression of artistic innovations, and in encouraging naturalism, photographism, and so on." Others did not advance such "strange" arguments. They simply took refuge in silence. This was considered subversive in Stalin's time; it is no more welcome in the present time. Il'ychev said: "One does not hear the voice of certain artists and literary writers in this serious debate about serious matters. Frankly speaking, whom do they intend to mislead by their 'silent attitude'? The Party, the people? Have we not certain groups of creative people who intend, for the time being, not to write, compose and create? This neutral position is below the dignity of the Soviet man. . . . Silence also means something, also expresses a point of view."

Khrushchev once again reiterated the Party view regarding the relations with the West. Peaceful coexistence meant the avoidance of a nuclear war but certainly did not mean an armistice in the war of ideologies: "Peaceful coexistence in ideology would amount to a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism." His words conveyed to his particular audience a clear message: no right to relax vigilance in relations with foreigners or to share with the Western colleagues the same or similar esthetic views. "Splendid isolation" and a retreat to the nineteenth-century temple of arts were once again proclaimed the proper attitude for a dignified Soviet writer or artist.

Finally, Khrushchev and Il'ychev formulated the Party view of freedom of the thought. Il'ychev said that the Party could not tolerate

the opinion according to which there was "an impersonal, timeless, nonclass, general truth," and could acknowledge the existence of only "our Soviet, Communist truth." Khrushchev approached the same problem from a different angle: "One hears talks about some sort of absolute freedom of the individual. I do not know what it means but I feel that the absolute freedom of the individual will never exist, not even in the period of full Communism."

If Soviet citizens could aspire only to a freedom limited by the boundaries traced by the Communist truth, Khrushchev was logical in concluding: "We must mobilize all the ideological weapons which the Party has, including literature and arts, these mighty tools of Communist education." He made clear that he meant what he said: "All this [the anti-Stalin campaign] does not signify that now, after the denunciation of the cult of the individual, an era of spontaneity has come, that the reins of government are loose, that the ship of society is drifting aimlessly on the waves, and that everyone may follow his own whims. Nay, the Party implements and shall implement consistently and firmly the policy which it has formulated and will act uncompromisingly against all ideological deviations."

The writers and artists were again told that their mission was to act as the propagandists of Communist ideas. As such they could not freely choose their media of expression; the Party message, which they were asked to convey to the masses through their works of art, had to be understandable to the man in the Soviet street. The artistic form had to be pleasant and limpid, and the content should reflect the Party outlook as much as the Soviet press does.

Dudintsev wrote *Not by Bread Alone*; Soviet writers and artists, like all human beings, must live also by bread. The Party is the general employer for them and all other Soviet citizens. They had to accept its views. The unions of writers, plastic artists, and composers hastened to assure the Central Committee that they were most willing to abide by the Party line which Khrushchev had explained to them. All the unions pledged solemnly their faithfulness to socialist realism, their repudiation of any and all bourgeois ideologies, their intent to stand by the national traditions, and their opposition to formalism and ideological peaceful coexistence with the West. The Union of Plastic Artists assured the Party that their art was "a powerful means of Communist education." Writers said: "Soviet literature is called upon to be an ardent propagandist of Communist ideas . . . [and] . . . has inexhaustible possibilities for creating images of fine and heroic men."²⁷

"PROLETARIAN" ARCHITECTURE

While the twentieth century is abhorred by the Party, the nineteenth with its eclecticism is enthroned on the Soviet "revolutionary" altar. This tendency was easily visible in architecture. In 1949 *Pravda* attacked the Board of the Soviet Academy of Architecture for their approval of Soviet books inspired by foreign art. Mentioning the authors of such "anti-Communist" books on architecture, *Pravda* said of one:

This "scholar" derived his "experience" from articles in American journals pervaded by poisonous anti-Soviet propaganda, praise of the bourgeois science and the American ways of life. Slavish worship of American construction practice and unconcealed propaganda of the absurd fable about workers' housing in America are the "ideas" that fill the works of this homeless cosmopolitan. . . . [Talking about another author, *Pravda* continued] since our Soviet reality did not interest the author, he used Paris and Rome as examples. . . . This book is of no practical value to the Soviet architects.²⁸

The conclusion was limp: ". . . a group of kowtowing cosmopolitans . . . have found shelter in the Academic Board."

In May, 1948, the British *Architectural Review* invited three leading Soviet architects to explain to their British colleagues the achievements of the new proletarian art. The Soviet authors, unfortunately for them, illustrated their articles with several reproductions of new Soviet buildings. The Frunze Military Academy in Moscow looked like Louis Sullivan's utilitarian buildings in Chicago in the early twentieth century "monumental" style. The Karamyshevo Dam was crowned by pretentious Italianate towers in the Renaissance style, leaving the spectator with the unresolved dilemma of why a modern construction built in the so-called socialist state should be ornamented with Renaissance towers. The State Opera House in Novosibirsk reminded one of the prevailing style of the interwar-period federal buildings in the United States—the same profusion of columns, the same classical portico and vast rotunda. The control towers of the Karamyshevo Dam looked exactly like the suburban branch of a British bank.

Khrushchev at the 20th Congress condemned the Stalinist predilection for costly ornamentation of public buildings and recommended a cheaper and utilitarian style. The Western modernistic style in architecture is creeping in through this utilitarian door, opened by the Party for budgetary reasons. However, this change is a matter

of economy rather than creative freedom. Architects took orders from Stalin and now take them from Khrushchev.

PARTY ORIENTATION VERSUS OBJECTIVITY IN SOVIET SCIENCE

Similar standards have been applied to social sciences. *Bolshevik* stated: "In our country the scholar is also a social worker. He cannot be apolitical. . . . He must follow in his work the policy of the Soviet State which represents the vital foundation of the Soviet regime."²⁹ The Party orientation in social sciences involves the necessity of discarding objectivity in favor of the Party point of view. The social scientists, be they philosophers, lawyers, historians, economists, or sociologists, are left practically no freedom of research. They share the fate of the literary writers and artists and are forced to act as Party propagandists who must disregard the objective results of their research for the sake of fidelity to the Party line.

Of course, objectivity in social sciences is an ideal even in free countries. Social facts cannot be ascertained with an abstract yardstick and are evaluated according to the best understanding but within the unavoidable limitations of the mind brought about by national environment, inherited traditions, and habits of thought. Pascal said: "Truth on this side of the Pyrenees—error on the other side of the Pyrenees." The same facts may be interpreted differently by two equally honest social scientists, each of them with a different national background and perhaps even with a different personal temperament. Objectivity is not, however, meaningless in a relative sense. It means an honest effort to discard the prejudices known to the social scientist (it might still leave him with these prejudices which his environment takes for granted and treats as absolute truth) and to draw conclusions without regard for his personal likes or dislikes. The relative objectivity understood in this limited sense has been banned from the Soviet social sciences. A Soviet scholar is not allowed to draw conclusions or to note facts which would contradict Marxism or the current policy of the Party.

However, one does not find traces of a similar policy enforced in the natural sciences because imposing a Party line in natural science would be highly impractical and would seriously affect Soviet technological achievements. This is a risk which no modern state can afford. A physicist or a chemist must be left in peace, as long as he does not try to indulge in an unorthodox philosophy of science. In the latter field only one doctrine is allowed—the Marxist dialectical materialism with its faith in the objective existence of matter and the universe; relativity is banned, while the

practical results of Einstein's approach to science are utilized by Soviet scientists. Thus, a mathematician or a physicist may work on his research on two conditions: he must occasionally pay lip service to Marxism-Leninism; and he must avoid any unorthodox statements concerning the philosophy of science. Except for biology, the Soviet scientists who had much trouble with the Party in the Stalinist period were those who tried to formulate a history or a philosophy of science.

The history and philosophy of science, being located in the intermediate zone between the natural and social sciences, share the fate of the social sciences. They must conform strictly to the Marxist Party line at the expense of that scientific objectivity which is contemptuously called objectivism.

THE ISSUE OF SOVIET CULTURAL ISOLATIONISM

Can the Soviet Union limit cultural contacts with the contemporary West with impunity? This is perhaps the most important question to be asked regarding the Soviet future. If she cannot, and if the Party continues to enforce cultural isolationism for a long time to come, then the Soviet regime is menaced with the withering away of originality in contemporary Soviet social thought and in literature and the arts. The answer depends on one's view concerning the place of Russian culture. Is it an autonomous civilization, as one contemporary British historian maintains, or is it only one of the national branches of Western civilization?

If a civilization is a self-sufficient cultural unit which may be adequately understood by references only to its own contents and development (without excluding transitional and sporadic influences of other civilizations), one may consider that there were and are several distinct civilizations, like the Mayan, the Chinese, the Indian, the Moslem, and others, but one cannot state the same about the Russian. One may understand Chinese civilization without constant references to others, but this is not true about Russian culture. Furthermore, modern conditions of life, the speedy means of communication, and the necessity for each nation in the world to keep abreast of technological progress now preclude the independent development even of civilizations which had in the past their own distinct and autonomous history. Chinese civilization is in the process of being transformed by the impact of the Western; the same is true of the Moslem and the Indian. And the Russian nation, again, has never created a distinct civilization. Like other European nations it has produced only a branch of European civilization, the successor of Hellenism.

The Russians originally built up their national culture around the Byzantine version of the Hellenistic heritage. By the thirteenth century they produced a respectable national branch of Byzantine civilization, if one has to use the latter term. The Tartar invasion ended this first period of Russian national history. The Tartars left behind them a cultural desert, owing to their having destroyed the Russian cities, which were also cultural centers. The second period, which lasted for several centuries, was that of silence. Russia was not able for a long time to regain her cultural vigor. When the Tartar yoke had been finally thrown off in the fifteenth century, she faced a dilemma: she had either to remain aloof and be culturally sterile or turn to the West. She could not rejoin the Byzantine stream because the Turks had conquered Constantinople in 1453, and the Greeks themselves had entered a period of cultural decline similar to that of Russia after the Tartar conquest. Russia refused to shift to the Western heirs of Hellenistic civilization because the West was heretical—Catholic and Protestant—while she wanted to carry on the Byzantine torch of the “true” Christian faith, the Greek Orthodox. She did so at the heavy price of cultural isolation and of ensuing intellectual silence for a few centuries.

The silence was maintained until the eighteenth century. Russia then awakened, thanks to newly established contacts with Western civilization. If one used philosophy as an index, he might quote from a history of Russian philosophy published recently by a Russian *émigré*: “. . . we do not find in Russia until the eighteenth century any independent writings or essays of a philosophical nature; in this sense the history of the Russian philosophy should begin only with the eighteenth century.”³⁰ This statement could be generalized to include other fields of thought. Russian theological writings of the time were a mere repetition of Byzantine ideas. One looks in vain for a Russian St. Thomas Aquinas or Abélard, for a Bacon or a Descartes or a Spinoza, to mention a few Westerners who lived in the historical period of the Russian cultural silence which followed the Tartar invasion.

Beginning with the middle of the seventeenth century, Russia had to accept Western influences if she wanted to survive as a modern state. She was helped by the reannexation in 1667 of Kiev, which had become under Polish sovereignty a center of Western influence and where Greek Orthodox thinkers had had to become familiar with Western philosophy in order to use it as a weapon to defend their faith against the encroachments of the Catholic Church, supported by Poland. The Kievan scholars spread their own knowledge over the

whole of Russia. Moscow herself attracted Westerners to bring in their culture. Speaking of the awakening of seventeenth-century Russia to cultural life, the Soviet history books do not deny the dominant influence of contacts with the West:

The growing knowledge of the foreign, especially Western-European, culture resulted in the progressive infiltration of the latter in the ways of life of the wealthy classes of the Russian population—the gentry and the merchants. In the rich homes appeared the objects of foreign origin: paintings, geographical maps, musical instruments, books, plates and dishes, ornaments, etc.³¹

The ground was prepared for Peter the Great, who opened the gates of Russia to Western civilization. It is true that he was interested not in Western philosophy but in Western technology and state administration, which were to make a Great Power of his country. It is true, too, that when he went to England he did not study the Bill of Rights but the art of shipbuilding. But the gate was opened to the Western flood and could not be closed. Stalin was the first to try to shut it tightly again.

Stalin interfered with all social sciences because all of them, if left free, could produce views impossible to reconcile either with the Marxist outlook or with the Party domestic or foreign policies. The same reasoning has guided the post-Stalinist leadership who cannot allow for full freedom of thought. However, the Party struggle against the cult of Stalin has resulted in a carefully measured relaxation which has already brought visible fruits. For instance, the post-Stalinist historical works have achieved a much higher level of learning and sophistication. Even so, they must be written from the Marxist point of view and, if they deal with current history, cannot deviate from the Party official interpretation of events. This interpretation depends on the practical needs of the Party. For instance, the Stalinist history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union knew of only two giants of the Revolution, Lenin and Stalin. The post-Stalinist edition upgraded Khrushchev and reduced Stalin to insignificant proportions, while Khrushchev's rivals, vanquished in June 1957, became, to use Orwell's words, non-beings and either completely or almost completely vanished from its pages. Reading the current accounts of the Stalingrad battle, one feels that Khrushchev was there the main artisan of victory.

The quick scientific and technological advances made by the Soviet Union, in spite of Party censorship in other fields of thought, have proved that freedom of thought is not an indivisible whole.

Actually, the present nuclear might of the USSR, the intercontinental missiles, the sputniks, and other visible fruits of Soviet scientific-technological progress could not be understood if one assumed that the Stalinist period was that of enforced stagnation. These achievements, if they had been the result of only the last ten years, would have been a miracle. It is true that Stalin was prompted to interfere in natural sciences as well (this was especially true of biology), but he, like his successors, heavily financed research which could contribute to the Soviet military and economic might. The present leaders do not seem to be tempted to interfere except for what any government does, namely to allocate financial resources to the projects which they deem the most urgent and the most important. Yet they have maintained the censorship over social sciences, literature and arts.

This practice and its results have proved that freedom of thought is divisible, that one may, on the one hand, allow freedom of research in the nonpolitical fields (science and technology) and get abundant results, while tightly limiting, on the other hand, freedom in other fields where the creative thought might encroach on the purity of official doctrine or have undesirable political repercussions. This policy leaves the scientist free in his laboratory or study. Its penalty consists in the impoverishment of social sciences, literature, and fine arts. It seems that the Party is willing to pay this price for the sake of its own political security. This does not mean that the Party leaders would not like to have their cake and eat it too. The optimum they seek in vain is to enforce the Party line and still to see social sciences, literature, and arts flourishing. Unfortunately for them the creative process cannot dispense with freedom.

As said before, Stalin occasionally interfered with natural sciences, although his most arbitrary intervention took place only in biology. His tight restrictions on cultural exchanges with the West extended to scientists. This certainly did not help Soviet scientific research. His successors ended this unwise policy. They have encouraged for the last several years contacts with the West insofar as they can be useful. They have assured a steady flow of Western scientific and technological publications, which are now available to Soviet people either directly or through governmental translations; they have been sending missions to various Western countries to pump up the storehouse of Western knowledge in science, technology, and modern agriculture. For other reasons they have promoted visits to the West by Soviet actors, dancers, musicians, and sportsmen; their performance is meant to create sympathy for the USSR, as though these otherwise excellent performers had anything to do with the formulation of Soviet policies.

However, social scientists have not been given the freedom to express their views freely and have been constantly warned against the peril of being contaminated by Western thought. The Soviet private citizen finds now as before that he remains isolated from the outside world; he can neither travel freely abroad nor have unimpeded access to foreign sources of information. Politically, though not scientifically or technologically, Russia remains sealed off.

NOTES

1. A. M. Pankratova, *Istoriia SSSR*, State Educational-Pedagogical Publication of the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR (Moscow, 1947), II, p. 148.
2. A. Ya. Vyshinskii, *Uchenie Lenina-Stalina o proletarskoi revoliutsii i gosudarstve*, Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 186.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
4. *Pravda*, June 5, 1949.
5. Review of the book, Maurice Comforth, *In Defense of Philosophy: Against Positivism and Pragmatism* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1950), in *Bol'shevik*, May, 1951, No. 9, pp. 74-79.
6. P. Trofimov, "Za boevuiu, partiinuiu kritiku burzhuaznoi filosofii i sotsiologii," in *Bol'shevik*, October, 1949, No. 19, pp. 67-72.
7. Reprinted from "Voprosy Filosofii," No. 1, 1947, in *Bol'shevik*, August, 1947, No. 16, pp. 7-23.
8. The resolution is reproduced in *Bol'shevik*, February, 1948, No. 3, pp. 10-14.
9. *Loc. cit.*
10. *Loc. cit.*
11. The proceedings of the meeting were reported in *Bol'shevik*, March 30, 1948, No. 6, pp. 62-74.
12. A. Fadeyev, "O literaturnoi kritike," in *Bol'shevik*, July, 1947, No. 13, p. 25.
13. V. Kemenov, "Vyrozhdeniia sovremennogo burzhuaznogo iskusstva," in *Bol'shevik*, August, 1947, No. 15, pp. 20-35.
14. A. Fadeyev, "O literaturnoi kritike," in *Bol'shevik*, July, 1947, No. 13, p. 27.
15. The resolution is reproduced in *Bol'shevik*, August, 1946, No. 15, pp. 11-14.
16. The resolution is reproduced in *Bol'shevik*, August, 1946, No. 16, pp. 45-49.
17. "Smeleie razviorotyvat' kritiku v tvorcheskikh organizatsiakh" (Editorial) in *Pravda*, January 6, 1954.
18. *Loc. cit.*
19. *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.
20. *Pravda*, February 19, 1956.
21. Vladimir Dudintsev, *Not by Bread Alone*, Dutton (New York, 1957), translated from the Russian by Edith Bone.
22. Tikhon Khrennikov, "Pered vtorym s'ezdom kompozitorov," in *Pravda*, April 2, 1956.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. These two speeches were reproduced in *Pravda*, March 9 and 10, 1963.

26. V. Nekrasov was soon after threatened by Khrushchev with expulsion from the Party.
27. The resolutions of the unions were reproduced in *Pravda*, March 29 and 31, and April 14, 1963.
28. *Pravda*, March 21, 1949.
29. Editorial in *Boľshevik*, August, 1946, No. 15.
30. V. V. Zenkovskii, *Istoriia Russkoi Filosofii*, YMCA Press (Paris, 1948), Vol. I, p. 33.
31. A. M. Pankratova, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 218.

CHAPTER TWO

Russian Nationalism

It is symptomatic of the present era of Soviet life that in 1950 the State Publishing House of Political Literature deemed it necessary to publish a pocket-size gospel of Russian nationalism. There one finds the main leitmotifs of current Party propaganda reflected in the titles of the four chapters: "1. The Soviet patriotism—patriotism of a higher type; 2. The historical merits of the great Russian nation; 3. The leading role of the Soviet people in the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism; 4. Homeless cosmopolitanism and servility before everything foreign—the most harmful survivals of capitalism."¹

THE GOSPEL OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

Mazzini or Renan could hardly have quarreled with the following definition: "Patriotism is the love of one's country, one's nation, culture and the best national traditions, which is transmitted from generation to generation and which has existed among nations for many centuries. V. I. Lenin defined patriotism as: ' . . . one of the deepest feelings developed throughout centuries and millennia of the existence of separate countries.' "² No one would be entitled to deny to the Russians or to any other nation the right to love their own country. There is, however, a basic difference between the positive love of one's country, which may be called patriotism, and a negative hatred of or contempt for other nations, which may be called nationalism. Soviet patriotism, like the Nazi or Fascist, is blended with hatred: "The love of the toilers is bound indissolubly among the Soviet people with the hatred of the enemies of the socialist Fatherland. The true love of one's country always breeds hatred against its enemies. . . ."³ The enemy to be hated is everyone who does not follow the policy of the Party. It is the capitalist United States, half-Laborite Britain, any government that restricts the freedom of action of the Communist Party or disagrees with Soviet foreign policy, in fact every country outside of the Soviet Bloc. One may contrast this kind of "patriotism" with the definition given by the nineteenth-century liberal Russian writer, N. A. Dobroliubov: "True patriotism which is a sectional expression of love for man-

kind cannot be reconciled with hostility against any other nationality."

The concept of Soviet patriotism includes three distinct notions: Russian nationalism, loyalty of non-Russian citizens to the Soviet State, and complete devotion to the same State on the part of all "progressive" foreigners (Communists). Russian nationalism is fed on the remembrance of the struggle of the Russian nation against foreigners: "The patriotic feelings of the popular masses of our country were expressed even in the long-gone past in their spontaneous struggle against the Tartars, the German dog-knights, the Polish and Swedish interventionists, against Napoleon and other foreign invaders."⁴ Of course, the Russians are the No. 1 nation.

Great and versatile are the merits of the Russian nation not only in respect to the other nations of the USSR, but also in regard to the whole of mankind. Already at the beginning of contemporary European Civilization our nation saved Europe more than once with her own blood from the barbarian invasions. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Russian nation covered Europe from the East against the invasion of the Mongol-Tartar hordes and thus prevented its conquest. Pushkin observed that at that time "the beginning Renaissance movement was saved by the martyrdom of Russia." . . . In the middle of the eighteenth century the Russian nation routed the armies of Frederick II, thus destroying completely the conquering plans of the German aggressors in Europe. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Russians, who defeated the armies of the French conqueror Napoleon, saved the European nations from his tyranny. . . . During several centuries our nation waged the struggle against the Turkish hordes which had enslaved the nations of the Balkan peninsula and had menaced Russia and all the European nations. This struggle ended by the utter defeat of Sultan's Turkey. To the present day the Balkan nations keep in their hearts the gratitude toward the Russian nation which liberated them from the bloody Turkish yoke. . . .⁵

A non-Russian Soviet citizen is not expected to indulge in bourgeois nationalism; this is the privilege of the Russian citizen. A non-Russian should cultivate Soviet State patriotism. As a State citizen, he should find a source of pride in the glory of the Soviet Union, which has rendered "tremendous" services to mankind:

Beginning with the twentieth century the center of the international revolutionary movement was shifted to Russia. At that time our country took over the leading role in the struggle of the toilers of the whole world for their emancipation. . . . There is no other people in the whole world which did so much for the true

liberation of mankind as our people. It will enjoy for eternity the love and respect of the toilers of the whole world, because it laid the foundations for a new, socialist era in the history of the social development and in the true history of the human society. . . .⁶

Soviet patriotism, understood as the feeling of allegiance to the Soviet State, is not limited to the Soviet citizen. It is open to all "progressive" foreigners as well. "The USSR is the Fatherland not only of the Soviet people. The toilers of all countries see in it the bastion of socialism and democracy, of friendship and equality among nations. They feel a burning love for the Soviet Union and consider it as the Fatherland of the toilers of the whole world."⁷

Why should the "toilers" (Communists) of the whole world ardently love a foreign state? Because this state is pledged to spread the Communist revolution to all countries. As the Soviet State is pledged to promote world revolution, "progressive" foreigners have a corresponding obligation:

The defense of the USSR is the sacred debt of all honest people in the world. The Soviet patriotism of the citizens of the USSR is inconceivable without proletarian internationalism; but the proletarian internationalism of the toilers of other countries is inconceivable without the love and total devotion to the Soviet Union as the Fatherland of socialism and the socialist Motherland of the international proletariat.⁸

Such a "moral" debt toward the Soviet State leaves foreign Communists with no choice but to abandon loyalty to their own states and nations and to become servants of the Russian State.

MISSIONARY SPIRIT—EX ORIENTE LUX

What about those Soviet homeless cosmopolitans who are interested in Western thought? "A man who is infected with the disease of servility [before the West] ceases to be a Soviet patriot. He cannot be a highly idealistic and active builder of the Communist society."⁹ After all, why should a Soviet citizen be a homeless cosmopolitan, since Stalin had already written in December, 1918: "The light comes from the East. The West with its imperialist cannibals has become the refuge of obscurantism and slavery. The task before us is to destroy this refuge to the joy and happiness of the toilers of all countries."¹⁰ *Ex oriente lux*—this is the motto of Soviet nationalism.

This motto has a long tradition in Russia. Its history goes back to the fifteenth century when Russia, once again united and freed from Tartar control, had to face the West. She was culturally impoverished

by the Tartar conquest, while the West was about to reach the intellectual and artistic summits of the Renaissance. The Russians of that time had an inferiority complex in respect to the much more culturally evolved West. However, this inferiority was balanced in their minds by their own feeling of righteousness. They were the guardians of the true faith after the fall of Constantinople, while the West was engulfed by what seemed to them the heretical, Roman interpretation of Christianity. Moscow had to take over the mission from Byzantium of preserving the true Church, even for the eventual benefit of the West. This missionary vocation of Russia was formulated by the monk Theophilus, who addressed to Tsar Basil III at the beginning of the sixteenth century those famous words: "The Church of Old Rome fell because of its heresy; the gates of the second Rome, Constantinople, have been hewn down by the axes of the infidel Turks; but the Church of Moscow, the Church of the New Rome, shines brighter than the sun in the whole universe. . . . The two Romes have fallen, but the third stands fast; a fourth there cannot be."

Of course, the Third Rome had the moral obligation not only of keeping the true faith pure but also of spreading it and bringing the light to the West. This missionary spirit has survived to the present day and has been incarnated in various forms, depending on the prevailing ideas in Russia herself.

The modern atheist heir of Theophilus exclaimed: "The capitalist West, its era over, is enveloped in the darkness of doom. But for the laboring people of all countries the dawn of liberty and happiness, filling the East, blazes with the bright light of hope. The light will triumph over darkness."¹¹ Moscow again claims to be a third Rome, this time not of the "true" version of Christian faith, but of a new materialistic religion.

A nation which claims to be the leader of mankind must cultivate her own complex of superiority. The Party does not neglect this. "There was a time," wrote *Pravda*, "when the capitalist countries flaunted their civilization before Russia. But that time is long past. Now our Fatherland is the country of the most progressive culture in the world, and their culture has been left far behind; it has rotted to its roots."¹²

REWRITING RUSSIAN-TSARIST HISTORY—DENIAL OF WESTERN INFLUENCE ON RUSSIAN THOUGHT—SLAVIC SOLIDARITY

In the first period of the Soviet era, the Party encouraged Soviet historians to take a critical view of the prerevolutionary history of their

own country. The imperialist expansion of Russia was freely denounced. The internal history of the country was rewritten from the point of view of class warfare. One of the Soviet historians of the time attained a position of prestige for his Marxist and otherwise unmerciful treatment of the prerevolutionary history of Russia. His name was M. N. Pokrovskii. As late as 1931 his *Brief History of Russia* was reprinted with the following letter of Lenin on one of the first pages: "To comrade M. N. Pokrovskii. I congratulate you very heartily on your success. I like your new book—*Brief History of Russia*—immensely. The construction and the narrative are original. It reads with tremendous interest. It should, in my opinion, be translated into European languages. . . . With Communist greetings. Yours—Lenin."¹³ But Stalin deemed it necessary to correct Lenin's opinion. Therefore, in 1948, the historical journal *Voprosy Istorii* delivered this verdict:

The past decade has been marked by an intensified study of history. The primary prerequisite for this [study] was the defeat of the so-called Pokrovskii "school." It was impossible to make progress in historical research without first overcoming these views which had liquidated history as a science. The anti-Marxist essence of the historical concepts of M. N. Pokrovskii and his "school" was exposed in the comments made by Stalin, Zhdanov and Kirov. . . .¹⁴

The post-Stalinist leadership rehabilitated Pokrovskii and his school but did not revert to his interpretation of Russian history.

Since the war Soviet historians were busy rewriting the history of Russia in order to present it in the best possible light and also to make it fit the general framework of current Party propaganda. This has forced Soviet historians to adapt their views to the changing circumstances. Before the war the black characters of the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War were Britain, France, and Japan; nowadays the place of honor is reserved for the United States, which is denounced as the main instigator of the intervention. In Pokrovskii's period the Russian annexations in Central Asia and the Caucasus were roundly condemned as imperialist; now they appear to have been a blessing, conferred generously on backward nations thus given the privilege of living together with the great Russians. In the 1940 edition of the school textbook of A. M. Pankratova, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 was presented as an imperialist struggle over the division of China, with Russia seeking to control Korea and Manchuria and "brazenly plundering the Chinese people." In the 1945 edition the references to Tsarist imperialism were toned down, and the heroism

of the Russian army and navy was stressed. The 1945 edition quoted Stalin's appraisal of the Normandy landing as a "brilliant success" and his statement that the "history of war knows no other enterprise like it for breadth of purpose, grandiose scale and masterful execution." The 1946 edition omitted those quotations and mentioned dryly that "on June 6, 1944, Allied forces landed in Northern France." The same edition omitted the 1945 references to the Western Allies as "peace-loving countries" and to the "democratic powers of Europe and America."

History is considered one of the tools of Party propaganda. The Party organ, *Bol'shevik*, formulated in 1947 what was to be expected from Soviet historians. The pertinent article began by pointing to the origins of the shift in the Party line concerning the history of Russia:

The decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) concerning ideological questions formulated the task of intensifying by all means the Communist education of the Soviet youth. Teaching the national history has to play an important role in this respect. . . .¹⁵

The thesis of independent Russian development required the rejection of the view formerly held by many Russian historians that the Eastern Slavic State, the ancestor of Russia, had been founded by Scandinavian warriors. This Norman theory of the origins of the Russian State was roundly condemned:

The question of the origin of the Russian State is one of the most important problems of our history. It was the object of controversies among historians for almost two centuries. Some of them considered that one should see the origin of the Russian State in the alleged invitation of the Varangers [the Vikings] who were deemed to have been the founders of the Russian State; the others pointed out that the Slavic tribes themselves created their State. The former theory was known as the "Norman theory" of the origin of the Russian State. The groundless and antiscientific nature of the "Norman theory" has been convincingly proved by the Marxist historical science. . . .¹⁶

The Norman theory of the origin of the Russian State may be right or wrong, but what may be the value of the Soviet historical research if a theory has to be discarded on orders from the Party? Anyhow, Soviet historians had to correct their political, if not scientific, mistake in the expurgated editions and to write bravely: "The bands of Varangers could not exercise any influence whatsoever on the life of Eastern Slavs. . . . They were not at all culturally superior to the Slavs."¹⁷

In a guiding article *Bol'shevik* turned to the question of the history of non-Russian Soviet nationalities after having discarded the "cosmopolitan" Norman theory. This problem was important because it concerned the mutual relations between the ruling and the ruled nationalities of the Soviet Union. *Bol'shevik* did not intend to encourage in any way the national feelings of non-Russian Soviet citizens and treated the problem of their national histories in a manner which would not have been repudiated by the nationalists of any imperialist nation. It said:

The correct presentation of the history of the nations of the Soviet Union plays a considerable role in the patriotic education of the youth. . . . However, the textbooks on the history of the USSR—the high school textbook (Vol. II) and the university textbook (Vol. I)—do not sufficiently explain this problem. . . . For instance, the university textbook thus pictures the inclusion of the Kazakhs within Russia: "The time of the successors of Shauke (died in 1718), the Khans Kaun and Abulkhair, has remained in the memory of the Kazakh nation as the period of great misery" (Vol. I, p. 717, first edition). The narrative continues by stating that the invasion by Djungar Oirots forced Abulkhair to begin conversations with the Tsarist government concerning annexation by Russia. . . . The authors of the textbook do not explain the historical conditions which accompanied the annexation and omit to include the appraisal of that event. . . . What was better for the Kazakhs: to join Russia or to surrender to the mercy of the Djungars? The authors of the textbook do not at all answer this important question. However, it should have been explained with complete clarity that the annexation of Kazakhstan by Russia, although it brought about the Tsarist oppression, was nevertheless the lesser evil under the contemporary historical conditions. . . . The school textbook does not say much about the progressive influence of Russian culture on the nations of our country. . . .¹⁸

In other words, the Kazakhs and other conquered nationalities should be taught gratitude towards the Tsars who annexed them and put an end to their independence.

The Party instructions, as explained to historians by the *Bol'shevik*, also took up the problem of Slavic solidarity and the leadership of the Russian "big brothers." The organ of the Central Committee said:

One must not lose from sight one of the most important problems in the history of Russia's foreign policy—the relations between Russia and the Slavic countries. Learning the history of the relations between our State and the Slavic nations and States, and understanding the leading role of the Russian nation in the

age-old struggle of the Slavic nations against German aggression, serve the purpose of consolidating the solidarity of these nations. . . .¹⁹

The pan-Slavic theme is not new in Russia: it was popular in the nineteenth century and in this one before the October Revolution. It was sometimes valuable to Russian interests because the appeal to other Slavic nations could help Russian expansion in Central and Balkan Europe. But it was only one of various tools of achieving the aims of Russian foreign policy, which was at other times anti-Slavic. One need mention only Russian participation in the partitions of Poland, a Slavic nation, and in keeping that country divided for over 125 years among Russia, Austria, and Germany. Russian policy was at times friendly or unfriendly to Bulgaria and Serbia depending on Russian general interests and irrespective of the Slavic character of those two nations. Bulgaria fought the First World War on the side of the Central Powers against the coalition to which Russia belonged. The solidarity of the Slavic nations is a myth often contradicted by actual events. After the last war, however, all the Slavic nations found themselves within the Soviet zone of influence. Therefore the Soviet government rediscovered the usefulness of the Slavic slogan with its anti-German undertones. The Soviet concept of Slavic solidarity does not differ essentially from that of prerevolutionary Russia; it assigns to Russia the role of the "big brother" who is more big than brother.

GLORIFICATION OF PREREVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

The final reminder of *Bol'shevik* encouraged Soviet historians to glorify the prerevolutionary national heroes of Russia. It said:

The Russian nation found eminent commanders in her age-old struggle against the external enemies. Russian military art attained in the past a very high level; it was represented by such commanders as Peter I, Suvorov, and Kutuzov. Naval art was represented just as well by Ushakov, Nakhimov and Makarov. . . . Young people should know the great achievements of the military and naval commanders of their nation and the heroic traditions of our military past which are a part of the traditions of the Soviet Army. . . .²⁰

Someone who knows nothing about Russian history might wonder who generals Kutuzov and Suvorov were. Did they lead the Bolshevik armies in the Civil War? Were they faithful servants of the Communist Party? Why did the Party, which likes to call itself the leader of the international proletariat, order its historians to glorify those generals?

Actually, Suvorov lived in the second half of the eighteenth century, and Kutuzov commanded Russian troops in the first years of the nineteenth century. Both were able commanders and rendered great services to their country. Neither of the two was interested in social problems nor intended to become a social reformer. They executed the orders of the Tsars brilliantly. But both had the same merit: they were the artisans of Russian victories. Therefore, they were placed in the Soviet Pantheon side by side with Marx and Engels, who would not relish such company if they were alive. By the same token the British Communists should glorify Cromwell, the Duke of Marlborough, or the Duke of Wellington; Americans, General Grant and General Pershing; and the French, Napoleon or Foch. Russian Communists did not, however, concede this privilege to foreign Communists who were forbidden to indulge in the glorification of their own national heroes.

After the praises of the Russian medieval princes, Alexander Nevskii and Dimitrii Donskii, homage was also paid to the despotic Ivan IV because he had expanded the frontiers of Russia and consolidated the central power even though by drastic means. His political police, the Oprichnina, were extolled in the following words:

The Oprichnina . . . had a progressive meaning in the history of our country. . . . The Tsar was able, thanks to the assistance of the Oprichnina, to apply the most cruel terror to the boyars [nobility]. Ivan IV pitilessly executed his enemies, exterminating the higher feudal stratum; he exterminated them with their whole kin, including minor children, refusing pardon even to their servants and peasants. . . . The Oprichniks transplanted the peasants from other estates to their own . . . resorting even to violence and burning down the cottages of those peasants who refused to be transferred. . . . The autocracy assisted in strengthening the centralized feudal State and contributed to the defensive capacity of the State. This is why it was, by comparison with the previous situation of the dispersal of State power, a beneficial phenomenon.²¹

The peasants who were victims of the Oprichnina might not have thought of it as a progressive force, but this was the opinion of a Party that claimed to be that of the workers and peasants. Of course, the cruelty of the means used by Ivan IV was not appalling to a Party which had recourse to the same means.

Peter the Great was another Soviet hero because he had begun the process of modernization of Russia, expanded her frontiers, and made her a great power. It did not matter that the position of the peasant

serfs deteriorated greatly under Peter's reign. "The peasant serfs were in a particularly bad condition because they had to pay State taxes and face their duties towards the landlords [Peter introduced a poll tax on the peasant serfs]. . . . The sale of the serfs independently of that of the land became a widespread practice in Peter's time. . . ." ²² But the social aspect of his reign was of little importance to Soviet historians. What mattered was this:

Peter was an able organizer and an outstanding statesman. . . . Peter understood the historical tasks which awaited his country. . . . Peter tried to eliminate backwardness in all its aspects: economy, technology, State structure, culture, and ways of life. Endowed with a strong will, a capacity to make decisions, and perseverance, he swept away all the obstacles which rose on his road toward the transformation [of Russia]. Peter was indefatigable in the struggle against backwardness and barbarity. V. I. Lenin wrote: ". . . Peter hastened the Westernization of barbarian Russia, never stopping before using barbarian means against barbarity." ²³

Interestingly enough, the sons of Ivan IV and Peter the Great were executed by their respective fathers for their willful acts of resistance to their crowned fathers. Lenin was not guilty of overstatement when he wrote that Peter (the same could be said about Ivan IV) used barbarian means to reach his goals. No wonder that Stalin felt duty-bound to extol both of them.

Catherine the Great was treated leniently by Soviet historians, who noted her ability in employing celebrated foreigners for the purposes of Russian propaganda. Those eminent Westerners who are used by the Soviet rulers of Russia for similar purposes could read the following passage with profit:

Corresponding with Voltaire, Diderot, and other writers of the period of Enlightenment, Catherine II wanted to create in Europe an image of herself as a wise and enlightened monarch. She cheated those writers. Misery, hunger and ignorance were reigning in the Russian villages of serfdom. . . . She surrounded herself with flatterers and sought to be praised in European literature. ²⁴

Although Catherine the Great did not become a Soviet national hero like Ivan the Terrible or Peter the Great, the achievements of her foreign policy were duly praised, and her statesmen, generals, and admirals received wide posthumous publicity as builders of the greatness of Russia. Even after Stalin's death *Pravda* warmly welcomed

a new Soviet film, *Admiral Ushakov*, picturing the life and victories of this successful admiral of Catherine's time. *Pravda's* article significantly began by quoting the words of Pushkin: "Russia entered Europe like a launched warship—to the accompaniment of the hammering of the axe and the salvos of the guns."²⁵

Soon after Stalin's death, *Pravda* published an article by the well-known historian A. M. Pankratova in which she dutifully reminded the Soviet public of the privileged position reserved by the Party for the Russians:

In the struggle for the victory of socialism, the great Russian socialist nation played a particularly important role as the most outstanding nation of our country. The Russian nation with her clear mind, reliable character and endurance, and her revolutionary enthusiasm, has truly merited universal recognition as being the leading force of the Soviet Union. . . . In the intellectual development of the nations of the Soviet Union an enormous role belongs to Russian culture which exercises a gigantic and enriching influence on the cultures of all other nations.²⁶

The current Party line is much more subtle. It no longer insists on the glories of Tsarist Russia and does not extol Tsarist generals but insists on other merits of the Russian nation: her having achieved the first socialist revolution, her thus having blazed the trail of progress for all other nations of the world, and her dominant and great culture from which other nationalities of the USSR should borrow and which they should imitate.

"SERVILITY" TOWARD THE WEST

There is no logical contradiction between Russian nationalism, with its superiority complex, and the Soviet isolationist attitude toward Western culture. The former Great Inquisitor of the Soviet Union and later its permanent delegate to the United Nations, A. Ya. Vyshinskii, devoted an entire article to the problem of "servility" toward the West, which was in his eyes the most antipatriotic sin a Soviet citizen might commit:

Servility and kowtowing before foreign countries is the most repulsive and harmful antipatriotic survival. This survival has not yet evaporated from the consciousness of several Soviet people and is still present in the minds of the backward section of the Soviet intelligentsia. . . . Several authors have a stubbornly slavish habit in their investigations concerning the history of Russian literature, sciences, and arts to consider Russian philosophers, artists, and writers as followers of Western European patterns.²⁷

According to Vyshinskii, Russian discoveries and inventions should have been enjoyed only by the Russians and their benefits should have been refused to other countries:

Foreigners reviled Russian science but at the same time were stealing from the Russian scientists, misappropriating the results of their research and discoveries. . . . The agents of a French firm proposed to A. S. Popov, the inventor of the radio, the purchase of his invention. But A. S. Popov refused. "I am a Russian," said he, "and have the duty to place all my knowledge, all my efforts, and all my achievements only at the disposal of my country." . . . In January, 1913, Mayer, a representative of the Department of Agriculture, paid a visit to Michurin and offered to buy on behalf of the U.S.A. his whole collection of plants. But the scientist, although he lived then in poverty, refused: "I do not find it possible to sell to America all the newly produced plants even at much higher prices." . . . In the summer of 1936 a representative of Ford paid a visit to the well-known Stakhanovite, A. Busigin, who rested then at the spa Lagry. He told Busigin: "I am instructed by Ford, Mr. Busigin, to hire you for work at his Detroit plant. You will receive the best possible conditions. We shall cover you with gold."

"Tell Ford," answered Busigin, "that a Soviet worker does not sell himself for gold. I work for the Soviet people and my great country and will serve them my whole life. I shall not work in order to fill the pockets of capitalists with money. As to good conditions of existence I have them here in my own country." . . . To prevent transfer abroad of the scientific discoveries made in the Soviet Union and to vindicate Soviet priority in the scientific discoveries is an integral part of the general task of defending our country and the socialist Fatherland against the hostile forces of the capitalist world. . . . It is the duty of every Soviet scientist to deliver to the Soviet State and our country the results of his whole research and to protect his discoveries from the foreign intelligence services. . . .²⁸

Western industries and sciences have progressed surprisingly despite the proud refusals of Russian patriots to share the secrets of their discoveries and inventions.

An editorial in the *Bol'shevik* complained also of Russian discoveries and inventions having been stolen by foreigners:

The great Russian scientists were robbed by foreigners who criminally misappropriated the discoveries made by the Russians. This happened to the discovery of Lomonosov in chemistry which was attributed to Lavoisier; such was the fate of the invention of radio by Popov which was stolen by the Italian

Marconi, and of the invention of Yablochkov of the electric bulb, etc., etc.²⁹

THE PARTY MORAL OUTLOOK

Hostility toward the West, its political structure, and its culture, is meant to arm the Soviet citizen morally for his mission of spreading the revolution throughout the world. Actually the Party openly subordinates all moral considerations to its basic hostility to the foreign world. In an article devoted to the problems of Marxist-Leninist ethics the *Bolshevik* said:

The Marxist theory of morality asserts that the moral rule does not possess an absolute value either throughout several successive historical periods or within the same epoch as long as there subsist antagonistic classes. The moral rule is neither perpetual nor immovable; it does not have a universal meaning in a society split into classes. . . .³⁰

The moral rules having only a relative value, the same act may be moral if it benefits the Soviet Union, and immoral if it is harmful to the USSR.

War itself is considered evil when waged by foreign states but becomes a moral enterprise when fought by the Soviet Union:

Leninism teaches that wars are just when they are waged for the liberation of peoples from their class or national servitude, and that they are unjust when they have for a purpose the annexation and the deprivation of freedom of foreign countries and foreign nations. . . . Moral is everything that serves the liberating struggle of nations and the class-emancipating struggle of the toilers, while everything that serves reaction is immoral. . . .³¹

Thus, an insurrection of a subjugated nationality against a colonial power, especially if directed by Communists, is just, but a revolt of a non-Russian nationality against its Soviet masters would be unjust and brutally punished as in the case of Hungary.

Another aspect of Communist morality is the entire subordination of the individual to the community or, to be more realistic, to a few other individuals controlling the society:

. . . morality is everything that serves the purpose of the emancipation from exploitation; the achievement of that emancipation is impossible without individuals serving the collectivity and the masses. . . . This requires the individual to offer his forces, time, and means to the general cause and in case of necessity even his life for the sake of the general interest. . . .³²

The exponent of the Communist moral philosophy ends by opposing the exclusive Soviet patriotism to a general love of mankind as though non-Communists were not human beings deserving moral consideration:

The Communist morality includes a limitless love of the Fatherland which is filled with a conscious feeling of national pride, courage in its defense, invincibility in battle, pitilessness regarding the enemies of the Fatherland and the people, and self-devotion to the interests of socialism and the socialist Fatherland, going as far as self-immolation. . . . Every Soviet patriot should be instilled with the spirit of the Bolshevik Party orientation, rejecting the so-called "all-human" point of view, which is only a fiction as long as the world is split into the forces of progress and those of reaction, and should determine always and everywhere his conduct by remaining boundlessly and unconditionally faithful to the interests of the Soviet Fatherland and those of Communism. . . .³³

This fanatical outburst of hatred demonstrates the paradox of our age. The nineteenth century reformers, including Marx and Engels, intended to show the road to greater human happiness on earth. Their followers, fascinated, sincerely or not, by the mirage of the earthly paradise, have lost sight of the living reality—the individual. The image of a future happy mankind has made the individual and his personal happiness invisible behind a haze of formulas and theories. The individual has become only an obstacle to a vague "bright" future of mankind, which must necessarily be composed, after all, of individuals.

COSMOPOLITANISM—RUSSIAN NATIONALISM VERSUS INTERNATIONALISM

A "terrible disease" which ravaged the minds of many Soviet intellectuals was that of "cosmopolitanism." A cosmopolitan (literally, a citizen of the world) was, in Soviet usage, a person interested in Western cultural life, lacking intense nationalistic Russian feeling. According to the Soviet philosophical view *Voprosy Filosofii*:

Cosmopolitanism is a reactionary ideology preaching renunciation of national traditions, disdain for the distinguishing features in the national development of each people, and renunciation of the feelings of national dignity and national pride. . . . [It] is hostile to, and radically contradicts, Soviet patriotism—the basic feature which characterizes the world outlook of the Soviet man. . . .³⁴

Soviet patriotism has its hard core in Russian nationalism, which *Voprosy Filosofii* also stressed:

All the peoples of the Soviet Union recognize and appreciate the tremendous historical mission which the great Russian people are performing, as the outstanding people of the Soviet fraternity of nations. The Russian people are the most numerous in the Soviet Union. But this is not the core of the matter by far, although this circumstance itself has significance. The Russian people have the richest history. In the course of this history it has created the richest culture, and all other countries of the world have drawn upon it and continue to draw upon it to this day. . . .³⁵

To live isolated in their own world is easier for nationalists who believe that their particular nation might carry on alone without cultural intercourse. The Party thought that the absurd proposition of isolation should be made more palatable by rewriting the history of Russian culture and by proving that the Russians had never owed much to the West. It was necessary, too, to formulate an even more absurd proposition which negated the idea of world science transcending national boundaries. The Party proposed that each nation develop its own science autonomously and independently of other nations. Of course, Russian science had to become the most independent in its evolution and superior to other national sciences; hence the need of claiming scientific priorities. The *Voprosy Filosofii* declaimed this aspect of the problem:

It is necessary to remember that the struggle against cosmopolitanism and national nihilism in science takes the form, in particular, of a struggle for national priority in scientific discoveries made by the representatives of individual peoples and nations. Science in any country exists and develops not as faceless "universal" ideas and concepts lacking in nationality, but in definite national form indissolubly linked with the whole history of that particular country and its people. . . . Soviet historians of science must firmly defend the priority of their Fatherland's scholars, a priority trampled by our enemies with the toleration and sometimes even with the cooperation of some of our people who bowed before these enemies. . . . The tendency to understate the value of Russian culture is closely connected with grovelling before Western bourgeois culture.³⁶

Stalin and his propagandists seemed to forget that their proposition that each national science developed allegedly independently of other national sciences contradicted the basic Marxist tenet. If science is

supposed by Marxists to be one of the elements of the superstructure whose content is determined by the economic basis, they could talk about the science of the slave-owning period, feudal, capitalist, or socialist science, but they were hardly logical in pretending that each nation safeguarded the continuity of its own science throughout all economic periods. However, the Soviet Marxists formulated such an un-Marxian claim. For a non-Marxist both propositions seem equally absurd, but this is another matter. Why should one consider Madame M. Curie as a product of capitalist society or of Polish national culture, or Newton as the necessary result of a capitalist economic basis or of English national science, or Pasteur as being predetermined in his research by a capitalist environment or by his French nationality?

The Party abandoned in the post-Stalinist period most of the former claims to the priorities in scientific inventions.

But if nationalism opposes cosmopolitanism, it is considered the monopolistic privilege of the Russian nation. It is withheld from the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union, from the satellite countries under Russian control, and from foreign Communists. For those people there is a different slogan—internationalism—which means in practice loyalty to a foreign state—the Soviet Union. *Pravda* defined this duty of the so-called progressive foreigners, who must not be nationalists in their own countries:

The most vivid and effective criterion of proletarian internationalism is readiness to defend the Soviet Union with every ounce of strength, to fight in every way for its well-being, and to ensure the conditions necessary for its unhampered and triumphant progress toward Communism. . . . The USSR is the beacon and hope of all the exploited classes of the bourgeois world and the oppressed peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. . . . By virtue of this, the attitude taken toward the USSR—the first country of victorious socialism—is the chief criterion of the progressiveness or reaction of various public figures, social groups, parties and classes. . . .³⁷

While Russians are encouraged to become nationalists of their own country, “progressive” aliens are openly asked to prefer the interests of a foreign state, actually a state serving Russian interests, to those of their own nation. Dissident Communists of the Eastern-European countries and the Chinese Communists have discovered that there might be a clash between the national interests of the Soviet Union and those of other Communist nations. However, foreign Communists are asked to defend a foreign state, even if it is equivalent

to betraying the interests of their own nations. The late G. M. Dimitrov, former prime minister of Bulgaria, illustrated this peculiar situation by calling upon his countrymen to be not nationalists but internationalists: "The people's democracy is for internationalism. Nationalism is incompatible with the people's democracy. . . . We consider that nationalism, no matter what mask it hides behind, is the foe of Communism."³⁸

Dimitrov had the time to learn the true meaning of such internationalism. He wanted to build up a Balkan federation of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, negotiated the matter with Tito at a time when Tito was still in the good graces of Moscow, and was severely rebuked by the Soviet Government, which did not see any Russian interest in strengthening Balkan satellites by a federation. He had to recant and to abandon his plans, which did not suit Russian imperialism in the Balkans, while Tito was for this and other sins expelled from the Cominform as a heretic.

NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION—THE CASES OF TADJIKS, KAZAKHS, TURKMENIANS, UZBEKS, UKRAINIANS, JEWS

The Party "Russian first" attitude makes one wonder what its policy is toward that other 40 percent of the Soviet population, those people who have not had the privilege of being born of Russian parents. Are they encouraged to be proud of their countries of birth—the Ukraine, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaidjan, Kazakhstan, and others? The Party clearly says No.

It is the traditional doctrine of the Party that the question of nationalities and their self-determination should be envisaged from the point of view of the socialist revolution. Thus, a national movement of self-determination that aims at the emancipation of a colonial nation and weakening of a Western colonial empire is to be supported by the Communists, while a similar trend within the Soviet multinational State should be ruthlessly suppressed because it would involve undermining the bastion of world revolution. This opportunist view was familiar to Lenin, who could not be accused of being a Russian nationalist. But once he had become head of the Soviet government, he and his colleagues appealed to the subjugated nations, especially in Asia, to revolt against the Western Powers, while they ordered Soviet troops to invade the Baltic nations and Poland in a fruitless attempt to get those nations within the Soviet State. Georgia, which had proclaimed her independence of Russia, was conquered *manu militari* in 1921 by Leninist troops. These same troops had also

occupied the Iranian province of Ghilan for over a year until the Iranian government was forced to sign a political treaty with the Leninist Government, granting Russia the right to move troops into Northern Iran whenever the forces of another power should land in Southern Iran. Lenin wished to subordinate the self-determination of nations to a cause he deemed superior: the strength of the Soviet State, itself a preliminary condition of conferring the "benefits" of a socialist revolution upon the whole world.

The same thesis sounds different today. The Soviet State is that of Russian nationalism. The nations controlled by that State are in fact subjects of the Russian nation. Obsolete Leninist slogans cannot hide the real subordination of non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union to their present master, the Russian nation. History has come full circle back to the situation familiar in Imperial days.

In 1950 *Boľshevik* presented the authentic version of the current Soviet approach to the problem of nationalities:

. . . It is necessary to approach the problem of the right of nations to self-determination, including secession, and the question of the expediency of secession from the point of view of the class warfare of the proletariat. Each nation may organize her life as she wants; she is sovereign. But the working class which safeguards its own independent class position educates the toilers and influences the nation so as to make her organize her life in accordance with the tasks imposed by the struggle for Communism and with the interests of the class warfare of the proletariat.³⁹

If one substitutes for "the working class," "the Communist Party," one may understand the obtuse language of the quoted paragraph. The Communists must prevent the development of any separatist movement in Soviet territory.

Non-Russian Communists must also remember the superiority of the Russian nation:

The great Russian people, who have merited general admiration as the most outstanding nation and the leading force among all the nations of the USSR, have played an exceptionally important role in the organization and consolidation of the friendship and cooperation among the nationalities of the USSR.⁴⁰

The other nationalities are faced with the thinly veiled threat that any of them could be refused to be considered a distinct nation because the Soviet definition of a nation is extremely flexible:

Comrade Stalin provided us with a perfect definition of the nation which he formulated in his *National Problem and Lenin-*

ism: "The Russian Marxists have for a long time had their own theory of nationality. According to it, a nation is a firmly established group of people which has been created throughout centuries and which arose out of the community of four fundamental factors: community of language, community of territorial habitat, community of the economic life, and community of mentality which has been reflected in the whole complex of particular peculiarities of the national culture" (*Works*, Vol. II, p. 333). . . . The absence of one of these factors is enough for a nation to cease to be a nation.⁴¹

The community's lack of territorial habitat makes the Soviet Communists refuse to Russian Jews the right to call themselves a nationality. Community of economic life or of mentality is liable to all sorts of interpretations, which might imply danger to the non-Russian nationalities, some of which might be declared one day to be part of the great Russian nation.

This fear may not be empty if one considers the present attitude of the Party toward the non-Russian nationalities and contrasts it with the full encouragement of Russian nationalism. The Party seems to be particularly sensitive to the potential danger of the national aspirations of the Ukrainians and those nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia which gravitated until the Revolution toward the orbit of Moslem culture.

Espousing the familiar theme of all colonial nations about the blessings they have conferred upon the subjugated nations by bringing them "higher culture," the Party organ says:

. . . In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the nations of the Caucasus were urgently faced with the question of their further fate. They could have been engulfed and enslaved by the backward and feudal Turkey and Iran, or could have been annexed by Russia. Russian annexation was for them the only possible road to their economic and cultural development. . . . Notwithstanding the arbitrariness and cruelty of the Tsarist colonizers, Russia's annexation of the Caucasus played a positive and progressive role in the history of the Caucasian nations. The proximity of the Russian nation, the common struggle together with the Russian workers and peasants against Tsardom and its autocracy, sharing in the leading Russian culture, contacts with the representatives of progressive Russian revolutionary social thought, promoted the uplifting of the material and spiritual culture of the Caucasian nations and provided the stimulus for the development of the revolutionary movement among them. . . .⁴²

The *Kommunist* (formerly *Boľshevik*) noted in January, 1953, a

decided improvement in the way the historian B. G. Gafurov presented the history of the Tadjiks. The Party criticized him for the first edition of his book *History of the Tadjik Nation*, published in 1949. The second corrected edition, which appeared in 1952, deserved the praises of the *Kommunist* because: "B. G. Gafurov paid due attention to the criticism addressed to his book and changed it greatly, while preparing it for the second edition, by clarifying some of his arguments and amending several of his opinions."⁴³ Gafurov, who had considered in 1949 that the native insurrections against Russia in 1898 and 1916 had been "national-liberating," amended his views in 1952 and declared these revolts to have been feudal-nationalistic. Native movements against Russia had to be considered reactionary from the Party point of view, and the following formula was the only one to be used: "The local reactionary forces—the Moslem reactionary clergy, the bourgeois nationalists and feudal people—tried [in 1916] to set the backward elements among the Tadjiks, the Uzbeks, and other peoples of Central Asia against the Russian nation."⁴⁴ The reviewer said with satisfaction: "The scientific value of the book has gained greatly as a consequence of the immense work the author did in revising it for the second edition."⁴⁵ The source of satisfaction was disclosed a few lines below:

The book analyzes the deep historical roots of the friendly ties between the Central Asiatic nations and the great Russian nation and stresses the progressive significance of the annexation to Russia of Central Asia, in particular for the history of the Tadjik nation. . . . This annexation to Russia provided the Central Asiatic nations with the opportunity of participating in the leading culture of the Russian nation. . . .⁴⁶

After giving the Tadjiks the inexpensive gift of crediting their origin to the great Persian poet Firdousi (939–1020), and the famous Arab philosopher and physician Avicenna (980–1037), the *Kommunist* condemned all the Tadjik patriots of our century by stating: "The author has disclosed the class roots of the bourgeois nationalism and has proved that since its inception the bourgeois nationalism was hostile to the Tadjik people and that the nationalists were selling out the interests of the people and were ready to serve the foreign intelligence services."⁴⁷

The same story may be told about other Moslem nations. An epic of the Turkmenian nation, *Korkut Ata*, was denounced as being a reactionary feudal poem. A Turkmenian poet, K. Kurbandsakhatov, was criticized for his poem "Thou Art a Turkman" because "he glossed over the historical fact that only the annexation to Russia saved the Turkmenian people from age-long slavery and complete ruin, and that

only thanks to the October Socialist Revolution and the Soviet regime were the Turkmenian people able to begin a new life and to achieve a great success in the economic and cultural development."⁴⁸

The colonialist attitude of the Russian Communists toward other Soviet nationalities may largely explain the anti-Jewish trend in the contemporary Soviet policies. The Jewish problem is more complicated, though. With the Jews the Party fights two evils: the "bourgeois" nationalism which might be shown by some of the Soviet Jews and the temptation to sympathize with organizations located beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union and thus outside the Party control, such as the Israeli State and Zionism. No Soviet citizen may have ties with foreign centers. This point was made clear by *Literaturnaya Gazeta*: "In whatever clothes it is arrayed, whatever its pseudonym, whether the guise be pan-Americanism, Catholicism, Zionism, or any other name, cosmopolitanism actively serves the interests of imperialist reaction."⁴⁹ One cannot detect, however, in Soviet sources any trace of a racial anti-Semitism. From the religious point of view the Jews are treated as badly as other believers. But they, like the Ukrainians, Turkmenians, Uzbeks, and others, are forbidden to indulge in the pride of national descent.

Stalin's policy of encouraging Russian nationalism and suppressing the symptoms of national feeling among the non-Russian nationalities continues as before, after a short intermission which followed his death and preceded Beria's downfall. *Pravda* in its article of July 10, 1953, the first devoted to the Beria affair, accused the fallen leader of both crimes—distortions of Party nationality policy and sabotage of its agricultural policy. It said:

. . . Beria tried by diverse treacherous means to subvert the friendship among the nations of the USSR, this friendship being the main foundation of the multi-national socialist State and the principal condition of all successes of the brotherly Soviet Republics; he tried to sow discord among the nations of the USSR and to revive the bourgeois-nationalist elements in the Soviet Republics. . . . It is the sacred duty of the Party . . . to continue the decisive and uncompromising fight against all symptoms of bourgeois nationalism.⁵⁰

"Bourgeois nationalism" means non-Russian patriotism.

The return to the Stalinist concept of submissive nationalities grouped around their master—the Russian nation—produced in August, 1953, new oaths of loyalty on the part of the representatives of non-Russian national groups. Those loyalty affirmations were made

on the occasion of the summer session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and were couched in much the same terms as similar statements made in Stalin's lifetime.

If one wanted to have proof of the continuation by Stalin's heirs of his nationalist policy, he could find it, among other places, in *Pravda* of April 13, 1954. The daily mouthpiece of the Party then paid glowing homage to the Tsarist Admiral S. O. Makarov, who had served his absolutist sovereigns for many decades until he perished with his flagship on April 13, 1904, during the war with Japan. *Pravda's* article appeared on the occasion of the anniversary of his death. Of course, *Pravda* could not mention any sympathies of this loyal servant of the Tsars for the political activities which had led to the Revolution of 1905. His title to glory was to be sought elsewhere, namely in his devoted service to the country, whatever the ruling regime was at the time. Thus, the Communist *Pravda* concluded its moving homage to the Tsarist Admiral, who would have court-martialed any Communist found among his sailors, by the following words: "The Soviet Armed Forces and the whole Soviet people piously revere the memory of the great Russian patriot who died at his battle station."⁵¹

THE COMMUNIST APPEAL TO COLONIAL NATIONS

Russian nationalism with its counterpart of persecutions of non-Russian patriots among the Soviet citizens might harm the Soviet chances of winning the sympathies of colonial nationalities. In any event, the Party has two ideological weapons: the Marxist-Leninist slogans addressed to the workers and poor peasants and, more powerful, the slogan of liberation for colonial or semicolonial nations. The explosive potentialities of nationalism have been proved in our time. Nationalism and nations' assertions of their right to self-determination and independence have greatly changed the political map of Europe throughout the last hundred years and that of Asia and Africa during the postwar years. The Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party have stressed the slogans of the liberation of colonial nationalities ever since the October Revolution. They were frustrated bitterly whenever the colonial powers reconciled themselves to the inevitable and granted independence to the colonial nations, as for instance, in the Near East, India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, and most of Africa, where non-Communist local governments took over the succession. But the process of self-determination is not yet ended, and the Communists continue to be able to fish in troubled waters.

It was Lenin who was the first to link the progress of the revolution with the cause of the colonial nations. In his booklet *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, written in 1916, he said:

Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world by a handful of "advanced" countries. . . . The world has become divided into a handful of usurer States and a vast majority of debtor States. . . .⁵²

While Marx had divided each nation into two classes, the exploiters and the exploited, Lenin formulated a more explosive theory of dividing mankind into two groups: the rich and the exploited nations (the haves and the have-nots). Thus he raised the banner of the underdog nationalities in the underdeveloped countries.

Lenin endowed the Party and the Soviet State with a forceful weapon which could be used against the Western Powers whenever they failed to show sufficient understanding of the power of modern nationalism among non-Europeans. This weapon may, however, become blunted when the colonial nationalities understand that the USSR has herself become a colonial power much more ruthless than others. Her current policy of oppression of the subjugated nationalities of the Soviet Union, including the Asian populations of Russia, and her domineering policy in the European satellite countries might result in the bankruptcy of her policy of appealing to the foreign colonial nations. Her duplicity is visible. Like Janus she has two faces—she is the colonial oppressor of the Ukrainians, the Poles, the Czechoslovaks, the Hungarians, the Kazakhs, the Uzbeks, the Azerbaidjanis, and many others, and she masquerades as an ally of those Asians and Africans who are still controlled by the Western Powers or have quarrels with the same Powers. The Asians and Africans might be frightened one day by the other face of the Soviet Janus, who might turn from an ally into a new colonial master.

NOTES

1. S. Kovalev, *O Natsional'noi Gordosti Sovetskikh Liudei*, State Publishing House of Political Literature (Moscow, 1950).

2. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 28, 29, 36, 41, 42, and 63.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
11. Mikhail Sholokhov in *Pravda*, May 24, 1949.
12. *Pravda*, June 5, 1949.
13. M. N. Pokrovskii, *Brief History of Russia*, International Publishers, New York, 1933, Vol. I, p. 5.
14. *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 12, December, 1948.
15. N. Yakovlev, "O prepodavanii otechestvennoi istorii," in *Bol'shevik*, November, 1947, No. 22, pp. 26-37.
16. *Loc. cit.*
17. A. M. Pankratova, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 39.
18. N. Yakovlev, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.
21. A. M. Pankratova, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 145-147.
22. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 16, 28.
23. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 39.
24. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 57.
25. K. Paustovskii, "Film o Slave Russkovo Flota," in *Pravda*, April 24, 1953, p. 3.
26. A. M. Pankratova, "Druzhiba Narodov—Velikaia Sila v Bor'be za Kommunizm," in *Pravda*, April 27, 1953.
27. A. Ya. Vyshinskii, "Sovetskii patriotizm i yevo velikaia sila," in *Bol'shevik*, September, 1947, No. 18, pp. 26-38.
28. *Loc. cit.*
29. "Vospitaniie sovetskovo patriotizma vazhneishaia zadacha ideologicheskoi raboty," in *Bol'shevik*, July, 1947, No. 14, pp. 1-8.
30. G. Gak, "Voprosy etiki v Marksistsko-Leninskom mirovoznrenii," *Bol'shevik*, May, 1948, No. 9, pp. 25-40.
31. *Loc. cit.*
32. *Loc. cit.*
33. *Loc. cit.*
34. *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 2, 1948.
35. *Loc. cit.*
36. *Loc. cit.*
37. D. Shepilov in *Pravda*, May 30, 1949.
38. Quoted in *Pravda*, December 21, 1948.
39. A. Aziian, "Razvitie tovarishchem Stalinyim marksistsko-leninskoi teorii po natsional'nomu voprosu," in *Bol'shevik*, February, 1950, No. 3, pp. 21-36.
40. *Loc. cit.*
41. *Loc. cit.*
42. M. D. Bagirov, "K voprosu o kharaktere dvizheniia Miuridizma i Shamila," in *Bol'shevik*, July, 1950, No. 13, pp. 21-37.
43. A. Yakubovskii, "Ser'ioznoe issledovanie po istorii tadjikskovo naroda," in *Kommunist*, January, 1953, No. 1, p. 103.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

48. *Izvestiia*, February 12, 1952.
49. A. Yelistratova in *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, March 2, 1949.
50. "Nesokrushimoe edinenie partii, pravitel'stva, sovetskovo naroda," in *Pravda*, July 10, 1953.
51. "Admiral S. O. Makarov," *Pravda*, April 13, 1954.
52. V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Foreign Languages Publishing House (Moscow, 1940), pp. 13, 163, 168, and 196.

Part Two: The Citizen and the State

CHAPTER ONE

The State and the Party

A REGIME nowadays is judged from two points of view: the political and the socioeconomic. How much influence the individual citizen has upon his government is a matter of political democracy. What actual guarantees are offered to every citizen for equal opportunity and a minimum existence (a highly relative question, depending on the time and place) is a question related to the so-called social democracy. Today a political democracy which does not provide some answers to such questions as full employment, minimum wages, social insurance for the old, the sick, the disabled, and equal opportunity for every child to acquire an education, can be very vulnerable to criticism. On the other hand, it must be understood that social democracy means only greater equality at the beginning of life and minimum security for everyone, not equality as to how far each individual can go by his own ability.

The guiding idea is that every newborn citizen should have equal opportunity, as far as possible, to move to a higher social status than his parents if he has the ability. Free education and stipends help solve the problem. If an individual remains in the low income brackets, he is to be protected against misery by social insurance. Social democracy can be achieved by a totalitarian regime as well as by a political democracy. The citizen of a political democracy, however, has a powerful weapon—the ballot. In a totalitarian state he must rely on the good will of the ruling professional politicians. This is an extremely important point of interest to the common man.

Does the Soviet regime provide an adequate solution to the problem of social democracy? This is the subject of the following two parts of this book. The present part is devoted to the other major question: Do Soviet citizens enjoy the benefits of a political democracy?

SOVIET ELECTIONS

Political democracy means that the citizens have the decisive voice as to the composition of their government and thus may influence the policies of their country. Since a free ballot means a definite term of office for the ruling political group, the professional politicians cannot be sure of having their mandate renewed. The need to face the electorate at fixed intervals creates a feeling of responsibility. On the contrary, if a ruling group has a monopoly of power and may not legally be displaced by the ballot, they feel no responsibility to their countrymen—except as they fear a revolution or a coup that could overthrow them. To say that they are responsible to God, to history, to the future generations of their nation, or to their ideology—as totalitarian politicians often say—is nothing but an indefinite responsibility toward their individual consciences. They remain the sole judges of what is good for the nation. They may be tempted to visualize this good in terms of some millennium for future generations and forget in the process the well-being of their contemporaries. Any sacrifices may be asked from the living generation, whose opinion is not requested. The common man becomes a tool of state policy, while in a political democracy he is conceived as its end.

The Soviet regime leaves unanswered the question of whether living Soviet citizens consent to all the means of achieving the grandiose goal of industrialization. A peasant might prefer private husbandry to a collective farm or he might like to transfer to industry voluntarily. A worker might prefer to bargain through free unions about his working conditions. An educated man might prefer freedom of thought. Perhaps all these would like to consolidate the Soviet international position without further expansion. But they have nothing to say about these vital matters.

The free ballot becomes meaningful only when there is a choice between two or more sets of rival politicians. The free ballot is further indissolubly connected with the right of association for the defense of particular interests and beliefs.

In turn, the freedom of association would be largely meaningless without freedom of expression, be it in a private conversation, in the press, or at a public meeting. Though a new idea is not always a good idea, political or social progress depends on the propagation of new ideas by non-conformists, whose very existence is ruled out by a totalitarian regime.

A society runs the danger of becoming ideologically petrified unless

it provides the citizen with the right to replace one government by another, and gives the present minorities a fair chance to become by peaceful means future majorities. A totalitarian regime permits no such flexibility. It lives by one pattern of thought, imposed by the ruling group.

The English say that a free government is better than an efficient one. Not that a free government is necessarily inefficient. The combination of freedom and efficiency is the product of political maturity. It is obvious, however, that a totalitarian regime can enforce more effectively the sacrifices required for the attainment of a distant goal. This is the reason why a nation without a secure tradition of political freedom, pressed by the need for rapid development, may be tempted to rely on a totalitarian group.

It is a matter of personal tradition and preference whether one considers the attainment of any goal worth the price of individual freedom. But there is another aspect. Men are liable to error. The individual who chooses an effective but not free government abandons his right to check the errors of the government or ask another set of politicians to correct them. He further relinquishes his right to affect the means employed for the attainment of the set goals. What the price of an "effective" government may become can be seen in the wartime destruction of Germany.

Once a group of professional politicians seizes power with the determination to keep it forever—save for violent overthrow—it must act on the presumption that it is infallible. Otherwise, it should accept criticism and free elections. The false dogma of infallibility rests on the assumption that some men are born superior, with the innate ability to know what is best for the country at all times. They even pretend to be the sole judges of their own infallibility. But being mortals they are liable to error. When they do err, their countrymen pay the penalty.

It is a matter of historical record that no free government may expect to have unanimous support. Since there is no uniformity of human minds—much less of human interests and beliefs—individuals are bound to have different opinions. As long as they are free to express their beliefs, the results at the polls can hardly be expected to be unanimous. Yet the Soviet elections are the only ones whose results may be predicted with mathematical precision years in advance.

Soviet leaders call the strangely unanimous results of all elections the proof of the political unanimity of the Soviet society. One would have to believe in miracles in social matters to take this statement at face value. The explanation is much simpler. In these elections

there are no counter-candidates and none of the prerequisites for a free exercise of the right to vote. However, Stalin, commenting on the results of several elections held under the Constitution of 1936—in his opinion, “the most democratic in the world”—called the uniform results of 99 plus percent “the most exemplary.” It remains, of course, a debatable question what one understands by exemplary elections—the free or the unanimous. And if “the Soviet elections are the brilliant demonstration of the socialist democracy in action,” one might also have some doubts about the virtues of the Soviet democracy.

The criterion of unanimity—a 99 percent majority—has been faithfully enforced in all postwar Soviet elections. The editorial board of the leading Soviet law review made the following comment on the 1950 elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR when 99.98 percent of the electors participated, with 99.73 percent of the ballots cast for the candidates of the single list:

Not one country in the world knows such a unanimous participation of the population in the elections; not one ruling party in the bourgeois states has ever had nor has now such powerful support in the nation as has the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.¹

It is fortunate that political parties in the democratic countries are unable to show 99 percent majorities in elections. Actually, Soviet elections are not political contests but great festivals where the actual balloting plays a minor role. The same law review is right when it says: “It has been known for a long time that the elections in the USSR are not just a political campaign but an all-national festival, a day of a true all-national triumph.” Triumph for the Party, and possibly welcome intermissions in the monotonous life of the people.

The following quotations indicate the extent of political “unanimity.”

On December 17 and 24, 1950, elections were held. . . . The published results . . . prove that almost all the electors who participated in the elections unanimously cast their ballots for the candidates of the Communist-non-Party Bloc. For instance, 99.97 percent of the electors actually took part in the elections . . . 99.60 percent cast their votes for the candidates of the Communist-non-Party Bloc. . . .²

“Unanimity” is more difficult to attain in a multinational state such as the Soviet Union. Yet in that country miracles accompany all elections. The percentages of votes cast in favor of the single slate of

candidates in the elections of 1950 were as follows: RSFSR—99.76; Ukrainian SSR—99.91; White Russian SSR—99.92; Uzbek SSR—99.92; Kazakh SSR—99.82; Kirghiz SSR—99.77; Turkmenian SSR—99.89; Estonian SSR—99.85.

The elections of 1950 and 1951 covered all deliberative bodies from modest village soviets to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Yet, there was not the slightest variation in the percentages of participation or of the favorable votes cast for official candidates.

The same electoral pattern was reproduced in 1958 elections to the Federal Supreme Soviet. The Party-Bloc candidates were elected to the Soviet of Nationalities by the quasi-unanimity of 99.73 percent and to the Soviet of the Union by an equal unanimity of 99.57 percent.

The latest electoral results in 1962 and 1963 again conformed to the pattern which Stalin had set up. In March, 1962, the two houses of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were elected. The official results were as follows: 99.95 percent of registered voters (they numbered just over 140 million) cast their ballots. The Party-sponsored candidates to the Soviet of the Union received 99.47 percent of votes; those to the Soviet of Nationalities, 99.60 percent. The Central Electoral Commission proudly announced that all the candidates had been elected.³ One year later, in March, 1963, elections were held to the Supreme Soviets of Union Republics. Soviet electors did not disappoint the Party expectations. On the average over 99.5 percent of registered voters took part in the elections, and over 99.5 percent cast their ballots for the candidates of the Party and non-Party Bloc. *Pravda* called these results a proof of the monolithic unity of the Party and the Soviet people.⁴

It is easy for a totalitarian regime to obtain such results. Abstention, of course, would be interpreted as an act of disloyalty. It is much more difficult to understand the "unanimity." The ballot is secret. How are these invariably uniform results obtained? It is true that carefully selected Party members form the Electoral Commissions that count the ballots. They may have instructions to report a definite percentage of votes. But it was apparently indecent to report even one unfavorable vote cast against Stalin, who was always elected with 100 percent unanimity. Another intriguing question is, Who are the few heroic nonconformists who vote against the single slate of candidates? Probably these infinitesimal percentages of unfavorable votes are added just to give a democratic flavor to the Soviet elections.

Some Western commentators think that the real battle takes place at an earlier stage, when the candidates are nominated. If the nomina-

tion of a candidate could be an occasion for struggle between two or more citizens sponsored separately by various local organizations, this would be a kind of democracy. But this is not the case.

Article 141 of the Constitution says: "The right to nominate candidates is secured to . . . the Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, and cultural societies." This provision is reproduced in Article 57 of the present electoral law.⁵ There is nothing in the existing legislation that would prevent the various organizations from nominating different persons. In practice, however, all the local organizations in a constituency sponsor one and the same candidate from the beginning of the campaign. His name will first appear in the press as being the choice of one organization, not necessarily the Party. Later all other organizations and public meetings endorse him as the only "choice" offered to the electors.

This fact is acknowledged by the Soviet press. This is what *Izvestiia* wrote on November 11, 1950: "The nomination of the candidates . . . has become a new, powerful demonstration of the indestructible unity of the Soviet people. . . . The Soviet people nominate unanimously [*sic*] as candidates for deputies to the local soviets their best sons and daughters. . . ."

The process of nomination develops in three stages. First of all, a name (probably picked by the Party) is suggested at an electoral meeting held by one of the authorized organizations on the premises of an enterprise, or a collective farm, or by a local group of the Party, the trade unions, or the Communist Youth League. The second stage is the unanimous approval of the same name by a general meeting of delegates from the same organizations. The third stage consists in the registration of the candidate by the local electoral commission. The whole process takes place smoothly because the decisions are taken unanimously, and discussion is confined to praise of the selected person.

The minimum age of the Soviet elector is 18. The electoral right is denied to insane persons.

There is no requirement of residence. It is true that in any modern state a deputy to the national legislature is considered first of all as representing the interests of the nation, but he is also expected to express the views of his own constituency. This last consideration is disregarded in the Soviet Union for a very good reason. Soviet legislatures are mere rubberstamp bodies—no opposition is expected and the decisions are always taken unanimously. This is why Article 73 of the electoral law allows a Soviet citizen to vote where he may happen to be on election day, provided he has with him the absentee

voter's certificate, a requirement preventing him from casting more than one vote. Characteristically a passenger in a long-distance train may vote in the train, his vote then being included in the total of the constituency the train stops at next.

In December, 1950, when elections to local soviets (of a territory, a region, a district, a city, or a village) took place, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR outlined a polling system on long-distance trains for all passengers, irrespective of their residence. Here are a few major points of that system as reported in *Izvestiia* of December 8, 1950:

. . . The executive committee of the district, city, or city district soviets at the location of a junction railroad station or at another important station, organize . . . electoral precincts on the long-distance passenger trains and include these precincts within the electoral constituencies. . . . After the collection of the electoral ballots from all passengers who have certificates entitling them to vote, the precinct electoral commission declares the polling ended, proceeds to the counting of ballots, and immediately informs the district electoral commission of the results. . . .

This interesting procedure means simply that a complete stranger, who knows nothing about the candidates of a particular constituency and cares little about the local affairs of a region, a district, or a city, may nevertheless vote on local elections only because his train happens to be passing through the area. In any country with free elections such a procedure would be bizarre. In the Soviet Union it is without any practical consequences. Both the passenger of the train and the resident of a constituency receive a ballot with the name of the sole candidate printed on it. They both return the ballot intact. The election of the single official candidate for each office holds no surprises. It is certain before the polls open. It does not make any difference if a stranger to the region, district, or city is granted the innocent pleasure of solemnly dropping the printed ballot, which he is not expected to alter, in a box located on a train. After all, the elections are not meant to decide anything, but to provide a festival for the population.

While Article 135 of the Constitution requires the age of 23 for eligibility to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Republican electoral laws lower the age requirement to 21 (Article 3) for the lower-rank soviets. Women have equal electoral rights, while members of the Armed Forces have the right to vote and to be elected. Aliens, even the members of foreign Communist parties, have no electoral rights.

The registers of the electors are kept by the executive committees of the local soviets and are posted 30 days before elections. Those who expect to be away on election day are given an absentee voter's certificate, which entitles them to vote in any constituency of the Soviet Union they expect to be in on election day.

Electoral commissions supervise the elections. The nomination of their members follows the same pattern as that of the candidates to elective posts. The names are picked by the Party, suggested by its members to the various local organizations, and finally approved unanimously and nominated formally at a joint meeting. To prevent the appointment of an undesirable person, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of a Republic or the executive committees of the local soviets, as the case may be, must approve the nominations.

The composition of the electoral commissions is very important. They count the ballots and produce the results of 0.49 percent or less of negative votes from the unknown heroes of the Soviet "opposition."

The Soviet system does not take any chances. The electoral commissions are also entrusted with the registration of the sole candidates whom the various organizations have nominated. The electoral commission may refuse to register the candidate. He then may appeal to the Central Electoral Commission, whose decision is final. The electoral laws do not specify any reasons required for refusal. This omission allows the Party to drop quietly an undesirable candidate by asking the electoral commission to refuse registration.

The registered candidate's name is printed on the electoral ballots. Once the registration is completed, the electoral campaign begins. There perhaps lies the key to understanding Soviet elections. They are not intended to decide anything but to provide the Party with a period of intense propaganda for its own policy. Public opinion under a totalitarian regime may be silent but it does exist. The ruling politicians must ensure the passivity, at least, of the population if not its active support by, say, the greater productivity of labor. The propaganda of the electoral period is hardly connected with the person of the candidate, whose election is a foregone conclusion. Rather it works in favor of the official policy. Article 61 of the Russian electoral law says: "Each organization . . . as well as every citizen of the RSFSR, has the right of a free canvassing for the candidate, at the meetings, in the press, and otherwise according to Article 129 of the Constitution of the RSFSR." This statement candidly recognizes the nature of Soviet elections. Soviet citizens are granted every facility in canvassing for, but not against, the official candidate or in favor of a person who is not a registered candidate. This reflects the spirit of Soviet legislation concerning individual political freedoms.

Any occasion is good for stimulating "socialist competition," which is the regular feature of Soviet economic life. Elections provide such an occasion for the toilers to manifest their loyalty by pledging their "spontaneous" participation in the overfulfillment of the current production plan. In this sense the elections are meaningful for Soviet employees.

The propaganda of the electoral period is carefully organized. It is carried out by "an army of trustworthy agitators" selected by the various organizations. *Izvestiia* of November 25, 1950, explained the task of the agitators:

. . . Canvassing for the candidates for deputies to the local soviets, the trustworthy men, agitators and propagandists must bring forth to the toiling masses of the cities and villages the great ideas of the Lenin-Stalin Party, the ideas which unite our nation in the struggle for the new victories in the construction of Communism and for the strengthening of the might of our socialist Fatherland.

The same article assured that "in none of the bourgeois countries is there such a wide possibility for a truly free canvassing in favor of the candidate; such a possibility cannot exist there. This is possible only in the country of the victorious socialism." In a sense this statement is only too true, because in a democratic country the freedom of canvassing in favor of a candidate is limited by the freedom of others to canvass for his rival.

The electoral laws safeguard all the usual formalities of voting; separate booths are provided for placing the printed ballots in the envelope. According to official statistics, only an infinitesimal fraction of the electorate avails itself of the secrecy to cast negative or invalid ballots.

An elector may return the ballot intact at the polling station or strike off the name of the single candidate, registering a Nay. He may even invalidate the ballot by replacing the name of the candidate or adding another name.

Article 93 of the same electoral law is touching in the care it takes of events that practically never happen in Soviet elections. In the absence of an absolute majority of valid favorable votes, or if less than half of the registered voters cast their ballots, new elections must be held within two weeks. The only trouble is that there is only one candidate, who is always assured of over 99 percent favorable votes; and the attendance at the polls always exceeds 99 percent.

Successful candidates are not assured, however, of clear sailing. They are under constant pressure because Article 142 of the Constitu-

tion threatens them with recall by the majority of the electors of their constituency if they fail in their duties. It is easy for the Party to secure a 99 percent majority for the recall of a deputy who has displeased it, as it is easy for it to achieve the same majority for his election. If such an event occurs, by-elections take place within two weeks.

The spontaneous nomination of candidates put forward by private groups is ruled out because it "would be nonsensical . . . as a candidate without support on the part of the organized collectives of toilers would have no chance to be elected."⁶ The candidates may be either members of the Party or non-Party people who have not been admitted to this highly selective organization but who are devoted to the regime. In the words of Stalin, the difference between the two categories is only a "formal difference."⁷ This precludes the election of political opponents or religious believers, since only an atheist can be a Party-sponsored candidate.

THE SOVIETS—THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR

Once the various soviets (councils) are elected, they act as rubber-stamp agencies for the much smaller executive bodies although the Constitution—differing, as usual, with actual practice—states proudly in Article 3 that "all power . . . belongs to the people . . . as represented by the soviets. . . ." One might expect that each soviet has long, practically permanent sessions. But "the soviets are not, unlike the bourgeois parliaments, organs that sit for a significant part of the year."⁸ They meet only periodically for short sessions. There lies the crux of the matter. The deputies have only a few days to approve en bloc and unanimously the decisions of the executive organs and indulge in "criticism" of bureaucrats or officials with whom Party leaders have not been satisfied. Serious deliberations of any political significance are made impossible by the extreme brevity of the sessions.

According to articles 30, 44, 57, and 89 of the Constitution, "the highest organ of State power" in the USSR is the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; in a Union or an Autonomous Republic, their own Supreme Soviets; while at the lower levels "the organs of State power in territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities and rural localities . . . are the Soviets of the working people's deputies." Between the formal rights and the actual role of each soviet there is a wide discrepancy. Even the Supreme Soviet of the USSR meets annually for only two sessions of a week duration each. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR is composed of two chambers, the Soviet of the

Union, which resembles the United States House of Representatives, and the Soviet of Nationalities, which is somewhat the equivalent of the United States Senate. As their names imply, the former is deemed to represent the whole population at large, the latter the various national groups. Every constituency of 300,000 elects one deputy to the Soviet of the Union. The Soviet of Nationalities is composed of 25 deputies for each Union Republic, 11 for each Autonomous Republic, 5 for each Autonomous Region, and 1 deputy for each National Area.

The social composition of the Supreme Soviet is interesting. In 1937, 42 percent of the deputies were listed as workers, 29.5 percent as peasants, and 28.5 percent represented the intelligentsia. At the same time 64 nationalities were represented at the Soviet of Nationalities. In 1950 the largest percentage of deputies (48 percent) belonged to the intelligentsia—a proof of the growing influence of the new upper and middle classes—while the percentage of workers had been reduced to 32 percent and peasants to 20 percent. The ratio of the Party to non-Party deputies remains more or less constant, 2 non-Party deputies for every 10 Party members. This is not “an accident . . . because [the Party] represents . . . the leading nucleus of all the organizations, whether social or State.”⁹

A deputy, whether a Party member or not, is expected to follow the Party line. But the social composition of the Supreme Soviet is significant because it reflects the social stratification visible in any field of Soviet life. A closer look at the membership reveals that the portion of the intelligentsia is even larger than the above 48 percent. In 1950, 69.9 percent of the deputies had higher, incomplete higher, or secondary education.¹⁰

The preponderance of the intelligentsia remained marked in the next-to-last Supreme Soviet of the USSR, elected in March, 1958: 48.3 percent of deputies to the Soviet of Nationalities and 49.1 percent of those to the Soviet of the Union had a university or incomplete university education. The Party members dominated both chambers, as they represented three-fourths of the total. That the Party nominated only politically reliable persons for the posts of deputies was evidenced by the fact that more than 85 percent of the deputies were listed as having Soviet decorations.

Of course, one may argue that the aspirations of manual workers and peasants are more articulately presented by educated deputies. The Soviet authors do not think so, however, when it comes to criticizing a foreign labor party: “The top leadership of the Labor Party [in England] is composed two-thirds . . . of lawyers, officers,

professors, wealthy doctors, journalists, etc.”¹¹ Obviously this Soviet author cannot see the beam in his own eye.

The total membership of the present Supreme Soviet is 1,443 of whom 791 are deputies to the Soviet of the Union and 652 are deputies to the Soviet of Nationalities.

The formal powers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR make an imposing list. The two chambers have equal rights, both may initiate legislation, and they each decide by majority vote. The Supreme Soviet has exclusive legislative power, power to elect its Presidium (the collegiate head of the Soviet Union), the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court, and the Procurator General of the USSR; power to make war and conclude peace, ratify or denounce treaties, admit new republics to the Soviet Union; power to approve national economic plans, the budget, and establish taxes; and power to determine the basic principles of the organization of various aspects of Soviet life.

The Supreme Soviet is elected for four years and usually meets twice a year for short periods. In spite of its impressive “powers,” its work is expedited “unanimously” within one week.

The two houses of a newly elected Supreme Soviet elect during the first session their officers, committees, and at a joint session the Presidium for a four-year term. The Council of Ministers resigns at the beginning of the first session of a newly elected Supreme Soviet only to be reappointed unanimously, a few Ministers who have ceased to please the Party leaders being replaced.

The budget in a state with a completely nationalized economy is obviously a formidable document. The Soviet budget is, moreover, consolidated and includes Federal, Republican, and local budgets. Yet it is usually approved after five or six days’ discussion (the deputies on that occasion criticize one or another department and make suggestions in accordance with the wishes of the top Party leaders) and all the speakers “unanimously support the motion in favor of the approval of the State budget.”¹² Of course, the motion is carried unanimously. The Soviet legislature does not need to “waste” time on discussions and proceeds quickly and efficiently with its heavy agenda, accepting unanimously the successive motions. There is additional guarantee for unanimity. “In the Soviet parliament there is no secret vote.”¹³

The procedure of both houses is so well organized that the press communiqués relating to the simultaneous meetings of the two houses in many instances are practically interchangeable except for the names of the orators and the name of the house. Seeing them printed side by side in the Soviet press, one is impressed by the uncanny similarity.

Even the words used are identical. This is so because they refer to identical discussions, developing according to the same timetable.

The post-Stalinist period has brought about an improvement, namely a more active role of the commissions of the Supreme Soviet. Each house elects at the beginning of the four-year legislature the following commissions: the commission of mandates, the legislative, the budgetary, and that of foreign affairs. The Soviet of Nationalities appoints in addition an economic commission. These commissions of both houses meet more frequently than the Supreme Soviet itself, familiarize themselves with the governmental bills (there are no other bills) and with projects of the annual budget and the annual plan prior to the next session of the Supreme Soviet, hear the Ministers concerned, and, judging by the meager information in the Soviet press, engage in a friendly discussion. This discussion cannot be but friendly, as there is no opposition in the Supreme or any other Soviet. The main purpose of this discussion is not to change the governmental policies but to suggest improvements for their better implementation.

THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR— THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

More or less the same story could be told about the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics (the State legislatures) and the local soviets. One may ask who performs the normal functions of a legislature while the Supreme Soviet is not in session. The answer is that those functions are performed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a body composed of only 33 men elected at a joint meeting of both houses of the Supreme Soviet.

The composition of the Presidium is as follows: the Chairman (now L. I. Brezhnev, one of the top Party leaders), fifteen Vice-Chairmen, one for each Union Republic, the Secretary, and sixteen members. The present Presidium elected in April, 1962, by the Supreme Soviet, itself elected in March of the same year, includes only important national and provincial Party leaders, a few of them also members of the Presidium of the Party Central Committee. The Presidium exercises all the powers of the Supreme Soviet between sessions, i.e., during almost the whole calendar year.

According to Article 49 of the Constitution, the Presidium among other things convenes the sessions of the Supreme Soviet; issues edicts, which need only be formally approved *ex post facto* at the following session of the Supreme Soviet; and interprets the laws. Theoretically it can quash the decisions of the Council of Ministers, though this has never happened, since this body also includes the most eminent

members of the Party leadership. The Presidium also ratifies and denounces treaties; declares war and proclaims martial law; and promulgates the statutes which are passed by the Supreme Soviet.

The Presidium combines the powers of the head of the State and those of the legislature. Under Article 146 "the Constitution . . . may be amended only by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted by a majority of no less than two-thirds of the votes in each of its chambers." Yet Soviet practice points to the fact that the Presidium does change even the Constitution by simple edict. For instance, the hours of work originally guaranteed by Article 119 of the Constitution were increased by an edict of the Presidium in 1940; only in 1947 was the Supreme Soviet asked to formalize this decision by a constitutional amendment.

Despite its imposing powers, it would be a delusion to believe that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is the most important organ of the State. It executes the instructions of the Party leadership, concentrated in the Presidium of the Central Committee, which is represented much more adequately on the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Before the enactment of the Stalinist Constitution "there was a plurality of State organs which issued legislative acts."¹⁴ Presumably the Constitution intended to put an end to this situation by vesting all the legislative powers in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In practice, however, we find that the main legislative body is the Presidium, while the Supreme Soviet confines itself to the approval of the edicts which already have legal force. Moreover, the decrees of the Council of Ministers frequently contain rules of law which cannot be regarded as a mere extension of the legal rules already contained in the statutes or the edicts. The actual legislative powers of the Council of Ministers are openly admitted by one Soviet textbook, which says that the joint decrees of that Council and of the Central Committee of the Party ". . . determine definite measures to be taken and define the rights and obligations of the citizens and of the juristic persons."¹⁵ An act which defines the rights and obligations of citizens is a law, whatever name may be affixed to it—a statute, an edict, or a decree.

Although the Constitution does not provide anywhere for the enactment of joint decrees by the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Party, this is done quite frequently, whenever the Party wants to enhance the prestige of a decree.

In . . . specially important cases . . . joint decrees of the Council of Ministers and of the Central Committee of the All-Union Com-

munist Party (Bolsheviks) are issued. The decrees of the Government acquire in such cases the significance of the Party directives.¹⁶

The latest example of the legislative action by the Central Committee is the important Decree of January 17, 1963, on the Party-State control system. It was issued jointly by the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers.

This plurality of legislative organs does not cause confusion because, as Mr. Arzhanov and others say: "The directing force of the mechanism is the Communist Party. . . . All other organizations, state and social, serve as the channels of the Party, leading to the masses of the toilers."¹⁷ All the members of the top leadership of the Party are also members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Some of them are also members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet or members of the Council of Ministers.

This personal participation of the top leaders of the Party in the highest organs of the State provides a practical means of avoiding confusion. At the same time, it reduces the role of the highest organs of government to that of mere "channels" for the implementation of policies formulated elsewhere, namely, within the Presidium of the Central Committee. The average citizen, of course, has no actual influence on policy-making in the Soviet system.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR, "the highest executive and administrative organ of the State," is constitutionally "responsible and accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR." In fact, the Supreme Soviet is an obedient voting machine and could hardly call to account the members of the Council of Ministers, who are also members of the powerful Central Committee of the Party.

The membership of the Council of Ministers is too numerous to allow it to act as a policy-formulating body. This function is performed by an inner ring called the Presidium of the Council. This Presidium is made up of the Chairman, First Vice-Chairmen, and Vice-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers.

REORGANIZATIONS OF STATE ADMINISTRATION

It is too early for expressing any definite opinion concerning Khrushchev's ability as a Communist statesman except that he is certainly more impulsive in his decisions than Stalin was. He is a typical organization man deeply interested in the structure and functioning of public administration.

Stalin had constructed a system of checks and balances which perfectly suited his dictatorial temperament. Neither the state ad-

ministration nor any association could make an important decision without his orders. Nobody could possibly build for himself an independent source of power because the political police, which reported directly to him, checked on the Armed Forces, on the Party, on the whole State bureaucracy, and on every mass association. The Party in turn acted as another watchdog. Any rebellion by the political police and its special troops would have been quelled by the detachments of regular Army. All the strings of control were in Stalin's strong hands. This absolute rule by one man, largely founded on the use of political police, could only reduce in fact the role of the Party machine. The Party functionaries formed a privileged elite within the Soviet population, but they could not be sure that they were as important as the officials of political police.

The post-Stalinist period has been marked by two interrelated developments. The fall of Beria was followed by the termination of the arbitrary, all-pervading and dominant role of the political police. This police, which now operates under the name of the State Security Committees, remains an integral and important part of the Soviet setup, but it no longer terrorizes guilty and innocent, small fry and high dignitaries alike. The Party has, by contrast, gained in prestige. For Stalin the Party machine was one of his levers of command. For Khrushchev it has become the principal one. He seems to rely, first of all, on the Party for keeping in check the Army officers, the State bureaucrats, and the mass associations of non-Party people. The Party organization is admirably suited for this purpose. Its primary organizations and groups function at the grassroots of Soviet society and are able to channel the leadership's instructions to the mass of Soviet population, to control from inside the political loyalty and also the operational efficiency of army units, industrial plants, collective farms, local trade-union and Komsomol organizations, and to report to their Party superiors the shortcomings, moods and feelings of any section of the nation. Khrushchev, not unlike Stalin, considers that the principal task of the Soviet Union is rapidly to become the most mighty power in the world. Rapid economic development and technological progress are more important to him than anything else. He clearly wants the Party members, especially its functionaries, to keep abreast of various aspects of economic production so that he can make them his principal tools in stimulating and supervising economic development. This outlook is reflected, typically for his type of mind, in the reorganizations of the Party machine.

The same urge to organize and reorganize is visible in his experimenting with the State administration. Stalin believed in the

efficiency of detailed instructions issued from Moscow and being literally implemented by the lower administrative officials. Khrushchev prefers a greater flexibility that leaves more room for local initiative. His attitude agrees with Stalin's in one respect: neither has ever intended to decentralize the process of policy formulation. If this process was Stalin's monopoly, it now is probably shared by Khrushchev with other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee and perhaps even with the Central Committee itself. But there is not the slightest intention of inviting the Soviet population or even rank and file Party members to take part in this process.

Decentralization for Khrushchev means something else. He believes that the State administration was mummified by excessive centralization under Stalin's rule. He expects more efficient implementation from people who are left room to devise by themselves the best means of carrying out policies formulated in Moscow. While certainly he would not allow any deviation from these policies, he welcomes innovations and better use of local resources for their implementation. His initial enthusiasm for decentralization cooled off after he discovered that local officials, given a limited freedom, sometimes went too far and distorted the originally planned policies. He did not hesitate to reorganize his former reorganization of public administration, going back a few steps towards greater centralization.

His reforms of the State administration for national economy illustrate the point. He began by wholesale liquidation of Stalinist federal ministries for the supervision of various branches of production. Their functions were mainly shifted to newly formed regional national economy councils (*sovnarkhozy*). The national territory was divided into 106 economic regions (which should not be confused with the regions for general public administration), each region being headed by its own council. Large Republics (the Russian, the Ukrainian, the Kazakh, and the Uzbek) were subdivided into several economic regions; the smaller Republics were treated as self-contained units with one council for each Republic. These councils of national economy were placed in charge of the coordination and supervision of production in their region and were made responsible for regional fulfillment of the national plan. The Government balanced this local autonomy regarding the implementation of its economic policies by tightening the over-all control vested in the vastly expanded departments of the federal State Planning Commission.

The main reason for reform was the waste of resources resulting from lack of coordination on the local level. For instance, a ministry in Moscow in control of a distant factory not infrequently instructed

the manager to buy raw materials or half-finished goods hundreds of miles away when they were available in the same province; or local needs for finished products were served at greater cost by a distant plant when there was a similar factory in the vicinity.

The new system proved soon to be disappointing. It might have resulted in better use of local resources, but it also produced effects less desirable. The regional council of national economy was confronted with a heavy responsibility: the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the national plan of production was its main task. It was only human for council officials to assign top priority to the regional performance and thus to disregard the needs of other regions. Local resources were hoarded as a reserve for future shortage or emergency instead of being shipped to other regions. The over-all national implementation of the plan suffered in consequence.

The Government reacted by increasing the severity of pertinent criminal sanctions and by tightening the central control system. A law enacted in 1958 made it a crime for an official (including members of the regional councils of national economy and factory managers) to assign undue priority to local needs over the national or to obstruct the planned flow of supplies from one region to another.

Another edict issued in 1961 intended to prevent a rather frequent practice of falsifying bookkeeping in order to prove exact fulfillment or even overfulfillment of the State plan of production. Persons (principally industrial managers, accountants, and members of regional councils of national economy) who falsify books or otherwise intentionally submit untrue reports on the implementation of plans, are to be punished by imprisonment for up to three years.

Step by step, the former federal ministries reappeared in different forms and under new names. The list of national departments as fixed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1962 gives a clear idea of the great number of departments now in charge of supervising the various branches of national economy. The Soviet administrative system distinguishes three types of departments: Union (Federal) Ministries, which often are named Committees or Administrations; Union-Republican; and Republican. The latter ministries operate under the supervision of the Union-Republican Council of Ministers and have no visible counterpart on the national level; their jurisdiction is limited to the territory of the Union Republic. The Ministries of the Interior and of Justice, which used to be Union-Republican, are now only Republican, the two federal departments of this name having been dissolved a few years ago. A Union Republic might have such other ministries as those of Education (excluding the higher and technical-

secondary education), Municipal Services, Social Security, Motor Transport and Highways, and Irrigation.

The Union-Republican Ministries exist on both levels, federal and Republican. For instance, there are sixteen Ministries of Higher and Technical-Secondary Education, the principal one in Moscow and fifteen in the capitals of Union Republics. The Ministries in the Republican capitals take their orders from the federal Ministry of the same name but are also subordinated to the Republican Council of Ministers. Instructions from the federal Ministry filter down to local administrations through the intermediary of the Ministries in each Republic.

The All-Union Ministry, Committee, or Administration has its administrative apparatus all over the national territory, and its orders go directly to its local officials.

The present setup in Moscow is as follows:

1. All-Union Ministries: Foreign Trade, Merchant Marine, Transportation, and Medium Machinery Construction (this innocent name is a cover-up for the department in charge of nuclear research and production for military purposes).

2. All-Union Committees, Councils, and Administrations which in essence do not differ from Ministries except in name: the Supreme Council of National Economy, in charge of the central supervision of production; the State Planning Committee which devises the long-term plans of economic development; the Council of National Economy which prepares annual plans of development; the Council for Construction of Enterprises; the Committee of Party-State Control; the Committee for Problems of Manpower and Wages; the Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research; the Committee for Professional-Technological Education; the Committee for Radio and Television Industries; the Committee for Automation and Machine-building (engineering) Industries; the Committee for Aeronautic Industries; the Committee for Defense Industries; the Committee for Electrification; the Committee for Radio-Electronics Industries; the Committee for Electronics Industries; the Committee for Shipbuilding; the Committee for Chemical Industries; the Committee for Steel and Non-ferrous-metal Industries; the Committee for Fuel Industries; the Committee for Timber, Paper, Wood-processing Industries, and for Forestry; the Committee for Fisheries; the Committee for Geology; the Committee for Construction of Means of Transportation; the Committee for Domestic Trade; the Committee for Use of Atomic Energy; the Committee for Procurements (i.e., for the purchase of agricultural products); the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations; the Com-

mittee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; the Committee for State Security (this is the department in charge of political police known in Stalinist times as the Ministry of the Interior or of State Security); the Administration for the Sale of Agricultural Machinery, Spare Parts, Mineral Fertilizers and Other Means to the State and Collective Farms (this Administration, which has its own national network of offices, also supervises State workshops in charge of repairing agricultural machinery); the Administration of State Banks; and the Central Statistical Administration.

The list is actually longer than that of the ministries with similar names which existed under Stalin. The trend is toward multiplication of these specialized committees, most of which supervise the various branches of the national economy and assure control from the federal center. Their quick numerical growth testifies to the existence of the new trend toward centralization.

The chairmen of these councils, committees, and administrations have the rank of federal ministers and are members of the Council of Ministers.

3. The following ministries are Union-Republican: Foreign Affairs (this is rather peculiar, because one does not hear about any activities of the Foreign Ministries of Union-Republics, and because foreign policy is monopolized in Moscow at the federal ministry); Finances; Public Health; Culture; Higher and Technical-Secondary Education; Defense; Communications; and Agriculture.

The Federal Council of Ministers has a large membership, because it includes not only all federal Ministers and Chairmen of Councils, Committees and Administrations, but also the Chairman of the Council (Khrushchev), a few First Vice-Chairmen and several Vice-Chairmen, not all of them in charge of particular departments, and *ex officio* all Chairmen of the fifteen Union-Republican Councils of Ministers. Hence the need for a much smaller policy-making body which is called the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and is composed of the Chairman, First Vice-Chairmen, and Vice-Chairmen of the Council.

The same trend towards greater centralization, a reaction to the former inclination towards decentralization, is visible in the recent reorganization of councils of national economy. Their number in the Russian Republic was cut down from 67 to 24 and in the Ukrainian Republic from 14 to 7.

Moreover, the regional councils were subordinated in 1960, for the purpose of coordination, to the newly created Republican councils of national economy in those Republics which had been subdivided

into more than one economic region. Amalgamation of economic regions into larger units took place also in Central Asia where the former four economic regions, each corresponding to one Republic (Uzbek, Turkmenian, Kirghiz and Tadjik), were united in one Central-Asian region with only one council for the whole territory. It is probable that a similar process will affect other small Republics which will also be integrated within one large economic region, for instance, the three Baltic Republics.

Another example of Khrushchev's administrative reforms is the splitting of regional administration into halves, one for the urban and the other for the rural population. Each region now has two regional soviets and two executive committees for the general administration operating independently of each other in the same province. This reform has accompanied a similar reorganization of the Party structure (see below).¹⁸

PARTY-STATE CONTROL—THE NEW CONSTITUTION

The Party Central Committee and the Federal Council of Ministers decided on January 17, 1963, to reorganize drastically the machinery of control over Party organizations and the State administration. Until then the two controls operated independently as a Party Control Commission which checked on the operation of the Party machine and a Committee, earlier known as Ministry, of State Control. The two were merged in order to associate the Party closely with the functioning of State bureaucracy, a characteristic move for enhancing the Party role in public administration. As a result of this reform the Committee of State Control was liquidated, and the Party Control Commission retained principally the function of being a court of appeals for Party members whom lower Party organizations have expelled or punished in disciplinary procedure.

The task of the Party-State Control Committee is to check on the implementation of Party or Government instructions by Party organizations or by the State administration as well as to prevent and root out abuses. The control machinery is headed by the Party-State Committee of Control, whose chairman has the rank of federal Minister. It acts under joint supervision of the Party Central Committee and the Federal Council of Ministers. Its membership is recruited from high Party officials and selected representatives of the trade unions, Komsomol, workers, collective farmers, and intelligentsia, all appointed by the Central Committee and Council of Ministers.

The lower rungs of this new administration are as follows:

1. Union-Republican committees similarly composed and subordinated to both the Union-Republican Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers.

2. Regional (provincial) committees of two types, urban and rural, each working under the supervision of the corresponding regional Party committee and the regional soviet. One regional control committee supervises Party and State activities in the realm of industries and other urban occupations; the other supervises agricultural activities. The regional soviet or its executive committee does not cooperate in the selection of members of regional control committees; this is the exclusive prerogative of the regional Party committee.

3. The control committees on the level of cities, districts, and collective-State-farm production agencies are appointed by corresponding Party committees.

4. At each enterprise, office, collective or soviet farm, housing administration, or any similar grassroot institution, groups of cooperation are formed; they cooperate with city or district committees of control. These control groups are composed, like the higher organs, of representatives of the Party, trade unions, Komsomol, and other local organizations who are elected by the local assemblies of the same organizations. Other members of the control groups are elected at the meetings of collective farmers or tenants living in the same city housing block. These groups include Party members and non-Party citizens, and generally people representing various occupations, including housewives. Each group, once constituted, elects its own chairman and vice-chairmen whose appointment must be approved by the local primary Party organization. If the group is large, it forms its own executive bureau.

5. Similar groups are also constituted at the lowest level of plant shops and brigades of collective or state farms.

All the local groups not only report abuses to the higher committees of control but also may raise questions concerning the eradication of defects which they have discovered and the responsibility of guilty persons. They discuss those questions with the management of factories and farms or heads of administrative offices, with local Party, trade-union and Komsomol organizations, and with city or district control committees. Their queries and suggestions for improvement must be examined by their interlocutors.

The principal objective of this vast apparatus of control is to eradicate the shortcomings and abuses which plague the Party and the Government in a country endowed with an enormous administration necessitated by such phenomena as nationalization of the

economy and regimentation of daily life. The bureaucrat, frightened by his responsibility for the fulfillment of plans of development, often finds salvation in forgery of reported results, in fulfilling the plans at the expense of quality of production, or in all sorts of other malpractices. Fraud, bribery, and pilfering of public property also are frequent occurrences in Soviet life. Khrushchev and his colleagues hope to find the remedy in this vast mobilization of large groups of citizens who are expected to provide an effective check on abuses. This new device will also hinder the operation of local cliques, formed of Party and State officials, managers, and even State procurators, who together render to each other various services and cover up their mutual shortcomings and abuses. The association of a great many people in control groups will probably make it difficult for the cliques to operate with impunity.

The specific objectives are as follows: 1) to exercise control over the correct implementation of production plans; 2) to discover the unutilized reserves which can be used in current production; 3) to check on execution of the Party's and Government's instructions; 4) to promote a better quality of output; 5) to help in reducing the cost of production; 6) to increase labor productivity; 7) to ameliorate the efficiency of administration and management; 8) to fight against any and all abuses, including bribery, speculation, theft of public property, abuse of power, and infractions against labor discipline.

The control committees have the right to issue instructions concerning the elimination of shortcomings to State officials, functionaries of the Party and other public organizations, and managers. The control committees may also ask for oral explanations and written reports, require submission of pertinent documents, impose disciplinary penalties and fines on those guilty of making false statements or other offenses, suspend harmful decisions, fix deadlines for the eradication of irregularities, submit the cases of minor misdemeanors to the comradely courts, demote people guilty of abuses to lower jobs, dismiss them altogether, and, if the discovered offense is a crime, send the file to the State procurator for initiation of criminal proceedings. These are tremendous powers which might assure a more honest and efficient administration but might also paralyze it by sheer fear of the consequences of any decision.¹⁹

The reorganizations of the State administration, the many legislative reforms, and the new ideological Party Program require a redrafting of the Constitution. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR appointed in December, 1962, a commission for the drafting of the new Constitution. As one should have expected, Khrushchev is its chairman, and it is

made up of the members of the Presidium, the Secretaries of the Party Central Committee, and a few other high ranking members of the same Committee.

POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Looking behind the screen of the formal Soviet structure, one finds everywhere the source of all power—the Party. This fact is openly and fully admitted by every Soviet source.

... The Party determines the political lines, the policy that forms the foundation of the action of the whole mechanism of the socialist State . . . all important political or organizational questions are decided by the State and social organizations in accordance with the directives given by the Party . . . [which tries] to promote to the decisive State posts . . . people who are devoted to the Party . . . controls the activities of the organs of government and of public administration . . . and issues the general leading instructions. . . . Party leadership has great political and practical importance in the elections to the Soviets.²⁰

Another source reports the following:

The All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) is the only party in the USSR and also the directing party. . . . Not one important decision concerning the general problems of the State action is taken . . . without the directives of the Party. . . . The Party directives form the nucleus of law, as the Party forms the nucleus of the government.²¹

Another author says:

Every act of the Soviet State—a statute, an edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the decrees and decisions of the Government, the orders and instructions of a minister, the decisions and by-laws of the local soviet—all of them express the policy of the Communist Party.²²

Similar opinions are expressed by other Soviet authors.²³

The political monopoly of the Party—to which only 10 million people belong out of a total population of over 220 million—is formally acknowledged in Article 126 of the Constitution. When Stalin discussed in 1936 the draft of the present Constitution, he commented in these words on the monopolistic position of the Party: "There is no ground in the USSR for the existence of several parties, and, consequently, for the freedom of these parties. In the USSR only one party can exist, the Communist Party. . . ."²⁴ The proletariat, the peasants, and the intelligentsia have nothing to say about the exalted role of the

Communist Party, which has not the slightest intention of asking the people whether they really want it to remain in control.

ELITIST NATURE OF THE PARTY—HIERARCHICAL CONCEPT
OF THE PARTY AND OF SOVIET SOCIETY

Party membership assures access to any career in the Soviet Union. It is a privilege open only to the elite of the Soviet society. Since 1939 membership increased from 2.5 million persons to 10 million. The total population increased during the same period of time (1939-63) by 50 million. The percentage of Party members remains low by comparison with the total population of 220 million. It is less than 5 percent. This low percentage reveals the elitist nature of the Party. Lenin himself conceived the Party as a political organization closely knit together by severe discipline, and being "the teacher, guide and leader of all the toilers and exploited in the task of building up their social life without the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie."²⁵ He did not conceive the Party as an agent of the working masses which would follow their aspirations, but as a leader and guide that would lead the masses, perhaps against their will, toward a goal determined by itself. He was true in this respect to the trend prevailing in Russia since the rise of the Muscovite Duchy.

This concept of the ruler deciding by himself what is best for the people was shared by such men as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. The same image of the ruler was present in the mind of Nicholas I and his mortal enemy, Colonel Pestel, the most intelligent among the leaders of the Decembrists, whose memory is justifiably extolled by the present regime. Colonel Pestel wanted to replace the absolute monarchy by an absolute republic with all the paraphernalia, like censorship and secret police, necessary to a regime that would not tolerate opposition. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Russia counted many leading people who were sincere political democrats and whose concept of the leader would coincide with that of the West, but they never had a chance to carry out their ideas, except for a few months in 1917.

The elitist concept was further developed by Stalin after Lenin's death. In a series of lectures delivered in April, 1924, at the Sverdlov University, Stalin emphasized that "the Party cannot be a real party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working class feel and think . . . if it is unable to rise above the momentary interests of the proletariat. . . . The Party is the political leader of the working class."²⁶ This statement implies contempt for the working masses, who are not expected to know what their real interests are. They must,

therefore, be led by the elite. This idea involves in turn the concept of leaders who are politically mature, and of politically ignorant masses who should follow the leaders obediently. Any autocrat would not quarrel with this view of mankind.

Stalin, with his predilection for military terminology, defined the Party as "the General Staff of the proletariat."²⁷ In his view, the Party should be the vanguard of the army of citizens; not a democratic organization, but strictly hierarchical, with all power concentrated in the hands of the top leadership. He added that

... the principle of directing the Party work from a center not infrequently gives rise to attacks on the part of wavering elements, to accusations of "bureaucracy." It need hardly be proved that systematic work by the Party, as one whole, would have been impossible if these principles had not been adhered to.²⁸

He meant by the "center" the Central Committee.

The average citizen is even encouraged to be a member of various organizations such as trade unions, youth organizations, para-military associations, learned and cultural societies. Those organizations are conceived as channels through which the Party transmits its orders to the citizenry.

... The question then arises: Who is to determine the line, the general direction, along which the work of all these organizations is to be conducted? Where is that central organization which ... has the necessary experience ... and prestige ... to induce all these organizations to carry out this line ... and to preclude the possibility of working at cross purposes? This organization is the Party of the proletariat.²⁹

Here is a pertinent exposé of the totalitarian doctrine:

The Party is ... the only organization capable of centralizing the leadership of the struggle of the proletariat, thus transforming each and every non-Party organization of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the class.³⁰

Of course, the transmission belt is not expected to make political decisions, while the smooth transmission of the orders is secured by the presence of a hard core of Party members within all State and social organizations.

The hierarchical view of human society applies to the Party itself as well, whose members must abide, in the spirit of military discipline, by the instructions coming from the Party leaders. Lenin had spoken

about the necessity of iron discipline within the Party during the struggle preceding the seizure of power. Stalin extended this concept to all times. "The same, but even to a greater degree, must be said about discipline in the Party after the dictatorship has been achieved."³¹ For those who would dare express doubts about the Party line, there was only one solution—expulsion from the Party.³² On the occasion of the purge of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov (July, 1957), the Party reaffirmed that it was not "a debating club" and required all its members to be of one mind.

The Party seized power under the banner of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but Stalin said several years later:

In this sense it could be said that the dictatorship of the proletariat is in essence the "dictatorship" of its vanguard, the "dictatorship" of its Party. . . .³³

Of course, the Party leadership is too intelligent to believe that the Party could rely only on coercion to govern the country. The ruled should be convinced as far as possible. This is why the Party must have a monopoly of propaganda.

This does not mean, of course, that the Party must convince all the workers, down to the last man. . . . It only means that before entering upon decisive political actions, the Party must, by means of prolonged revolutionary work, secure for itself the support of the masses of the workers, or at least the benevolent neutrality of the majority of the class.³⁴

One may ask how the Party is to know that it enjoys the support of the majority if it does not allow the free expression of the will of the population in genuinely sincere elections.

The dissenting nonconformist cannot just hold his tongue. "It may be said," Stalin stated in 1936, "that silence is not criticism. But this is not true . . . it is a stupid and ridiculous form, but a form of criticism, nevertheless."³⁵ The present leaders are no less suspicious of silence. One of the spokesmen of the Central Committee, L. F. Il'ychev, reprovingly said in March, 1963: "Silence also means something, also expresses a point of view."

THE BASIC DUTY OF A PARTY MEMBER IS IRON DISCIPLINE,
NOT KNOWLEDGE OF MARXISM—PREDOMINANT
ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA

Party members must be loyal to the cause of Communism, not in any free interpretation of Marxism, but in the current interpretation given

by the Central Committee. Loyalty is to leaders, rather than to doctrine. According to the Leninist formula, repeatedly affirmed in the last three decades, "a member of the Party is one who accepts the program of the Party, pays membership dues and works in one of its organizations."³⁶

Distortion of facts is often used in the indoctrination of members. According to Stalin's *History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*, the most sinister crimes, including the delivery of State secrets to foreign intelligence services, "had been perpetrated during twenty years with the participation and under the leadership of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kameniev, Bukharin, Rykov, and their stooges, in accordance with the tasks assigned to them by the foreign bourgeois intelligence services."³⁷ If the closest collaborators of Lenin were "the stooges" of the foreign intelligence services, the Soviet State must have been protected for 20 years by supernatural forces from disaster and total collapse! Similarly, the Party leaders purged in July, 1957, are now retrospectively "credited" with all sorts of imaginary errors and crimes they allegedly committed.

The present policy of the Party leaders remains in favor of quality; the quality of members is considered far more important than their number. Quality further means complete adherence to the current Party line and the obligation of denouncing comrades who seem to deviate from that line or simply do not show enough eagerness in the execution of their functions.

If the work goes badly in an organization and the interests of the Party and of the State suffer, the Party member is bound, irrespective of the persons involved, to report such defects to the leading Party organs as high up as the Central Committee itself. This is the duty of each Communist, his most important Party obligation.³⁸

While the democratic countries seem to fear Communist infiltration, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is afraid of penetration by Western ideology.

We have no insurance against the infiltration of alien views, ideas and attitudes from abroad, from the capitalist states, or from inside, from the groups hostile to the Soviet authority which have not yet been completely exterminated by the Party. . . .³⁹

To preserve its power the Party must "continue to improve its qualitative composition."⁴⁰ But quality in the present-day Soviet Union also means having a better formal education, which leads to higher careers. "From year to year the proportion of people who have higher or

secondary education increases among the candidates to the Party membership.”⁴¹ The intelligentsia, the new upper and middle classes, have been asserting themselves within the Party.

THE AMENDED CHARTER ADOPTED AT THE 22ND CONGRESS

The 22nd Party Congress, held in the fall of 1961, amended the Charter but left intact its main features as they had been fixed by Stalin. The Preamble of the Charter says:

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the militant, tried and tested vanguard of the Soviet people, uniting on principle of voluntary participation the most advanced and most politically conscious segment of the working class, collective-farm peasants and intelligentsia of the USSR. . . . It is . . . the guiding and directing force of Soviet society. . . . The immutable law of the life of the C.P.S.U. is the ideological and organizational unity and monolithic cohesion of its ranks, and the highly conscious discipline of all Communists. Any manifestation of factionalism and group activity is incompatible with Marxist-Leninist party principles and party membership. . . . The C.P.S.U. is an integral component part of the international Communist and workers' movement. . . . It is . . . actively strengthening the fraternal ties with the great army of Communists of all countries.⁴²

The 22nd Congress attenuated the old contradiction between the two Party claims: on the one hand, that the Soviet State was that of dictatorship of the proletariat, and, on the other hand, that the Soviet State was also a democracy, a State of all the people—irrespective of their being industrial workers, peasants, or members of the intelligentsia. The Congress proclaimed that the Soviet society had become a friendly community of three equal strata: the workers, the peasants, and the intelligentsia. The amended Charter defined the Party as a vanguard, an elite, but it called it the vanguard of the Soviet people, not just of the industrial proletariat. Except for this verbal innovation, the Party remains what it used to be. It continues to be the directing force of Soviet society and a monolithic organization incompatible with any internal opposition factions.

PARTY MEMBERS' DUTIES AND RIGHTS

A citizen of the Soviet Union who has been admitted to the Party must “set an example of Communist attitude toward work . . . implement firmly and steadfastly the decisions of the Party, explain the policy of the Party to the masses, promote the consolidation and expansion of the ties between the Party and the people . . . take an

active part in the political life of the country, in the management of State affairs, in the economic and cultural construction, set an example in the execution of public duties . . . master Marxist-Leninist theory . . . wage a struggle against any kind of manifestations of bourgeois ideology . . . protect in every possible way the ideological and organizational unity of the Party . . . develop criticism and self-criticism . . . oppose any activities prejudicial to the Party and the State and report them to the Party organs, right up to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. . . . observe Party and State discipline . . ." (Article 2 of the Charter).

The most difficult of all these obligations must be that of self-criticism and nonopposition to the criticism of oneself, especially on the part of subordinates whom one could easily silence. The top leadership, however, attaches great importance to that obligation because it provides a valuable check on the bureaucracy. The top leadership is actually isolated from the mass of the population by the Soviet bureaucracy, a large part of which is identified with Party bureaucracy. It naturally fears the abuse of power by a bureaucracy whose members support one another and often mutually cover up shortcomings. The weapon of criticism was invented to keep the bureaucrats in check.

The bureaucracy, however, is not eager to follow the wishes of Party leadership in this direction. Nikita Khrushchev at the nineteenth Congress complained that "another evil which exists in our Party consists in some Communists assuming incorrectly that we have in our Party two disciplines—one for the rank and file members and another for the leaders. There are quite a few officials who believe that laws have not been written for them. . . . There are even some cases where such leading officials threaten comrades, who have presented correct but critical observations, and force them to repent and promise that they will never again criticize defects."⁴³

The criticism greatly favored by the Central Committee does not mean freedom of expression. It certainly does not mean the right to criticize the Party line. That would be a reprehensible deviation for which a Party member would be expelled. It does not mean the right to criticize the leadership concentrated in the Central Committee, because that would imply an attempt at forming a faction, also punishable by expulsion. It means only the criticism of lesser Party members. Even so, a subordinate Party member cannot know for sure whether his boss is protected by a powerful member of the Central Committee or has influential friends among the other local dignitaries of his rank. Silence might be the safer policy for the uninfluential

Party member. Of course, criticism becomes easier when a given dignitary or a disgraced Party leader has already been denounced publicly in the official press.

It is even less probable that anyone would indulge in spontaneous self-criticism. A public confession never precedes a public campaign inspired by the Party. If the official's shortcomings are not serious, self-criticism may be a way of regaining the favor of Party leaders and of keeping one's post. Public repentance is humiliating but better than expulsion from the Party. Of course, the Party leadership reserves the right to decide whether a particular case of self-criticism is in the Party's interest, whether it "raises the cultural level of the working class" and does not result "in undermining the Party, in subverting Soviet authority . . . in disarming the working class and in the chatter about 'regeneration.'"⁴⁴

Implicit prohibition of criticizing the Central Committee is laid down in such statements as: "The existence of factions cannot be reconciled with Party unity and with Party iron discipline,"⁴⁵ or, "The leadership of the revolutionary action of the masses requires from the Party strict centralization, unity of will, iron discipline. . . ."⁴⁶

The bureaucrats have their own means of preventing criticism from below. Here is an example of the methods used:

The bureau of the Mordov regional committee of the Party convoked in November, 1947, the plenary session of the committee. . . . Each question on the agenda required a deep discussion on the merits with wide criticism and self-criticism. But the leaders of the regional committee thought little about this side of the meeting. The first secretary of the regional committee opened the meeting and said: "The present meeting of the plenary session of the regional Party committee is a meeting of victors. The many years' activity of the Party organization has yielded notable successes." This approach of the secretary prejudged the nature of the discussion of all problems on the agenda. The speaker who presented the report of the bureau and other speakers outbid each other in talking about the successes and in keeping silent about the serious defects in the work of the Party, Soviet, and agricultural organs. It was striking that the speakers were mainly the officials of the regional committee and of the ministries who presented all sorts of variations on the theme of the successes and victories introduced initially in the debates by the secretary of the regional committee.⁴⁷

A secretary of the local Party organization might be entirely in good faith and might have no personal interest in covering up abuses. But he is confronted with another difficulty. He knows that he must

prevent "malicious" criticism that would undermine the Soviet regime. If he gave free rein to a meeting of Party members, how might he be sure that the members would not overstep "legitimate" criticism and indulge, perhaps inadvertently, in remarks contrary to the Party line? To be on the safe side, some Party secretaries "determine in advance the contents of speeches the selected Party members will make."⁴⁸ Case after case proves that it is difficult to have free discussion on the local level if the country as a whole is subject to a totalitarian regime.

Because it is simply an aspect of free discussion, criticism benefits only a democracy. But the Central Committee can hardly complain about the lack of genuine criticism. Free discussion cannot be artificially limited to lower levels of public life. Lack of genuine criticism may be very convenient to the local Party machine, which is left in peace by the rank and file, but it results in the passivity of the latter.

Theoretically a Party member must be an example of virtue. An implacable foe of bourgeois ideology, devoted to the Party, overfulfilling the plan of production, an ideal husband, not indulging in extramarital relations, an excellent father of numerous children, a zealous patriot, he must be a perfect Puritan. The frequent complaints voiced in the Soviet press indicate that Party members often fall short of the ideal. Article 2 of the Charter makes it also clear that a Party member must, if need be, act as an informer.

The Party member has the right to elect and to be elected to the Party organs, to participate in the Party meetings, to voice at the meetings his criticism of other Party members, to attend the meetings at which his own conduct is being criticized, and to address his questions and proposals to any Party organ, including the Central Committee (Article 3 of the Charter). These rights should be understood in the interpretation given by long-standing Soviet practice. He may participate at the meetings of his own local organization, but not at those of a superior organ if he is not a member of the latter. His right to criticize is limited by the circumstances already explained. He may vote; but the candidates are selected beforehand by the Party machine. He may write safely to any organ of the Party, provided that his letter does not contain ideological heresy.

ADMISSION OF NEW PARTY MEMBERS—EXPULSION FROM THE PARTY

The procedure of admission to the Party is complicated because the Party wants to remain an elite organization. A prospective member

must be at least 18 years old and must be recommended by three Party members who have at least a three-year record of membership and are well acquainted with the candidate, since "sponsors are responsible to the Party organizations for objectively describing the professional and political qualifications of the candidate" (Article 5). This provision implies that the sponsor might be called to a joint responsibility with the member whom he has recommended. Members of the Communist Youth League may be admitted with the recommendation of only two Party members and that of the district committee of the League; young people below the age of 20 cannot be admitted unless they are members of the League.

An application for membership is first examined by the general meeting of the primary organization (at the plant, the collective farm, an Army unit, etc.). The decision of the primary organization must be approved by the district or the city committee of the Party. Even after taking all these precautions, the Party does not trust fully a newly admitted person. He becomes a candidate for one year to give the Party time to verify his devotion and personal qualifications (Article 14).

Candidates may participate in general meetings of the primary Party organization but cannot vote or be elected. At the end of the probationary period the same procedure of screening is followed (Articles 4 and 15). No wonder only approximately 5 percent of the population are Party members.

A member may be expelled and become, from a privileged member of the Soviet society, a pariah. The decision to expel is taken by a two-thirds majority of the general meeting of the primary organization but must be approved by the regional committee (Article 10). If the offense is trivial, the guilty member may be punished by a warning or a reprimand, or he may be demoted to candidate status for one year, and then readmitted to membership according to the usual procedure of admission (Article 9).

An expelled member may appeal to the higher Party organs, all the way to the Central Committee. A Party member who is, at the same time, a member of a city, district, or regional committee, or of the Republican or national Central Committee, may be expelled from the Party only by a two-thirds majority of the other members of his committee (Article 11 of the Charter). This provision seems to offer an important guarantee to all higher-ranking Party members except for the fact that their case, especially members of the national Central Committee, would usually have a high political significance. If they

were faced with the prospect of expulsion, it would mean that they had already lost the battle for power against the rival group who then would have no difficulty in mustering the two-thirds majority.

A Party member who has been convicted by courts of having committed a crime is automatically expelled (Article 12).

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY AND OF STATE ADMINISTRATION

The Party had been organized until November 1962 on the territorial principle. Only the primary organization was set up according to the functional principle. All Party members, working at the same place (factory, collective farm, institution, Army unit) were united within one primary organization. All higher Party organizations were formed on the various territorial levels of State administrative subdivisions. Thus all primary organizations, located within a city or a rural district, were assembled within one city or district organization; all city or district organizations of the same region formed a regional organization; all regional organizations of the same Union Republic belonged to a Republican organization; finally all Republican organizations formed together the national one.

The Central Committee decided on November 23, 1962, drastically to alter this pattern.⁴⁹ It is characteristic of the low esteem in which the Party leaders hold the Party Congress that they did not deem it worthwhile to convoke an Extraordinary Congress and to seek its approval for this reform of cardinal importance. The new pattern is founded from the bottom up on the functional or, as they call it, the production principle.

The present setup is as follows:

1. The primary organization functions as before at the place of employment where at least three Party members work. This place may be a plant, a mine, a collective or state farm, any State institution, an educational establishment, an Army unit, and so forth. If Party members cannot be grouped in this functional manner, a territorial primary organization may be specially set up to unite all of those who inhabit the same village or the same city housing block or blocks. If there are more than 50 Party members at a place of employment, primary organizations may be formed at a lower level than a whole plant, namely at each shop or each brigade. If Party members are fairly numerous but less than fifty, their primary organization is subdivided into party groups; each of these groups assembles together those Communists who work at the same shop or brigade.

2. The same functional (production) principle has been extended

to all higher organizations. Actually the Party has been split up into two parallel organizations: one for Communists who work in industries and transport (in fact, for those who live in the cities and industrial settlements), and another for agriculture (in fact, for the rural population). Khrushchev explained to the Central Committee that this was the only way for the Party organizations to avoid confusion in trying to take care of everything, and for concentrating their whole energy on either of the two principal aspects of production, industries and related economic branches or agriculture. He added that the main task of the Party was to assist in increasing the output of the national economy, and that the reorganization would help in achieving this result. The C.P.S.U. has, therefore, become in effect two parallel organizations, urban and rural.

Above the primary organizations there are now two higher organizations. All the primary organizations located within a city continue to be united in the city organization. Those primary organizations which are set up at the industrial enterprises, situated within a predominantly rural district, have been withdrawn from the former jurisdiction of the district organization; they are now grouped in a separate zonal organization, which has the same rank as a city or district organization. Hence the Communists who work in agriculture no longer meet within the same organization with other Communists who live in the same county but who are employed in industries.

The organization of the same rank, which now groups only Communists working in agriculture, cannot be explained without reference to the simultaneous reform of the state administrative subdivision, the district (county). These districts were several years ago very small. Then the Government began the process of amalgamation which is still continuing. In 1962 there still were about 60 percent of districts with less than 40,000 inhabitants; 14 percent out of those 60 percent had less than 20,000 residents. On the average, a rural district grouped together about 14 or 15 collective and State farms. The Party expects to wind up the process of amalgamation by reducing the total number of rural districts to less than 1,500 for the whole country.

These territorially enlarged districts have now a new administrative body in charge of supervising rural production. Its long name is the collective-State-farm production agency.

The rural district Party organization must now unite all primary organizations within the territorial jurisdiction of the new agency. In other words, there are now three important bodies within each rural district: the district soviet and its executive committee in charge of

general state administration; the collective-State-farm agency for the supervision and coordination of agricultural production; and the district party organization uniting exclusively agricultural primary organizations.

3. Each region (province) has also two parallel regional organizations unless its industrial production is insignificant, in which case there remains as before only one regional organization for the rural population. In all other regions, where both types of production are important, all the city and zonal organizations for the urban population are grouped together into one regional organization, while all rural district organizations form another, parallel regional organization. These two organizations are independent of each other, although they are located within the same province.

4. At the Union-Republican level the present Republican Central Committee is retained, but each Committee has now two Bureaus, one heading all regional organizations for urban Communists, and the other directing all regional organizations for Communists occupied in agriculture. Each Republican Central Committee elects its own Presidium from among its members; the Presidium coordinates the activities of both Bureaus.

The Russian Republic has no Central Committee of its own. Party affairs are placed there under the direct supervision of the national Central Committee which has its own Bureau for this particular purpose. Since the November 1962 reform this Bureau has formed in turn two functional Bureaus, one for urban Party affairs and the other for rural Party organizations. These two Bureaus work under the coordinating supervision of the Bureau for the Russian Republic. Thus the general organizational pattern is also followed in the Russian Republic.

5. On the national level the main Central Committee of the Party has also formed two functional Bureaus, each being in charge of either of the two parallel Party structures. These two Bureaus work under the direct supervision of the Presidium of the Central Committee.

If one were to look at the charter of the Party organization, he would see two parallel lines beginning with the primary organization and going up through all the territorial levels but never crossing each other until they reach the level of the Republican Central Committee and its Presidium.

At the session of the Central Committee where this important reorganization was approved, Khrushchev disclosed that the proportion of Party members working in industries and transport to

members working in agriculture was 3.65 to 2. This proportion did not reflect the relative numerical weight of the rural population, which in 1962 still represented 48 percent of the total.

The same session of the C.C. decided to form a Central-Asian Bureau for the supervision of the party organizations in the Uzbek, Tadjik, Turkmenian and Kirghiz Republics. This new Bureau works under the direct control of the Presidium of the national C.C. Although the Central-Asian Bureau includes the four Central-Asian Republican first secretaries, it is hard to believe Khrushchev's assurance that the formation of that Bureau would not restrict at all the autonomy of the four Central-Asian Republican Central Committees.

As the Party is closely interlocked with the State administration, its own new functional pattern is now paralleled by the new administrative subdivisions. At the city level there remain as before the city soviet and its executive committee; if a city is large enough, it is subdivided into boroughs (districts), each having its own soviet and executive committee. On the same level the enlarged rural district (county) has its soviet and executive committee and, in addition, its collective-State-farm production agency. Each regional administration is now split up into two: one for urban and the other for rural population. Therefore, each region (province) has now two regional soviets and two executive committees which operate independently of each other. Only on the Union-Republican and the national levels the State administration remains unified and continues to be exercised by one Supreme Soviet and one Council of Ministers.

However organized, the Party is run according to the following principle: "The decisions of the higher organs are absolutely binding on lower organs" (Article 19 of the Charter).⁵⁰

The structure of Party organs follows on all levels the same pattern: a large deliberative body and a much smaller executive committee with its inner working cell. Thus, the primary organization has its general meeting of all members which is supposed to be held at least once a month (Article 55). It elects for one year an executive bureau and a secretary who, like other secretaries on all higher levels, is the main agent and a part of the Party machine. These Party secretaries are paid functionaries; only the secretary of a primary organization with less than 150 members is unpaid and must earn his living at another profession. The secretary of primary organizations must have been a Party member for at least one year before his election.

The primary organization performs important functions in grass-roots communication between the Party and the population. It is expected to implement Party policies on the important level of a

production unit and to report to the higher Party bodies the state of mind of its non-Party neighborhood. It admits new members, organizes study groups of Marxism-Leninism, supervises the fulfillment of production plans from inside the place of work of its members, initiates socialist competition, strives to strengthen labor discipline and increase labor productivity, protects public property, carries out Party propaganda among non-Party coworkers, and gives the example of "devotion to the cause of Communism and of love of the socialist Fatherland, . . . of moral purity, simplicity and modesty in public and personal life, mutual respect in family relations and concern for the education of children" (Article 58). In short, the primary organization should be a group of politically alert patriots, body and soul devoted to the Party, who are shining examples for their non-Party coworkers and saintly persons in their personal lives.

On the next city or rural district level the general conference of Party members, convoked at least once every two years, elects its committee. The city or district committee in turn delegates its powers to a bureau that includes a secretary and two assistant secretaries. These secretaries must have been Party members for at least three years, and their function is considered important enough for the Charter to require that their election should be approved by the regional committee. One of the assistant secretaries is in charge of the ideological office and the other of the organizational one. Moreover, the secretaries have under their orders a staff of several inspector-organizers who supervise the primary organizations. The true show is run by the secretaries and inspectors, while the plenum of the city or district committee meets only once every three months.

The two parallel regional organizations (urban and rural) have the same structure. The regional conference is composed of delegates elected by the city or district conferences of Party members. It meets once every two years and delegates its powers to the regional committee which it elects. The latter committee in turn delegates its powers to a bureau and the regional secretaries who must have been Party members for at least five years before their appointment. The plenum of the regional committee should be held no less than once every four months. There are two regional secretaries for each of the parallel regional committees.

The Union-Republican organization reflects the same basic pattern. The Republican congress, composed of delegates elected by the city and district conferences, meets once every two years in the Republics which are relatively small and hence not subdivided into regions. These Republics have a three-level structure: the primary organi-

zations, the city and district organizations, and, above them, the Union-Republican organizations. The larger Union Republics (Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan), which are subdivided into regions, have a four-level structure, the regional organizations being inserted between the city (district) and the Republican organizations. Their Republican congresses meet only once in every four years. The largest Republic, the Russian, is subdivided into regions and has its regional organizations, but has no Republican organization of its own because its over-all Party activities are directly managed by the national Central Committee through its Bureau for that Republic. This Bureau has somewhat similar duties as a Republican Central Committee.

The Republican Congress elects its Central Committee which in turn designates its Presidium (a smaller executive body) and its Republican secretaries who have had at least a five-year record of Party membership (usually much longer in view of their being the most important persons in each Republic).

THE NATIONAL PARTY ORGANIZATION—THE CONGRESS

Finally, the same pattern is reproduced on the national level. "The supreme organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the Party Congress" (Article 31), which meets at least once every four years. Stalin did not respect this rule. The 18th Congress, for instance, met in 1939, and the 19th only in 1952 shortly before his death. However, the regular convocation of Party congresses has been scrupulously observed since 1953. The 20th Congress met in 1956, the 21st extraordinary in 1959, and the 22nd in 1961. The Congress approves the report of the Central Committee and of the other national Party organs such as the Party Auditing Commission, if necessary amends the Party Charter and adopts a new Party Program, determines the Party line on domestic and foreign policies, elects the Central Committee and the Auditing Commission (Article 33).

This very impressive list of powers might make one believe that the Congress is truly the supreme source of Party power and a policy-making body. In fact this unwieldy assembly, composed of almost 5,000 delegates who have been elected by the regional conferences and, in smaller Republics, by the Republican congresses but not directly by Party rank-and-file members, is a rubberstamp body. It listens to the speeches made almost exclusively by the Party elders, the national and provincial leaders, whose interventions are occasionally followed by a timid and conformist speech of an ordinary delegate. All its decisions are obviously preordained, and its outcome may be safely predicted by anyone who has carefully listened to the intro-

ductory report which the main Party leader (Khrushchev at the post-Stalinist congresses) submits on behalf of the Central Committee. No opposition group can possibly make its appearance for two reasons: first, the formation of factions is strictly forbidden by the Party Charter, and, secondly, the delegates are hand-picked by the Party secretaries before the formality of their election. It is not surprising to find that the Congress delegates abide by the general Soviet rule and always unanimously adopt all the motions submitted by the Party leadership. Anyone who would like to check has only to read Khrushchev's report and initial speeches, the draft of the new Charter and that of new Party Program which had been published prior to the 22nd Congress, then familiarize himself with the tenor of Congress debates and with the resolutions finally adopted. He will find that the debates had been prearranged, and that nothing unexpected took place.

The Congress does not initiate any policy but it provides the Party leadership with a solemn opportunity for reviewing its past achievement and for outlining the program of its future action. This is done for the edification of the rank-and-file Party members and of the non-Party population. In this sense the Congress is a useful and vast propaganda venture.

THE 21ST PARTY CONGRESS⁵¹

This Party Congress held in January 1959 was an extraordinary one. It was convoked only three years after the 20th, while ordinary Congresses should be convoked at four-year intervals. Being an extraordinary Congress, it was not meant to review all the Party policies nor to outline all the plans for the future. Its task was officially to approve the target figures of the Seven Year Plan (1959-1965). It served also another purpose, that of consecrating the leading role of Khrushchev, who played there a pivotal role. A Party Congress is usually opened by a report of the Central Committee, submitted by the most important leader of the time. Stalin never failed to observe this rule and addressed the Party Congress on behalf of the Central Committee even though the latter body was nothing but his rubber stamp. His old age did not allow him to do so in 1952 when the report of the Central Committee was submitted to the 19th Congress by his trusted lieutenant Malenkov. The 21st Congress was opened with a report submitted by Khrushchev in his own name. This new procedure made it possible for the delegates to praise his wisdom but not that of the whole Central Committee. Khrushchev needed at this stage to build

up his stature which would be otherwise diluted in the collective concept of the Central Committee. The principle of collective leadership so much advertised in 1953-57 was forgotten on this occasion.

The delegates to the Congress represented 7,622,356 full Party members and 616,775 candidates. The total membership since the 20th Congress passed the figure of eight millions. The candidates admitted to the Party in 1958 were about two-thirds workers and collective farmers. Although the intelligentsia had still a higher proportion among Party candidates than the other social classes in comparison to their respective ratios in the total population, the increased interest in recruiting collective farmers and workers indicated the Party desire to open more adequate channels of communication with the working classes. The story was different when it came to the Party functionaries. The overwhelming majority of the Congress delegates were members of the intelligentsia. Out of 1,260 delegates, 708 had higher education, 67 an incomplete higher education, and 155 had secondary education. Judging by the educational background of the delegates, just over one-fourth were or had been actual workers or farmers. The predominance of bureaucracy of all sorts was reflected in the following figures: 432 delegates were Party officers, 147 State officials, 12 labor union functionaries, 7 Communist Youth League officials, and 91 members of the Armed Forces. The political reliability of delegates was illustrated by the fact that 94 percent had been decorated with orders or medals and 209 bore the titles of Heroes of the Soviet Union or of Socialist Labor.

Khrushchev's report which took six hours naturally related principally to economic matters.⁵² The discussion that followed for several days was nothing but repetition of what Khrushchev had already said. The main points of his report were as follows:

1. He illustrated the high rate of development of crucial branches of Soviet economy by giving these figures for 1958: 55 million tons of steel, 113 million tons of oil and 233 billion kilowatt-hours of generated electric power. The recent stress on the renovation of industrial machinery was mentioned by his quoting the figure of 4,500 new types of machines and instruments introduced during the years 1956-1958. Khrushchev indicated also a notable improvement in agriculture where the situation had been disastrous in 1953. He said that 3.5 billion *poods* of grain were supplied to the State in 1958, 1.6 billion more than in 1953. He must have felt proud as this was partly due to the cultivation of virgin lands and other measures which he himself initiated.

2. The number of specialists with higher or secondary-technical

education amounted to about 7.5 millions, while Khrushchev claimed that the USSR graduated in 1958 three times more engineers than the United States.

3. The Seven Year Plan again stressed the development of heavy industries with the planned increase of 80-85 percent over the production achieved in 1958. Steel production, for instance, by 1965 was to reach 86-91 million tons. Khrushchev, like Stalin, fully realized that the heavy industries represent the key factor in the potential of any country. A few years after this Congress he shifted the gravity point of economic development from steel to chemical and electronic industries.

4. The plan intensified the trend toward a proportionately quicker development of Asian parts of the USSR where over 40 percent of capital investment was to be made. Khrushchev believed that by 1965 the share of those areas would reach 50 percent of the national production of coal, 48 percent in steel output, 88 percent in refined copper, 71 percent in aluminum output, 42 percent in cement production, 46 percent in electric power generation, 52 percent in timber output, and 32 percent in paper production. These goals will necessitate a continuous flow of millions of European settlers. The vast resettlements required by the Plan will help in solving the nationality problems of the Central-Asian Republics where Russians and Ukrainians, who of necessity will form the bulk of new settlers, will gradually make of the natives a minority in their own homeland. The intensive development of Asian areas will have other consequences. For example, these areas will furnish room for the strategic dispersal of Soviet industries, a common-sense precaution in a nuclear age, and the newly developing settlements will serve as a barrier to 700 millions of Chinese neighbors.

5. The principal reason for the Seven Year Plan was spelled out. Khrushchev said that the Soviet industrial output exceeded in 1958 the industrial production of France, Great Britain and West Germany combined. The next step is to overtake the United States. Khrushchev said: "Therefore, if we calculate on a per capita basis, we will probably need, after the fulfillment of the Seven Year Plan, about five more years to catch up with and outstrip the United States in industrial output." He thus hopes that the Soviet Union will become in 1970 the first industrial power in the world in terms of both absolute volume of production and in per capita output.

Khrushchev also was confident regarding the rate of development of the entire Communist Bloc. He claimed that the Bloc's present industrial output amounted to one-third of the world production. He predicted that this output would reach by 1965 more than a half of the

world industrial production. However, the realization of this forecast depends on factors independent of Khrushchev's control, the rate of industrial growth not only in China and Eastern Europe but also in the non-Communist part of the world.

6. The technological-economic progress depends on the available skilled manpower. The Plan provides by 1965 for 4.5 million specialists with higher education. This has to be achieved by graduating during the next seven years 2.3 million people from the institutions of higher learning, while 1.7 million have been graduated in the past seven years.

7. Speaking about the future, Khrushchev disclosed the inveterate Party resentment against the existence of individual peasant subsidiary plots of land. He predicted the gradual disappearance of these plots owing to the growing collective supplies. He said that the peasant will not need to plant wheat, potatoes, vegetables, and fruit trees or bushes nor to have his own cow because the collective farm will be able to supply him with all foodstuffs. Thus his subsidiary economy will become superfluous. His forecast is his policy which aims at gradually easing out the peasant from the subsidiary plot and making him depend for his whole income on collective work. The peasant will thus be converted into an agricultural worker, which Stalin always wanted him to be.

8. Khrushchev promised to do away in a few years with personal direct taxation. (He had to retract his statement a few years later when the progressive reduction in direct taxation was suddenly stopped.) He said that these taxes, notably the income tax, represented only 7.8 percent of the State revenue. He did not add that the citizen heavily paid in other ways which were more effective than direct taxation. He did not mention the turnover (sales) tax which usually provided from 45 to 50 percent of State revenue nor did he explain that the State control over the size of citizens' incomes and over prices of consumer goods gave the State the required means of carrying out any fiscal or other policy.

9. He promised to complete by 1960 the gradual transition to seven-hour working day and to introduce in 1962 a 40-hour working week.

10. The compulsory subscription to State loans was abandoned. The Government seized this opportunity for postponing for 20 to 25 years (maybe forever) the repayment of loans. Khrushchev displayed his usual sense of humor assuring his audience of the enthusiasm of the population at being in this way fleeced of their compulsory savings.

11. There are people who think that Soviet society is immune to

Western ideas. Khrushchev is not one of them. He firmly warned his Party never "to underestimate the evil bourgeois influence on the Soviet people, particularly the youth."

12. He mentioned his pet project of boarding high schools which should accommodate by 1965 at least 2.5 million children. The long-term goal, which is difficult to reach because of the tremendous expenditure involved, is to make all Soviet children between the ages of 7 and 15 attend such schools. Only then could the Party be sure that Soviet children would be entirely withdrawn from the influence of their parents, whom they could see only during vacations. The Party could then mold their minds through State teachers and the youth organizations without fearing their contamination by "alien" ideas of their families. The Soviet press never stops complaining about the survival of religion among the adults and young people. This "evil survival of the past" could also be more quickly eradicated within the closed walls of a boarding school.

13. The Soviet propaganda freely indulges in a contradiction; it depicts the USSR as a bulwark of peace and offers nuclear and rocket threats to all countries which dare to disagree with Soviet foreign policy. Khrushchev did the same, proudly boasting that the Soviet ICBM could reach any target in the world and simultaneously assuring foreign public opinion of his peace-loving intentions.

14. Like Stalin, he devoted a good part of his report to the expression of solidarity with the foreign Communist parties which, he said, numbered 33 million people and existed in 85 countries. He mentioned with special pride the Italian Communist party (2 million members), the French (500,000 members), the Indonesian (1.5 million) and the Indian (300,000). Guest-delegates of 72 foreign Communist parties from all parts of the world listened to his declaration that it was his international duty to assist in "strengthening by every means . . . the unity of the international Communist movement." This was stated by a man holding the official position of Prime Minister in spite of the fact that the movement is pledged to overthrow every non-Communist government.

15. The final part of his report was devoted to theoretical reflections on the Communist millennium. According to both Marx and Lenin, it should be an era of an unbelievable abundance of goods with their free distribution according to the needs of each individual, of voluntary work without any coercion, and of the disappearance of the State as the agency of social coercion. Khrushchev was more modest. While announcing that the Soviet Union was building the foundations of the future Communist society, he cautiously said: "Of

course, when we speak of satisfying the needs of the people, we have in mind not the whims and desires for luxuries, but the healthy requirements of a culturally developed man." This begs the question as to who will decide which are the healthy requirements and which are whims? Technological progress with its incessant production of new needs makes this matter very complex. The whim of yesterday becomes a healthy requirement of tomorrow. If neither the regulating system of free competition (a system rejected by Communists) nor an authority empowered to answer this question and to enforce its decision by coercion if necessary (the present Soviet method of solving the dilemma of whims and true needs) is not to exist in the future Communist society, who would tell the citizen that his alleged healthy requirement is only a whim which may not be satisfied? Actually, technological progress will always make it impossible to satisfy all the people in all respects because each new invention pertaining to manufactured consumer goods involves the problem of the initial shortage of newly developed products. Also such consumer goods are of necessity of various qualities; in the future Communist society devoid of any compulsion, who would decide which brand of the same product should be given to whom? Actually Khrushchev is too much of a practical politician to be bothered by such problems. His intention is to fire the imagination of his people by telling them that they or their children will discover at the end of their valley of toil and tears a paradise where there will be not only an unbelievable abundance of all goods, but also no police, no procurators, no Committee of State Security, actually no State. His cautious interpretation of the meaning of abundance of goods will offer him another possibility, namely, to proclaim the advent of the millennium on the day when Soviet living standards are comparable to those of the West, and when each Soviet citizen can satisfy his basic needs (healthy requirements but not desires for luxuries, to use his own words) thanks to a high output of consumer goods. If he has this in mind, then American living standards, not only the American industrial output, seem to be the ultimate goal of the anti-American Party.

It is plausible that he had in mind this type of Communism, because he remained extremely vague concerning the other feature of the Communist society, namely the withering away of the State. His views would allow for the survival of the State in an allegedly Communist society. He promised a gradual transfer of State functions to public organizations. But all Soviet public organizations are manipulated by the Party and are nothing but State agencies in all but

name. Such a transfer would be a manipulation of semantics but not the dying out of the State, especially as neither Khrushchev nor anyone else has ever promised that the Party would wither away. For the time being, Khrushchev asked for the strengthening of the armed forces and the State security agencies which are the most visible symbols of State coercion. Soviet citizens could remain assured that, despite the promises of the Communist millennium, they would continue to feel the heavy hand of the State.

Khrushchev reaffirmed his faith in another dogma, that the citizens of the future Communist society would "voluntarily and independently of the material values received, work to their full capacity realizing that this is necessary for society." This dogma is founded on the assumption of a complete change of human nature under the beneficent influence of the socialist State. Yet a quick perusal of the Soviet press proves that Soviet citizens, after experiencing for 45 years the blessings of that State, continue to display all the weaknesses of human nature and many of them a strong propensity to crime. The severe criminal legislation testifies to the need to keep them in the straight path by coercion. If the former supreme Party leaders, in fact the majority of the then Presidium of the Central Committee, could in 1953-57 sink so low as to sabotage Party policies (his own accusation levelled at Malenkov and company), and if Stalin could have committed crimes (according to Khrushchev's own story in 1956 and in 1961), can one reasonably expect that the Soviet society will ever become, as he said, "a harmonious fraternity of working people"?

Khrushchev did not miss the opportunity of trampling underfoot his former rivals for power, the "anti-Party group." He accused Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Bulganin, and Shepilov of having "used the basest methods of factional and dissenting tactics and of having attempted to destroy the unity of the Party, to wreck the implementation of the decisions of the 20th Congress, and to divert the Party and the country from the Leninist path." The pattern was well known. Stalin's vanquished rivals had heard the same accusations, and his path was the only true Leninist one. Now only Khrushchev knows what is the Leninist path. Actually, the Soviet system, which cannot exist without a complete unanimity of views, allows only one man to be the source of "true" Leninism; this is the man who has defeated his rivals for power. Plato wanted the philosopher to be the king; the Soviet system makes the king an *ex officio* philosopher.

The following several days of debates did not add anything particularly interesting to what Khrushchev had said in his report. The delegates of various rank developed or reiterated his ideas and added

details or more figures. But practically all of them were duty-bound to do two things: to denounce the anti-Party group, and to pay obeisance to the present Party boss. Only one delegate, but the most important in this respect, Marshal Malinovskii, Minister of Defense and hence the spokesman of professional military men, went further and mentioned another of Khrushchev's fallen rivals: "The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. discerned in time the ambition of the former Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov, to sever the Army from the Party, and gave this new Bonaparte a sharp rap on the knuckles." The anti-Khrushchev majority on the former Presidium was given no chance to answer the wild accusations levelled at them by the Congress delegates. Neither Marshal Zhukov, who had had the bad luck to side with Khrushchev in the fateful days of June 1957, nor the members of the "anti-Party" group were present. However, two members of that majority, themselves dismissed from the Presidium but not yet formally included in the "anti-Party" group, Pervukhin and Saburov, spoke at the Congress. They were spared a complete disgrace because they vacillated in June 1957 and eventually abandoned Malenkov and his group and rallied to Khrushchev. Both of them humbly offered their apologies for their political mistake. Pervukhin confessed to have joined in the attacks on Khrushchev's policies but claimed that he had not agreed to have him fired as the First Secretary of the Party. The latter fact saved him; he was at the time of the 21st Congress the Soviet Ambassador to the East-German Republic. Saburov defended himself less well and conceded that he had sided with the anti-Party group at the crucial plenary meeting of the Central Committee held in June 1957 where Khrushchev had eventually won the victory. No wonder that in January 1959 he was not an Ambassador but only a humble factory manager in a remote town where, as he said, "he was striving to atone for the wrong he had done to the Party and the people." The chapter of the anti-Party group was far from closed, and was reopened at the 22nd Congress which heard even sharper accusations levelled at the group.

The criticism of his former enemies served as a sort of background for the enthusiastic praise of Khrushchev. Every delegate exclaimed in his own words: "Hail, Khrushchev," acclaiming the victor on whose grace the Party careers now depended. Here are taken at random some of the laudatory statements: "All of us have listened profoundly moved to the remarkable report made by N. S. Khrushchev. This outstanding Party document is a model of the vivid and close link of the Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of Communist building . . ." (Ye. A. Furtseva); "Nikita Khrushchev's

report has fallen on our ears like a magnificent symphony of Communist construction. . . . It formulates a number of extremely important principles which enrich the Marxist-Leninist theory concerning the transition from Socialism to Communism." (A. I. Mikoyan); "The brilliant, comprehensive and profound report of Comrade Khrushchev" (M. A. Suslov); "The report of Comrade Khrushchev contains scientific-theoretical foundations of the national policy of the Party" (N. A. Mukhitdinov); "This historical document" (A. B. Aristov); "We must say quite plainly, comrades, that in the great political, theoretical and organizational work that has been carried out in all spheres by our Leninist Central Committee . . . the outstanding role belongs to the initiative, the rich political experience, and tireless energy of Comrade Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev" (P. N. Pospelov); "I consider it my duty to state that thanks to the daily solicitude of the Communist Party, its Central Committee and Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev personally, our armed forces fully meet the present-day military requirements . . ." (Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskii); "In the accomplishment of the great task of creating the material and technical foundation in the USSR for building Communism, an outstanding role belongs to Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev" (N. M. Shvernik).

Many of the same men paid a similar homage to Stalin. Was there any sense in condemning the cult of personality at the 20th Congress to revive it at the 21st?

Khrushchev was away on a short vacation at the time of his 65th birthday in April, 1959. His colleagues on the Presidium and the Secretariat of the Central Committee seized this opportunity for paying him an homage of fealty. All of them: A. Aristov, N. Beliaev, L. Brezhnev, K. Voroshilov, N. Ignatov, A. Kirichenko, F. Kozlov, O. Kuusinen, A. Mikoyan, N. Mukhitdinov, M. Suslov, E. Furtseva, N. Shvernik, Ya. Kalnberzin, A. Kirilenko, D. Korotchenko, A. Kosygin, K. Mazurov, V. Mzhavanadze, N. Podgornyi, D. Polianskii and P. Pospelov (full and alternate members of the Presidium and Secretaries of the Central Committee) signed a telegram of birthday greetings which was displayed on the first page of the Soviet press.⁵³ They hailed him as "our elder comrade and friend, the faithful disciple of Lenin, an eminent statesman of the Communist Party, the Soviet State and the whole international Communist and workers' movement." They discerned in him: "a tireless fighter for the triumph of Communism who gives the example of the Leninist style in work and of the selfless service in the interest of toilers . . ."; they praised his "ebullient energy, his rich political experience, wisdom, and bold

sense of initiative"; they laid at his door the main credit for all the post-Stalinist policies, domestic and foreign; they acknowledged in him their own model, assured him of the love and respect which the Party and the people had for him, and hailed him as a great theorist of Marxism-Leninism. He was thus duly crowned by his former peers as the legitimate successor of Stalin who had heard from the same people similar dithyrambs, only sung at a higher pitch which would be unbecoming at this initial stage of the new cult of personality.

Bold would be the man who would say that Khrushchev's power is now unchallengeable. To claim it one would have to know all the intricacies of the highest inner Soviet politics. But it seems that he is now firmly in saddle having only one enemy who cannot be purged and exiled to a remote place; namely, his age. Stalin was only in his early forties when he had won the battle for power. Nature itself sets a limit on the time left to Khrushchev for enjoying full power.

THE 22ND PARTY CONGRESS

Two and a half years later the 22nd Congress was held in October, 1961. It amended the Charter and adopted a new program of the Party. It also further developed the theme that was one of the subjects of the 21st Congress, the image of the future Communist society.

According to the report of the 22nd Congress Credentials Commission, the total Party membership including the candidates reached ten million. There were at that time 296,440 Party organizations in the whole country, including 77,681 for the industrial and transport employees and 49,206 for the rural Communists (40,000 on the collective farms and 9,206 on the state farms). Almost every collective farm had its own primary Party organization.

Each Congress delegate represented 2,000 Party members or candidates. The total of delegates was 4,813, a huge crowd too large for any effective debate. They were elected in indirect elections. First, the city and district conferences of Party members designated their representatives to the regional conferences and, in the smaller Republics, to the Republican congresses; secondly, these regional conferences and Republican congresses elected Congress delegates. The delegates from the Russian Republic alone represented a crushing majority of Congress membership; they were 3,093. The city of Moscow sent 345 delegates, while the second largest Republic, the Ukrainian, had only 783 delegates, less than twice the number of Muscovite delegates. Russians were also numerous among the 1,720

delegates from the fourteen non-Russian Republics. The Congress, like the Party and the Soviet State, was unmistakably dominated by the Russians, who form only about 60 percent of the total population.

The social composition of the Congress retained the traditional feature of preponderance of the intelligentsia and paid functionaries of the Party and other public organizations. Workers (including foremen) totaled 22.3 percent of the Congress membership, and collective and state farmers (including farm managers), 10.6 percent. In other words, the intelligentsia, with its 67.1 percent, even numerically dominated the Congress. There were 1,727 officials of the Party, state administration, trade unions, and Komsomol among the delegates.

This Congress, like its predecessors, was mainly an assembly of people who have made or are making a good place for themselves in the Soviet society rather than a conference of "the toilers." In this enormous crowd of men and women devoted to the Party leadership and mindful of their careers (84.1 percent of delegates were decorated with orders and medals for their services) it was no surprise to meet Marshals, generals and admirals, scientists, writers, painters, composers, engineers, industrial and agricultural managers, economists, educators, physicians, lawyers, journalists, other members of the intelligentsia, Heroes of the Soviet Union and of Socialist Labor, and laureates of Lenin Prizes.

Women, who had represented in 1961 only 19 percent of Party membership, were favored by having a higher proportion of Congress delegates, 22.3 percent of the total.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The Congress elects the national Central Committee and the Auditing Commission. The Central Committee has now 175 full members and 155 alternate members, altogether 330. Its meetings are attended by full and alternate members, who have the right to take part in its debates but may not vote. In case of vacancy in the full membership, the Central Committee elects a new full member from its alternate members.

The Central Committee "directs the Party activities" during the intervals between Congresses (Article 35), i.e., continually: this statement reflects a half-truth. In Stalin's time the Central Committee rarely met and had no real authority; as a matter of fact, Stalin was the only authority. The Central Committee has met frequently since his death, sometimes more often than the Charter requires (once every six months). It was in June, 1957, the battlefield where Khrushchev's rivals were decisively defeated after they had outvoted him in the

Presidium. Its membership encompasses the uppermost political layer of the Soviet society. One finds there the top national and provincial Party, trade-union, Komsomol, and other organization leaders, the highest civilian and military dignitaries, the distinguished writers and scientists. This is *the* elite. However, 330 people, important as they may be, cannot rule. They may deliberate, approve and censor. This is probably what they have been doing in the post-Stalinist period, judging by the scanty information published in the Soviet press. The Central Committee could be called a substitute Soviet parliament (neither the Congress nor the Supreme Soviet deserves this name) if its composition were truly determined in a genuine election by the Congress delegates. In fact, however, its membership is fixed by the Party top leadership in advance of the election and then unanimously approved by the Congress. It is more realistic to say that its membership derives from co-optation. Yet it is now an important body, the only truly deliberative body in the USSR which has more than a shadow of power. If the top leader is careful enough, as Stalin was and Khrushchev has been, the Central Committee is packed with his political friends and followers who owe him their careers.

Khrushchev has introduced an innovation by inviting sometimes to the plenary meetings of the Central Committee outsiders who are experts on the matters to be discussed. This useful innovation both allows the Central Committee to listen to knowledgeable views and also helps the people who will be in charge of implementing the policies decided upon by the Committee to familiarize themselves with the tasks beforehand.

The Central Committee can express its opinions and offer advice and possibly even modify proposals submitted by the top leaders; it can also select the top leader if its Presidium is hopelessly split, as happened in 1957. But it cannot "direct all party activities." This task is in fact delegated to its two committees, the Presidium and the Secretariat.

Immediately after the 22nd Congress the newly elected Central Committee appointed its Presidium and its Secretaries. The composition of the Presidium was fixed as follows: N. S. Khrushchev, L. I. Brezhnev, G. I. Voronov, F. R. Kozlov, A. N. Kosygin, O. V. Kuusinen, A. I. Mikoyan, N. V. Podgornyi, D. S. Polianskii, M. A. Suslov, N. M. Shvernik (full members); V. V. Grishin, Sh. R. Rashidov, K. T. Mazurov, V. P. Mzhavanadze, and V. V. Shcherbitskii (alternate members). The following were appointed Secretaries of the Central Committee: N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary, F. R. Kozlov, O. V. Kuusinen, M. A. Suslov, B. N. Ponomarev, I. V. Spiridonov, and A. N.

Shelepin.⁵⁴ Four Secretaries were also members of the Presidium. The Party Charter does not fix the maximum or minimum number of members of the Presidium or Secretaries of the Central Committee. Actually the numerical composition of both varies from time to time, but it is never much increased, in order to avoid making these two working bodies unwieldy. The Presidium formulates Party policies and supervises their implementation; the Secretariat controls the Party machine. One is as important as the other in their different ways. The Secretaries of the Central Committee and its Presidium form together the top leadership, the ultimate source of all power in the Soviet Union. The First Secretary of the Central Committee, who also chairs the Presidium, is the supreme leader. The present one, Khrushchev, holds also the post of Chairman of the Federal Council of Ministers.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee has its own departments for supervision of the implementation of Party policies in all fields of social activities.

Other national organs deserve mention. The Party Control Commission, designated by the Central Committee, is a "court of appeal" from lower Party committees regarding expulsion and other disciplinary penalties meted out to Party members. The Party Auditing Commission, elected by the Congress, checks on the Party accounts. The Central Committee is helped also by three bureaus: one for Party affairs in the Russian Republic, and two functional bureaus (for urban and rural organizations).

PERIODICAL RENEWAL OF THE PARTY COMMITTEES—PARTY CONTROL OVER THE ARMED FORCES AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS

The Charter as amended by the 22nd Congress introduced an innovation. Its Article 25 prescribes a partial and periodical renewal of the composition of all Party committees. This new rule aims at keeping Party functionaries on their toes, prevents their becoming permanent "fixtures" too sure of the tenure of their posts, and opens to Party members great opportunities for being designated to various committees. This amendment is typical of Khrushchev who is, first of all, an organization man. He never has tired in pointing out that the Party should fight against routine in its functionaries and passivity in its rank-and-file members. Frequent turnover in Party committees serves this purpose, and so does the mobilization, by local Party secretaries, of the so-called *active*. The active includes any Party members who are eager to help in a campaign, for instance, for over-fulfillment of the State plan of production or for increase in labor productivity. The trade unions and Komsomol as well as other large

organizations also have recourse to their active of rank-and-file members. This device was known in Stalin's time, but the all-powerful Party machine did not use it. Khrushchev's urgent appeals cannot now be ignored.

The Party Charter fixed the following rules:

1. At every regular election (once every four years) one-fourth of the national Central Committee and its Presidium must be renewed. Members of the Presidium should not be as a rule elected for more than three consecutive terms (twelve years). This provision would have been a threat to the power wielded by the top leaders, including Khrushchev himself, except for the next part of the same Article 25 which says: "Some Party workers may be elected, because of their recognized authority, high political, organizational and other qualifications, successively to the leading organs for a longer period of time." For those leaders there is no final term of office. They must receive at least three-quarters of the votes, but this requirement does not hinder the re-election of leaders in control of the Party machine. The general rule of periodical renewing of the Central Committee and its Presidium could prove handy for the top leader, assured himself of permanent tenure, in dislodging from the main Party bodies those less powerful colleagues who have made themselves political nuisances, failed in their assigned tasks, or acquired the stature of possible rivals.

2. At least one-third of the Republican Central Committees and regional committees, one-half of the city and district committees, and one-half of the bureaus of primary organizations should be renewed at every election. The members of these bodies cannot hold their office for longer than three consecutive terms. The secretaries of the primary organizations may not be designated for more than two terms. (However, all of these officials may be re-elected for longer periods of time if three-fourths of their electors so decide in view of their outstanding qualifications.) This rule is intended to interrupt the tenure of office for at least one term. After the lapse of this term, the former holder of office may again be elected.

A member of the national Central Committee, Republican Central Committees, and regional, city, or district committees may be deprived of his office by a two-thirds majority vote by the body to which he belongs. The same majority is required for expulsion from the Party of members of these committees.

Decisive control by the Party over the State administration and all other Soviet associations is assured by Article 67 of the Charter which says: "At congresses, conferences, and meetings convened by

administrative, trade-union, cooperative, and other toilers' mass organizations and also in the elective organs of these organizations having at least three Party members, Party groups will be organized. The tasks of these groups will be the comprehensive increase of the influence of the Party and implementation of its policy among non-Party members, the strengthening of Party and State discipline, the struggle against bureaucratism, and the verification of Party and State directives." This provision precludes any independent action by the State administration, including all the Soviets, and by the non-Party associations.

Article 68 completes the instruction: "Party groups come under the corresponding Party organs: the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., the Central Committee of the Communist Party of a Union Republic, the territorial or regional committee, the area committee, the city or district committee. Party groups must strictly and unswervingly follow the decisions of leading Party organs on all questions."

Party control, of course, extends to the Armed Forces. It is assured by another assistant body of the Central Committee, the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy. The heads of branches of this Administration must have, depending on the level of units of Armed Forces with which they work, at least five or three years of Party membership. The Army and Navy Party organizations and the officers of the Political Administration are bound to maintain close ties with the local civilian Party committees and systematically report to them on their political work within the military units (Articles 65 and 66 of the Charter). Effectiveness of Party influence within the Armed Forces is assured by a mutual compact. The Party acknowledges the necessity of strict subordination of soldiers and sailors to their commanding officers and expects in return a complete political loyalty. Marshal R. Malinovskii, the Minister of Defense, expressed the gist of this unwritten compact in his speech at the 22nd Congress: "Our Soviet officer is the representative of the Party and Government in the Army and Navy. He is a commander with single authority, and his order is law for subordinates. At the same time, he is also the painstaking educator of his subordinates, the conductor of the Party ideals. It is indicative that the proportion of Communists and Komsomol members among the officers, generals, and admirals, amounts to almost 90 percent of the total."

The Charter makes no secret of the fact that the Komsomol organization is "an active assistant and reserve of the Party. . . . [Its members] must, in fact, be active promoters of the Party directives in all fields. . . . The All-Union Komsomol Organization conducts its

work under the supervision of the C.P.S.U. The work of the local organizations of the All-Union Komsomol are directed and controlled by the respective Republican, territorial or regional, area, city, or district Party organizations" (Articles 60-62).

The naked truth, as reflected in the Party Charter and other documents, is that all of the power in the Soviet Union is vested in the Party—or, in less than five percent of the population—and this power is delegated for all practical purposes to the top leadership. With this fact fully grasped, the elitist and hierarchical structure of the Party is easily understood.

THE NEW PARTY PROGRAM

The 22nd Congress approved the new Program.⁶⁵ This is the third consecutive ideological charter, the first and the second, respectively adopted in 1903 and 1919, having been drafted with Lenin's personal participation. The first Program was the manifesto of a Socialist Party not yet sure of its future; the second was elaborated soon after the Bolshevik seizure of power and was meant to be a program of action to be undertaken in the foreseeable future. The new Program, approved in 1961 by the Party Congress at a time that could be called the zenith hour in the long Party career, outlines the objectives of Party policies for the coming two decades and formulates the ideological creed for contemporary Russian Communists and their foreign sympathizers. It was adopted at a time when the Party was safely entrenched in power, when Russia was one of the two greatest powers in the world, when one-third of mankind, living in both hemispheres, was ruled by regimes fashioned in the Soviet image. The C.P.S.U. had every right to say that it had blazed the trail for other Communist Parties. Yet the hour of triumph was also an hour of deep frustration. The political and ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking was no longer a secret at the time of the 22nd Congress. It was visible that the former era, when the Soviet Party had been the uncontested leader in the international Communist movement, was ended by the Chinese challenge. For the first time in the history of the movement, the threat of a split that could rend it into mutually hostile factions was taking shape. The 22nd Congress adopted the new Program in an atmosphere in which the feeling of triumphant self-assurance blended with dark premonition regarding the future of the Communist movement.

The Party had been building since the October Revolution a society which they called socialist and which was founded on two principles: socialization of all means of production, and distribution

according to the criterion, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." Party leaders proclaimed at the 21st and 22nd Congresses (1959 and 1961) that the time had come for looking forward to the next stage of social development, the Communist stage, where the above stern criterion would be replaced by the generous principle: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." In other words, the Party considered that the socialist society had already been built in Russia and that the time had come for building a more perfect Communist society.

The Program says: "What is Communism? Communism is a classless social system with a single public ownership of the means of production and full social equality of all members of society. . . . All sources of public wealth will flow abundantly and the great principle, 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,' will be implemented. Communism is a highly organized society of free, socially conscious workers in which . . . labor for the good of society will become for all the prime, vital requirement, a necessity recognized by one and all. . . ." This passage makes clear that the advent of that ideal human society will require not only an immense increase in the economic output, especially of foodstuffs (the chronic weak spot of Soviet economy) and manufactured consumer goods, but also a fundamental transformation of human nature, a process that has not yet even begun in the Soviet Union. The Program is in this respect a very optimistic document.

It assures that "under Communism all people will have an equal position in society. . . ." It does not answer the self-evident question how this perfect equality will be reconciled with the great diversification of social functions which characterizes every economically advanced country. No party can change the fact that certain individuals perform commanding or controlling functions in production processes and in social organizations and others occupy subordinate positions. Certain social functions require a deep and complex educational background, while others may be carried out with a relatively limited luggage of general and professional education. If one could assume that the promised Communist society would be able to distribute to all its citizens equal wages, that a scientist or a manager responsible for the most complex production would receive no larger wages than a rank-and-file industrial worker or farmer, that the material incentive which plays a great role in the present Soviet Union as a stimulus for better work would no longer be necessary, that all Soviet men of the future would do their utmost in work without compulsion of any sort, including the encouragement of diversified wages, even then

the ideal of social equality would not be attained. A man who commands would not be an equal of those placed under his orders. A man with a high level of education would be in this respect superior to the mass of Communist citizens who could hope at best to achieve a secondary education. The unequal education would continue to be a barrier even in their mutual social relations, as their intellectual interests would be greatly different. It was rather irresponsible on the part of the Congress to leave these questions unanswered and to make bold promises while ignoring the existence of such obvious problems.

However, one must acknowledge a greater realism of Party leaders concerning the material equality of citizens of the future society. The Program says: "The demands of the people in all their great variety will correspond to the healthy, reasonable needs of a fully developed man." In other words, abundance of goods will allow satisfaction of healthy and reasonable needs. Other needs will remain unsatisfied in the Communist society. The Program does not specify who will define, and how, which needs are "healthy and reasonable" and which will be declared "unhealthy and unreasonable," who will disqualify citizens who voice these unhealthy demands as "underdeveloped men." Probably the responsibility will go to the Party.

If the image of future Communist society were stripped of its Marxist terminology, it could, in its material aspects, be reduced to an image familiar to the world, that of the affluent society. The Party in reality promises Soviet citizens that they will live one day in this type of society and will enjoy high living standards. Soviet living standards being much lower than American, the Program is right in preaching patience: "It is not possible to jump over the necessary stages of development." It outlines two next stages, 1961-70 and 1971-80, during which "Soviet society will come close to a stage where it can introduce the principle of distribution according to need. . . . And so in essence a Communist society will be built in the USSR. The complete building of a Communist society will be concluded in the subsequent period." The Party was cautious enough to avoid being more specific about the length of that final period or fixing criteria by which one could check whether the Communist society will be in 1980 Communist "in essence." The plan for the next two decades calls for a rapid increase in production and in labor productivity, the prerequisite for abundance of goods. The Program confidently predicts that the USSR will surpass the United States in 1970 in per capita production and that by 1980 it will become the most affluent society in the world.

These ambitious goals may or may not be achieved. The Soviet Union does not look, in 1963, like a country which will be able in seven years to surpass the United States in over-all production including foodstuffs and durable consumer goods. Its agriculture has not yet overcome its perennial problems, including the employment of a much higher proportion of the active population than that used in any other developed country. Its stress on heavy industries and defense effort, including nuclear power and outer-space exploration, absorbs so much of its resources that it can hardly expect to make up for deficiencies in the output of manufactured goods. The remaining seven years would require a gigantic effort to fulfill the promise of surpassing the United States in over-all per capita output.

This promise might prove to be a boastful slogan, but it means in any case that the living standards of Soviet citizens will continue to rise and that the present generation will begin to taste the fruits of untold sacrifices which Stalin exacted for the economic development of Russia. The large industrial base which has been built makes possible the gradual passing towards the pattern of affluent society which has been realized in the West by other methods, under a democratic system of government, and without herding millions of people into forced labor camps. The pace of further Soviet progress will depend on many factors such as the proportion of investments reserved for agriculture and consumers' goods industries and the average of labor productivity. The Party wisely left open for itself an exit in case the progress of the next two decades proves less satisfactory than was expected at the time of the 22nd Congress. The program formulates a caveat: "Complications in the international situation and the increased defense expenditure thereby required may impede the realization of plans for increasing the people's prosperity." This caveat will allow for finding excuses in case of non-fulfillment of the stated goals.

What will the next two decades bring to collective farmers? The Program says: "The transition to a guaranteed, monthly wage" and "the personal subsidiary establishments will gradually become uneconomic. Then the communal husbandry of collective farms will be able fully to replace the personal subsidiary establishment of collective farmers; they will receive all forms of social insurance: pensions, leaves, and so forth, at the expense of collective farms and state funds." The Soviet peasants will not feel happy at the announcement that the Party will continue its policy of reducing the size of already small family plots of land which are a vital though subsidiary source of income. If they are finally deprived of those plots of land and of

the small quantity of domestic animals which allow them to subsist in spite of rather meager remuneration for work on the collective farm (they now earn on the average half the wages of rank-and-file industrial workers), they might not respond as they have so far—by reducing their labor productivity—only if the State otherwise guarantees them fairly decent living standards. The Party promises to do so by equalizing their status with that of industrial workers. Guaranteed wages instead of the present computation of work compensation in labor-days (the ultimate value of labor-days depends on the actual annual income of each collective farm and is highly uncertain) and the extension of social insurance to collective farmers who now are denied this benefit could compensate for the loss of subsidiary establishment. Otherwise, the problem of agriculture will remain unsolved.

Although the Party never tires of stressing the crucial importance of material incentive in stimulating industrial labor productivity, it has not paid enough attention to this aspect of collective farming. Collective farmers find no reason for working hard, because they are discriminated against in comparison with industrial workers. Their income, calculated in labor-days, is an unknown quantity until the collective farm learns towards the end of the agricultural year its own income. The total income of the farm depends on many factors which escape the control of collective farmers, such as the quality of soil, climate, possible drought, and damages to crops which bad weather, insects, and natural calamities might cause. This income also depends on prices which the State is willing to pay for its massive purchases of agricultural products. The peasants might work as hard as industrial workers, but they are refused old age and disability pensions and paid annual vacations, unlike the urban population. This discrimination will have to be ended in order to expect the peasant to acquire a personal interest in greater productivity.

These improvements in the peasant's lot will demand a much greater State expenditure. The agricultural output also depends on willingness to invest more in agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and other means which modern agriculture requires. The Party cannot hope to solve its perennial agricultural problem by constant reforms in the organization of supervision over collective farms. The only effective remedy would be to move agriculture higher on the scale of State expenditures; this could be done if the State were to spend proportionately less on defense and industries. The Party cannot have its agricultural cake and eat it.

The Party promises the urban population, including industrial

workers, a constant increase in wages which will continue during the next two decades to be unequal, a progressive lowering of retail prices, a gradual reduction and eventually abolition of direct taxes (they are already low since the State derives its income from indirect taxes, mainly the sales tax), an expansion of free public services such as education, housing, medical treatment, transportation and public utilities, and higher pensions. The secret remains how all these generous promises could be fulfilled in twenty years. There are already proofs that it will not be easy. The promised reduction in direct taxation was halted in 1962, and the prices for meat, meat products, and certain dairy products were raised in the same year.

If one does not take these extravagant promises literally, they mean that the Party will do its best gradually to improve living standards. This can be achieved. Wages have been going up, and the State has seriously begun construction of urban housing on a large scale. Actually, the Soviet Government has at its disposal many devices for improving living conditions. The State is directly or indirectly the owner of all means of production. It fixes the level of wages and retail prices, decides the housing rent, and sets charges for public utilities and other services. Whether the wages are raised or the prices and rent lowered, the effect is the same. This does not mean that the Government can do whatever it likes. Its resources are limited, and it must husband them; it must decide each year how much from the national income will be invested in further economic development, what portion will be spent on military expenses, what will be the cost of public administration, and which part of the national income may be distributed among the citizens in improving their living conditions. This down-to-earth calculation makes it rather improbable that everything promised in the Program will be fulfilled.

The Program holds the prospect of reducing the workweek during the next ten years to 34-36 hours from the present 41. This is not impossible if improved technological processes, notably automation, reduce the need for the present man-hours and if the level of output will depend more on mechanical equipment than on human effort. This same prospect would be true for any advanced society whatever its social regime. Paid vacations are to be extended during the same period of time to three and later to four weeks from the present two. This change is also within the reach of any advanced society if technological progress warrants such reduction in manpower. The practical question remains whether all will be realized in ten years.

The Program reaffirms the Party pet idea of a mass extension of boarding schools and full-day schools. The difference between the

two consists in the students at boarding schools remaining on the premises during the whole academic year except for vacation periods, while full-day school students live at home but receive meals at the school. The purpose is the same—to reduce contact between children and young people and their parents and thereby to circumscribe as far as possible parental influence. This system, still far from universal, would enable the Party to act as “the engineer of human souls,” to use Stalin’s favorite expression, and to mold young minds almost without interference by parents. The teachers and the organizations for children and young people would do the job. The stakes are high for the Party, but expenses are also high and limit its freedom of action in quickly carrying out its scheme.

The Program is very cautious regarding the other Marxist feature of a Communist society, namely the withering away of the State: “The State . . . will remain until the complete victory of Communism. . . . To insure the complete withering away of the State, it is imperative to create internal conditions such as a developed Communist society and external conditions such as a final solution of contradictions between capitalism and Communism in the international arena to the benefit of Communism.” Without discussing the problematic question whether a society free of compulsion and where citizens would work and peacefully co-exist owing only to their inner social discipline, is possible at all, it is obvious that the process of withering away of the State would require prerequisites impossible to fulfill. Not only human nature would have to be completely altered, a process which has not even begun in the Soviet Union as one may see from the severity of criminal legislation, but all other regimes would have to disappear from the surface of the earth. This is not all. The current Soviet-Chinese quarrel gives a premonition of the fact that Communist nations will not necessarily be fraternal to each other. The suspicions between them, their rivalries and disputes would warrant the existence of the State as a bulwark of defense even in a wholly Communist world.

In the meantime the Party wants to achieve something else, namely to elicit from the population a greater collaboration in maintaining public order and social discipline. The concept of the *active* helps by periodically mobilizing rank-and-file citizens in assisting the Party, the State administration, and various mass organizations such as trade unions and the Komsomol in carrying out their tasks. The post-Stalinist development of comradely courts, elected by coworkers at a place of employment, has alleviated the task of both Soviet courts and management, because minor misdemeanors and breaches of labor

discipline may be submitted to these courts. The same courts take cognizance of noncriminal misconduct which is a public nuisance, such as making the life of other tenants unbearable, drinking, or misbehaving in public places. Another device is the Komsomol brigades of volunteers who assist the militia (police) in maintaining public order. All these means may be useful and may lighten the tasks of the State administration, but they do not eliminate State compulsion; they add another method of compulsion.

The Party wants to have a more rapid turnover in the State administration for two reasons. One is the intention to discover and attract new talent, and the other to give as many Soviet citizens as possible the feeling of participating in public affairs. They are not invited to share with the Party the formulation of policies but only to help in their implementation. The program has given precise instructions which parallel the amendments in the Party Charter adopted by the 22nd Congress: "It is advisable to renew at each election at least one-third of the total number of deputies to the Soviets. . . . It is advisable to adopt the principle that the leading officials of All-Union, Republican, and local organs [of public administration] should be elected to their posts, as a rule, for no longer than three consecutive terms. In exceptional cases, when the personal talents of the official, in the general opinion, make his continued activity in the leading organs useful and necessary, his reelection may be permitted. In this case, his reelection is determined not by a simple majority, but only if the candidate receives not less than three-quarters of the votes." The Program extends the same rule to all public organizations such as the trade unions and Komsomol which are also advised not to reelect the same officials for a third consecutive term.

The application of this new rule remains entirely in the hands of the Party. It is the Party that selects the candidates for all elective posts. The vote is usually unanimous. It is the task of the Party not to sponsor the same candidates after the expiration of their two or three terms.

The Program alludes to the process of gradual Russification of non-Russian Soviet nationalities: "An international [i.e. Russian] culture common to all Soviet nationalities is developing. . . . The voluntary study of the Russian language along with the maternal tongue now taking place is of positive significance. . . . The Russian language has in actual fact become the common language of intercourse and cooperation between all the peoples of the USSR. . . . The growing scale of Communist construction demands the constant exchange of cadres among nationalities. Any manifestation of national aloofness

in the education and employment of workers of various nationalities in the Soviet Republics is intolerable." These two sentences refer to internal migrations of manpower which mainly result in increasing ethnic infiltration by the Slavs, principally Russians and Ukrainians, into the homelands of other nationalities. The number of these Slavic islands in the midst of indigenous populations has been constantly growing. The net result is eventually the reduction of a former autochthonic majority to the position of minority in their own country. This has been achieved already in two Republics, the Kazakh and the Kirghiz. Such "success" has never been won by French settlers in Algeria or British settlers in Southern Rhodesia. The Soviet Party is more efficient.

The Program has not brought anything new regarding ideological orientation: "Marxism-Leninism, as an integral and orderly system of philosophical, economic, and socio-political views, is the ideological basis for the [Communist] world outlook. . . . The peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems does not signify the termination of ideological struggle." In other words, the Party remains the guardian of its absolute truth and does not intend to tolerate any other truth among the Soviet citizens. Not only Party members but all citizens are expected not to raise any doubts concerning the dogmatic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and are told to accept them on faith. The Marxist doctrine has been transformed into a quasi-religious creed that does not brook nonbelievers or agnostics.

The Communist's "love for the socialist Fatherland" should be allied with "implacable hatred towards the enemies of Communism." This sort of aggressive patriotism is called nationalism in the case of other nations. But Russian Communists reserve this term ("bourgeois nationalism") for other nationalities; then it is a term of opprobrium.

The Program outlines the educational plan. The decade of 1961-70 should be one gradually extending eleven-year secondary schooling to all children to be enrolled. Young people who have had only the chance of completing an elementary education should be given the opportunity to work for an eight-year school diploma (junior high school), presumably through evening and correspondence courses. The decade of 1970-80 should become one of universal secondary education (eleven years of schooling). The 22nd Congress went back to the old plan which had already once dismally misfired. After several years of experimenting with universal secondary education in urban centers, the Party abandoned the plan in the late fifties. Only the future will tell whether the Party will this time be more successful. In giving itself twenty years, the Party is wiser than it

was ten years ago. The Program also promises an extension of opportunity for acquiring higher education and secondary-technical education; this is to be achieved by a further expansion of the existing network of night and correspondence schools.

The perennial Party line regarding social sciences, literature, and arts, has been solemnly reaffirmed. The Program judges in advance the results of research and indicates what desirable conclusions should be: "Research into the problems of world history and contemporary world developments should [*sic*] reveal the natural process of mankind's progress towards Communism. . . . Social sciences must also in the future oppose bourgeois ideology, right-wing socialist theory and practice, revisionism, and dogmatism, upholding the purity of Marxist-Leninist principles." Neither Stalin nor Zhdanov could possibly have quarreled with these instructions: "Soviet literature and arts, filled with optimism and dynamic Communist ideas, play an important ideological-educational role. . . . They are called upon to serve as sources of joy and inspiration for millions of people. . . . The principal line in the development of literature and arts is . . . a realistic and highly artistic reflection of the richness and variety of socialist reality, an inspired and bright portrayal of all that is new and truly Communist, and a condemnation of everything contrary to the progress of society." "Socialist realism" remains in the Program the only tolerated method.

The Party has not been overly timid in describing itself as "the intellect, honor, and conscience of Soviet society" and in predicting the timelessness of its mission: "The period of full-scale construction of Communism is characterized by a further growth of the role and importance of the Communist Party as the leading and directing force of Soviet society." The State might or might not wither away, but the Party does not intend to disappear at any time in the future.

The Program contains the now stereotyped slogan: "The cult of the individual . . . is incompatible with the Leninist principles of Party life." However, the same 22nd Congress which adopted the Program was dominated by one individual to whom speaker after speaker was bound to pay tribute in generous praises. His self-satisfied pictures adorn almost daily the front page of the Soviet press which reproduces *in extenso* his lengthy and frequent speeches on all imaginable topics. He might not be an absolute ruler, as Stalin was, but certainly he is much more "equal" than his nominal peers on the Presidium or in the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

By contrast, the 22nd Congress adopted the usual Communist attitude towards the defeated rivals of the supreme leader. Figura-

tively, the former Party leaders were rejected by the Congress to the Party limbo, as Stalin and his Congresses had done with Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov, and others. Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov, and Shepilov were now collectively baptized as "the anti-Party group." They were charged with responsibility for Stalin's crimes. Whatever their true record was, it was a distasteful spectacle to see abuse heaped on the heads of men who were not allowed to exculpate themselves and who had been instrumental in the rise of those who insulted them. The Party education does not allow any feeling of pity for dead or fallen idols. The last step in repudiating Stalin himself, to whom all senior Congress delegates owed their careers, was taken at the time of the 22nd Congress. His body was removed from the Lenin Mausoleum, and the city of Stalingrad was renamed Volgograd. Yet this battle against the dead titan is not yet decided. Time will erase or blunt the recollection of his innumerable crimes with which present Party leaders were associated. The Party will probably acknowledge that he was the main artisan of its power, of the might of the Soviet State, and of the external expansion of Russian influence. The constant re-evaluation of Stalin's merits and demerits by Khrushchev himself proves that it is easier to cast a Malenkov and a Molotov into the Communist place of damnation and oblivion than to do it with Stalin who cannot be disassociated from thirty years of Soviet history.

THE MULTI-NATIONAL STATE—THE UNION REPUBLICS

The Soviet Union is a multi-national State. It is composed of some sixty nations, national groups and nationalities. The Russians represent more than half of the population of the Soviet Union. . . . The Russians . . . play the leading role in the life of our country. . . . The Russian nation has merited general esteem among all the nations of our country as the leading force of the Soviet Union and as the first among the equal and friendly family of the Soviet nations.⁵⁶

This naïvely sincere statement contained in a book destined for Soviet youth defines exactly the national situation in the Soviet Union. It is supposed to be a Federal State of equal nations, but the Russians are considered the leading (ruling) nation.

Depending on its numerical importance, a national group may form one of the states of the Soviet Union. There are fifteen Union Republics: the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), Ukrainian SSR, Byelorussian SSR, Uzbek SSR, Kazakh SSR, Georgian SSR, Azerbaidjani SSR, Lithuanian SSR, Moldavian SSR, Latvian SSR,

Kirghiz SSR, Tadjik SSR, Armenian SSR, Turkmenian SSR, and Estonian SSR. The sixteenth, the Karelo-Finnish, several years ago was quietly demoted to the lower rank of Autonomous Republic. For the numerically smaller nationalities there are 20 Autonomous Republics within the Union Republics; they occupy in the scale of public administration a place somewhat equal to a region (province). The Russian Union Republic contains the following Autonomous Republics: Bashkir, Buriat, Dagestan, Kabardin-Balkir, Karelian, Komi, Mari, Mordva, Chechen-Ingush, Northern-Ossetin, Tartar, Tuva, Kalmyk, Udmurt, Chuvash, and Yakut; the Georgian Union Republic has two Autonomous Republics: Abkhaz and Adjar; the Armenian, Nakhichevan; and the Uzbek, the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Republic. Each Autonomous Republic, like a Union Republic, has its own Supreme Soviet and its Council of Ministers. There are 8 Autonomous Regions for even smaller nationalities: Adygey, Altay Mountains, Jewish, Khakass, and Cherkess-Karachayev within the Russian Republic; Karabakh Highlands within the Azerbaidjani Republic; Southern Ossetin within the Georgian Republic; and Badakhshan Highlands within the Tadjik Republic. Finally, the Russian Union Republic includes 10 National Areas for minuscule national groups; these Areas are supposed to form autonomous units within the Russian regions. These complicated administrative subdivisions principally give one satisfaction to the various nationalities; namely they allow for the existence of two official languages and two languages of school instruction—the local one, and the Russian.

The long list of autonomous national units may produce the impression that the national problem of Russia has been solved on the basis of a federation of its many nationalities. This optimistic picture is blurred by the Constitution itself, which grants enormous powers to the federal government. Article 14 says:

The jurisdiction of the USSR as represented by its higher organs of State power and organs of State administration, embraces: 1) representation of the USSR in international relations, conclusion, ratification and denunciation of treaties of the USSR with other States, establishment of general procedure governing the relations of Union Republics with foreign States; 2) questions of war and peace; 3) admission of new republics into the USSR; 4) control over the observance of the Constitution of the USSR, and ensuring conformity of the Constitutions of Union Republics with the Constitution of the USSR; 5) confirmation of alterations of boundaries between Union Republics; 6) confirmation of the formation of new territories and regions and also of new

Autonomous Republics and autonomous regions within Union Republics; 7) organization of the defense of the USSR, direction of all the armed forces of the USSR, determination of directing principles governing the organization of the military formations of the Union Republics; 8) foreign trade on the basis of State monopoly; 9) safeguarding the security of the State; 10) determination of the national economic plans of the USSR; 11) approval of the consolidated State budget of the USSR and of the report on its fulfillment, determination of the taxes and revenues which go to the Union, the Republican and the local budgets; 12) administration of the banks, industrial and agricultural institutions and enterprises and trading enterprises of all-Union importance; 13) administration of transport and communications; 14) direction of the monetary and credit system; 15) organization of State insurance; 16) contracting or granting of loans; 17) determination of the basic principles of land tenure and of the use of mineral wealth, forests and waters; 18) determination of the basic principles in the spheres of education and public health; 19) organization of the uniform system of national economic statistics; 20) determination of the principles of labor legislation; 21) legislation concerning the judicial system and judicial procedure, criminal and civil codes; 22) legislation concerning Union citizenship, legislation concerning the rights of aliens; 23) determination of the principles of legislation concerning marriage and the family; 24) issuing of all-Union acts of amnesty.

Practically none of the fields of State activity remains outside of federal jurisdiction. The economic life of each Union Republic has no financial autonomy because the federal government determines the budget as well as the taxation and revenues of a Union Republic. Besides, the federal government also has the decisive voice in legislation concerning education, health, labor, family, criminal codes, or the organization of courts. Practically nothing is left out. A Union Republic, Autonomous Republic, Region, or Area is in effect an administrative subdivision of a highly centralized State, except for the fact that in the administration the local language is used side by side with the Russian.

Their highest legislative organs—the Supreme Soviets—are subordinated in every respect to the legislative supremacy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and its Presidium.⁵⁷ In fact, two Republican laws referring to the same subject do not differ even in their wording except for minor adaptations to local conditions. No problem of conflict of laws exists because of the uniformity imposed on federal and republi-

can actions by the highly centralized Party. If any conflicts occurred, they would be solved by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in favor of the Union laws (Article 49 of the Constitution).

Decisions of the Republican Councils of Ministers may be set aside by the Federal Council of Ministers (Article 69). Similarly, the Presidia and Councils of Ministers of the Union Republics exercise the same powers over the organs of the lower national units—the Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Regions, and National Areas. The whole structure is highly centralized. Soviet commentators are right when they say: "Centralization is the consequence of the very existence of the socialist planned economy."⁵⁸ One could add another reason: Russian distrust of the other Soviet nationalities.

The third and decisive reason is the existence of a highly centralized, all-powerful, and Russian-dominated Party. The Party itself acknowledges that it is the directive force of the Soviet State. Its leadership formulates all policies in minute detail. The Union Republican governments are composed, like the federal government, of disciplined and devoted Party members who cannot deviate in any manner from the instructions issued from Moscow. It is simply impossible for them to assert the aspirations and needs of the nationalities whose name is given to the fourteen non-Russian Republics. The same is true of the administering bodies in the Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Regions, and National Areas. They may not forget that Marxism-Leninism is the only recognized doctrine for all nationalities, and that the Russians are to be treated as their "elder brothers." Their outlook is reflected in these slogans included in the speech made by I. Yusufov, the first secretary of the Kazakh Central Committee, at the plenary session of the national Central Committee in June, 1963: "We have only one Fatherland, the great Soviet Union. . . . The Kazakh nation thanks from the bottom of its heart all nations of our Fatherland, but, above all, the great Russian nation for the friendly and disinterested aid."⁵⁹ This "disinterested aid" made, however, Kazakhs a numerical minority in the land of their ancestors.

This all-embracing political role of the Party is much more important than the make-believe federal provisions of the Constitution.

The Federal Constitution contains some unusual provisions granting autonomy to the Union Republics in the field of foreign relations. They are entitled to have their own foreign ministries, the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs being of the Union-Republican variety. Article 18a, adopted in 1947 as a constitutional amendment, specifically states that "each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign States and to conclude agreements and

exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them." But one would search the Soviet press in vain for any mention of such activities. As a matter of fact, foreign states deal only with the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, and they are not allowed to establish legations in the capitals of the Union Republics. The only exception, of course, is the representation of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSR in the United Nations—an exception which provides the Soviet Union with two extra votes, and, since the Ukrainian and Byelorussian delegations always repeat in debate their master's voice, with two additional opportunities of hammering the same point of view.

Article 17 of the Soviet Constitution is at first glance the most astounding. It says: "The right to secede from the USSR is freely reserved for every Union Republic." This seeming generosity is meaningless in practice. The Soviet commentators say: "It is self-understood that the probability of any Soviet Union Republic expressing the desire, through its democratically elected Soviet organs, to secede is so infinitesimal that, practically speaking, it is non-existent."⁶⁰ It is true that the "democratic" mode of Soviet elections precludes any such possibility.

Secession is considered by Soviet theoreticians a progressive action if a national group secedes from a bourgeois state and thus weakens its structure. But it is "reactionary" to secede from the Soviet Union. "In the conditions of socialism any stimulus for a State secession of the component nationalities disappears. . . . All the nationalities are interested not in a State secession but in the unity within the framework of one big multi-national socialist State."⁶¹

Of course, the various nationalities of the Soviet Federal State are never allowed to express in free elections their own views concerning the "socialist" solution of their national problem. The Soviet Union worships the ideal of one great State:

Marxist-Leninist teaching about the State recognizes the progressive nature of large centralized States able to develop economically. Therefore, the Marxist-Leninist teaching rejects any idealization and fetishism of small national States, of national narrow-mindedness, and of separatism.⁶²

Article 17 of the Constitution is expected to remain a dead letter.

All Soviet nationalities received a clear warning during the last war when "certain autonomous republics of the RSFSR were liquidated"⁶³ because they were suspect, or actually attempted to secede by cooperating with the enemy. As Stalin once said, "The right to

self-determination may not and should not constitute an obstacle to the realization of the right of the working class to its own dictatorship. The former must give way to the latter." As a matter of fact, a movement for secession from the Soviet Union would be considered "counter-revolutionary" and treated as such. It is safer for the non-Russian nationalities not to take Article 17 of the Constitution too seriously.

According to Soviet commentators, "the principle of sovereignty of the Union Republics predetermines the conditions of the transformation of an Autonomous Republic into a Union Republic."⁶⁴ These conditions are: 1) a compact national majority, 2) a minimum of population to ensure independent existence in case of secession, and 3) outlying location, i.e., boundaries with foreign nations. "Thus, the transformation of an Autonomous Republic into a Union Republic is conditioned by its ability to make use of the right of secession from the Union."⁶⁵

Actually there is little practical sense in this neat theoretical outline, because there is not much difference in autonomy between a Union Republic, an Autonomous Republic, or an Autonomous Region. They are all parts of the same highly centralized State whose machinery at all levels is manipulated by Party members who, whatever their nationality, cannot deviate one iota from the Party line without the risk of being expelled for heresy or factionalism.

The Soviet regime is careful, however, to build the façade of a "democracy." For instance, the 15 Vice-Chairmen of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet are each of a different nationality, corresponding to the 15 Union Republics. Since 1958 the chairmen of the Republican Councils of Ministers are also *ex officio* members of the Federal Council of Ministers. The source of power, however, is located in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party.

"Every citizen of a Union Republic is a citizen of the USSR" (Article 21 of the Constitution). A Soviet citizen may exercise his illusory political rights anywhere without any formal requirement of minimum residence. This fact, simple as it may seem, has one serious implication for the non-Russian nationalities because of the quick industrialization and the influx of Russians into the various Republics. Gradually the national composition of these Republics is being modified, and the natives may one day form a minority in their original homeland.

The provisions of the constitutions of the Union Republics strictly follow the pattern of the Federal Constitution with few minor differences made necessary by local conditions. The principal organs of a Republic are: 1) a unicameral Supreme Soviet elected for four

years; 2) a Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, endowed with all the powers of the Supreme Soviet and composed of a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary, and 11 members; 3) a Council of Ministers, composed of a Chairman, Vice-Chairmen, Ministers, and chairmen of a few committees. It must be remembered, however, that only the implementation of Federal policies is left to the Republics. Their "autonomy" is restricted in fact by Federal plans and instructions and by central guidance provided by the national organs of the Party. The Republican organs, in turn, exercise control over local (regional, district, city, and rural) soviets and their executive committees.

THE GREAT RUSSIAN NATION—THE FIRST AMONG
THE "EQUALS"—"BOURGEOIS" NATIONALISM
OF NON-RUSSIANS

The Stalinist formula of "a culture national in form, but socialist in its content" which has "created the truly brotherly cooperation of nations within the system of one federal State"⁶⁶ has an ominous meaning. A Russian may be a nationalist if he is a loyal citizen of the regime, while a non-Russian Soviet citizen must pay tribute to the first among the "equal" Soviet nations, and avoid mentioning the glories of his own native country under the threat of being denounced for bourgeois nationalism. He is further expected to condemn his national heroes who opposed subjugation by Tsarist Russia as vile reactionaries. The Russians are encouraged to express their nationalist feeling within the "socialist content" of their culture, while the other nationalities are forbidden to add their national elements to the "socialist content." This discrimination is much more important than Union Republics, the Soviet of Nationalities, and other such technicalities. "The leading place within the brotherly family of equal nationalities of the USSR belongs to the great Russian nation,"⁶⁷ and "the leading role within the brotherly family of the . . . Union Republics belongs to the first among the equal Republics—the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic."⁶⁸

Annexations by other nations are the most horrible crimes. Not the Russian conquests, however. In the modern Communist theory they are a positive blessing for the subjugated nationalities. At the 19th Congress in 1952 the representative of the Lithuanian Communists was violent in denouncing bourgeois nationalism in his Republic, which had lost its independence only twelve years before. He said:

The Lithuanian nation is full of warm love of, and gratitude for, her elder brother and friend—the great Russian nation. . . . The bourgeois nationalists who have been unmasked as the enemies

of the people do not act now openly. They . . . try to smuggle in their views which are camouflaged so as to poison the backward elements with chauvinism. This is done mainly by distorting the history of the Lithuanian nation, by idealizing the feudal times and the so-called bourgeois national movement of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. . . .⁶⁹

If the Lithuanians forget their past and begin their history with the date of their annexation by the Soviet Union, they will be safe from "bourgeois" nationalism. A point worth remembering by those who are prone to condone Soviet infiltration or to hail the USSR as an anti-colonialist power.

Since the war the program of teaching Russian in the non-Russian schools has been intensified. A non-Russian child is educated as a future bilingual citizen.

The First Secretary of the Tartar Region, F. A. Tabeev, at the plenary session of the national Central Committee, held in June, 1963, made a statement which mirrored the general policy towards non-Russian nationalities. He said: "Today we increasingly turn towards our second native [*sic*] language, the Russian language, which is becoming an integral part of the culture of our nationality and the means of its development."

Most important is the exclusive Federal control over the system of higher education because of the role played by the intelligentsia in any national movement. The Federal Ministry of Higher Education directs and controls all schools at the university level, and technical-secondary schools as well, appoints their directors and deans and, since 1947, the professors, and approves programs and textbooks of the higher schools.⁷⁰ Thus, both the teaching personnel and the nature of education are determined by a federal organ and are taken away from the jurisdiction of the non-Russian Republics. The instructors of history are expected "to draw the attention of the students to the leading place of the Russian nation in the development of other nations of our country and to the leadership of the Russian working class in the revolutionary movement in Russia and in the struggle for the socialist transformation of our country."⁷¹

The Party and the Government are also making an effort to introduce Russian terminology into the Soviet non-Russian languages and to eliminate the vocabulary borrowed from foreign languages. This will affect particularly the Ukrainian and the Byelorussian nationalities whose languages are not very different from Russian, and thus they may lose their distinct character by the forced Russification. It has already affected the Central-Asian languages which have been

subject to Russification of vocabulary for the last several years. The nationalities of Central Asia have also been forced to shift from their Arabic script to the Russian.

The present leadership of the Party has covered a long road, leading from the former internationalist point of view with a critical attitude toward Russian history, to the present position of promoting nationalism among the "superior" Soviet citizens—the Russians.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT—THE CITIZEN AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Soviet local government primarily provides the central organs of the State with the machinery they need to implement their policies. Its purpose is not to secure autonomy in local affairs.

While the higher elective organs (the Supreme Soviets) have a four-year term, the local soviets are elected for two years. The hierarchy of the local soviets begins at the provincial level—the regional soviets—and includes other subdivisions from district (county) and city soviets to the lowest rural soviets. All local soviets are elected from a single list of candidates by the inhabitants of the area and those who happen to be there on election day. The candidates, of course, belong to the single Communist and non-Party Bloc. As a result, the local soviets are just as docile as the various Supreme Soviets. This is openly conceded by Soviet writers:

Opposition by the local elective organs of self-government against the State authority represented locally by the agents of the central government is impossible within the Soviet system. . . .⁷²

The impossibility of difference of view between local soviets and the national government of a highly centralized State is guaranteed by the politically uniform composition and by the unified Party leadership of all organs of the State.⁷³ The execution of the Party policy by all agencies of State administration, including the local soviets, is accomplished through the following setup: "1) The Party sends its own candidates to the representative bodies—the soviets; 2) if at least three Party members participate in any Soviet elective body, they organize a Party group; 3) no important question is decided without instructions by the Party organs; 4) members of the Party, however important the State post they occupy, are subject to Party control; 5) the Party supervises the work done by the organs of the State administration, correcting mistakes, eliminating the discovered defects, and assisting in the execution of Party decisions."⁷⁴

The true picture being thus clearly described by one of the most eminent Soviet specialists on public administration, one should never ask what the local policy is going to be. One should rather inquire what is the policy formulated by the corresponding Party organs, in accordance with the current Party line. The non-Party members of the executive committee of a local soviet are expected to, and as a rule they do, support the policies advocated by the Party members. The attainment of unanimity within the local soviets is encouraged by the following rule: "Questions are decided in an open vote by simple majority."⁷⁵ The open vote always results in that unanimity which is the pride of the Soviet regime.

The executive committee of a local soviet carries on its administration through two kinds of offices—the departments of local interests (finance, trade, health, communal economy, roads); and the local offices of the various National and Republican Ministries (Justice, Agriculture, Internal Affairs, and others). The number and nature of these offices depend, of course, on the territorial level of a given soviet.

The local soviet and its executive committee are subordinate to the control of the higher organs of public administration. "The legal acts of the lower soviets are quashed by the higher soviets."⁷⁶ The same formula applies to each executive committee, which is subordinated "to its own soviet and also to the superior executive committee or the council of ministers of a Union or Autonomous Republic."⁷⁷

Soviet books call this highly centralized system "democratic centralism." The centralization of Soviet public administration is described quite correctly by a Soviet specialist:

This [centralization] means that each Soviet . . . has its own executive and administrative apparatus which is responsible to it directly, and that the whole system of organs of administration from top to bottom represents one integrated whole—all directed from one supreme and all-State center. The Council of Ministers of the USSR is this center. . . .⁷⁸

All roads lead to Rome; all Soviet roads lead to the same center of power—the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party, acting through the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (since all those organs have an inner ring composed of the same persons).

The Soviet regime believes in many checks of the bureaucracy. This is why the local offices of the various ministries are subordinated not only to the ministry but also to the executive committee of the

same territorial level. For instance, the district office of public health is controlled not only by the regional and national organs of the Ministry of Public Health, but also by the district executive committee of the local soviet. This system is supposed to provide the government with an additional check on the local bureaucrats. However, it frequently fails to produce the desired effect because the head of the ministry's local office may be a personal friend of the committee members, who will protect him according to a principle known to all regimes, that of reciprocity of friendly services.

The ordinary citizen has no judicial protection against abuses of power by the organs of State administration. There are no administrative tribunals, and the citizen has no recourse in such cases to ordinary courts unless the administrative act of which they complain is a criminal offense.

The only way of appeal left open for the ordinary citizen is to submit a complaint to the superior organs, ascending the hierarchical ladder of public administration if he does not get satisfaction from the lower organs. The purpose of allowing such complaints is twofold—to redress a wrong caused by an official and to provide the government with a source of information on the shortcomings of its own administration.

A citizen who disobeys orders of the militia (police), or of members of the volunteer brigades of cooperation with militia, may be punished by the militia with arrest, correctional labor, or a fine. Correctional labor in the case of serious offenses is carried out at a place of confinement; otherwise it is hardly different from a fine, because it means working at the usual place of employment for a definite period of time at wages reduced from 5 to 20 percent.

The administrative fines may be imposed not only by the militia but also by several other administrative services such as labor-union inspectors, customs officials, and officers of frontier troops within the frontier zone. Each service fines for infractions of regulations of its particular concern. The militia, for instance, does it in case of breaches of public peace, disobedience to its orders, violation of traffic rules, and infractions against the domestic passport regulations. There are several other types of regulations, such as the rules for the protection of safety of work, customs regulations, anti-fire regulations, rules for the protection of public health, the regime of frontier zone, etc., for violations of which the guilty persons, private citizens or officials as the case may be, are punished by administrative fines.

The maxima of administrative fines are fixed at 10 rubles for

ordinary citizens and 50 rubles for officials; in case of aggravating circumstances these maxima are respectively raised up to 50 or 100 rubles.

The public administration service may refrain, in cases of minor infractions, from imposing a fine, and instead submit the case to the comradesly court which is called upon to "reeducate" the culprit.

Since 1961 the citizen may appeal to the people's court which decides the matter of fine in the last jurisdiction. This judicial control over the administrative fines is a definite improvement over the former system where citizens could seek redress only by the way of appealing to the higher administrative authorities in the order of hierarchical seniority. As said before, all other decisions by the public administration may be appealed only to the superiors but not to courts.

The new *Principles of Civil Legislation*, enacted in 1961, considerably improved the position of citizens by introducing the concept of financial responsibility of the State for damages caused to citizens by the irregular acts of its officials or employees, if these irregular acts were due to the official's or employee's fault and were committed while the official or employee performed his service functions. Article 88 unequivocally established this responsibility for the State business enterprises. Article 89, which refers to the responsibility of State public administration, investigation organs, procurators and courts, is more evasive. It states that the State is responsible for damages caused by the irregular acts of public administration officials, but adds that particular statutes might provide otherwise. Moreover, it specifies that a future law will determine the procedure according to which the citizen will be able to sue the public administrative institutions for the recovery of damages. Finally, the same Article 89 entirely postpones the State responsibility for irregular acts, committed by officials of pre-trial investigation, the procurators and the courts, until such time as future laws will determine the cases and the limits of this responsibility.⁷⁹

The acceptance by the State of responsibility in such cases is part of the general trend in the post-Stalinist period to provide the loyal citizen with a feeling of legal security and to protect him against the arbitrariness of the bureaucracy which the Government wants to be strict but not to annoy the population without any good reason.

THE PROCURATORS

There is another way of defending oneself against the illegal acts of the public administration, namely, by complaining to the public procurator, whose duties include supervision over the legality of

administrative actions. The procurators have the so-called power of general supervision over all organs of public administration and all Soviet organizations.⁸⁰

Whenever the procurator learns about an illegal administrative act through the complaint of a citizen or by his own direct observation, he either requests the organ involved to modify the wrong decision or institutes a protest to the higher administrative authority, requiring modification or annulment of the decision. He may initiate a criminal prosecution of the official who committed a criminal offense by his decision.

The procurators form a hierarchy of their own, placed, however, in a position of strict hierarchical subordination to their own superiors. The Procurator General is the principal head of the whole hierarchy. He is elected by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for a period of seven years, and he may be recalled by the same organ.

The Procurator General is independent of all organs of the State except the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and its Presidium. In practice, he is guided in his actions by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party, which determines indirectly his election by the Supreme Soviet and holds the power of recall over his head if he disobeys the instructions of the Party. Otherwise, the Party has a vital interest in his being completely independent of all other organs of the State and also in his being able to check through his own hierarchy the activities of every official, administrative organ, public organization, every citizen of the USSR—except, of course, the top Party leadership.

A procurator, like any other official, knows that if he executes strictly and intelligently the instructions of his superiors and lives up to the expectations of the Party, he may be promoted and have a fine professional career. If he fails in his duties, he may be discharged or be subject to disciplinary penalties.⁸¹ The titles of rank open to a conscientious procurator are so impressive that a bureaucrat of Imperial Russia did not hold any better ones:

The class ranks are as follows: Actual State Councillor of Justice, State Councillor of Justice of the 1st class, State Councillor of Justice of the 2nd class, State Councillor of Justice of the 3rd Class, Senior Councillor of Justice, Councillor of Justice, Junior Councillor of Justice, Jurist of the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd class.⁸²

The procurators of the Union Republics and regional procurators are appointed for five years by the Procurator General of the USSR. District and city procurators are appointed, also for five years, by the procurators of the Union Republics with the approval of the Procu-

rator General. Assistant regional procurators in charge of special affairs (for instance, political matters) are appointed by the procurators of the Union Republics with the approval of the Procurator General.

Besides the territorial organization, there is a functional hierarchy of procurators in charge of Armed Forces, but they are also placed under the supreme authority of the Procurator General. The offices of the military procurators have their own hierarchical organization. The Principal Procurator of the Armed Forces is the immediate superior of procurators of the military areas, to whom are subordinated successively the procurators of the armies, corps, and divisions. The fact that the naval and military procurators are subordinated to the Procurator General of the USSR provides the Party with another guarantee of the Armed Forces' political loyalty.

The Procurator General and the Principal Procurator of the Armed Forces are chosen very carefully by the Party because of their political importance. They are Party members of long standing. Military commanders may not interfere with the activities of procurators.

The procurators form a Federal hierarchy completely independent of the Union Republics. "The governments of the Union Republics are not consulted before the appointment of the Republican Procurators, who are in no way dependent on those governments."⁸³ On the other hand, the Republican Procurator is empowered to check on the legality of actions of the Republican Council of Ministers and other Republican organs. This makes the "autonomy" of the Union Republics even more illusory.

Although the procurators of lower rank are strictly subordinated to the superior procurators, the usual Soviet system of checking on all bureaucrats, whatever their position, applies also to the procurators' hierarchy: "Each procurator, who thinks that the instructions given him by his immediate superior are illegal or incorrect, not only has the right but also the obligation to inform the higher procurator, even the Procurator General of the USSR."⁸⁴ Thus, high dignitaries of the procurators' hierarchy are kept on their toes.

The procurator is a symbol of the penalties which await a disloyal or careless Soviet citizen. But the procurator also plays a useful role in protecting the citizens against the red tape and abuse of power by bureaucrats. A citizen may face the procurator as his prosecuting attorney or meet him in a correctional labor camp or prison as an inspector of conditions or he may ask his protection against an illegal action by an official.

A Soviet citizen cannot be arrested without either judicial warrant or the order of the procurator.

NOTES

1. "K itogam pervoi sessii Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR tret'yevo sozyva," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, August, 1950, No. 8, p. 1.
2. "Velika Pobeda Stalinskovo Bloka Kommunistov i Bezpartiinykh," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, January, 1951, No. 1, pp. 1-3.
3. *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, No. 12, March 14, 1962.
4. *Pravda*, March 21, 1963.
5. Reproduced in *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, No. 3 (618), January 9, 1950.
6. A. A. Askerov, N. D. Durmanov, M. P. Kareva, V. F. Kotok, I. D. Levin, and I. P. Trainin, *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvennoe Pravo*, Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Moscow, 1948), p. 324.
7. J. Stalin, *Rechi na predvybornykh sobraniakh izbiratelei Stalinskovo izbiratel'nogo okruga g. Moskvy* (Moscow, 1950), p. 24.
8. A. A. Askerov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 304.
9. "K itogam pervoi sessii Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR tret'yevo sozyva," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, August, 1950, No. 8, p. 2.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
11. A. Gavrilov, *Vnutripartiinaia demokratiia v Bol'shevistskoi Partii*, State Publishing House of Political Literature (Moscow, 1951), p. 4.
12. "K itogam pervoi sessii Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR tret'yevo sozyva," *op. cit.*, p. 5.
13. A. A. Askerov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 350.
14. M. A. Arzhanov, M. P. Kareva, S. F. Kechekiyan, B. S. Mankovskii, and M. S. Strogovich, *Teoriia Gosudarstva i Prava*, Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 371.
15. I. I. Evtikhiiev and V. A. Vlassov, *Administrativnoe Pravo SSSR*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1946), p. 67.
16. M. A. Arzhanov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 380.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
18. See section below: The organization of the Party and of State administration.
19. *Pravda*, January 18, 1963.
20. M. A. Arzhanov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 328-330.
21. A. A. Askerov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-286.
22. G. I. Fedkin, "O rukovodiashchei roli VKP (b) v razvitii sovetskovo sotsialisticheskogo prava," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, June, 1950, No. 6, p. 19.
23. For instance in I. I. Evtikhiiev and V. A. Vlassov, *op. cit.*, pp. 5 and 6.
24. J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Foreign Languages Publishing House (Moscow, 1940), pp. 578-579.
25. V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, Foreign Languages Publishing House (Moscow, 1949), p. 39.
26. J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, p. 73.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
31. *Loc. cit.*
32. *Loc. cit.*
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 135, 137 and 138.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-147.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 573-574.
36. *Resolutions of the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, Foreign Languages Publishing House (Moscow, 1939), pp. 45-46.
37. *Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bol'shevikov)*, State Publishing House of Political Literature (Moscow, 1938), p. 331.
38. *Pravda*, October 6, 1952, p. 7.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
41. S. Kurdin, "Rukovodstvo priimom v riady partii i vospitanie molodykh kommunistov," *Bol'shevik*, December, 1951, No. 23, p. 49.
42. The Charter is reproduced in *Pravda*, November 3, 1961.
43. *Pravda*, October 13, 1952, pp. 1 and 2.
44. Quoted in A. Gavrilov, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 51 and 52.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
49. *Pravda*, November 24, 1962.
50. The new Charter, adopted by the 22nd Congress, was reproduced in *Pravda*, November 3, 1961.
51. Records and resolutions of the 21st Congress, published in *Pravda*, January 28-February 8, 1959.
52. Report of Khrushchev, published in *Pravda*, January 28, 1959.
53. *Pravda*, April 19, 1959.
54. *Pravda*, November 1, 1961.
55. The new program is reproduced in *Pravda*, November 2, 1961.
56. N. K. Ivanov, V. A. Karpinskii, N. N. Mikhailov, P. S. Semenov, and G. E. Glezerman, *Besedy ob obshchestvennom i gosudarstvennom ustroistve SSSR*, Publishing House of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League "Molodaia Gvardiia" (Moscow, 1948), pp. 20-21.
57. "In the event of divergence between a law of a Union Republic and a law of the Union, the Union law prevails" (Article 20 of the Federal Constitution of the USSR).
58. A. A. Askerov, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
59. *Pravda*, June 20, 1963.
60. A. A. Askerov, *op. cit.*, p. 254.
61. A. A. Askerov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 201.
62. N. D. Durmanov, R. O. Khalfin, A. V. Karass, V. F. Kotok, I. D. Levin, A. F. Kleiman, N. D. Kazantsev, A. E. Pasherstnik, V. I. Serebrovskii, and M. S. Strogovich, *Osnovy Sovetskogo Gosudarstva i Prava*, Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 120.
63. M. A. Arzhanov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 260.
64. N. D. Durmanov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
66. Quoted in M. A. Arzhanov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 260.
67. M. P. Kareva, "Stalinskaia konstitutsiia i sotsialisticheskaia federatsiia," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, February, 1952, No. 2, p. 17.
68. N. P. Farberov, "SSSR—Obrazets mnogonatsional'novo gosudarstva," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, February, 1951, No. 2, p. 24.
69. *Pravda*, October 7, 1952, p. 6.
70. M. I. Movshovich, *Vysshaia Shkola. Osnovnye Postanovleniia, Prikazy i Instruksii*, 2nd edition, The Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR. Publication of the State Publishing House "Sovetskaia Nauka" (Moscow, 1948), pp. 33-39.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 106-109.
72. A. A. Askerov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 416.
73. M. A. Arzhanov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 337.
74. S. S. Studenikin, *Sovetskoe Administrativnoe Pravo*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), pp. 11 and 12.
75. A. A. Askerov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 429.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 431.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 441.
78. M. A. Arzhanov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 338.
79. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 50, December 15, 1961.
80. The Statute on Procurators of May 24, 1955, is reproduced in *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 9, 1955.
81. D. S. Karev, *Sovetskoe Sudoustroistvo*, 2nd edition, State Publishing House of Juristic Literature (Moscow, 1951), p. 154.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
83. S. A. Golunskii and D. S. Karev, *Sudoustroistvo SSSR*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1946), p. 180.
84. D. S. Karev, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

CHAPTER TWO

The "Freedoms" of the Individual

CHAPTER X of the Soviet Constitution devotes as many as 16 articles to the fundamental rights and duties of citizens (Articles 118-133). The first four articles deal with economic-social rights (analyzed in Parts III and IV of the present book). Articles 122 to 129 enumerate the traditional civil rights, while Articles 130 to 133 formulate the duties of Soviet citizens. The large place devoted to civil rights in the Constitution makes legitimate the question as to what the relationship between the individual and the State is and what the Soviet regime understands by those rights.

THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The original Marxist doctrine promised the individual that after the revolution, the socialist state would progressively wither away, leaving individuals and their associations absolutely free. It left to the imagination, of course, how this stateless society would function.

Soviet interpretation of Marxism relegates the advent of this heaven to a distant and undefined future. For the time being the State is here to stay. It will outlive the so-called period of Socialism and continue to exist even during the period of Communism when, according to Marxist doctrine, each citizen will receive according to his needs. Actually, the withering away of the State is now postponed to a nebulous future.

But one may ask why the material coercion of the Soviet State is necessary to keep the citizen obedient. How does the individual fare within a strong Soviet State endowed with punitive organs? Stalin in an interview with Roy Howard said emphatically: "We have built up this society not to limit individual freedom, but to make human personality really free."¹ The question, of course, is what the Party understands by individual freedom.

It is rather interesting that almost all the members of the United Nations cast their votes for the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948; only the Soviet Bloc, Saudi Arabian and South

African delegations abstained. Thus, the countries of the "really free personality" took, for their own reasons, the same attitude as a Moslem state which could not sponsor the freedom of all religious denominations and another state which could not underwrite the equality of races. The concept of civil freedom did not appeal to any of them.

Of course, the political rights granted to citizens in the democratic countries might be very useful to the Communists. Vyshinskii once wrote: "Under capitalism the proletariat is extremely interested in bourgeois-democratic 'freedoms' and 'civil rights' which ease the process of organizing its ranks and guiding its allies."² Once the revolution is successful civil rights becomes a superfluous notion. "The dictatorship of the proletariat is 'the power of one class, the class of proletarians which does not and cannot share that power with other classes.'"³

In 1948 Vyshinskii tried to explain to the General Assembly of the United Nations the absence of the need for democratic civil rights:

The contradiction between the State and the individual is a phenomenon which has occurred in history when society has been divided into rival classes. . . . That contradiction is eliminated when a society has reached the stage where it is no longer divided into classes conflicting with each other, the class of exploiters and the class of exploited. . . . History has already solved that problem in my country. The State and the individual are in harmony with each other; their interests coincide.⁴

This statement is truly sweeping. Soviet society is officially divided into three groups: two social classes—the workers and the peasants—and a social stratum—the intelligentsia to which all Soviet leaders belong. The intelligentsia never calls itself a class. Yet, if a social class is a group of people of similar education, income, and interests, the Soviet intelligentsia is a distinct social class. The very nature of intellectual work separates the intelligentsia from the manual workers of industry and agriculture.

Soviet writers claim that there is no conflict of group interests within the Soviet society. They should have said that such conflicts cannot be openly expressed. To accept their claim one should assume that Soviet peasants are happy despite the fact that, not having a passport, they cannot leave the collective farms at their own volition and reside in the cities; or that they relish having their children work at the age of 12, while town children start to work at the age of 16.

Are there not any latent conflicts between the workers and the executives who receive bonuses for exceeding the production plan?

Does the worker enjoy the great inequality of income between the workers and the managers and engineers? Is there a hidden conflict between peasants and workers, on the one hand, and the intelligentsia, on the other, because the regime gives high salaries and other rewards and privileges to the intelligentsia, especially the upper stratum? Is there a silent conflict between the average citizen and the Government, or the Central Committee of the Party?

There may even be a discrepancy of interests within the Soviet social classes. After all, what is there in common between a shock worker who earns hundreds of rubles per month and an average worker who is afraid that the exploits of the shock worker may result in an increase of the minimum norm of output by which he will have to abide? Is there true solidarity between a peasant and a collective farm brigadier who is his slave driver?

Actually, a leading theoretician such as the late Andrei Vyshinskii admitted in one of his books the existence of class warfare in the Soviet Union.

The withering away of the State will come—not through weakening State power—but through the maximum intensification of this power which is necessary to finish off the remnants of the dying classes. . . .⁵

Since there are no capitalists or landlords in the Soviet Union, the class struggle that “continues under triumphant socialism” must involve the remaining social groups—the intelligentsia, the peasants, and the workers. Probably because he thought of himself as a Marxist dialectician, he was not afraid to contradict himself in the same book:

For the first time in human history the conflict between social and personal interests, and between society and the State, and individuality and individual interests, is eliminated.⁶

Assuming that there is no conflict between the interests of the citizen and those of the State, one could logically ask why coercion is necessary in the Soviet Union. The same Soviet authority did not leave any doubt about the necessity of applying coercion:

Law, like the State, will wither away only in the highest phase of Communism after the annihilation of capitalist encirclement when all learn to get along without special rules defining the conduct of people under the threat of punishment, and when people are so accustomed to observing the fundamental rules of community life that they will fulfill them without constraint of any sort. Until then, however, there is a necessity for general

control, firm discipline in labor and in community life, and complete subordination of all in the new society's work to a truly democratic State.⁷

This Soviet writer tried to escape the logical dilemma by introducing a metaphysical entity, "the collective individual." "[In a society where there are no rival classes] there cannot be any contradiction between the Government and the individual since the Government is in fact the collective individual."⁸ Following in the footsteps of Rousseau whom the Soviet theoreticians treat contemptuously and ungratefully as a petty bourgeois writer, Soviet writers oppose the collective will to the individual will.

The theory is very alluring, except that one may ask who formulates the collective will? The state or the society has no brain of its own; its collective will must be expressed by particular individuals. Rousseau thought that the popular vote took care of the formulation of the general will of the society, forgetting, somehow, the wills of non-conformist minorities. Soviet doctrine sees another way of formulating the will of the collective individual: a group of men make the decisions and their will is substituted for the imaginary collective will of the society.⁹

Soviet doctrine considers every state the tool of a given social class. In the socialist state it is the collective dominant will of the proletariat; in a bourgeois state it is the collective dominant will of the capitalists. A very practical question then arises: Who formulates this metaphysical dominant will of a class? The next, equally practical, question is: Why are certain particular individuals, for instance, the leaders of the Communist Party, entitled to proclaim that they express the dominant will of the proletariat better than a group of workers could? And what entitles them to be identified with the collective individual?

Soviet doctrine rejects with contempt the eighteenth and nineteenth century theories of the general will of the nation as fallacious. "But where is proof," Vyshinskii wrote, "that the State and its activity exist specifically for the sake of satisfying [the interests of the individuals composing a nation]."¹⁰ There is no proof, either, that the will of the several individuals forming the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party could be identified with the dominant will of the Soviet proletariat or with the general will of the Soviet population. The several individuals concerned have not tried so far to test the proposition in free elections with competitive candidates. The Soviet Government does not intend to risk providing scientific proof for the veracity of the doctrine of the "collective individual."

In the Soviet State there "can be no place for freedom of speech, of the press, and other freedoms for the foes of socialism. Every attempt by them to use these freedoms granted to the toilers hinders the State and must be classified as a counter-revolutionary crime to which Article 58, paragraph 10, or one of the corresponding articles of the Criminal Code is applicable."¹¹ The identification of "the collective will" is carried out by eliminating dissident views, which may not necessarily be hostile to socialism but only to its official version of the Party. This explains the necessity of coercion. "It is no use to argue that ideas should be opposed only by other ideas."¹² Nonconformist ideas should be suppressed according to the Leninist formula: convince first and coerce afterward.

The Communists may be right when they say that civil rights do not shelter, clothe, and feed a person who lives in misery. But civil rights allow workers to organize themselves and to exercise a strong pressure on parliaments and governments in democratic states. The rapid development of social legislation and the progressive rise of the standard of living of workers can be traced largely to the existence of political freedoms in the democratic states. If political freedoms existed in the Soviet Union, they would play a similar role in the economic improvement of the situation of the workers. There is no contradiction between civil rights and economic and social progress; on the contrary, civil rights make the latter really meaningful.

Although Soviet society is supposed to have miraculously reconciled collective and individual interests and although Marxist doctrine predicts a modification of human mentality under the influence of the new socialist environment, the Soviet State seems to have as much trouble with individual citizens as any other regime, although it has existed for more than 45 years. Soviet criminologists explain the survival of political offenses as the work of "spies, saboteurs, wreckers, and assassins who are being sent to our country by the foreign intelligence services." But what about the ordinary crimes like murders, thefts, embezzlements, and similar acts committed by Soviet citizens? This main aspect of Soviet criminality is explained otherwise:

At the same time old habits and views which take often the outward form of criminal offenses like theft, violence, hooliganism, etc., survive still in the consciousness of such individuals who lag behind the development of our society.¹³

The old, evil habits must be deeply rooted, since they survive in a society made up mostly of individuals who have been brought up since the October Revolution and whose mentalities have been formed

by the Soviet regime. Whatever the reason for their survival, the Party does not take any chances. It freely uses coercion, the traditional weapon of all states.

POLITICAL SECURITY OF THE REGIME—COMMITTEE OF
STATE SECURITY—THE MILITIA AND ITS AUXILIARIES

The first concern of the Party is to guarantee the political security of the regime which claims to have the virtually unanimous support of the population. One way of achieving this objective is criminal legislation which is very severe in case of crimes against the State, which mostly would be political crimes, and its strict application by the courts. Another way is the vigilance of the political police apparatus which was formed almost immediately after the October Revolution under the name of the Extraordinary Commission (Cheka), later renamed the O.G.P.U. The O.G.P.U. was later called the People's Commissariat of the Interior, and eventually the Ministry of the Interior. This Ministry combined two different functions: first, that of the political police with its multitude of informers, and second, that of ordinary police. Its purposes were: 1) to ensure the maintenance of "the socialist order"; 2) to protect the frontiers; 3) to defend public property; 4) to keep the registers of acts of civil status (births, marriages, divorces, and deaths); 5) to maintain public order as any police does. The various services of this Ministry included the uniformed police (militia), the frontier and home protection troops, the fire brigades, the correctional labor camps and prisons. It derived a huge profit from the compulsory work of millions of inmates of correctional labor camps who were confined there during the Stalinist period.

In 1941 the Commissariat of the Interior was divided into two: Interior and State Security. A few months later the two ministries were merged again. In 1943 the separate Commissariat of State Security was reconstituted. Ten years later, immediately after Stalin's death, the two ministries were united in one Ministry of the Interior, to be separated again in the same year, 1953, after Beria's fall.

The Ministry of State Security was finally renamed the Committee of State Security. It is an All-Union Department with a network of officials, secret agents, and informers over the whole national territory. Its functions are now purely political, i.e., the ferreting out of crimes prepared or committed against the State and its regime. Its head, the Chairman, has the rank of federal minister and is a member of the Central Committee. His highest-ranking assistants are Chairmen of the

Union-Republican Committees of State Security who *ex officio* are members of the Union-Republican Councils of Ministers. While the present regime has put an end to the former omnipotence of this Department, it does its best to maintain its prestige as "the deserving heir" of Lenin's Cheka.

The Ministry of the Interior was liquidated in 1960 as a federal department, and its functions were transferred to the Union-Republican Ministries of the Interior. Those functions, separated from the political tasks reserved for the Committee of State Security, are basically the usual functions of that type of administration, mainly the preservation of public order. The strong arm of the Ministries of the Interior is the uniformed police, called militia.

The militia has the power to make sure that citizens and officials observe the rules of State order, to inflict administrative penalties, arrest persons disturbing public order, enter private dwellings and the premises of the offices, enterprises, and organizations, require the assistance of house janitors, night watchmen, village executive officers, members of the brigades of cooperation with the militia, and members of the Armed Forces, and use arms.¹⁴

The village executive officers, mentioned above, are selected by rotation from the inhabitants of a village—one for each 300 inhabitants—for a three-month term. The refusal to perform the functions of executive officer is a criminal offense.

The brigades of cooperation with the militia are organized at the places of work from among volunteers. The brigades may be armed while on duty.

The brigades especially favored in the post-Stalinist period are formed by the Komsomol volunteers who help in maintaining public order. Their task is to deal, among others, with drunks and juveniles. The Soviet Union, like other industrialized countries, is plagued by juvenile delinquency. The difference in the political and social regime does not seem to make any difference. The plenary session of the Central Committee held in June, 1963, heard many complaints about the misconduct of young people; one of the members of the Central Committee said that one-third of the crimes committed in his province were due to young offenders.¹⁵

Not only members of the Komsomol but also members of trade unions are enrolled in the brigades of cooperation with the militia. The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions issued on February 26, 1960, an appeal to all trade unions to attract volunteers from among their members. The people's brigades for the protection of public order are organized at enterprises, institutions, and educational establish-

ments. It is the task of the factory or local trade union committee to recruit volunteers, set up the brigades, and provide them with the required office space and means of transportation and communication.¹⁶

Disobedience of orders given by the militiaman or by a member of the brigade of cooperation with the militia is punished by the deprivation of freedom for up to one year or by correctional labor for the same period of time or by a fine of up to 100 rubles. The same offense, if accompanied by the threat of, or use of, force, is punished by imprisonment for from one to five years (Article 191, 1 of the Criminal Code). Attempts on the life of the same persons while they perform their official duties is punished by imprisonment for from five to fifteen years with or without the additional penalty of exile for from two to five years; the death penalty is meted out in the case of aggravating circumstances (Article 191, 2). Insults addressed to the same persons while they perform their official duties are punished by imprisonment for up to six months or by correctional labor for up to one year or by a fine of up to 100 rubles (Article 192, 1).

An apartment house must have a janitor and a night watchman, who are appointed by the managers of such houses "but must be approved by the head of the militia office."¹⁷ It is not difficult to guess that the janitors are asked to act as militia auxiliary agents in supervising the behavior of the tenants.

The dwelling house managers "keep the house registers of tenants, inform the militia about the arrival and departure of tenants, supervise the validity of passports of the tenants, etc."¹⁸ They are appointed by the local soviet. Their duties of supervision are rather heavy, but these are alleviated by the tenants' committees, which are responsible for the maintenance of order on the premises and for good conduct of people living in the same house or block. They may call to account the tenant who misbehaves and reprimand him or take other measures for his "reeducation." The other mission of these committees consists in spreading the Party propaganda among tenants; one of the ways is to hold meetings to hear ideological lectures and to have on the premises a "Red Corner" where Party newspapers and pamphlets are displayed.

PERSONAL FREEDOM

Article 127 of the Soviet Constitution guarantees the "inviolability of person. No person may be placed under arrest except by the decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator." Nevertheless, the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of

People's Commissars of the USSR of March 7, 1935, gave the Ministry of Interior the power of imposing on persons considered publicly dangerous exile up to five years, deportation up to five years, confinement to correctional labor camps up to five years. The courts could not intervene, and there was no requirement of public trial. The decision was made secretly by a Special Board instituted by the decree. The Special Board was abolished sometime in 1953, according to an article published at the beginning of 1956 in the leading law review, *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*. However, the same article did not say that the decree of March 7, 1935, had been repealed. The dissolution of the Board and "the transfer of all categories of criminal cases for examination to the general judicial system"¹⁹ mean that the practice of exiling and confining to camps without trial has been suspended. However, the correctional labor camps still exist, even if people may now be confined to them only by virtue of a judicial decision. This definitely is an improvement; however, an unduly optimistic interpretation would be out of place because the Party continues to consider judges as its political agents.

The post-Stalinist Party leadership frankly acknowledged that most of the correctional labor camp inmates had been confined there by the Ministry of the Interior for no reason at all. The blame is now conveniently placed on Stalin and Beria, both dead and unable to point out their living accomplices. What is not mentioned is the economic reason for herding millions of innocent people in the camps, namely the desire to have a vast pool of cheap labor for carrying out great projects such as building canals and felling trees and mining in the inhospitable far northern climate. The mortality rate was very high. This massive use of prisoners' labor proved to be wasteful of human resources. This consideration and the need to restore the sense of legal security in the population, formerly living in constant fear of unjustified deportation and confinement, were the reasons for large-scale amnesties which allowed the survivors of the camps to return to normal life. The camps have not been liquidated altogether. There is, however, indirect proof of an improvement in the camp regime. The post-Stalinist reform of criminal legislation has downgraded the camps from second to third place in the scale of penalties. The present order is capital punishment, followed by prison, and then the correctional labor camp.

The rumors about riots in Soviet places of confinement must have been true. An Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of May 25, 1961, decreed that particularly dangerous recidivists

and persons who had been confined for the commission of grave crimes (this included political prisoners) who terrorized at places of confinement (prisons and camps) and other convicts giving proofs of good conduct, or who committed aggressive acts against the administrative personnel of the place of confinement, or who organized criminal gangs for the commission of these offenses, or who actively participated in these gangs, were to be henceforth punished by additional confinement for from eight to fifteen years or even by the capital penalty.²⁰ The unrest must have been serious, if the punishments are the most severe that the Soviet laws provide.

Escape from a penitentiary establishment or a preventive arrest is punished by confinement for up to three years; escape from exile, by imprisonment for up to one year.²¹

A Soviet citizen may be deprived of liberty if he is confined to a prison or correctional labor camp by court decision; or if he is placed under preventive arrest through a judicial warrant or a procurator's order to prevent him from escaping investigation and trial. Of course, the writ of *habeas corpus* is unknown in the USSR.

"INVIOLABILITY" OF PRIVATE HOMES AND PRIVATE
CORRESPONDENCE—"FREEDOM" OF CIRCULATION—
FLIGHT ABROAD AND COLLECTIVE
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY

Article 128 of the Soviet Constitution says: "The inviolability of the homes of citizens and the privacy of correspondence are protected by law." However, the militia has the right to enter private dwelling places in pursuit of a person suspected of having committed a crime or having escaped from a place of detention. No judicial warrant is needed. According to Article 175 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the organs of the Procurator or of the Committee of State Security (regarding political or other anti-State offenses) may search the premises of a dwelling or seize objects or search a person without judicial warrant. Only an administrative decision is necessary.²² In seizing the postal or telegraphic correspondence of a person, the State investigator "submits his decision to the procurator's approval."²³ Again there is no need for judicial warrant.

"The circulation of citizens of the USSR, who are not judicially limited in their rights, is free within the whole country, except for frontier zones, the frontier belt, and some other specified localities."²⁴ The authors of this statement do not lack optimism. Actually, a peasant cannot leave the collective farm to which he belongs because he has

no passport without which no one may settle in an urban center, while citizens may be transferred "voluntarily," if the need for manpower requires it, to other localities under a State resettlement scheme.

The liquidation of certain autonomous republics during and after the last war illustrated what was meant by resettlement for security reasons. Hundreds of thousands of people, men, women, and children, belonging to the nationalities suspected of disloyalty (Volga Germans, Kalmyks, Crimean Tartars, and several small nationalities of the Caucasus) were deported wholesale and scattered all over the Soviet territory. No attempt was made to differentiate between the disloyal and loyal members of those nationalities. After Stalin's death, those who survived the tribulations of the indiscriminate deportation were allowed to return to their homes, except, insofar as one can know, for the Germans and the Crimean Tartars (their homeland was presented as a gift to the Ukrainian Republic and is now a part of that Republic).

When a Soviet citizen travels for only temporary reasons, his movements are supervised by the militia through the system of registration upon his arrival at any inhabited place. He must register his domestic passport with the militia and also register his stay at a home or dwelling with the manager or owner.

Entry into and departure from the USSR are subject to a system of control, because "they are related to the protection of the State frontiers and their security."²⁵ "The departure abroad or the entry into the USSR without the established passport or permission of competent authorities is punished by confinement for from one to three years."²⁶ Escape abroad or refusal to return home may be considered as treason. This assumes that flight abroad involves an anti-Soviet intent, although it may not be combined with activities usually connected with the concept of treason. The penalty then is death or confinement for at least ten years.

Flight abroad by members of the Armed Forces constitutes desertion and was until 1959 punishable by death and confiscation of property. Soviet legislation took into account that the possibility of apprehending a deserter was remote. In order to prevent desertions abroad, it instituted the notion, unknown to democratic countries, of the collective responsibility of the family of the deserter. Article 58-1c of the Criminal Code said:

In the case of the escape or flight abroad of a member of the armed forces, the adult members of his family, if they assisted in the preparation or commission of treason, or if they knew of it without informing the authorities, are punished by deprivation of

liberty for from five to ten years, with confiscation of all property. The other adult members of the traitor's family who lived with him or who were supported by him at the time of the crime are deprived of their electoral rights and are exiled to the distant areas of Siberia for five years.²⁷

In the second case, the members of the family were punished regardless of the fact that they did not know anything about the deserter's intentions. This unusual provision was abolished in December, 1958.

The preventive aspect of the collective responsibility was frankly acknowledged:

The political significance [of Article 58-1b] consists in the intensification of the general preventive influence of criminal law, in order to forestall the commission of serious crimes like flight abroad by a member of the armed forces who cannot be punished himself. The threat of applying repressive measures to members of his family may dissuade him from committing this treasonable act.²⁸

The severity of the Soviet criminal law follows Lenin's advice: "The courts should not shy from terror; to promise such an attitude would be equivalent to self-deception or fraud. On the contrary, it is necessary to lay down foundations for terror and to legalize its principles clearly and without falsehood or embellishments."²⁹

The free circulation of citizens is also restricted by the special regime in the vicinity of frontiers. Two strips of land are placed under this regime. One is the frontier zone, which includes whole limitroph districts (counties), and the other is the frontier belt, which is two kilometers wide. The latter strip is altogether withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the usual administration and placed under the jurisdiction of frontier troops, military detachments controlled by the State Security Committee. Article 10 of the Edict of August 5, 1960, says: "Entry into the frontier zone is forbidden to persons who are not residents unless authorized by the militia. . . . Entry into the frontier belt or residence therein may be permitted only by the frontier troops."³⁰

Article 197 of the new Criminal Code punishes the second infraction against the regulations on the entry into, residence in, and the registration of addresses within the frontier zone or the frontier belt, by deprivation of freedom for up to six months or by correctional labor for the same period of time or by a fine up to fifty rubles. The first offense is punished by administrative penalties.

REFORM OF CRIMINAL LEGISLATION

In spite of Soviet claims that the regime has the "unanimous" support of the population, as evidenced presumably by the elections, and that the socialist regime has changed human nature and has produced a new type of man, the Soviet man, criminal legislation is very severe and places major emphasis on the definition and punishment of "anti-State" crimes, which include what is called in the West political crimes. The Stalinist Criminal Codes were even harsher than the present ones but the existing criminal laws are not mild by any means. Two different trends have succeeded each other in the reforms of criminal law. The fifties were marked by several changes, notably the great reform of December, 1958, all of which tended to moderate the severity of Stalinist criminal laws. The sixties have brought a new trend toward increasing the number of acts declared criminal and, first of all, making the penalties much more drastic for those crimes which seem to be a major headache.

An Edict of January 10, 1955, introduced milder penalties for petty thefts of State and other public property (correctional labor for from six months to one year or confinement for from one to two years in case of repeated offense). The Draconian punishments for any pilfering whatsoever of such property (long imprisonment or the death penalty), provided by the Edict of June 4, 1947, were thereby limited to large thefts. The new edict did not define petty theft and left to the courts the making of a distinction in each particular case between a petty and a large theft.

Another Edict of November 23, 1955, repealed the former prohibition of abortion even if performed with the pregnant woman's assent. Abortion is now legal, whatever its reason, if carried out at a hospital and by a qualified doctor. The Party, mindful of the need of future manpower, continues to encourage high birth rate (one of the means is State assistance to mothers and the medals awarded to mothers of numerous children); however, the former prohibition of abortion must have had the opposite effect. A great many abortions, secretly performed by incompetent persons, must have resulted in endangering health or life of pregnant women. The Party hoped that the legalization of abortions would be counterbalanced by the pressure of public opinion which was expected to disapprove of them. It seems now to be disappointed. Legal or illegal, abortions continue on a large scale, among other reasons because of the crowded housing conditions which make married life unattractive and the birth of children not always a welcome event.

A Decree of September 1, 1955, abolished the former right of administrative superiors to place transport employees under arrest for up to ten days as a disciplinary measure. The special quasi-military tribunals for those employees were also disbanded. A Statute of December 25, 1958, abrogated the former supplementary penalty of deprivation of electoral rights. Since that time all Soviet citizens, 18 years old, have the rather innocuous right to participate in the elections.

The criminal law reforms, approved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in December, 1958, marked the culmination in the post-Stalinist trend toward a mitigation of penalties and the elimination of the harshest features of the criminal legislation inherited from Stalin.

On December 25 the Supreme Soviet passed ten statutes relating to the following matters: principles of criminal law, crimes against the State, military crimes, criminal procedure, principles of the judiciary organization, courts martial, and elections of people's judges.⁸¹

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW

The existing criminal codes were separately enacted in each Union Republic but are basically literal copies of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic). The content of these Codes (definitions of crimes and the attached penalties) is not affected by the new principles except insofar as these principles offer a binding general guidance in the application of the republican codes and of existing complementary federal legislation. The definition of crimes and the attached punishments were, however, altered by other statutes passed by the Supreme Soviet insofar as crimes against the State and military crimes were concerned.

The Statute of December 25 on the Principles of Criminal Legislation (both federal and republican) announces in its Article 3 a rule which is meant to express the trend towards greater legal security. It states: "Criminal punishment shall be imposed only by judgment of the court." This provision codified the former suspension in 1953 of the powers of the Ministry of the Interior to inflict exile or confinement to the forced labor camp on persons held socially dangerous but not convicted of any crime by the Soviet courts. The Soviet citizen cannot henceforth be punished except for a crime of which he was convicted by a Soviet court. This would be a welcome change except for the fact that the new Statute co-exists with the Republican laws enacted in 1957-58 in Uzbekistan, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizia, Azerbaidjan, Tadjikstan and Armenia, and later in the remaining

Republics, which allow for a nonjudicial penalization of persons "who carry on a parasitic mode of life . . . or those living on unearned income." (See below.)

A definite and unequivocal improvement is stated in the same Article 3: "Only persons guilty of committing a crime, that is, those who intentionally or by negligence have committed a socially dangerous act specified by the criminal statute, shall be held criminally responsible and incur punishment." This provision does away with the Soviet system of criminal responsibility by analogy. Until the enactment of the present Statute a Soviet citizen could be punished by courts for an act which was not expressly forbidden by legislation but which was considered by judges as socially dangerous. The penalty was to be the one provided by criminal legislation for offenses somehow similar in nature with the incriminated act. This system of analogy, contrary to the generally recognized principle: "*Nulla poena sine lege*," undermined the legal security of Soviet citizens who could have committed "offenses" never expressly forbidden by criminal legislation. It gave arbitrary powers to the judges who had the right to convict according to their individual understanding of what was socially dangerous, and could result in judicial contradictions, the same act being considered criminal by one court and innocent by another court. Analogy became unnecessary in a system which wanted to punish for actual crimes but did not intend to terrorize the innocent citizen. Moreover, Soviet criminal legislation is so severe and so all-embracing that punishment by analogy was a superfluous additional guarantee of State security.

Article 6 stipulates that: "A statute which makes an act punishable or increases the penalty shall not have retroactive force." This eliminates the responsibility for anti-Communist acts committed before the October Revolution. The lapse of time since the Revolution made this precaution quite unnecessary. However, this important provision has been violated since the enactment of the new Principles of Criminal Legislation. The Supreme Court of the RSFSR inflicted the death penalty on people tried under the Edict of 1961, which had introduced capital punishment for illegal transactions in foreign currencies, although they had committed these acts prior to the date of the edict. Apparently the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR had authorized the courts to apply the edict retroactively. This fact (there might be others unknown to outsiders) makes one wonder whether the temptation to bypass the legal obstacles in order to fight against certain crimes, characteristic of Stalin's regime, has truly died forever.

The new statute definitely improves the situation of minors. It raises their general criminal responsibility from the former 14 years of age to 16. The minimum age for criminal responsibility for certain crimes is also raised from 12 to 14 (Article 10). Minors aged 14 to 16 are responsible for murder, intentional bodily injuries resulting in the impairment of health, rape, assault with the intent of robbery, theft, malicious hooliganism (misbehavior in public), intentional destruction or damaging of State or other public or private property with serious consequences, and intentional causing of a train wreck. The list is long, but at least a minor now becomes responsible for these crimes at the age of 14 rather than at 12, as was the case before.

Necessary defense defined in Article 13 is interesting because it exempts from criminal responsibility, among others, such persons who committed acts which would otherwise be defined as crimes "while protecting the interests of the Soviet State or public interests," if the limits of necessary defense were not exceeded on this occasion. Article 14 similarly exempts from criminal responsibility acts otherwise defined as crimes, if committed "in a state of emergency, that is, to eliminate a danger threatening the interests of the Soviet State, public interests, life, or rights of a given person or other citizens, if such danger under the circumstances could not be averted by other means, provided the injury inflicted is less important than the averted harm." These two articles give much leeway to prison and camp guards and the police, who might interpret them as an encouragement to use force in all circumstances where they would deem it required in the "necessary" defense of State interests or in an "emergency" threatening the same interests.

Article 15 maintains the former rule that the preparation of or the attempt to commit a crime must be punished in the same manner that applies to the commission of the crime.

The crime of misprision is maintained in Article 19. As before, the crime consists in failing to denounce to proper State authorities persons guilty of planning or committing a crime against the State or against State or other public property. There is no exemption for the family of the culprit. All Soviet citizens, at least 16 years old, are thereby forced to act as informers or face the penalties provided for by Article 26, namely the deprivation of freedom for from one to three years or correctional labor for from six months to one year.

The list of punishments has been rearranged by Articles 21-31. The death penalty remains for treason, espionage, subversion, acts of ter-

rorism, banditry, murder committed under aggravating circumstances, and for more serious military offenses committed in wartime. (See below.) Political offenders are again placed on the same footing as common murderers. Minors less than 18 years old and pregnant women are exempt from capital punishment.

Confinement is limited to ten years as the usual maximum, but to fifteen (formerly twenty-five) years in the case of the most serious crimes and the most dangerous recidivists. Previous criminal legislation considered confinement to a correctional labor camp a heavier penalty than confinement to prison. This is no longer true probably because of the improvement in the regime of the camps now more elegantly termed correctional labor colonies. Dangerous criminals and those convicted of grave crimes will serve their sentences in prisons. Others will be sent to the correctional labor colonies. Prisoners can be shifted from prison to the camp or vice versa, depending on their good or bad conduct. Minors less than 18 years old may not be deprived of freedom for longer than ten years.

Exile (the removal of a person from his place of residence with mandatory settlement in a definite locality) and deportation (the removal of a person from the place of his residence and prohibition of residing in certain localities) remain as before the penalties immediately following confinement in severity. Those two penalties can be inflicted as basic or additional penalties (additional after the convict has served his sentence in prison or camp). The maximum period of exile or deportation is fixed at five years. Juveniles less than 18 years old may neither be exiled nor deported. The same exemption is extended to pregnant women and mothers of minor children.

The new Criminal Code (1961) severely punishes escape from prison, correctional labor camp, or exile, and willful return to the locality from which the guilty person has been deported. Escape from the place of exile or en route to that place is punished by Article 186 by confinement for up to one year. Deportation is replaced by exile if the deported person returns to places where he is forbidden to reside (Article 187). Escape from penitentiary or from preventive arrest is punished by the deprivation of freedom for up to three years; if accompanied by the use of force against the prison guards, by imprisonment for up to five years (Article 188).

Minor penalties include correctional labor without confinement. A person sentenced to this penalty will continue to work at his usual place of employment at wages reduced by no more than 20 percent. This form of correctional labor is nothing but a fine. Others may be sentenced by the court to perform their correctional labor elsewhere

(presumably in a correctional labor colony) but within the district of their habitual residence. Other minor or additional penalties include: deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or carry on certain activities; fines; public reprimand; confiscation of property; deprivation of military or other rank, and deprivation of orders, medals and honorary titles. A few former penalties have been eliminated; for instance, permanent or temporary banishment from the USSR which was never applied because the criminal could consider it a reward rather than a penalty.

The statute of limitation has been somewhat improved. The periods of time that must elapse for the application of the statute of limitation are as follows both for the initiation of prosecution and the execution of the sentence:

1. three years from the date of the commission of the crime or the date of the sentence if the offense is punished by no more than two-year confinement or by a lesser penalty;
2. five years if the penalty does not exceed five years;
3. ten years if the penalty exceeds five years.

The application of the statute of limitation may be altogether suspended at the discretion of the court if a person could be sentenced to death for the crime. However, the death penalty must then be commuted to confinement.

All this sounds fairly normal except for one reservation taken over from the former legislation, namely, the reckoning of the period of time required for the statute of limitation is suspended for the whole time when the guilty person hides from the investigation or evades service of the sentence. In both cases the statute of limitation begins to run only after the apprehension of the culprit or after his voluntary reporting to serve the penalty. This reservation formerly made the Soviet statute of limitation completely meaningless. A person hiding from justice could not invoke the statute of limitation; once apprehended he would be prosecuted after the lapse of any number of years and convicted. A person convicted who escaped from prison was not protected by any length of time from serving the full sentence because the statute of limitation was of no use during his evasion. The new statute partly corrects this absurdity by stating in addition that a lapse of fifteen years from the date of the commission of the crime or from the date of the sentence unconditionally frees the person concerned from either prosecution and trial or the service of the sentence. In other words, the present Soviet statute of limitation requires in fact the lapse of fifteen years to become truly effective. Even this long period of time does not protect a person condemned

to capital punishment, except for the substitution of confinement for death. The court may, however, at its own discretion, grant the statute of limitation even to persons condemned to death.

CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE

Another statute passed by the Supreme Soviet on December 25 replaced the former legislation concerning so-called counterrevolutionary (political) and some other serious offenses. Abolition of criminal responsibility by analogy was accomplished in this statute by doing away with the former all-embracing and rather vague definition of counterrevolutionary crime. This general definition made easier for the courts the extension of responsibility, by analogy, to such political acts as were not specifically forbidden in the existing legislation. There is no such general definition of crime against the State in the present statute. It simply enumerates various crimes against the State, defines them and attaches appropriate penalties. Another definite improvement consists in abolishing the former collective responsibility of the next-of-kin of a member of the armed forces who fled abroad. The responsibility is now strictly individual for one's own offenses.

Treason includes not only acts committed to the prejudice of the independence, territorial integrity or the military might of the USSR, desertion to the enemy, espionage, betrayal of state secrets to a foreign country, assistance rendered a foreign state in its activities hostile to the USSR, but also conspiracy with the aim of seizing power, and flight abroad or the refusal to return to the USSR. It is interesting to note that the anti-Party group purged in June 1957 have since been consistently accused of conspiring in order to seize exclusive power. Article 1 of the present statute will hang over their heads and could be applied to them if domestic politics required it. Mere flight abroad with the intention of never returning or the refusal to return to the USSR constitutes treason by itself, even if the culprit has not committed other treasonable acts. This gives the measure of the "liberalization" of the regime. This provision applies to all Soviet citizens, military and civilian.

The penalty for treason ranges from ten years of confinement to capital punishment.

Espionage is listed as a treasonable act. Article 2 of the same statute mentions it separately for the benefit of aliens or stateless persons whose penalty may be from seven to fifteen years of confinement, or death.

Espionage is defined as "the delivery as well as the theft and as-

sembly for delivery to a foreign State, foreign organization or their agencies, of information which is a State or military secret, and also the delivery or assembly for delivery, on orders from foreign intelligence services, of other information which might be used to the prejudice of interests of the USSR."

Article 3 defines terrorism as the murder of or the infliction of bodily injury on a public figure or an agent of public authority committed in connection with his public activities. The penalty is confinement for a period of from ten to fifteen years or capital punishment in the case of murder, and confinement for from eight to fifteen years in the case of bodily injuries.

Article 4 prescribes the penalty of deprivation of liberty for ten to fifteen years or death for the murder of the representatives of a foreign State, if the intention is to cause the outbreak of war or other international complications. The infliction of bodily injuries under the same circumstances is punished with deprivation of freedom for eight to fifteen years.

Article 5 punishes subversive acts (destruction of public property, mass poisoning, or spreading of epidemic diseases, in order to undermine the Soviet State) by confinement for from eight to fifteen years or capital punishment.

Article 6 defines sabotage as undermining the Soviet economy or the governmental or public organizations with the purpose of weakening the Soviet State. The penalty is confinement for from eight to fifteen years. This article is applicable in particular to inefficient Soviet administrators who can easily be accused of thus undermining the Soviet economy while the intention of weakening the Soviet State would probably be imputed if necessary. Sabotage may be committed not only by a harmful action but also by an intentional inaction.

Article 7 is the most interesting. It reaffirms the existence of an offense peculiar to the Soviet system, namely anti-Soviet incitement or propaganda. This article provides a better insight into the nature of the regime than many other Soviet legal provisions; it is worth reproducing *in extenso*: "Agitation or propaganda conducted for the purpose of overthrowing or weakening Soviet authority or for the commission of one of the especially dangerous anti-State crimes; the distribution for the same purposes of slanderous and concocted rumours discrediting the Soviet State and social regime, as well as the distribution or preparation or storing for the same purposes of literature having such a content—shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for from six months to seven years or by exile for from

two to five years. The same acts committed by persons previously sentenced for especially dangerous anti-State crimes, or if committed in wartime, are punished by deprivation of freedom for from three to ten years." The definition is flexible, especially in the use of such vague terms as "weakening of Soviet authority"; any criticism of the Party line or policies might easily be interpreted as an attempt at weakening Soviet authority. The penalties are stiff. This practical sanction for disobedience to the Party line makes the notion of freedom of expression totally meaningless.

Article 9 punishes organizational activities for the purpose of carrying out one of the aforesaid crimes, including propaganda, as severely as the commission of the respective crimes themselves. The participation in *any other* anti-Soviet organization (i.e., an organization which does not intend to commit anti-State crimes) is punished by the same article and in the same manner. This article is the logical implementation of the Soviet practice which allows for only one political Party and for one single organization sponsored by the Party for each public activity, and which rules out the legal existence of any competitive organization in a given field of human endeavor.

The Soviet interest in upholding Communist regimes in other countries is reflected in Article 10: "In view of the international solidarity of toilers, especially dangerous crimes against the State committed against another State of toilers shall be punished in accordance with Articles 1 through 9 of the present Statute."

The remaining articles (11 to 26) of the same Statute define other crimes against the State, such as inciting racial or national discord (penalty: confinement for from six months to three years or exile for from two to five years; this provision could be turned against non-Russian Soviet citizens if their pronouncements could be interpreted as directed against the Russians); divulging information which is a State secret if there is no implication of treason (confinement for from two to eight years); loss of documents containing State secrets (confinement for from one year to eight years); banditism (confinement for from three to fifteen years or death); contraband (confinement for from three to ten years); organization or participation in mass riots (confinement for from two to fifteen years); refusal to perform the compulsory military service (confinement for from one to five years); illegal departure abroad (with the intention of returning, since otherwise the illegal departure qualifies as treason) or illegal entry into the USSR (confinement for from one to three years); violation of the regulations pertaining to international flights (deprivation of

freedom for from one to ten years or fine of up to ten thousand rubles with or without confiscation of the plane); infractions committed by transport employees (land, water, and air transport) against the regulations concerning the safety of transport, or the defective repairs of transport equipment, if these acts result or might have resulted in human injuries, a catastrophe, or other serious consequences (confinement for from one to fifteen years, but only correctional labor for up to one year in minor cases); intentional damage caused to the means of transportation if it results or might have resulted in disturbance of the normal operation of transport (confinement for from three to fifteen years); counterfeiting or circulation of counterfeited money, banknotes, State securities, or foreign currency (confinement for from three to fifteen years with confiscation of property); infractions against currency regulations or speculation in currencies or State securities (confinement for from three to eight years with confiscation of currencies and State securities).

The new Criminal Code (1961) punishes the concealment and failure to denounce serious crimes. The penalties are more severe in the case of grave crimes against the State. The non-denunciation of the preparation or commission of these crimes (treason, espionage, terroristic acts, subversion, sabotage, organizational activities for the commission of crimes against the State or participation in the anti-Soviet organizations, banditism, counterfeiting or circulation of counterfeited currency or State securities), is punished by the deprivation of freedom for from one to three years or by correctional labor for from six months to one year (Article 88.1). Concealment of the same crimes, of contraband, and of illegal operations in currencies, is punished by the imprisonment for from one to five years with the additional exile for from two to five years or without exile, or by exile for up to five years (Article 88.2).

Failure to denounce the preparation or commission of several other crimes (murder, rape, theft under aggravating circumstances, robbery, pilfering of State or other public property, fraud, bribery, and attempt at the life of militiamen or members of brigades of co-operation with the militia) is punished by the deprivation of freedom for up to three years or by correctional labor for up to one year (Article 190). Concealment of the same crimes, of speculation (illegal trade), of infractions against the regulations pertaining to the safety of automobile traffic, homicide, forgery of official reports on the implementation of plans of production, and escape from penitentiary establishments or from preventive arrest, is punished by the depriva-

tion of freedom for up to two or five years (depending on the nature of the concealed crime) or by correctional labor for up to one year (Article 189).

One of the crimes punished by criminal legislation is worth mentioning, because it is characteristic of the Soviet economic system with its State monopoly of domestic wholesale and retail trade. This is speculation, which Article 154 of the new Criminal Code defines in the following words: "Speculation, i.e., purchase and sale of commodities or other goods for profit." This crime is in other countries nothing but a legal trade. In the Soviet Union it is punished by confinement for up to two years with or without confiscation of property or by correctional labor for up to one year or by a fine of up to 300 rubles. If this crime is committed professionally or on a large scale, the penalty is raised to imprisonment for from two to seven years. Petty speculation once (if a citizen sells a minor object of small value) may go unpunished, but the second time is punished by imprisonment for up to one year or by correctional labor for the same period of time or by a fine of up to 200 rubles.

The maximum penalties for all these offenses, which were also covered by previous legislation, have been reduced as a rule, except for the most serious crimes, but are still severe. Some of these penalties have been raised since 1958.

MILITARY CRIMES

Another Statute passed on December 25 redefined these crimes and revised the penalties attached to them. The Statute lists all sorts of military crimes, from insubordination and desertion to disclosure of military secrets and misbehavior while an enemy prisoner of war. Persons who are liable to the responsibility for the commission of military crimes include not only members of the regular Armed Forces but also commissioned and non-commissioned officers as well as privates of the State Security agencies (Article 1). This clearly indicates not only that the network of State Security continues to be conceived of as a quasi-military organization but also that the Committee of State Security has as before its own troops; there are, however, signs that these troops have been reduced in size since 1953.

Military discipline is severely upheld. An open refusal to obey orders of superiors is punished by deprivation of freedom for from one to five years; if it is committed by a group or if it had serious consequences, the penalty is raised to from three to ten years; in time of war, the penalty is either deprivation of freedom for from five to ten years or capital punishment (Article 2). The nonexecution of

orders is punished by deprivation of freedom for from three months to three years; in wartime, the penalty is from three to ten years (Article 3). Any other insubordination results in deprivation of freedom for from one to five years; if committed by a group, in imprisonment for from three to ten years; in wartime, the penalty is death or imprisonment for from five to fifteen years (Article 4). Threats, use of violence or insults in the relations with a superior are punished in peacetime, depending on the circumstances and the nature of the offense, by imprisonment for from three months to ten years, in wartime from three years to capital punishment (Articles 5-7). Desertion in peacetime brings forth the penalty of imprisonment for from three to seven years, in wartime either deprivation of freedom for from five to ten years or capital punishment (Article 11). Divulging military secrets which is not treason, or loss of documents with military secrets, is punished by imprisonment for from one to ten years, the severity of the penalty depending on the circumstances of the case (Article 23). Abandoning the battlefield or refusal to use arms is penalized by death or imprisonment for fifteen years (Article 27), while surrender to the enemy is punished by death or fifteen years of deprivation of freedom, if the surrender is due to lack of courage (Article 28).

The penalties for military personnel are stiff, but punishments for crimes committed by civilians are not mild either.

THE AGGRAVATION OF PENALTIES

The trend toward greater clemency has been reversed in the sixties. The Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 4, 1962, extended the application of capital punishment to crimes other than those which the Statute of 1958 had specified.³² The present list is as follows: all particularly dangerous crimes against the State (not only as before treason, espionage, terroristic acts, and subversion, but also sabotage, any organized activity aiming at the commission of particularly dangerous crimes against the State as well as participation in anti-Soviet organizations), banditism, acts which disorganize the functioning of prisons and correctional labor camps, forgery of money or State securities or their circulation, violations of currency regulations, looting on a particularly large scale of State or other public property, premeditated murder committed under aggravating circumstances, rape if committed by a group of persons or of a juvenile, robbery, accepting or giving bribes or acting as an intermediary in bribing if committed under aggravating circumstances, attempts at the life of militiamen or of members of the people's brigades of cooperation with the militia if committed in relation to

their official functions of protecting public order and under aggravating circumstances.

The Edict of July 1, 1961, increased the penalties for speculation in currencies and State securities or other violations of the regulations concerning currency operations. The death penalty is meted out to offenders who commit these offenses professionally or on a large scale or have been before convicted of the same crimes. Otherwise the penalty is deprivation of freedom for from five to fifteen years with confiscation of property and with or without an additional exile for two to five years.³³

The Edict of May 5, 1961, restored the death penalty for the pilfering of State or other public property on a particularly large scale.³⁴ It also prescribed the same penalty for inmates of prisons and correctional labor camps who had been deprived of freedom for particularly dangerous crimes or who were recidivists, and who committed one of the following offenses: terrorization of other inmates who were in the process of rehabilitation, aggressive acts against administrative personnel, organization of gangs for the commission of those acts or an active participation in such gangs. The alternative penalty for all the crimes enumerated in the edict is confinement for up to fifteen years with confiscation of property. Confiscation of property would mean little if anything to the inmates of penitentiary establishments, but is meaningful for pilferers of public property.

The same edict specified that persons convicted of the commission of particularly dangerous crimes against the State might be given the additional penalty of exile for from two to five years.

It further stated that release on parole should not be granted to: 1) particularly dangerous recidivists; 2) persons who had been released on parole and who committed during the remainder of their penalty another crime punishable by deprivation of freedom; 3) all persons convicted for the commission of particularly dangerous crimes against the State, banditism, counterfeiting currency or State securities or the circulation of counterfeited currency or State securities, breaches of the currency regulations, pilfering of State or other public property on a particularly large scale, premeditated murder under aggravating circumstances, rape of a juvenile or under aggravating circumstances, robbery, accepting or giving bribes or acting as an intermediary in bribing if committed under aggravating circumstances.

The Edict of February 24, 1961, established the penalty of confinement for from one to five years or of exile for up to five years for concealment of the following crimes: treason, espionage, terroristic

acts committed either against the Soviet officials or against the representatives of foreign States, subversion, sabotage, any organized activity aiming at the commission of particularly dangerous crimes against the State as well as the participation in any anti-Soviet organization, contraband, speculation in currencies or State securities, banditism, and counterfeiting of national or foreign currencies and securities.³⁵

All these edicts indicate which crimes the post-Stalinist regime considers most dangerous. The list includes what is called in the West political offenses, pilfering of State or other public property, speculation in currencies, and acts which disorganize penitentiary establishments. The Stalinist legislation was no more lenient in this respect. The question arises as to whether the Soviet people of the sixties are anywhere near the ideal Communist society respectful of social norms of intercourse, and whether the population is as monolithic in its loyalty to the regime as the Party constantly claims.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The Supreme Soviet enacted on December 25, 1958, the Statute on the Basic Principles of Criminal Procedure. Like the other Statutes passed on December 25, this one preserves the basic structure of the Stalinist period while it improves certain of its aspects. It reaffirms in its Article 7 the principle that: "Justice in criminal cases shall be administered only by the court. No one may be declared guilty of committing a crime and incur punishment except by a court sentence." Yet "a parasite" or "a person living on unearned income" may be declared guilty and incur severe punishment without a court sentence. (See below.)

The enactment on December 25 of this and other statutes by the Supreme Soviet was preceded by a lively discussion among Soviet lawyers which had taken quite a few years. Some of them must feel disappointed today; their bolder suggestions for the improvement of Soviet criminal laws have been largely ignored. For instance, several lawyers had proposed to announce in the statute on criminal procedure the principle, known to other civilized nations, of the presumption of innocence. B. S. Sharkov, the deputy to the Supreme Soviet, introducing the present Statute on Criminal Procedure, abruptly dismissed Soviet lawyers' suggestions in these words: "Efforts to include in our theory and practice obsolete dogmas of bourgeois law, for instance, the presumption of innocence, deeply contradict the essence of Soviet socialist law. The presumption of innocence was proposed to be included in the Principles of Criminal Procedure as a principle

of Soviet criminal procedure by using a formula like the following: 'The defendant shall be considered innocent until his guilt is established by the final court judgment.' Perhaps lawyers can understand the meaning of such a complicated [*sic!*] formula, but great masses of the working people could hardly understand it." The solution actually adopted in Article 14 is neither fish nor fowl. This Article provides a minimum guarantee to the suspected or accused person by saying: "The court, the public procurator, the investigator, and the person conducting the militia investigation shall have no right to shift the burden of proof upon the defendant." At least, the defendant does not need to prove his innocence, but will be considered half-guilty and half-innocent during the preliminary investigation and the trial.

The initial enquiry in a criminal case is carried out by the militia, or by the commanding officers regarding military personnel. This function is taken over by the officials of the Committee of State Security regarding crimes against the State. The purpose of this enquiry is to discover the circumstances of the crime and to identify the person suspected of having committed it. The militia may proceed with searches and may interrogate the suspect and the witnesses. It may also detain the suspect person. The militia, with the procurator's approval, submits minor cases to court for the judicial proceedings; no further investigation is required.

In all important cases, including the anti-State crimes, the initial enquiry is followed by the preliminary investigation which is conducted by State investigators (administrative officials subordinated to the procurator, himself an administrative official) alone or jointly with the special investigators of State Security. The Edict of April 17, 1963, established the following list of crimes which require the participation of State Security investigators: treason, espionage, terroristic acts committed against Soviet officials or representatives of foreign States, subversion, sabotage, anti-Soviet propaganda or agitation, any organized activity aiming at the commission of particularly dangerous anti-State crimes, participation in any anti-Soviet organization, particularly dangerous crimes committed against another socialist State, divulgence of State secrets, loss of documents containing State secrets, illegal departure from or illegal entry into the USSR, mass riots, infractions against the regulation pertaining to international flights, illegal operations in currencies, the concealment or non-denunciation of these crimes.³⁶

The investigators act under the general supervision of the procurator whose express sanction is required for the search (in case of emer-

gency the militia or the investigator may proceed on their own but should inform the procurator within the 24 hours following the search), the seizure of postal correspondence, and arrest of the suspect.

The militia or the investigator may detain the person suspected of having committed a crime for which the penalty is deprivation of freedom, if he is caught in the act of committing the crime or immediately after its commission, if eyewitnesses or the victim point him out as the author of the crime, if obvious traces of the crime are found on the person of the suspect, on his clothing, on objects in his possession or at his home, if he attempts to escape, if he has no permanent residence, or if his identity is not yet established. In all these cases the procurator must be informed within 24 hours and decides within the following 48 hours whether to release him or place him under preventive arrest. The arrested person may be detained for ten days without being told the reason of his arrest. Preventive arrest can be used as a measure of precaution only if the arrested person is suspected of having committed a crime for which deprivation of freedom is the penalty.

The length of arrest should not exceed two months. However, the regional procurator may extend it by one month, the procurator of the Union Republic by an additional three months, and the Procurator General of the USSR by another three months. All told, the detained person, only suspected of having committed a crime, might spend nine months under preventive arrest. This administrative procedure of detention stands in sharp contrast with the institution of habeas corpus. The courts do not intervene. Article 6 of the Basic Principles of Criminal Procedure sanctions this procedure by saying: "No person may be placed under arrest except by the decision of a court or with the approval of a procurator." The procurator has the power to act without the judicial warrant which is only an alternative way of placing people under arrest. Administrative encroachments on the inviolability of private homes and correspondence are likewise permissible with the procurator's assent.

The preliminary investigation is a dialogue between the suspect and the interrogating investigator, a dialogue between a man who is held incommunicado and an official armed with the power of the State. The investigator, as said before, may keep the suspect in the dark for ten days without disclosing to him the nature of crime which he is suspected to have committed. During a period possibly of several months the suspect is denied the right to be assisted by a lawyer. Only after the termination of investigation the suspect is given

cognizance of the materials of his case and may hire a lawyer for defense. The investigator, if he wants, may admit a defense lawyer to the investigation proceedings, but it is rather improbable that he would frequently be tempted to use this right and be embarrassed by the presence of a witness at his interrogation of the suspect. Only minors and persons physically or mentally incapacitated must be assisted by a lawyer.

The assistance by the lawyer for the defense begins, therefore, at the time the procurator submits to the court the bill of charges. This bill is founded on the results of the preliminary investigation. From that moment on the lawyer may have interviews with the accused and exercise the usual rights of a counsel for defense.

The criminal case is committed to trial by the decision of the judge of original jurisdiction; if he disagrees with the bill of charges which the procurator has submitted, the question is decided by the whole court. The court may commit the accused to trial or order a supplementary investigation of the case or dismiss the case for lack of proofs. It also decides whether the accused if arrested should remain in detention. The court may amend the bill of charges by eliminating those charges which do not seem *prima facie* founded or by modifying the qualification of the crime and citing a different Article of the Criminal Code.

The court of original jurisdiction always sits as a bench composed of one judge and two people's assessors, who decide together all points of fact and law. This arrangement allows the two lay assessors to outvote the judge even on points of law regarding which only the judge has competent knowledge. The proceedings are public except if this would endanger a State secret or if it is a trial of sex crime or if the court wants to protect the secrecy of personal life. The language of the proceedings is that of the Union or Autonomous Republic where the trial takes place, but an accused who does not know that language may use his own native tongue and is assisted by an interpreter.

The defendant and his attorney, and the State procurator act as the parties. The court interrogates the accused, witnesses, victim of the crime, and experts, and verifies the evidence.

The judgment of the court of primary jurisdiction may be appealed to a higher court. However, there is no appeal from the judgments of the Supreme Court of the USSR and of the Supreme Court of a Union Republic acting as the original jurisdiction. Both the convicted person and the procurator have the right to appeal. The procurator must do it if he thinks that the judgment contravenes law or is without

sufficient factual foundation. The court of appeal (this might be either the regional court acting on appeal from the people's court or the Supreme Court of the Union Republic regarding judgments rendered by a regional court) is always composed of three judges; the people's assessors do not sit on the bench. The court of appeal must verify the concordance of the judgment both with the existing laws and with the factual evidence. It reexamines the whole judgment even if the appeal has contested only a part of it. The appeal proceedings require the participation of the procurator who, among others, submits his conclusions before the appeal judgment is rendered. While the presence of the accused is mandatory in the court of original jurisdiction, the appellate proceedings do not require his participation; the court of appeal may, if it wishes, admit him to the hearings. The attorney for the defense, however, has the right to participate.

The court of appeals may take one of the following decisions: 1. maintain the judgment of original jurisdiction; 2. quash it and remand the case to the court of original jurisdiction for retrial, or order a new preliminary investigation and then a retrial; 3. quash the judgment and dismiss the case; 4. change the original judgment. If the judgment is changed on appeal, the new judgment cannot be more severe (i.e., qualify the incriminated act as a more serious crime or increase the penalty) unless the appeal proceedings take place following the procurator's appeal; in other words, the appeal by the convicted person only should not result in the deterioration of his situation. However, strangely enough, a judgment of acquittal may be quashed even if the appeal is heard at the request of the acquitted person. This improbable case could happen if the acquitted were dissatisfied with the motivations of judgment.

The Soviet law on criminal and civil procedures defies the general principle of *res judicata* which other civilized nations have always respected. This principle means that a final judgment, which has entered into force, cannot be challenged. A person acquitted by a final judgment cannot be retried for the same offense, and a person convicted has the certainty that he will not be punished more severely in case of retrial. The Soviet Statute of August 16, 1938, established a procedure which made possible the modification of final judgments at any time; no statute of limitation was fixed. The reform of criminal law and procedure, which the Supreme Soviet approved in December, 1958, notably improved the position of the convicted by introducing a statute of limitation, but maintained the procedure itself which is called judicial review. After twenty years a queer situation was ended. During those twenty years no final judgment was final; any criminal

or civil judgment, which had duly entered into force, could be contested at any later time. A person acquitted could be retried and convicted, another punished more severely. The present amended procedure of judicial review remains somewhat extravagant, but is no longer cruel in its consequences.

The review of a final judgment, i.e., a judgment that has entered into force and may no longer be appealed, is initiated by one of the following officials: 1) the President of the Supreme Court of the USSR or the Vice-Presidents, the President of the Military Division of the same Court, the General Procurator of the USSR, or the Principal Military Procurator, regarding all judgments rendered by any Soviet court; 2) Presidents of Supreme Courts of Union-Republics and the Union-Republican procurators regarding judgments rendered by any court of their Republic; 3) Presidents of regional courts and regional procurators regarding judgments rendered by any people's court of their region.

The President or the procurator sends his "protest" against a final judgment to the court of the corresponding rank (for instance, the regional procurator to the regional court of his province, and the President of the Union-Republican Supreme Court to his own court). The present statute of limitation forbids lodging a protest after the lapse of one year from entry into force of final judgment if the protesting official contests either the acquittal or the leniency of punishment. The law of 1958 protects thereby the person acquitted or convicted against the reversal of the judgment to his prejudice. Otherwise there is no statute of limitation, but the judgment, reviewed after the lapse of one year, may be only either confirmed or improved in favor of the convicted. He has no right to initiate the proceedings but may petition the President of the court or the procurator concerned, who then might lodge the protest against the final judgment if this action were deemed necessary.

Regardless of which court proceeds with the review of a judgment, the most interested person, the acquitted or the convicted, is not admitted to the court hearings. On the contrary, the procurator must be present and submit his conclusions. Even Soviet lawyers have some doubts about this particular aspect of procedure and agree that "the participation of the accused or his attorney . . . would represent a guarantee, because he or his attorney would be able to give explanations, produce their own arguments, and sustain or oppose the protest. . . ." (M. S. Strogovich, *Ugolovnyi Protsess*, pp. 494-495.)

The review of a final judgment results in one of the following decisions: 1) the contested judgment is left in force; 2) it is quashed

and the case is dismissed; 3) the case is remanded for a retrial or for a new preliminary investigation; 4) only the appeal judgment is quashed, and the case is remanded to the court of appeals; 5) the judgment is changed by the reviewing court itself.

The reasons for quashing or changing a judgment in the procedure of judicial review are the same as in the appellate proceedings, namely biased or incomplete preliminary investigation or court proceedings; contradictions between the motivations of the judgment and factual evidence; violation of the rules of criminal procedure; incorrect application of criminal law, for instance, an erroneous qualification of the crime.

The review of final cases should not be confused with the revision which is known to all countries and which Soviet law also allows if new evidence, unknown to the court that rendered the contested judgment, has been discovered and is of such a nature that it could have affected the judgment substantially. The revision may take place only within one year following the discovery of new and formerly unknown evidence.

The higher court's instructions, contained in its appeal or review decision, are binding on the court which proceeds with the retrial of the case.

NONJUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS—LAWS AGAINST "PARASITES"— COMRADELY COURTS

Article 3 of the Principles of Criminal Legislation emphatically stated: "Criminal punishment shall be imposed only by the judgment of the court." This principle cannot be reconciled with other developments unless one wants to indulge in semantical acrobatics and call punishments, imposed by institutions other than courts, not criminal punishment but public censure. These developments are two: the special "nonjudicial" tribunals of laymen for the "parasites," and the comradely courts of fellow-workers or co-residents.

Several Union Republics enacted in 1957-58 their own laws on the struggle against persons "who are leading an antisocial, parasite way of life . . . or are living on an unearned income." The definition itself was vague and might have embraced all sorts of people, from a speculator in consumer goods to a worker or collective farmer who failed to fulfill his norm of output. The procedure was rather unusual, because the "parasites" were to be arraigned before an assembly of their neighbors residing in the same village or the same city block. This assembly of laymen had the right to impose as punishment exile for from two to five years to another district of the same Union

Republic. The exile was obliged during the stated period of time to work under the supervision of the militia. The verdict of the assembly needed only approval by the executive committee of the city or district soviet which is an administrative body. There was no appeal to courts. The assembly decided in an open ballot by the majority of those present. As the quorum was the majority of adult residents, the actual voting majority could have been a minority of the total of inhabitants. It is easy to imagine that the vote of the assembly might have been swayed by the pressure of the local Party cell or local State officials.

Eventually the Russian Union Republic followed suit in 1961, but its law was an improvement. It created two alternative procedures: before the regular people's court or before the assembly of laymen. The former laws of other Union Republics have since been redrafted on the Russian model. The Russian law is directed against those able-bodied adults who "... avoid socially useful work, live on an unearned income . . . or commit other antisocial acts which permit them to lead a parasitic way of life."³⁷ A collective farmer who is derelict in fulfilling his seasonal or annual work of output and relies for income principally on his subsidiary establishment would be "a parasite" in the sense of this law. The penalty is exile for from two to five years with the confiscation of "unearned" property and with compulsory labor at the place of exile.

One alternative procedure established by Russian law is action before the people's court. Its decision is a regular judgment. It is final, and there is no appeal such as in the usual criminal procedure.

But this is a fifty-fifty solution, because there is the alternative nonjudicial procedure. The same Russian Edict provides, as other Republican laws had done, for the arraignment before the assembly of co-workers employed at the same enterprise, office, collective farm and the like. The difference consists in the composition of the assembly; the judges are no longer co-residents in the same village or city block but co-workers who are, however, laymen. The assembly remains a body which does not qualify for the name of court even in Soviet terminology; yet it may impose a very harsh penalty. The law says that State employees and collective farmers (i.e., practically all adult citizens), who "live on resources obtained by other means than work or commit antisocial acts permitting them to live a parasitic way of life," may be sentenced by their co-workers employed at the same factory, shop, office or collective farm. The decision of co-workers requires only the approval by the executive committee of the city or district soviet for becoming final. There is no recourse to courts.

The penalty is the same whether inflicted by the people's court or by the assembly of co-workers.

The initiation of the proceedings and the choice between the two alternative procedures are vested in the militia or the procurator. Either takes action after the denunciation of the "parasite" by a State office or enterprise or by a collective farm (i.e., the management) or even by a private citizen. The denunciation must be checked for its veracity before the case is submitted to either the people's court or the assembly of co-workers.

If the parasite has been earning his living by means forbidden by law (for instance, resale of consumer goods for profit), the case is sent to court for regular criminal trial.

If the parasite refuses to work at the place of exile, the people's court will sentence him to correctional labor at wages reduced by 10 percent. If he still refuses to work, the court will substitute confinement for exile. The time spent on correctional labor or in confinement is not included within the period of exile for which the parasite was originally sentenced. Escape from the place of exile or on the way to that place is punished as flight from prison.

Another extrajudicial procedure is the action before the comradely courts. These "courts" (the name is a misnomer, because they are not courts in the usual Soviet sense) are set up at the various places of employment or residence or education (enterprises, offices, collective farms, apartment houses, higher and technical-secondary schools).³⁸ Their purpose is to "reeducate" people by organized social pressure of neighbors or colleagues, but one of the means is punishment. The members of these courts are elected for the term of one year by open ballot at the general meeting of their co-workers (employees at the same enterprise, office or collective farm, or co-students at the same school), or co-residents at the same apartment house or village. They may be recalled at any time by the same meeting if they have proved to be unworthy. The members of the court designate their chairman, vice-chairman, and a secretary. It is interesting to note that the comradely court is one of the means for enforcing good conduct and discipline among Soviet students.

The jurisdiction of the courts includes: infractions against labor discipline (for instance, absence from work without valid reasons; arriving at work late or leaving before the end of workday; defective work; loitering and wasting time; damaging machinery, instruments, or raw materials due to negligence); drunkenness at work or in public places or other misconduct; unworthy behavior towards women or towards the spouse, parents, or children; use of abusive or foul

language; slandering a colleague or a co-tenant; damaging trees or shrubs at public places or premises of an apartment house; misconduct that is a nuisance to other tenants; other antisocial acts which are not criminal offenses; minor violations of administrative regulations if the competent authorities (the militia, the procurator or the people's court) prefer to submit the case to the comradely court.

The setting up of those comradely courts was a shrewd move. First, the industrial or collective-farm management is relieved, if it chooses, of imposing disciplinary penalties, and shifts this unpleasant responsibility to the co-workers, but without relinquishing its disciplinary powers which may be alternatively used. Second, the management of the apartment house is freed of some of its usual headaches by transferring to co-tenants the duty of maintaining order and peace on the overcrowded premises. Third, the administrative authorities and the people's courts are relieved of a part of their work by the right of transferring minor cases to the comradely courts. Fourth, the Party hopes that the manipulation of social pressure will help in improving the general conduct of the population. The other side of the coin is self-evident: the citizens face an additional responsibility for petty misdemeanors which are not crimes and often not even disciplinary or administrative offenses.

The court sits after working hours (the Soviet Government is always thrifty in its capacity of employer); its meetings are public and held at the place of work or residence. At least three members make a quorum.

The case is submitted to the court by the local trade-union committee, the people's brigade of cooperation with the militia, an apartment house, street or block committee of residents, any other local organization such as the Komsomol, the executive committee of the soviet, the management of an enterprise or collective farm, the militia, the people's court, the procurator, the State investigator, or by any private citizen. The court may itself initiate the proceedings. Any institution or individual must supply information or documents requested by the court, which also may call witnesses. If the accused fails to appear after the second summons, the case is examined in his absence. The decision is taken by a majority vote.

The court should be guided in its decision not only by the existing legislation but also by "its sense of civic duty." The penalties it may inflict are: a public apology, a comradely warning, a public censure, a fine up to ten rubles, a proposal submitted to the management for the transfer of the convicted citizen to a lower-paid job or for his demotion, the eviction of the tenant-offender, and, if required by the

circumstances of the case, the payment of damages up to fifty rubles (a larger amount may be recovered in the regular judicial proceedings). If the court comes to the conclusion that the offense is a crime, it submits the case to the procurator for further action. The decision of the court is final. Only if it contradicts the evidence known to the court or violates law, an appropriate labor-union committee or the executive committee of local soviet requires a rehearing of the case. If the decision is not carried out within the specified time, the people's court shall issue a writ of execution.

"FREEDOM" OF EXPRESSION

Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution declares:

In conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to strengthen the socialist system, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law: a) freedom of speech; b) freedom of press; c) freedom of assembly, including holding of mass meetings; d) freedom of street processions and demonstrations. These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, streets, communication facilities, and other materials required for the exercise of these rights.

The crucial point lies in the preamble. Civil rights may be used only in conformity with the interests of the working people and in order to strengthen the socialist system. The Soviet people are free to say "Yes" but forbidden to say "No."

The Soviet State, having abrogated bourgeois legality and created a new (socialist) legality, requires that all citizens, institutions, and officials observe all Soviet laws precisely and without any protest.³⁹

There lies the main difference between Soviet and democratic regimes—"without protest." Soviet citizens are not allowed to protest, by political means or otherwise.

The true meaning of anti-Soviet propaganda may be better understood by considering the following comments:

Class warfare manifests itself in the period of the dictatorship of the working class in various forms. One of them is the ideological struggle. . . . The 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) observed in its resolution: "In spite of the leading and constantly increasing important role of the socialist economic center, development of productive forces of the economy of the USSR cannot be accompanied by anything

but a partial growth of class opposition . . . [which] manifests itself also in the cultural, political, and ideological fields. . . ." Class enemies also exploit the relics of capitalism which have survived in the mentality of people for their own counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation. . . .⁴⁰

The 15th Congress of the Party took place in December, 1927, when there were still some opposition groups within the Party and police control of the country at large was not yet perfect; however, the catalogue of forbidden topics of counterrevolutionary propaganda is valid to the present day. Agitation for a change in the political line of the Party, for the establishment of any independent association, for the existence of at least two parties competing for power, would be termed counterrevolutionary today just as in 1927.

"Agitation and propaganda may be public or private; agitation usually assumes a public character, propaganda a private one."⁴¹ Anti-Soviet propaganda is liable to prosecution even if carried on in a private conversation. Article 7 of the statute on crimes against the State deals not only with verbal agitation and propaganda but also with the circulation or storage of any literature which might result in subverting or discrediting the Soviet regime.

Since newspapers, printing presses, and newsprint are controlled by the Party through its State and public organizations mechanism, the counterrevolutionary or nonconformist literature could only be smuggled from abroad or printed secretly. Every openly printed word represents the Party line. All printing is subject to the twofold censorship exercised by the Principal Office for Matters of Literature and Publications. This office was established under the Ministry of Education "to ensure political-ideological, military, and economic control in all its aspects over articles, manuscripts, photographs, illustrations, etc., which are destined for publication or circulation and over radio broadcasts, lectures, and exhibitions."⁴²

The Office has the right to exercise censorship before and after publication and forbid the publication or dissemination of writings, photographs, radio scripts, and so forth, if they do not correspond to the interests of the Soviet State. Further, without its permission, no printing or publishing house may be opened, no lecture given, no exhibition organized, no radio programs broadcast, and no foreign printed material imported. Thus every public avenue of nonconformist information is carefully closed. Violation of the censorship regulations is punished by correctional labor up to three months or by a fine of up to 300 rubles (Article 185).⁴³ Of course, these mild penalties

are applicable only if no crime of anti-Soviet propaganda has been committed at the same time.

In order to avoid the risk of publications being secretly printed, printing establishments may be opened only by State institutions or legally recognized public organizations—and only with the permission of the militia—but not by any private individual or groups. All engraving establishments are State-owned. Duplicating machines like hectographs must be registered with the Principal Office of Literature.

Another avenue for the transmission of nonconformist ideas could be the privately owned radio. The Edict of the Russian Union Republic (there are similar legal provisions in the other Republics), enacted on April 7, 1960, takes care of the matter. It forbids the construction or use of radio transmission equipment (for broadcasting or listening) without permission. The penalties for infractions are a fine of 50 rubles and the confiscation of radio equipment. The second offense results in the fine of 150 rubles. The fines are imposed by the people's judge at the request of the militia and are subject to no appeal.

Theatrical and concert repertoires must be approved by the All-Union Committee of Arts attached to the Federal Council of Ministers.

The Central Committee determines the Party line and circumscribes thereby the boundaries of Soviet thought. Freedom of thought under the existing legislation is beyond the reach of Soviet citizens.

"FREEDOM" OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

All meetings need to be licensed in advance. In this way freedom of assembly is effectively denied. The Federal Decree of May 15, 1935, and the similar Republican laws require permission of the administrative authorities to hold a meeting.

Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution guarantees the right of the citizens "to unite in public organizations: trade unions, cooperative societies, youth organizations, sport and defense organizations, and cultural, technical, and scientific societies; the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and the leading core of all organizations of working people, public and State." This constitutional provision expressly excludes the right to form any other political organization except the Communist Party. All other organizations are also in a way monopolistic because there cannot be

two organizations pursuing the same objectives. Each public organization is directed from inside by its nucleus of Party members. Moreover, the State closely supervises all organizations. The most important among them are even provided by the State with standard charters and are legally compelled to follow the standard provisions. The standard charters have the force of law.

To form any other "all-Russian voluntary association it is necessary to submit to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR a draft of the charter and an application requesting its approval signed by at least ten founders."⁴⁴ Registration provides the authorities with an opportunity to check the charter and the objectives of a proposed organization. In other words, any organization in the Soviet Union may exist legally only with the express blessing of the State.

The State may also dissolve any organization at any time "if its activities do not correspond to the objectives defined in the charter or if they cannot be reconciled with the State interests."⁴⁵ There is no appeal to courts against the decision of the public administration. Both the birth and the death of a public organization depend on the discretion of the Government and the Party.

One type of Soviet public organization is the cooperative, such as "collective farms, industrial, consumers', fishermen's, invalids' and the housing."⁴⁶ Although their activities are strictly regulated by the State, still it fears that by uniting on a national basis they may develop political power, particularly the collective farms. Therefore, the latter are forbidden to form any national unions.⁴⁷ Industrial cooperatives may form unions, but not on a national scale. The All-Union Council of Industrial Cooperatives was liquidated on January 7, 1941.⁴⁸ The National Union of Housing Cooperatives was dissolved in 1937. The fishermen's cooperatives, like the collective farms, are forbidden to form national unions. The invalids are luckier. Their cooperatives are allowed to form regional and district unions, though not a national union.⁴⁹

Only consumers' cooperatives have district, republican, and national unions, perhaps to provide a national center for contacts with foreign cooperative movements. They also assist the State in retail trade by sharing this task with State stores. These and other public organizations, such as trade unions, writers', composers', and artists' associations, are given juristic personality and may conclude contracts, own property, and act before courts. All these associations exist to provide the Party with convenient channels to the great mass of citizens, who have little chance of admission to the elitist Party organization. The

inner ring of the Party members within each organization assures its conformity with the Party line, whether it deals with labor relations, collective farming, art, music, science, or literature. This method of control is very neat, but it has nothing to do with freedom of association.

Any association formed for the purpose of propagating nonconformist ideas would be considered a criminal, anti-State organization. Participation in such an organization entails criminal responsibility, "although the member might not have taken any active part in the preparation or commission of any counterrevolutionary crime and the criminal organization itself has not committed so far any such crime."⁵⁰ This extensive responsibility covers all organizations which are considered criminal, i.e., are not expressly permitted, by Soviet law.

"FREEDOM" OF CONSCIENCE

Article 124 of the Constitution states: "In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the USSR is separated from the State, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of antireligious propaganda is recognized for all citizens." The Constitution guarantees freedom of antireligious propaganda, but does not allow for religious propaganda.⁵¹ Believers are allowed to worship but are not allowed to convert atheists or members of other denominations.

The teaching of religion to children, even outside the school building, would be "a violation of the laws separating the church from the State and the school from the church" and as such punishable by correctional labor for up to one year or a fine of up to 50 rubles (Article 142 of the new Criminal Code). Vice versa, "hindering the performance of religious rites, so long as they do not interfere with public order and are not accompanied by encroachments upon the rights of citizens, is punished by correctional labor for up to six months or public reprimand" (Article 143).

The State is more tolerant toward national churches which have no official or necessary connection with foreign centers such as the Vatican.

The new Criminal Code is particularly severe for certain religious sects. Its Article 227 says: "The organization or leadership of groups, whose allegedly religious teachings or religious worship are connected with practices harmful to the health of citizens or with other attempts against the personality or rights of citizens or with the incitement of citizens to the refusal of performing social activities or civic duties,

as well as the recruitment of minors, is punished by deprivation of freedom for up to five years or by exile for the same period of time, with or without the confiscation of property.

"Active participation in those groups or open and systematic propaganda for the commission of the above acts, is punished by deprivation of freedom for up to three years or by exile for the same period of time or by correctional labor for up to one year." Only if these acts and the persons who commit them do not represent a serious social danger, the penalty may be reduced to a public censure.

The religious denominations continue to exist on sufferance of the State, whose controlling organization—the Party—is committed entirely to atheism.

Party ideological hostility to all denominations, including the Greek Orthodox, has not been affected by the loyal and patriotic attitude of the Russian Greek Orthodox Church during the last war. A pamphlet directed against religion acknowledged the fact that "the Russian Greek Orthodox Church took part . . . in the struggle against German Fascism and for the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. . . . However, this . . . cannot alter the reactionary substance of religious ideology."⁵² Party hostility must continue, because "religious superstitions like other survivals of capitalism hinder in our Soviet country progress towards Communism. . . ."⁵³ The true reason is deeper, namely, the ambition of the Party to control completely the minds of Soviet citizens. The Party relies now on antireligious education rather than on administrative measures directed against religious communities. "To forbid religious services would be very easy, but this would not accelerate elimination of religious superstitions; on the contrary, those superstitions would be notably revived."⁵⁴ By its monopoly of public information and by forbidding religious propaganda, the Party has assured its antireligious propagandists a privileged position. The future will tell how successful this first attempt in history to impose atheism on a formerly deeply religious population will be.

Separation of the state from the church usually means mutual noninterference. But its meaning is quite different in the Soviet Union, which exercises a tight control over the activities of religious communities. This control is vested in two governmental Councils, composed of high officials who are themselves atheists. These are the Council for the affairs of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Council for the affairs of the other religious denominations. The churches are separated from the State, but the latter does not intend to be separated from them. The interference of the State violates one of the conditions of freedom of conscience.

Religious communities are the only associations which are refused juristic personality, and they may not, consequently, own property, act before courts, or conclude valid contracts. "Control over the activities of religious communities is exercised by local soviets. A church may be closed only by a decision of the toilers."⁵⁵

This gives a good idea of the precarious situation of religious communities. The decree of January 23, 1918, nationalized all property of the churches. As they cannot acquire property, they do not own temples or the usual objects of a cult. They are allowed only to use them while the title of ownership continues in the State. Pre-revolutionary religious buildings are placed at the disposal of religious communities at the discretion of the local soviets, but no new buildings can be built unless the State allocates building materials. Religious services may be held only with permission of the local soviet. The religious communities are, further, deprived of court protection because, not being juristic persons, they cannot defend their rights by judicial action.

Special attention is paid to "protecting" youth against religious influences. At the national Congress of the Communist Youth League in March, 1949, the Secretary General, Mikhailov, said: "The Communist Youth League must not be 'neutral' in religion. It must preach progressive science, whereas religion is in direct contradiction to science." Fourteen years later, L. F. Il'ychev, Secretary of the Central Committee in charge of ideological questions, said in June, 1963, at its plenary session: "Molding of the scientific world-outlook and of the Communist morality is impossible without struggle against religious ideology. Religion is the principal domestic enemy of scientific outlook and one of the most tenacious survivals of the past; a significant portion of the population has not yet freed itself of this survival. . . . The freedom of conscience proclaimed in our country has two facets: freedom of worship, and freedom of struggle against the religious world outlook. . . . It is necessary to oppose to religion a militant, aggressive, scientific-atheistic propaganda, and unmask the activities of fanatical sects which physically and morally harm people and have an antisocial character."⁵⁶ One may have legitimate doubts as to whether there is in the Soviet Union any genuine freedom of conscience.

NOTES

1. M. S. Strogovich, *Ugolovnyi Protsess*, Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Moscow, 1946), p. 18.

2. A. Y. Vyshinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State*, Macmillan (New York, 1948), p. 12.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
4. United Nations, Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, 183rd Plenary Meeting, pp. 928-929.
5. A. Ya. Vyshinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 39 and 40.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
8. United Nations, Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, 183rd Plenary Meeting, p. 929.
9. A. Ya. Vyshinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 617.
12. United Nations, Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, 180th Plenary Meeting, p. 855.
13. B. S. Utevskii, *Ugolovnoe Pravo, Biblioteka Narodnovo Sudii*, 2nd edition, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1950), pp. 7 and 8.
14. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlassov, *op. cit.*, p. 203.
15. *Pravda*, June 20, 1963.
16. *Spravochnik Profsoyuznovo Rabotnika*, 1960, pp. 97-101.
17. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlassov, *op. cit.*, p. 208.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 208-209.
19. "Za povysheniie roli pravovoi nauki v kodifikatsii sovetskovo zakonodatel'stva," in *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, 1956, No. 1, p. 1.
20. *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, No. 21, May 25, 1961.
21. *Ugolovnyi Kodeks*, Juristic Publication of the Ministry of Justice of the RSFSR (Moscow, 1962), p. 94.
22. M. S. Strogovich, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-248.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 248-249.
24. I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlassov, *op. cit.*, p. 220.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
26. *Ugolovnyi Kodeks*, p. 52.
27. *Ugolovnyi Kodeks* (1947), p. 26.
28. A. A. Gertsenzon, V. D. Menshagin, B. S. Osherovich, and A. A. Piontkovskii, *Ugolovnoe Pravo. Osobennaiia Chast'. Gosudarstvennye Prestupleniia*, p. 42.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 296-297.
30. *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, No. 34, August 30, 1960.
31. All these statutes are reproduced in *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, No. 1, January 1, 1959.
32. *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, No. 14, April 6, 1962.
33. *Ibid.*, No. 27, July 6, 1961.
34. *Ibid.*, No. 19, May 11, 1961.
35. *Ibid.*, No. 9, February 28, 1961.
36. *Ibid.*, No. 16, April 17, 1963.
37. *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta RSFSR*, No. 18, 1961.
38. *Ibid.*, No. 26, 1961.
39. A. Ya. Vyshinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 640.
40. A. A. Gertsenzon, V. D. Menshagin, B. S. Osherovich, and A. A. Piontkovskii, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

42. *Sobraniiie Uzakonenii i Rasporiazhenii Raboche-Krestianskovo Pravitel'stva RSFSR*, No. 31, July 5, 1931, Text 273.
43. *Ugolovnyi Kodeks*, p. 86.
44. V. I. Serebrovskii, Z. I. Shkundin, and M. V. Zimeleva, *Grazhdanskoe Pravo*, 3rd edition, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 48.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.
50. A. A. Gertsenzon, I. T. Goliakov, V. D. Menshagin, B. S. Osherovich, B. S. Utevskaia, and Z. A. Vyshinskaia, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
51. One may evaluate the true meaning of Article 124 of the present Constitution better by comparing it to Article 13 of the Constitution, enacted in 1918. The latter article guaranteed freedom of both religious and antireligious propaganda: "In order to ensure the toilers true freedom of conscience, the church is separated from the State and the school from the church, and freedom of religious and antireligious propaganda is guaranteed to all citizens."
52. P. Kashirin, *Reaktsionnaia Sushchnost' Religioznoi Ideologii*, State Publishing House of Political Literature (Moscow, 1951), p. 28.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
55. A. A. Askerov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-176.
56. *Pravda*, June 19, 1963.

CHAPTER THREE

Courts, Civic Duties, Family, and Youth

THE COURTS in the Soviet system are considered parts of the State machinery, which is expected to enforce the current policy of the Party. This is in keeping with Lenin's dictum (*Collected Works*, Vol. XXI, p. 24): "The court is an organ of government. This is sometimes forgotten by the liberals. It would be sinful for a Marxist to forget it."

The same concept is reflected in Article 3 of the Principles of Legislation on the Organization of Courts, adopted on December 25, 1958, by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It says: "The courts in all their activities educate the citizens of the USSR in the spirit of devotion to the Fatherland and to Communism, of exact and unflinching implementation of Soviet laws, of careful attitude towards socialist property, of observance of labor discipline, of honest attitude toward their State and social duties, of respect for the rights, honor, and dignity of other citizens and for the rules of socialist intercourse."

ROLE, ORGANIZATION, AND FLEXIBILITY OF THE COURTS

Although Article 112 of the Soviet Constitution says that "judges are independent and subject only to law," Soviet practice and theory has accepted that "the independence of judges does not mean their independence of the socialist State. . . . The action of courts must be co-ordinated with that of the whole Soviet and Party apparatus. . . ." ¹ Their legal action must "correspond to the socialist outlook, the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government."²

The Soviet courts have the following hierarchy: 1) Federal—the Supreme Court of the USSR and the courts martial; 2) Republican courts of three levels—the Supreme Courts of each Union Republic; the territorial, regional, and area courts and the Supreme Courts of the Autonomous Republics; and on the lowest level, the people's courts.

The people's courts are composed of people's judges and people's assessors. A people's judge need have no legal training, though he may acquire some through special courses or through experience. He is elected for a five-year term and may be reelected. The electoral

constituency is the city or district. His office is a full-time job. People's assessors are elected for a term of two years at the general meetings of workers, officials, and peasants. These meetings are held at the place of work or residence. The assessors serve two weeks by rotation unless a trial lasts more than fourteen days. A people's assessor continues in his usual occupation. Only in this respect is there some similarity to a juror. Otherwise, he has the same powers as a people's judge. The people's court sits as a body of three men, the people's judge and two assessors. Decisions are taken by a majority vote. Of course, the judge, due to his better familiarity with the law, may be able to sway over the people's assessors. In a people's-court area there are 50 to 75 people's assessors and one people's judge.

People's judges and assessors are elected by voters who have reached the age of 18. Any citizen over 25 may be elected, though in practice the only candidates are those sponsored by the Party and the local public organizations. As a rule they are people with some university training, "social-political experience," and are expected to know human mentality and be cultured men.³ The Soviet State has settled down to ordinary criteria of efficiency and has departed from early practice when inexpert proletarians were entrusted with the administration of justice.

The people's court acts as a court of primary jurisdiction with very wide competence. Its jurisdiction extends over most criminal cases, excepting the very important cases involving interests of the State, all civil cases involving individuals, and the less important cases involving State or other public institutions. It may inflict all the penalties provided by the Criminal Code except the death penalty. Criminal cases involving the supreme penalty are beyond its competence.

On the second level, there is a territorial or regional court in each territory, region, or Autonomous Region. The judges and people's assessors of these higher courts are not elected directly by the population but by each regional or territorial soviet.

The term of office of a regional judge or regional people's assessor is five years. The regional court acts in a dual capacity—as a court of appeals from the people's courts and as a court of first resort for cases not included in the jurisdiction of people's courts. It tries, as a primary-jurisdiction court, such cases as particularly dangerous crimes against the State, plundering of socialist property if the damages are serious, offenses committed by functionaries, more serious cases of rape, more important civil cases involving State or public institutions, and divorce cases. The Supreme Court of an Autonomous Republic has the same competence.

The Supreme Court of a Union Republic acts as a court of appeal from the regional courts and also as a court of first resort. Its judges and people's assessors are elected by the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic concerned. Their term of office is five years.

At the summit of the pyramid there is the Supreme Court of the USSR, composed now of its President, two Vice-Presidents, 13 judges and 45 people's assessors, elected for five years by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Even this Supreme Court may act as a court of first resort in some exceptional cases—usually highly spectacular political trials. Its primary function, however, is to act as the supreme court of appeals and give binding interpretation of existing legislation.

The most important fact concerning the distribution of jurisdiction is the possibility of transferring a case, particularly a criminal one, from one court to another by decision of the judicial authorities. Thus the accused can never be sure that his case will be tried by the court of the place where the offense was committed. A civil case may be transferred to another superior court because of its complexity or its exceptional importance for State interests. A criminal case may be submitted to another court because of its political implications, particularly when the Party has an interest in assuring wider publicity for the trial. The decision to withdraw a case from a competent lower court to a superior one is taken by the higher court. The initiative, however, can be taken by the procurator or the executive. In the withdrawal of a case from a lower court by the Supreme Court of a Union Republic or even of the USSR, the court usually makes the decision at the request of the corresponding procurator or the Presidium of the corresponding Supreme Soviet—an executive organ. When the Presidium submits the request for transfer, its motivation is purely political.

Withdrawal of a case for trial by one of the Supreme Courts entails one disadvantage for the accused: the judgment is final. There is no appeal.

The Statute on the Basic Principles of the Judiciary adopted in 1958 did not modify the organization of Soviet courts except for a few minor alterations. Its principal features are as follows:

1. All cases, criminal and civil, must be tried in the court of original jurisdiction by a bench composed of one judge and two people's assessors.

All appellate cases and also the cases reopened after the final judgment are examined by a bench composed of three judges, without the assessor's participation.

2. The judges are not required to be lawyers although those at

the superior courts usually are. A. F. Gorkin, Supreme Soviet deputy, said on December 25, 1958, on the occasion of the discussion of the present Statute, that 55.4 percent of people's judges had a higher law education, 37.1 percent a secondary law education and only the remainder had no formal legal training. This was a great improvement on the past. It is therefore understandable that the Soviet Government found it desirable to keep the people's judges on the bench and make them consider their elective job as a quasi-career. Among the several statutes passed on December 25 there was one which extended the term of office of the people's judge from three to five years, thus making it equal to the term of office of superior judges.

A people's judge with legal training has a better chance of influencing his two assessors, while his longer term of office and the prospect of reelection make him more reliable by providing him with a vested interest in his profession.

3. The hierarchy of Soviet courts continues to be as follows: the people's court, which is the lowest; the regional court and the Supreme Court of the Autonomous Republic which represents the next level; the Supreme Court of the Union Republic; and at the top the Supreme Court of the USSR. Those courts of general jurisdiction are supplemented by the courts martial which are federal courts.

4. All judges are elected for a term of five years. The people's judges are elected directly by the electors of their constituency; the other judges are elected by the corresponding soviets: the regional soviets, the Supreme Soviets of the Republics, and eventually the justices of the federal Supreme Court by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. They all may be recalled at any time and for any reason by the same electoral bodies. As the Party manipulates both the elections (one-slate and always quasi-unanimous) and recall (removal from office), judges in fact hold their office at the Party's pleasure. The sanction of recall is linked to the responsibility of judges before their respective electors. They are held accountable for all their activities in the following order: people's judges to the electors of their constituency; regional to their regional soviet; judges of the Supreme Courts of Union Republics and of the Supreme Court of the USSR to the corresponding Supreme Soviet, and, during the intervals between the sessions of the Supreme Soviet (i.e., the whole year except for a few weeks), to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

The people's assessors for the people's courts are no longer elected by all the electors of their constituency but at the meetings held at the various places of employment. The assessors of other courts are elected by the corresponding soviet; for instance, the people's assessors

of the Supreme Court of the USSR are elected by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Their term of office is two years for the people's courts and five years for the superior courts. However, they are called upon to serve on the bench in rotation and for periods which cannot exceed two weeks per annum.

5. The composition of the Supreme Court of the USSR has been enlarged because it includes not only a president, his deputies, justices, and people's assessors, but also the fifteen presidents of all Supreme Courts of Union Republics who have become *ex officio* members of the federal Supreme Court.

6. Any citizen of the USSR may be elected a judge or a people's assessor if he is at least 25 years old. It is the business of the Party to select candidates who have the necessary political and professional qualifications, the law making no such requirements.

7. While all the judges may be recalled by their constituents for any reason, they may be prosecuted on criminal charges by virtue of a decision taken by an executive agency: people's, regional and republican Supreme Court judges with the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic; the justices of the Supreme Court of the USSR and judges of courts martial may be prosecuted with the assent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union.

This whole system does not guarantee the independence of judges but is consonant with the Soviet theory of State which explicitly rejects the separation of powers.

COURTS MARTIAL

The post-Stalinist reforms have eliminated special courts for the employees of transport. The only surviving special tribunals are the courts martial which were reorganized by another of the several statutes passed on December 25, 1958. Those courts are the only federal tribunals besides the federal Supreme Court. They have their own hierarchy beginning with the garrison court and ending with the Military Division of the federal Supreme Court. The cases are tried in the original jurisdiction by a bench composed of a judge and two people's assessors, on appeal by three judges. Any Soviet citizen 25 years of age or more and on active military service (this notion embraces also the personnel of the State security) may be elected a judge or a people's assessor. Judges are elected by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for five years; people's assessors for two years by open ballot at a meeting of servicemen of the military unit concerned.

The jurisdiction of courts martial extends to all crimes (service or

common crimes) committed by members of the Armed Forces and by commissioned or non-commissioned officers and men of the State security agencies, as well as to service offenses committed by the staff of correctional labor institutions and the prisoner escort-guards. Moreover, all cases of espionage committed either by military or civilian citizens of the USSR or by aliens are tried by courts martial. The jurisdiction of courts martial may be extended to all criminal and civil cases in the localities placed in a state of emergency.

If a group of persons are prosecuted for the joint commission of a crime and if one of them is liable to the jurisdiction of courts martial (for instance, if he is a member of the Armed Forces), then all the defendants will be tried by the court martial.

The courts martial are organized in their own hierarchy. All servicemen up to the rank of a lieutenant-colonel or naval captain of second class are tried in the first jurisdiction by the courts of armies, flotillas or garrisons; colonels, or naval captains of the first class, commanders of regiments or naval vessels of the second or higher class, as well as all servicemen of lower rank but prosecuted for crimes punishable by death, are tried by the courts of military regions, groups of armies, or fleets; the Military Division of the Supreme Court of the USSR tries as a court of primary jurisdiction cases of exceptional importance, and all criminal cases of generals and admirals (there is no appeal from its judgment). The Military Division may at its discretion try any case which normally should be tried by a lower court martial. The same right is bestowed on courts of military regions, groups of armies or fleets, regarding lower courts martial.

The appeals and the judicial review of final judgments are included within the jurisdiction of the Military Division of the Supreme Court of the USSR regarding the judgments rendered by the courts of military regions, groups of armies, and fleets. The latter courts have the right to act as courts of appeal or courts of judicial review regarding the judgments of lower courts martial.

The military judges of all ranks may not be criminally prosecuted, dismissed, or arrested without the permission of the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

THE SUPREME COURT—CONTROL OF THE COURTS— RESPONSIBILITY OF JUDGES

The Supreme Court of the USSR is subdivided into the following divisions: civil, criminal, military, and may also meet in a plenary session. It may try exceptionally important cases, act as a court of appeals, exercise the powers of judicial review of final judgments, and

give binding instructions to courts on the interpretation of law. It may sit in plenary session when it examines a protest against a final judgment rendered in primary jurisdiction by one of its divisions or when it issues interpretative instructions to courts.⁴ The plenary session meetings must be attended by the Procurator General.

The question which may arise in one's mind is, To what extent are Soviet courts independent? First of all, judges are elected after their candidacies have been sponsored by the Party or the Party-controlled public organizations; on the other hand, they may be recalled at any time by the electors, undoubtedly at Party instigation. They are expected to apply the law in accordance with current Government and Party policy. If they show too much independence of mind, they may be recalled at any time.

The Ministries of Justice control the activities of the courts. The apparatus is composed of the Republican Ministries and their local organs. This apparatus sees to it that the courts perform their duty of fighting against crime "and educating the citizens in the Communist spirit."⁵ Periodical revisions of their activities by controllers sent by the Ministry keep judges on their toes. Their suggestions are undoubtedly noted by the judges very carefully and complied with. Thus the State makes sure that judges will observe the law, follow the official policy in interpreting the law, and carry out their duties efficiently. Whenever a Union Republic has abolished its Ministry of Justice, as Byelorussia did in 1960, the supervision over courts has been transferred to the Union-Republican Supreme Court. A judge may be disciplined for "violation of labor discipline, a defect in judicial work or commission of acts which cannot be reconciled with the dignity of a Soviet judge."⁶

People's and regional judges are responsible before the disciplinary division of the Supreme Court of a Union Republic; and the judges of the Republican Supreme Courts as well as those of the Supreme Court of the USSR are responsible before the disciplinary division of the latter Court. Penalties which may be inflicted by the disciplinary division are: observation, reprimand, and severe reprimand. Moreover it may request the appropriate Minister of Justice "to proceed with recall of the judge, according to the requirements of law."⁷ The Minister brings the matter before the electors or before the soviet which has elected a superior judge. There can be no doubt that the judge will be recalled. Of course, if the disciplinary division finds elements of crime, it raises the question of criminal prosecution. The decision to prosecute is taken by the procurator in cooperation with

another executive organ, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. The courts have nothing to say about it.

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

The Soviet attorney is a citizen bound by State discipline, and his defense may be of doubtful value to the accused. "The fundamental difficulty in the attorney's position consists in his heavy duty to speak in the defense of someone whom he considers a criminal against the Soviet State" (A. Ya. Vyshinskii's *The Revolutionary Legality and the Tasks of Soviet Defense*, 1932, p. 36). One may imagine the nature of the defense presented by an attorney who considers the accused, as the procurator does, a criminal. The following persons may become attorneys: graduates of the higher schools of law, graduates of secondary schools of law if they have worked for at least one year in the capacity of a judge, a procurator, an investigator, or a legal adviser of a public institution, and any person without formal legal training who has performed one of the above-mentioned functions for at least three years.

Attorneys are grouped in each main district city into law offices, which are headed by one of them, appointed by the presidium of the regional bar association; the latter is composed of all attorneys in a Region. The Ministry of Justice "expects from the presidia of the bar associations a very careful examination of materials concerning the previous work [of all applicants for admission to the bar] and their legal and political fitness."⁸ The year-round work of the association is conducted by its presidium whose members are elected at a general meeting for a term of two years by open vote.⁹ In this manner the Party can place trusted persons in the important posts of the presidium.

The presidium may exclude an attorney from the bar for the following offenses: 1) conviction in court of any crime; 2) commission of an act which cannot be reconciled with the dignity of the profession; and 3) violation of the rules of the internal organization of the bar association. The dismissed attorney has no recourse to courts. He may only appeal to the Republican Minister of Justice. The procedure of admission and the threat of expulsion from the bar association give a guarantee to the Government that a Soviet attorney will function in utter loyalty to the Party. This loyalty is further ensured by the disciplinary action the presidium of the bar can take against an attorney.

The daily work of the attorneys is controlled by the Ministry of Justice.¹⁰ (In the Union Republics, which have liquidated their

Ministry of Justice, the supervision has been entrusted to the Republican Council of Ministers.) It consists in giving legal consultation to clients, drafting complaints and petitions on their behalf, and representing or assisting them before the courts. They are paid by the clients according to a schedule approved by the Government.

As a rule, the attorney is not required to report facts learned from his client in confidence, with one important exception: "If the attorney learns of a prepared or committed counterrevolutionary crime, he is obliged . . . to inform the investigating organs and the procurator and to decline the defense of the accused."¹¹ Soviet lawyers think that attorneys should be free from the code of the professional secret in all cases in which there is a general obligation for citizens to denounce the criminal.¹² An individual must be very careful when talking to an attorney.

An attorney may defend the accused by agreement with him or by appointment by the court. Having accepted the duty of defense, the attorney may not decline it during the trial.¹³

CIVIL CASES—THE PROCURATOR AND THE COURTS

The new *Principles of Civil Procedure* were enacted by the Statute of December 8, 1961 (*Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, No. 50, December 15, 1961). The position of an individual acting as a party to a civil law suit is very different in the Soviet Union from that which is familiar to Western people. The plaintiff and the defendant are restrained by the independent action of the court or the procurator, who may intervene if State or other public interests require it. Individual interests are subordinated to those of the State.

A civil case is usually submitted to court by the plaintiff, but the procurator may submit it also. The procurator may also intervene at any stage of the civil process if he feels that the interests of the State require it. The parties may be satisfied with the decision and not wish to appeal to the available higher court. However, the procurator "in order to protect the interests of the State" has the right of appeal (protest) against a judicial decision which he holds for being contrary to law or ill-founded.¹⁴

The winning plaintiff may ask the proper authorities to enforce judgment if the losing defendant refuses to abide by it. He is free to forego this right, but the procurator may ask for compulsory execution of a judgment in order to protect the interests of the State.¹⁵

Soviet specialists explain in these words the position of the procurator in civil controversies:

V. I. Lenin pointed out the necessity of extending State intervention to "private law" relations. Lenin's recommendations impose the need of securing, in civil procedure, participation of the procurator . . . he must be able to intervene in any civil law controversy if this is required for the protection of the interests of the State. . . . The procurator is a politician; he should know and understand the policy of the Party and the Government; this helps him in determining his role in the civil process correctly. . . . The procurator has all the procedural rights and obligations of a party (those of a plaintiff) . . . but he is not limited by the claims and actions of a plaintiff [and] . . . he may present a protest against a judgment . . . [and] thus initiate the proceedings before the court of secondary jurisdiction. . . .¹⁶

The procurator has the right to protest against a final judgment, thus reopening a case settled by a valid and "final" judgment.

The Soviet courts may adjudicate, independently of the claims of the parties, i.e., more than the amount claimed by the plaintiff. The court of secondary jurisdiction examining an appeal is similarly not restricted by the claims of the plaintiff. Both parties in a law suit may renounce the use of procedural means placed by law at their disposal and end their litigation by an amiable agreement. But the law subjects all these decisions of the parties to the control of the court.¹⁷ The parties guide only partly the development of the civil controversy, since they are constantly supervised by the court and, if necessary, by the procurator. The guiding beacon for the court's or the procurator's intervention is the interest of the State.

Of course, intervention is more probable when the State or a public institution is involved in civil litigation.

The interests of the State are always well taken care of. For example, there is no statute of limitation which precludes recovery by the State of its property in initially illegal, but bona fide, possession of a private citizen.¹⁸

Civil proceedings entail costs. The costs of witnesses, experts, and investigations are borne by the party who requested them. If they are called by the court on its own initiative, the costs are borne by both parties. A party may be exempt if he cannot afford them. A winning party may ask the court to adjudicate in his favor all costs, which would then be reimbursed to him by the opposite party. The State risks judicial costs only when both parties are exempt from them.¹⁹

The new *Principles of Civil Procedure*, enacted in 1961, exempt from court costs the following plaintiffs: workers, officials and col-

lective farmers who claim wages or other compensation for their work; authors and inventors for claims deriving from their copyright or patents; persons who claim alimonies; plaintiffs who claim damages for wrongs which have caused their incapacitation or impairment of their health or the death of their breadwinner; and persons whom the court considers indigent and unable to pay costs.

The new *Principles* have not affected the former structure of Soviet civil procedure. The procurator may, as before, initiate a civil case, participate in the proceedings, lodge an appeal, and generally act independently of both the plaintiff and the defendant. The court also is allowed to assume the initiative in the civil proceedings, if necessary against the wishes of both parties. It may require the submission of supplementary evidence, it may collect itself any evidence it deems necessary, it may refuse to accept the plaintiff's decision to withdraw his claim, the defendant's acknowledgment of the claim, or the out-of-court amiable settlement between the parties. The court of appeals remains unrestricted by the terms of appeal and should reexamine the judgment of original jurisdiction in its entirety. While the procurator is required to participate in the appeal proceedings and to present his views, the court decides at its own discretion whether the parties should be present.

The "final" civil judgments continue to be liable to the judicial review as criminal judgments are. The procedure is exactly the same (see above), but there is no statute of limitation. The review procedure may be initiated by the same procurators and Presidents of courts who are empowered to do it regarding criminal judgments. As in the appeal proceedings, the court may, if it wants, admit the parties to its review proceedings. But the procurator is required by law to be present and to submit his views on the merits of the case. The final civil judgment may be quashed for similar reasons as the criminal one: a substantial infraction of the civil law or procedure, or an insufficient factual foundation for the judgment.

Civil cases, like criminal cases, are examined in the original jurisdiction by the court composed of a judge and two people's assessors; appeals and judicial reviews, by three judges without the participation of people's assessors.

DUTIES OF SOVIET CITIZENS—MILITARY SERVICE

Chapter X of the Soviet Constitution is entitled: "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens." Its last four articles define duties. Article 130 describes the general duties of Soviet citizens in the following words:

It is the duty of every citizen of the USSR to abide by the Constitution of the USSR, to observe the laws, to maintain labor discipline, to perform public duties honestly, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.

Except for the references to labor discipline and socialist intercourse, this article formulates requirements whose fulfillment would be expected from the citizen of any country. Article 131 underlines the obligation to respect socialist property in rather solemn terms.

It is the duty of every citizen of the USSR to safeguard and fortify public socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system: socialist property is the source of the wealth and might of the country, the source of the prosperity and culture of all the working people. Persons committing offenses against public socialist property are enemies of the people.

Criminal legislation with its severe penalties against "enemies of the people" assures respect for Article 131 of the Constitution, whose solemn unity of style is somehow broken by the word "sacred," which does not rhyme with the atheistic nature of the regime.

The last two articles of the same chapter define the military obligations of the Soviet citizen. Article 132 says: "Universal military service is law. Military service in the armed forces of the USSR is an honorable duty of the citizens of the USSR." Thus, the existence of universal military service is part of the Constitution itself. Article 133 adds: "To defend the country is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Treason to the motherland (violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing military power of the State, espionage) is punishable with all severity of law as the most heinous of crimes." These two articles make it perfectly clear that the Soviet regime is not pacifist but relies on military strength.

Universal military service for Soviet citizens begins at the age of 18, but it is deferred until age 19 for young men with secondary education. The length of service varies with the type of service (army, navy, or air force), ranging from two to five years. After active service, Soviet citizens become members of the reserve and are subject to call for periods of training. Reserve duties for soldiers and noncommissioned officers end at age 50. The ages of retirement for professional officers from active service and, later, from reserve duties vary with rank. For instance, a captain retires from active service at 40 and ceases to belong to the reserve at 60; a general retires at 60 and ceases to belong to the reserve at 65. Retired officers keep the right to use the

titles of rank. Those who have rendered particular services and those who have served for at least twenty-five years are entitled to wear uniforms after retirement.

Article 80 of the new Criminal Code determines penalties for evasion of compulsory military service: "Evasion of the call for active military service is punished by deprivation of freedom for from one to three years. The same offense, if committed by inflicting upon oneself bodily injury, by simulating an illness, by forgery of documents or any other fraud, as well as under any other aggravating circumstances, is punished by deprivation of freedom for from one to five years."²⁰

LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC MORALITY

The Soviet State takes care of the moral behavior of its citizens.

Article 206 of the new Criminal Code provides severe penalties for hooliganism, i.e., "acts which seriously infringe upon public order and express a flagrant lack of respect for society."²¹ The penalty is confinement for up to one year or correctional labor for the same period of time or a fine of up to 50 rubles or public censure. Hooliganism which is accompanied by exceptional cynicism or arrogance or by disobedience of orders of the militia or of a member of the brigade of cooperation with militia, or committed by a person who has been already once convicted of the same offense, is punished by imprisonment for up to five years. This article invites Soviet citizens to behave properly in the streets and in public places.

Homosexuality is a crime punishable by confinement for up to five years; if the victim is compelled by threats or use of force or by a hierarchical superior or is a minor, the penalty is raised to imprisonment for up to eight years (Article 121). Homosexuality was not a crime prior to 1933. The evolution toward stricter standards was visible also in the case of abortion.

At first, the Soviet regime was opposed only to abortions performed by unqualified persons and in unhealthy conditions. On June 27, 1936, abortion was declared to be prohibited, even if the operation was performed by a doctor according to the highest health requirements. The about-face was caused by Soviet preoccupation with a high birth rate, the source of manpower, and by the new moral outlook.

Abortion could be performed only by a qualified doctor at a hospital or nursing home and only when the continuation of pregnancy threatened the life of the pregnant woman, or when it might have caused a grave injury to her health, or when the prospective parents

had a serious illness transmissible by heredity. The authorization was granted by the state medical commission at the pregnant woman's request. In 1955 the prohibition of abortion was repealed. Abortion is now legal if performed at the request of the pregnant woman, by a qualified doctor, and at a hospital. Only illegal abortion (i.e., performed by a medical doctor but not at the hospital, or by a person without a medical degree) is punished by Article 116 of the new Criminal Code by confinement for up to two years or correctional labor for up to one year; if the guilty person has performed illegal abortions more than once or if the operation has resulted in the pregnant woman's death or serious impairment of health, the penalty is raised to imprisonment for up to eight years.

The Criminal Code reminds parents, children, and guardians of their obligations. Article 122 states:

"The malicious nonpayment by parents of alimonies due, by virtue of a court judgment, to minor children or to adult but incapacitated children dependent on parents' support, is punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to one year, or by exile for a period of up to three years, or by correctional labor for a period of up to one year."

Article 123 reminds the children of their obligations toward parents: "The malicious nonpayment of alimonies due, by virtue of a court judgment, to the incapacitated parents, is punished by correctional labor for a period of up to one year, or by a public reprimand, or shall result in the application of measures of social censure."

Finally, the Criminal Code threatens guardians who fail in their duties. Article 124 says: "The use of a guardianship for purposes of profit or the abandonment of wards without supervision or necessary assistance, is punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to two years or by correctional labor for a period of up to one year."

FAMILY, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, INHERITANCE

After years of experimentation with the institutions of marriage and family, the Soviet State has finally settled down to a Victorian policy. Until 1944 Soviet law recognized marriage by cohabitation, which was considered legal even without official registration.²² The children of two people living together were considered to be legitimate and had the right of succession. This situation was radically altered by the Edict of July 8, 1944, issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Only marriage "duly registered gives rise to the rights and obligations" of the spouses. The Soviet commentators

say that the new rule "has been formulated in the interest of State and society and in order to protect personal and property rights of spouses and children."

A marriage is recorded in the towns at the Office of the Registration of Civil Status Acts, and in the rural localities at the local rural soviet. The Office or the rural soviet delivers a certificate of marriage to the spouses and makes pertinent entries in their passports, probably to prevent bigamy. The Offices of Registration have been instructed by the Government to enhance the solemnity of the occasion by proper surroundings and dignified procedure. The managements of enterprises, offices, and collective farms have been told to provide wedding parties with transportation and grant the newlyweds credit to buy necessary household items.

The solemnity of the registration may have the additional purpose of dissuading people from contracting a religious marriage as well. Religious marriage is not forbidden, but it has no legal significance.

A person cannot conclude a marriage contract if he is already married or is less than 18 years old. Other impediments to marriage are mental incapacity or mental illness, and blood relationship between the prospective spouses—when one is the descendant of the other or when they are brother and sister or half brother and half sister. Though there is no requirement for a certificate of health, the spouses are required "to sign an affidavit in which they declare having informed each other of their health, in particular on venereal, mental, and pulmonary illnesses."²³

The spouses may retain their family names or adopt one as their joint name. They rear children jointly. The property which each of them owned before marriage remains separate property, but any property acquired during the marriage becomes joint property, with the exception of gifts or inheritance acquired by one of them. If one spouse becomes incapacitated, the other is obliged to support him or her as the case may be. The amount of alimony is fixed by the court.

Marriage may be dissolved either by death or divorce. Originally the decree of December 19, 1917, authorized the registration of divorce at the request of both or only one of the spouses. The decision was left entirely to the spouses. This situation was completely reversed by the Edict of July 8, 1944. The new legislation aims especially at preserving the unity of the family.²⁴

The edict does not enumerate the reasons for divorce. Each case is left to the judgment of the courts, but courts should grant divorce only for serious reasons.

According to the spirit of the Edict of July 8, 1944, it is completely clear that the court may grant divorce only after having discovered circumstances which justify the conclusion that the family has been disrupted and that it is impossible to recreate and maintain it by any means.²⁵

The court must examine the truthfulness of the arguments submitted by the parties:

If one spouse does not contest the reasons of the other's request for divorce, the court should not feel satisfied with the absence of formal controversy because spouses sometimes conceal the true reasons. . . .²⁶

The procedure of divorce established by the Edict of 1944 is both complicated and costly. The spouses or one of them first apply to the people's court. The court should do its best to reconcile the spouses; if that fails, its proceedings are terminated. The people's court is not empowered to grant a divorce. After the termination of the proceedings before the people's court, one of the parties or both may submit their cases to the regional court. The procedure before the people's court is dispensed with if one of the spouses has disappeared, or has a chronic mental illness, or has been confined for at least three years. In such a case the State makes divorce easier as an additional penalty on the convicted person.

Proceedings before a regional court are opened only at the request of one of the spouses and not at the initiative of the people's court. As a Soviet commentator explains it, "The State is not at all interested in the continuation of divorce proceedings." If the other spouse does not appear, the meeting is adjourned, and a second notice is sent. If his or her absence after the second notice is unjustified, the proceedings take place in his or her absence. The regional court conducts a thorough investigation and also tries to reconcile the spouses. If it fails in this, it gives its judgment, which may be appealed to the immediately superior court. The regional court decides also such matters as the custody of children, division of property, alimony, and support obligations to the children.

A marriage may be declared void (e.g., a marriage with a minor or, until November, 1953, with an alien) not only at the request of one of the spouses, but also at the request of another person concerned (for example, the parents of a minor) or of a State authority, even against the wishes of the spouses.

The main purpose of the Soviet family is to rear children.

In the realm of personal relations between parents and children

the fundamental obligation of the parents consists in taking care of the education of their minor children, future Soviet citizens, in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and of devotion to the socialist Fatherland and in training them in publicly useful occupations of interest to the socialist society (Article 41 of the Code of Laws concerning marriage, family, and guardianship). When parents fail to fulfill their obligation, or use their rights toward children unwisely or treat them cruelly, the courts may decide to take them from their parents and to entrust them to the organs of guardianship and tutelage, thereby depriving the parents of their parental rights (Article 46 of the same Code).²⁷

The mutual agreement of the parents, however, "concerning their child's being a member of a religious denomination is without any legal consequence."²⁸

Parents are obliged by law to support their children until they reach the age of 18, and after 18 if they are incapacitated. Children have the same obligation regarding their needy and incapacitated parents. Adult brothers or sisters must support their minor or incapacitated brothers or sisters if their parents cannot. A similar mutual obligation exists between grandparents and grandchildren. This extension of mutual obligation of support reduces in proportion the social insurance burden of the State.

The about-face in 1944 created a new problem—that of unmarried mothers who could no longer claim to be married by cohabitation to the father of their children. The "lonely mother," as she is called by the Edict of 1944, was formally forbidden by its Article 29 to seek to establish legally the parenthood of the presumptive father or to claim alimony for the support of the child. The only way the father may acknowledge the child as his own is by marrying the mother. Then the child becomes legitimate and acquires the father's name. Otherwise, he bears his mother's family name.

Although the State frowns upon sexual relations outside of registered marriage, it is interested in a high birth rate. To reconcile these two considerations it provides pecuniary assistance to "lonely mothers." Under Article 4 of the said edict, a "lonely mother" may either rear the child herself with State assistance or entrust the child to a State institution for homeless children. Allowances are paid by the State until the child reaches age 12. If, however, the "lonely mother" is not so lonely, because she lives with a man who is probably the father of the illegitimate child and who helps her materially, the State allowance is suspended.

Mothers of large families (legitimate or not) are encouraged by

allowances and decorations. According to the Edict of November 25, 1947, there are two types of allowances—one paid at the birth of the child and the other paid monthly while the child is between one and five years old.

Motherhood decorations are as follows: Medal of Motherhood of the 2nd Class for five children, the same medal of the 1st Class for six children, Order of Maternal Glory of the 3rd Class for seven children, and same order of the 2nd Class for eight, and of the 1st Class for nine children. Medals or orders are bestowed if the last child of the required number has reached one year of age and all the other children are alive. Mothers who have reared ten children are granted the title and order of the Mother-Heroine.

The increased importance of the family is reflected also in the Edict of March 14, 1945, concerning inheritance. The new *Principles of Civil Legislation*, enacted by the Statute of December 8, 1961,²⁹ confirm, with few modifications, the rules governing inheritance as they had been established by the Edict of March 14, 1945. An estate may be inherited either by heirs at law or by any person or institution designated in the last will. The heirs at law who have the first title to inherit in equal shares are: children (including adopted children), spouse, and parents (including adoptive parents) of the deceased person. The grandchildren and great-grandchildren are also heirs at law if at the time of inheritance their parent, who would have been included in the first category of heirs at law, is no longer alive. They inherit in equal shares the portion which would have been due to their deceased parent.

The Union-Republican laws designate a second group of heirs at law (brothers and sisters) who may claim even shares of the inheritance but only if there are no heirs of the first group.

Illegitimate children inherit only from their mother. The household articles pass to those heirs who were living together with the deceased person. The first group of heirs includes also those dependents who are not included among the relatives entitled to inheritance but who are incapacitated and have been supported by the deceased for at least one year prior to his death.

The estate includes the whole personal property, including the copyright and patents of the deceased; however, the heirs have the right only to 50 percent of royalties due. (The other 50 percent is retained by the State.)

The Soviet citizen may leave all or a part of his property by will to any other citizen or citizens, whether or not included in the group of heirs at law, as well as to the State or any public institution or

organization. This right is limited by the safeguards in favor of minor or incapacitated children, incapacitated spouse or parents, or other incapacitated dependents, who retain, disregarding the will, their right to not less than two-thirds of their legal share.

If the deceased has no heirs at law and has left no will, the State is the general successor.

These legal provisions regarding the heirs at law aim at strengthening the family ties.

THE PARTY IDEAL OF THE FAMILY

The Party point of view concerning the family was defined by the organ of the Central Committee, *Bol'shevik*, in the following words:

Transformations in our country by the Great October Socialist Revolution have caused basic changes in the social foundations, the character, and the nature of the family. The USSR has produced a new socialist family. The main function of that family consists in rearing children as Soviet patriots and as active and conscientious builders of Communism. . . . Proportionately to the mental development of the child and to widening of his horizon, he begins to understand the essence of the Soviet socialist regime. Love of country begins to blend in his consciousness with love for the socialist public and state regime and for the Bolshevik Party and its leaders. . . .³⁰

The ideal Soviet citizen should be, if possible, the parent of a large family of disciplined and patriotic children, and should serve as a shining example of political conformity and devotion to the country and the Party and its leaders. He is expected to be a combination of a Spartan and a Victorian Englishman, but wholeheartedly devoted to the Soviet brand of Marxism.

The Party does not rely exclusively on the family for the upbringing of loyal citizens. There may be a clash between the family interests and those of the State. The latter take precedence. The ideal example for a young Soviet citizen is Pavlik Morozov, a 14-year-old boy who denounced his father to the authorities during the forced collectivization of the early thirties. His father was executed. Later the boy was killed by his grandfather. The State erected statues of Pavlik Morozov, and his story is found in countless books for young readers.

YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

To make sure that Soviet children will follow the example of Pavlik Morozov when there is a conflict between State and family interests, the Soviet State divides education among the family, schools,

and youth organizations. Children under the age of 3 are accommodated at day nurseries. Children between 3 and 7 years of age may be sent to State kindergartens where they spend from ten to twelve hours a day. Kindergartens have several purposes:

... to inculcate habits of personal independence, hygienic habits
... to accustom children to order ... to teach them respect for their elders, and the love of their parents ... to teach them love for the Soviet Fatherland, their people, their leaders, and the Soviet Army, to train them in making use of the wealth of nature, and to tell them about the people's creative work, the outstanding events in the life of the country and other things accessible to their understanding.³¹

A child attending an elementary, junior high, or secondary school is trained civically not only in school but also in one of the youth organizations. Children between the ages of 7 and 10 may become members of the Little Octobrists. Those between ages 10 and 15 may belong to the Pioneers.

A boy or girl admitted to the Pioneers takes a solemn oath "to stand firmly for the victory of Communism."³² The Pioneers wear a three-pointed kerchief, the points standing for "... the indestructible friendship of the three generations, the Communists, the Young Communists, and the Pioneers."³³ A child is not forced to become a Pioneer, but he is tempted to join by various advantages offered to the members of the organization. There are thousands of Houses of Pioneers where young children are trained in crafts and technology and inculcated with the official ideology.

The total membership reached in 1962 the high figure of 18,500,000 Pioneers, i.e., almost all eligible children were enrolled in the organization.

A youngster cannot be admitted without the recommendation of his schoolteacher. In the Pioneers he gets used to regimented Soviet life. Ten Pioneers form a link; two to four links form a detachment; several detachments form a brigade. A detachment is commanded by a leader, who should be a member of the Communist Youth League. A Pioneer Brigade also includes the links of the Little Octobrists.

The highest youth organization is the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League, whose members' ages range from 14 to 28. This organization, though not too exclusive, does not pretend to include *all* Soviet youth. In 1962, there were about 20 million Young Communists. The League is conceived as a nursery for new Party members, though not all Young Communists are admitted to the Party. Young people between 18 and 20 years of age cannot become Party

members unless they have been Young Communists. This requirement is dropped for people over 20, but it is obvious that a candidate for Party membership would have "a spot" on his record if he were not able to point to previous participation in the League.

A young applicant must be recommended by two members of the League of at least one year's standing. A Pioneer needs only the recommendation of one Young Communist and that of his brigade.

The supreme organ of the League is supposed to be its national Congress, which meets, according to the League Charter, once every four years. This rule, disregarded under Stalin (the 10th Congress met in 1936 and the 11th only in 1949), has been respected since his death. The 12th Congress was held in 1954, the 13th in 1958 and the 14th in 1962. The Komsomol Congress, like the Party Congress, is not expected to formulate any policy or to become the forum for controversial debates. It has only to approve unanimously the policies and programs outlined by the Party leaders. The Congress delegates are carefully selected. Over 22 percent of delegates to the 14th Congress were Komsomol functionaries and approximately 57 percent were Party members or candidates. Well over 14 percent were older than the maximum age for membership, i.e., occupied the leading positions in the organization. Both the Komsomol and the Party Charter forbid the dual membership but both make an exception for "holders of leading positions in the Komsomol organization," as Article 63 of the Party Charter says. The composition of the Congress in 1962 as in the earlier years effectively precluded a revolt of the young Communists against their elders, the Party.

The actual power is vested in the Komsomol Central Committee and even more in the inner executive ring of the Committee called the Bureau and in its Secretariat. The principal boss of the organization is its First Secretary.

The organization of the Komsomol is copied after that of the Party. Going down from the national level one finds the republican, regional, city and district organizations, every lower organization strictly subordinated to the higher. The Komsomol show, like the Party show, is run by its secretaries who are on the district, city, regional, republican and national levels paid functionaries and Party members.

The Komsomol primary organizations are set up at the place of work (factories, collective or state farms, offices), service (Army units), or studies (schools).

The League has two purposes—to train its best people as prospective members of the Party and to help the Party as an auxiliary

organization. The age of the League members makes possible their use at schools and places of employment as a nucleus of ardent supporters of the Party line. The League is subordinated entirely to the Party. Articles 60 to 62 of the Party Charter say:

The All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth is an independent social organization of youth, an active assistant and the reserve of the Party. The Komsomol helps the Party in educating the youth in the spirit of Communism, attracts youth to the practical construction of the new society, trains the generation of fully developed men, who will live, work and administer under the system of Communism. [Article 60]

The Komsomol organizations have the right of wide initiative in the evaluation of problems of work at the enterprises, collective farms, and institutions; they may submit their views to the corresponding Party organizations. They must be indeed active implementing agents of the Party directives regarding all the fields of Communist construction, especially where no primary Party organizations exist. [Article 61]

The All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth works under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The activities of its local organizations are directed and controlled by the corresponding Republican, territorial, regional, area, city, or district Party organizations. The local Party organs and the primary Party organizations rely in their Communist education of the youth on the Komsomol organizations, support and extend the application of their useful initiatives. [Article 62]

The Komsomol performs its function of training the future candidates for Party membership by teaching them Marxism-Leninism, explaining the current Party line, and encouraging their participation in political activities. Its other function consists in providing leadership for the Pioneers. Finally, its members are expected actively to help the Party in propagandizing the Party ideology and policies among the population, principally their co-workers or co-students, and in carrying out the State plans of production. In other words, the Komsomol is, besides the Party, an auxiliary army of "soldiers" who fight the political battles in accordance with the directives issued by the Party leadership.

The Young Communists should, of course, imitate the great example of Pavlik Morozov. They "should inform the Party of the defects in the work of the Party or State organs . . ." ³⁴ and they should pay special attention to the struggle against religion and "organize special circles and lectures for antireligious propaganda."

However, the problem is probably not very easy to solve. N. A.

Mikhailov, the former principal leader of the League, complained to the Party Congress of 1952 in a rather revealing manner:

We cannot refrain from observing facts which testify to the attempts of influencing the youth in an alien spirit. The survivals of the past make themselves known in the consciousness of our people. . . . Some boys and girls succumb to the influence of religion.³⁵

Present-day Soviet Marxism, which has become a sort of materialistic religion, cannot be challenged under the penalty of excommunication as an apostate. With its mysticism which forbids rational criticism of the Party line, it tries to fill the void which exists in those irreligious minds which cannot accommodate themselves to atheism. It cannot escape, however, the basic contradiction between pretending to be the only scientific doctrine of the universe and history and forbidding a scientific or rational approach to its own tenets. This contradiction cannot elude the grasp of many young Soviet people.

No wonder the Young Communists are constantly reminded of their obligation to be atheists and to fight religion. ". . . A League member must not be indifferent to religion. . . . He must be an active fighter against religious superstitions."³⁶

The Party pays careful attention to the civic training of Soviet youth. Its future depends on its success in molding the young minds into a conformist mold. It does its best to prevent nonconformist trends among young people, fully realizing the importance of education in this respect. In the words of Stalin: "Education is a weapon whose effect depends on the person who holds it in his hand."³⁷

NOTES

1. S. A. Golunskii and D. S. Karev, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
2. D. S. Karev, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 180-182.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 164-165.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
11. M. S. Strogovich, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-189.
12. S. N. Abramov *et al.*, *Grazhdanskii Protseess*, Moscow: 1948, p. 213.
13. D. S. Karev, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-160.
14. S. N. Abramov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-129.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39, 48, 84, 171, 186-187, 192, 194, 198-199, 214, 217-218, 230.
18. V. I. Serebrovskii, Z. I. Shkundin, and M. V. Zimeleva, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
19. S. N. Abramov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
20. *Ugolovnyi Kodeks RSFSR* (Moscow, 1962), p. 51.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.
22. V. I. Serebrovskii *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 426.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 427.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 435.
25. S. N. Abramov and K. A. Grave, *Novoe Zakonodatel'stvo o Brake i Sem'ie*, Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 25.
26. S. N. Abramov *et al.*, *Grazhdanskii Protsess*, pp. 322-323.
27. V. I. Serebrovskii *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 438-439.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 441.
29. *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, No. 50, December 15, 1961.
30. V. Kolbanovskii, "Ukreplenie semii v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve," in *Bo'shevik*, September, 1949, No. 17, pp. 53-63.
31. A. M. Danev, *Narodnoe Obrazovaniie. Osnovnye Postanovleniia, Prikazy i Instruktii*. The State Educational-Pedagogical Publication of the Ministry of Education of the RSFSR (Moscow, 1948), pp. 272-279.
32. *Ogoniok*, May, 1952, No. 21, p. 2.
33. *Bo'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia*, col. 1740.
34. *Pravda*, October 7, 1952, p. 6.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
36. *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, July 4, 1952.
37. Quoted in N. Yakovlev's "Sovetskaia Shkola—Vazhneyshee Orudiie Kommunisticheskovo Vospitaniia Molodezhi," in *Bo'shevik*, June, 1947, No. 11.

Part Three: The Worker and Social Stratification

CHAPTER ONE

Workers' Responsibilities Under the Proletarian Dictatorship

ACCORDING to official Soviet doctrine, the industrial workers represented the ruling class of the country, because the regime was based on the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

The dictatorship of the working class "has been and remains the characteristic and fundamental feature of the Soviet socialist State which is a State of a new, superior type; . . . The new Constitution of the USSR, as Comrade Stalin stressed [in November 25, 1936] ' . . . actually leaves in force the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat, just as it safeguards without modification the present leading position of the Communist Party of the USSR.' " ¹

The 22nd Congress modified this thesis and adopted a new version which is as follows: "Born out of the Socialist Revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat has played a world-historic role by insuring the victory of socialism in the USSR. . . . In connection with the liquidation of the exploiting classes, the function of crushing their resistance has died. . . . The socialist State has entered a new period. The process of transformation of the State into a nation-wide organization of toilers of the socialist society has begun. Proletarian democracy has been increasingly becoming a nation-wide socialist democracy. . . . The dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission and, from the point of view of the tasks of internal development, has ceased to be indispensable to the USSR. The State, which arose as the State of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has become a nation-

wide State, an organization expressing the interests and the will of the entire nation. Insofar as the working class is the most advanced, organized force in Soviet society, it plays its leading role also in the period of accelerated Communist construction. The working class will fulfill its function as the leader of society with the building of Communism, when classes will disappear. The Party starts with the premise that the dictatorship of the working class will cease to be necessary before the withering away of the State."²

This extract from the new Program proves that the Party has not yet opted for either thesis: the upholding of the theory of leadership of the proletariat even in the present-day Soviet society, or the proclaiming of the termination of this leadership and the advent of equality of all social classes. The difficulty in formulating a clear thesis consists in the fact that the Party, "vanguard" of the proletariat, has not the slightest intention of abdicating its own leadership. Yet this leadership is exercised in the name of the proletariat. At the same time, the Party wants to give all social strata of the USSR the feeling of being treated equally. Hence the tortuous text of the Program which conveys the sense of transition: the leadership of the proletariat is gradually on its way out, and the socialist democracy for all citizens and classes is emerging.

The problem is highly academic. Neither the proletariat nor the whole people but only the Party is the true holder of power. Stalin, the best expert on the subject, wrote:

The Party is the main guiding force under the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . Without the Party as the main guiding force, a dictatorship of the proletariat to any durable and firm extent is impossible. . . . Not a single important political or organizational question is decided by our Soviet and other mass organizations without guiding directions from the Party. In this sense . . . the dictatorship of the proletariat is in essence the "dictatorship" of its vanguard, the "dictatorship" of its Party. . . .³

Only a small fraction of the industrial workers may belong to the Party, which is an elitist organization, drawing into its ranks "the best elements" from the mass organizations of the proletariat. The Party elite acts as the "tutor" of that feeble-minded "ruling" class of workers.

The Party cannot be a real party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working class feel and think, if it drags at the tail of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to overcome the inertness and the political indifference of the spontaneous movement, if it is unable to rise above the momentary

interests of the proletariat, if it is unable to elevate the masses to the level of the class interests of the proletariat. The Party . . . must see further than the working class. . . .⁴

The Party elite cannot share this responsible role with any other party: "This is what we call the dictatorship of the proletariat."⁵

Those views of Stalin are echoed by Soviet theoreticians. "The working class must have its experienced, ideological, and political leader in the person of the Communist Party in order to play its role of hegemon and leader within the State."⁶ It is a rather singular "leader" who must be led by another leader, but this is the acknowledged position of the Soviet proletariat.

One may ask how the working class, that presumptive leader, fares under the guidance of the Communist Party? "The working class of the USSR is an entirely new working class, emancipated from exploitation, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before."⁷ After this emphatic statement let us turn to the actual labor legislation and see the present condition of the "leader" under the care of its self-appointed Communist tutor.

LABOR-DUTY

Every able-bodied Soviet citizen is expected to work. Article 12 of the Soviet Constitution states:

Work in the USSR is a duty and a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." The principle applied in the USSR is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

The obligation to work begins at age 16 in towns, and 12 in rural districts. The working age begins two years earlier than that of full civil capacity. While in towns juveniles must be 16 before they are required to work, and the same age is required for admission to membership in a collective farm, the children of collective farmers are legally compelled to work at 12, although the quota of output for them is notably lower than for the adults. In towns youngsters 15 years old may begin to earn a living and may be admitted as members of an industrial cooperative.⁸ A 15-year-old who decides to begin work needs the permission of the trade-union factory committee but not the consent of his parents or tutors.⁹ Young people may dispose of their earnings without any interference from parents or guardians. This is an indirect incentive to start working earlier than at age 16.¹⁰

At the plenary session of the Party Central Committee held in

June, 1963, suggestion was made to lower the beginning age of labor duty from 16 to 15. The author of this suggestion pointed out that young people now completed their eight-year compulsory education at the age of 15 and often did not know what to do with their time during the idle year inserted between their graduation and the start of professional life. He wanted this modification of the legislation to eradicate one of the reasons of juvenile delinquency.

ONE-MAN COMMAND—PERMANENT PRODUCTION CONFERENCE

Once a person enters into an employment contract with a State institution, factory, or office, he knows he will have to deal with the so-called leaders of production, the various executives. Production is organized on the basis of the officially acknowledged principle of one-man command. This precludes participation by workers in the business of running a plant.¹¹

The managers of a plant, the heads of a shop, or the foremen are neither required nor expected to seek approval of the factory committee of workers for their decisions. The top man runs the show alone, commanding the members of the "ruling" class.

The principle of one-man command is defined very clearly by the Soviet specialists of administrative law:

The principle of one-man command, which is being applied in all Soviet institutions, has a particular importance in the management of economic enterprises, because "any big mechanized industry, i.e., the very material and productive source and foundation of socialism, requires an unconditional singleness of will which directs the joint work of hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands of people" [Quotation from Lenin's *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII, p. 462]. . . . The chief is the leader with full powers; he directs personally the apparatus of management, supervises the organization and the technology of production, appoints, discharges, and transfers workers, etc.¹²

As long as he is politically loyal and dutifully overfulfills the production plan, the Party primary organization, trade union, and other organizations of workers "may not interfere with or quash the decisions of the director of the enterprise; however, they have large opportunities of influencing process of work at the enterprise and of assisting [him] in strengthening labor discipline."¹³

The main task of the Party and trade-union organizations on the premises of a plant is to supervise employees and stimulate them to greater production. The Party organization may also exert some control over the "commanders of production" by pointing out defects

"and advising what should be done to secure exemplary work by the plant in observing technological discipline and the established quality and quantity of output."¹⁴

The concept of one-man command has its corollary in the obligation of workers to obey strictly the orders of their hierarchical superiors.¹⁵ Obedience of the workers is secured by the disciplinary powers wielded by superiors:

The Soviet legislation endows the organs of management . . . with functions of management as well as with the disciplinary authority in the process of productive work.¹⁶

The principle of one-man command is enforced also by strict hierarchical order within the highly centralized industrial organization. If several enterprises are combined in a trust, its director appoints or dismisses the managers of each subordinated enterprise. He takes his orders from the regional national economy council which is in turn controlled by the federal government. The manager acts through the heads of particular shops, the latter transmitting orders to various sectors of a shop through foremen.

Foremen are as important in the Soviet as in a capitalist economy. The foreman is "a leader of his own sector with full powers . . . personally responsible for the observance of technological discipline and for execution in every respect of the task entrusted to his sector." In consequence the foreman has the right to impose disciplinary penalties, distribute bonuses, and appoint or dismiss workers with the approval of the head of the shop. Foremen are selected from among the engineers, technicians, and highly skilled workers.

Such a system does not leave much room for participation of workers in the management of the factory. The workers are expected to work honestly, observe labor discipline, and come to work punctually.

The post-Stalinist regime has not repudiated the principle of one-man command and has not attempted to install a collective leadership at the helm of enterprises or give workers' committees the right of co-management. Khrushchev emphatically told the plenary session of the Central Committee (November, 1962) that this principle continued to be the very heart of management, and that the manager should be, as before, alone entitled to make decisions and should be held responsible for the results. He mentioned, however, an innovation introduced a few years before, the consultative assemblies on the premises of enterprises. These assemblies, called permanent production conferences, began to emerge on the *orders* issued in the joint

Decree of July 9, 1958, by the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.¹⁷ These conferences are organized at each enterprise which employs at least a hundred people. Their members are elected by the general meeting of all employees and must include workers and higher personnel and the representatives of the local trade-union committee, factory management, and local Party and Komsomol organizations. The decree does not specify which proportions of the total membership are to be assigned to each segment represented. This repartition is probably decided by the local Party organization. In any case the total membership of the conference is large. Therefore, the current work is confided to its presidium which is composed of five to fifteen persons and is elected by the conference. If an enterprise employs less than a hundred people, the general meeting of all the employees acts as the conference which then does not need to be elected.

The production conference is supervised by the trade-union factory committee and meets once or twice each quarter. If a plant is so large that it has trade-union committees for each of its shops, the production conference is elected for each shop; then the conference meets once each month. In the meantime its functions are performed by its presidium. The conference reports on its activities every six months to the plenary meeting of all employees.

The tasks of the conference are advisory and include the following matters: the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan of production, promotion of socialist competition, increasing of labor productivity, incorporation in production processes of new ideas suggested by employee-innovators or by shock workers, ensuring of proper conditions for enabling each worker to implement his assigned norm of output, improvement of quality and lowering of the cost of production, assistance in introducing better technics of production, suggestion of the best use of resources reserved for the employees' welfare, amelioration of safety conditions, ensuring of a better labor discipline, and so forth. The conference must "strictly observe the existing legislation" which regulates all the conditions of work as well as the approved State plans of production assigned to a given enterprise.

In other words, the conference is not conceived as a genuine body of self-government for the employees. It may not voice on their behalf any demands addressed to the State, their employer, and may not become an organized opposition to management. Its main role consists in helping the management devise the best methods for producing more and better goods.

The 12th Trade-Union Congress, held in March, 1959, clearly

defined what was expected from those conferences: "The task of trade unions consists in constantly improving the leadership of permanent production conferences and in directing their activities toward the disclosure and use of the internal [plant's] resources for the further increase in output, increase in labor productivity, lowering of the cost of production, and the perfection of methods of managing enterprises and constructions."¹⁸

The one man who commands is not thereby deprived of his powers of decision, but he is given an advisor and also a watchdog. He is surrounded by other watchdogs who supervise his management: the factory trade-union committee with its many specialized commissions, and the Party primary organization. The Central Committee, on June 26, 1959, ordered all primary organizations to establish their own control commissions for supervising the efficiency and honesty of management.¹⁹ Local committees and groups of Party-State Control (see above) complete the picture.

The manager, the head of a shop, and the foreman are all-powerful figures, but they are watched from all sides, not to mention the control from above by their hierarchical superiors including the regional councils of national economy. Their responsibility is heavy; it includes not only the sanction of demotion or dismissal but also the threat of criminal proceedings. For example, Article 152 of the Criminal Code says: "In a case where an industrial enterprise repeatedly and in large amounts produces goods of defective quality or which do not conform to existing standards or technical specifications or are incomplete, the director, chief engineer or chief of department of technical control, as well as persons who occupy other responsible positions but perform the aforementioned duties, shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for up to three years or by compulsory labor for up to one year or by dismissal from their position." The Edict of April 24, 1958, established penalties for another offense:

Failure of managing or other responsible officials of enterprises, economic organizations, state farms, ministries and governmental institutions to carry out plans and obligations regarding the delivery of products to other administrative regions or Union Republics and also for All-Union needs, is a grave violation of State discipline and shall incur disciplinary, property and criminal responsibility. Strict disciplinary fines or money deductions from salaries to an amount equivalent to three-month salaries shall be levied, in accordance with the procedure established by the Union-Republican legislation, against managers and other responsible officials of enterprises, economic organizations, State

farms, ministries, and governmental institutions, guilty of failing without valid reasons to carry out plans and obligations regarding these deliveries. In the event that nonperformance of plans and obligations for deliveries of goods to other economic regions and Union Republics, as well as for All-Union needs, occurs without valid reasons, the responsible person shall be held criminally liable as if he committed the crime of malicious use of a responsible position.²⁰

The penalty provided for this particular offense is deprivation of freedom for up to three years or correctional labor for up to one year or dismissal from the occupied position (Article 170 of the Criminal Code). The use of power is termed malicious if power is used for mercenary or personal profit or to the prejudice of State interests.

There is another political reason for the creation of permanent production conferences at the enterprises. The post-Stalinist Party leadership wants to attract as many millions of ordinary citizens as possible to an organized social activity which would give them the sense of personal responsibility for public affairs. Those millions are asked not to influence the formulation of policies but to assist in carrying them out, in maintaining public order, and in surveilling good conduct of their fellow citizens. This is a clever policy because the average citizen can be helpful, can relieve the State administration of a part of its duties, and can acquire in the process the feeling of being somebody other than a mere passive cog in the State machinery. The present organizations of Party-State Control, the comradesly courts, the brigades of cooperation with the militia, the housing committees of tenants, the multiple commissions of factory trade-union committees in which large numbers of employees perform voluntarily all sorts of functions (social insurance, protection of the safety of labor, cultural-welfare activities, work with children of the employees) are several examples of this new policy. If the citizen is not a member of any of those numerous bodies, a soviet deputy, or a people's assessor in court, he has a good chance to be called upon to help in his capacity of activist of the Party, trade union, or Komsomol, and be asked to assist one of the existing local commissions or committees. If democracy meant only an active participation of citizens in implementing policies devised by a power elite, this would be democracy. However, the tests of democracy are free choice of government from contending parties, responsibility of the government before the electorate, legal existence of dissenting minorities and their right to strive to become a majority, and full exercise of individual

freedoms. These rights cannot be achieved under a one-party monopoly of power.

WORKING DAY AND WEEK

Although the Constitution guaranteed the workers a seven-hour day, on June 25, 1940, the workday was extended to eight hours. This change was effected by a simple Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in spite of the fact that Article 146 of the Constitution states that it may be amended only by a two-thirds majority of the two Chambers of the Supreme Soviet. The amendment approving the Edict of 1940 was duly enacted only six and a half years later on February 25, 1947.

The Edict of 1940 established the 48-hour week for adult workers, office employees, and for juveniles from 16 to 18 years old who had previously worked a six-hour day. Still, Soviet commentators insisted that the workday in the USSR "remains the shortest in the world."²¹ Whenever Soviet sources disclosed that in some capitalist countries, as in the United States, there was a 40-hour workweek, they commented that the shorter week was "actually an incomplete workweek hiding unemployment," adopted "under the pressure of the working class."²² If the reduction of the length of the workweek led only to greater exploitation of the workers and a reduction of their wages, one may ask why the workers exerted pressure, as the same commentators conceded, to obtain a shorter workweek.

In 1940 the decision to increase the workday was explained by the urgent war needs. Since that time the war ended, but the prolonged workday became for many years a permanent feature of the Constitution. A new argument had to be invented. The prolonged workweek was justified "by the interest of a more speedy recovery and of a further development of the national economy after the Great Patriotic War."²³

Only in 1956 was the length of the workday put back to six hours on the eves of Sundays and official holidays. Employees paid on the time basis retained their former wages for the shorter period of work on such days. But piece-rate workers, who number approximately 80 percent of the total industrial class, are remunerated on Saturdays strictly in proportion to their actual output.²⁴ If a worker is unable to make a more strenuous effort and produce as much in six hours as he used to do in eight hours, he takes home smaller wages on Saturdays and eves of official holidays. The "proletarian" State is a strict businessman.

Only after twenty years was the seven-hour working day reestablished. The Statute of May 7, 1960, introduced the general seven-hour

workday and a six-hour workday for miners. The same Statute promised to shorten in a few years the duration of workweek to 40 hours; this change will probably mean a five-hour period of work on Saturdays.²⁵

Workers are expected "to use the whole workday to the utmost of one's capacity and in the prescribed manner, and to avoid any waste of time. The waste of worktime is a specific infraction against labor discipline. . . ." ²⁶ Of course, time spent "during the intermission for a rest, or spent on commuting to or from the place of employment, etc., is not included within the worktime and is not paid for. . . ." ²⁷

The strict rule against waste of worktime applies even to Party and trade-union activities. "All such activities should take place only during the nonwork time."²⁸ This prohibition is incorporated in Rule 18 of the Standard Rules of the Internal Labor Order of January 12, 1957.

The Soviet specialists of labor law distinguish the following rest periods: daily, seventeen out of twenty-four hours a day; and one day a week, usually Sunday, with a few exceptions as in Moslem areas where Friday has been the traditional day of rest, or in various enterprises where there must be one shift present on the premises at all times. In accordance with general capitalist practice, "if the weekly day of rest coincides with another official day of rest, another substitute weekly day of rest is not granted."²⁹

The official days of rest are January 1, May 1 and 2, November 7 and 8—the commemoration of the October Revolution—and December 5—the anniversary of the adoption of the Soviet Constitution.

If a worker is required to come to work on an official day of rest, he must be given a substitute day of rest or be paid double wages; or if he has worked on a Sunday, his wages are increased by 50 percent.

The attitude of the Soviet State toward the management-worker relationship is interesting. Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the USSR seems to indicate that the director of the factory should always be obeyed, even if his orders constitute a violation of the rights of the workers as guaranteed by labor legislation. In the case of a certain Baymatov, the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of the USSR decided that: "Regardless of the irregularity of the order itself, it was binding and should have been executed because an employee may not act on his own within the limits of his true or presumed right and refuse to report to work in spite of orders of the management. . . ." ³⁰

The same point of view was expressed in the decision of the

Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the USSR in the Musenko case:

Refusal to report to work without valid reasons on a day of rest which has been declared by the management a workday, even if such an order of the management involves infractions against the pertinent legal rules, represents nevertheless a willful absence.³¹

Willful absence is a disciplinary offense. The irregularity of the order is not considered a valid excuse. The management cannot be wrong if it subordinates the interests of the workers to those of the enterprise. Yet, workers are supposed to be masters in that State of the leadership of the proletariat. Since 1956 juveniles between 16 and 18 years of age work six hours per day instead of the previous eight hours. Juveniles 15 to 16 years old, if gainfully occupied or if they work as apprentices, have a four-hour workday. University teaching personnel are expected to work six hours daily, 2.25 to 3.5 hours on teaching, the rest on research. Teachers of secondary, junior high, and elementary schools are expected to teach three to four hours per day and devote the rest of the worktime to the preparation of their courses.³²

NIGHT AND OVERTIME WORK

As a rule the length of the worktime is shortened in night shifts from seven to six hours. However, at enterprises where production is of a continuous nature (e.g., power stations) the length of the worktime of a night shift is the same as that of a day shift. The worker should be paid for six hours of nightwork the same wages as for seven hours of daywork. However, the supplement for nightwork is calculated in such a way as to deprive the worker of the full value of the additional wages for nightwork. Since most Soviet workers are piece-workers, they are paid for the six hours of the night shift according to the piecework tariff, which is higher; to this amount the supplement for nightwork is added according to the lower time-tariff, so that they receive in effect approximately the equivalent pay of six and a half hours of daywork.

Certain categories of Soviet workers, those who always work at night, do not receive any supplemental pay for nightwork, but Soviet commentators explain that the supplement is included in the tariff rates of wages or in their salaries.³³

Article 94 of the Code of Labor Legislation established the so-called unregulated workday for "responsible" political, professional,

and State white-collar workers. This means that their workday is not limited to seven hours. One does not need to pity too much these important bureaucrats because "persons with the unregulated workday are compensated for the extra-time work by higher salaries and supplementary vacation."³⁴

Workers may be ordered by the management of a plant to work after the seven-hour workday if the local trade union agrees to it. This consent is a foregone conclusion if such an order is justified by the interest of the State for increased production, the trade union being another arm of the State. Some cases are specifically enumerated by Article 104 of the Labor Code, among them being work required by defense needs, work indispensable to avoid interruption in the services of public utilities, urgent termination of a production process to prevent damage to raw materials or machinery, and urgent repairs of machinery.³⁵ "A worker has no right to refuse to execute the order of the management concerning overtime work."³⁶ If he does, he is liable to be punished for willful absence. The only persons exempt from this obligation are "juveniles below age 18, pregnant women beginning with the fifth month of pregnancy, nursing mothers, and workers affected by tuberculosis in active form."³⁷ The same categories of employees may not be assigned nightwork. If the factory management has no time to secure the agreement of the trade union, its order is nevertheless obligatory for the workers.³⁸

The overtime work "should not exceed for one worker within one year 120 hours (Article 106 of the Code of Labor Legislation). Moreover, the overtime work within two consecutive days should not exceed four hours."³⁹

A worker receives 50 percent more than his usual wages for the first two hours of overtime and 100 percent more for the following two hours. Still overtime work of piece-rate workers is paid according to the lower time-tariff (lower by 10 to 15 percent).

JUVENILES AND WOMEN

The low wages of the father of a Soviet family are a powerful incentive for his wife and children to accept work as the only way of increasing the family income.

Until 1940 the special protection of labor law extended to all working juveniles less than 18 years old. The legislative amendment enacted in 1940 restricted this protection to young people less than 16 years old. Juveniles 16 to 18 years old were thereby "promoted" to the legal condition of adult workers. Only fifteen years later, the several laws passed in 1955 and 1956 restored the former juvenile

protection to young employees 16 to 18 years old. Now as before 1940, a juvenile worker is any worker less than 18 years old. During the same period, the list of particularly heavy and unhealthful occupations in which juveniles could not be employed was gradually cut down and now is shorter than that prior to 1940.⁴⁰ Even in occupations which continue to be closed to workers less than 18 years old, there is an exception allowed by law, namely, when a juvenile worker is trained for that particular occupation.⁴¹

The normal duration of the annual vacation for adult workers is two weeks. Minors who have not reached age 18 are entitled to a month vacation (not less than 24 working days) during the summer period.

A juvenile who has reached age 15 cannot legally be forced to begin to work, although he may decide to do so. But there are cases where the State regularly sends youngsters of age 15 to work. This is the fate of minors held in the various correctional settlements and children's homes who "are sent to trade, railroad, or factory-shop school or to work at some industrial enterprise . . . after they have reached age 15 and have completed their period of confinement to the colony. . . ."⁴²

Article 122 of the Constitution begins with the proud statement that "women in the USSR are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, government, cultural, political and other public activities." It is true that women are paid wages equal with men, but they are also required to perform the same tasks. Their equality must sometimes appear to them rather oppressive.

Women were admitted to work as railroad engineers and stokers; women were allowed to work on all occupations of fluvial navigation, except for a few especially arduous tasks. Simultaneously with the prohibition of employment of women on especially heavy occupations, there are established for women lower maximal norms for the carrying or moving of loads than for men. For instance, 20 kilograms are the maximum of the load which adult women may be asked to carry by hand and on an even surface.⁴³

One may imagine how Soviet women must rejoice in equality with men when they work on loading operations carrying on their shoulders loads weighing some 20 kilograms or pushing wheelbarrows with a fifty-kilogram load.

The deterioration in the situation of women, or, as Soviet authors would say, the improvement in their equality, was marked by a series of decrees: the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of November 1, 1938, bestowing on women the privilege of equality

in the occupations of railroad locomotive engineer and stoker and of locksmith repairing locomotives; the Decision of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions of June 13, 1940, conceding the right to work on fluvial transport, except as stokers on steamboats and as sailors on the cargo-passenger boats; the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of October 25, 1940, opening the mines to women, except for a few particularly difficult occupations; the Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of July 8, 1944, allowing women to work overtime and at night.⁴⁴ The latter two regulations were repealed in the middle fifties. Stalin said at the 17th Congress of the Party: "Women constitute an immense labor army and they educate our children, our future generations, that is to say, prepare our future."⁴⁵ They are most certainly looked at by the Soviet State as an immense labor army; one may wonder only if they are left much leisure to educate their children.

FORMER SERFDOM OF SOVIET EMPLOYEES

The Edict of June 26, 1940, stated in Article 3, Paragraph 2: "The departure from an enterprise or office as well as a transfer from one enterprise or office to another may take place only by virtue of the permission granted by the director of the enterprise or the head of the office."⁴⁶

Up to 1956 a worker or an employee could not quit his job without the express permission of the management; this permission was restricted to situations foreseen by State legislation. The analogous position of people bound to their jobs in the Middle Ages was called serfdom. In the Soviet Union, the State manager decided whether an employee should be granted permission to transfer to another job. In the Middle Ages, the peasant serf depended on his landlord.

Obtaining employment is of the utmost future significance to a Soviet citizen. However, Soviet law does not require hiring to take a particular written form. It can be oral. Whatever its form, a contractual agreement is void if not in conformity with the detailed State regulations.⁴⁷ The management of a Soviet plant cannot grant to its employees through individual contracts conditions of work more favorable than those determined by the State.

The management should hire personnel "according to the political and professional qualifications" of the applicants.⁴⁸ This seems to mean that the management should give preference to a Party member or an active non-Party Communist.

"The most universal form of labor contract is the contract con-

cluded for an indefinite period of time. The stability and duration of the labor relationship are prompted by the fact that neither the management nor the worker has the right to dissolve the labor contract or to alter its content except in cases foreseen by law."⁴⁹ This legal chaining of the employee to his place of work was formalized by the Edict of June 26, 1940, "which prohibited the willful dereliction of work. . . ."⁵⁰ Before the Edict of 1940, low wages and bad housing conditions forced the Soviet worker to wander from place to place in the hope of finding a factory and a town with better living conditions. Several inducements failed to stop the fluidity of manpower. Finally the Edict of June 26, 1940, completely forbade departure from one's place of employment and attached to the prohibition the penalty of imprisonment.

It would be a singular delusion to think that Soviet employees were at least free in choosing their first job. In the cases of peasants transferred to mines or plants and of youths who have graduated from vocational or higher schools, the State assigns the prospective employee to his place of work. Graduates of vocational or higher schools assigned to a particular enterprise must work there for a compulsory period of three to four years.

A peasant may become an industrial worker only in two ways—by being recruited by a State agency to a given industry or, if he or she is a youngster, by being admitted for training at a vocational industrial school. Otherwise the road to the industrial occupations is effectively barred to peasants by the fact that they have no passports, which are prerequisites to residing in a town or an industrial settlement. The occupation of a peasant is, in principle, decided by the fact that he is born in a village.

City youngsters who have not become specialists or skilled workers have some freedom on choosing their first job. This does not imply, however, "a free fluidity of manpower. The planned distribution of manpower has been considered by the Party and the Soviet Government, since the first days of the Great Socialist October Revolution, as a prime task. . . . The Soviet State has executed this task without hesitation, in various ways and by different means."⁵¹

The most efficient way of attracting to certain professions is to attach a wage differential and other benefits to occupations for which the State wants more manpower.⁵² A hard-working man in light industry, while comparing his lower wages to those of a friend working in a factory where the State pays higher wages in order to attract workers, may wonder whether such a different pay for comparatively

equal work corresponds to the celebrated socialist principle: "To each according to his work." But in this respect the Soviet State acts in the traditional capitalist manner.

The general rule of employment for an indefinite time has three main exceptions. One refers to contracts of work in distant areas of the country like the Far East or the Far North. The second exception is that of seasonal or temporary employment because of extra or temporary needs. The third exception is that of farmers temporarily employed in industrial jobs. This is a protection of the State against the mistake of hiring peasants who prove to be poor industrial workers.

The "right to work," according to a Soviet commentator, does not mean "the right to choose the place of employment at one's own discretion and without taking into consideration the interests and needs of the State nor the right to shift from one enterprise to another according to the concept: 'I shift about as I please.'"⁵³

THE LABOR BOOK AND PASSPORT

Only persons possessing a labor book may be hired by an enterprise or an office. In nonrural areas a passport is also required. The labor book was introduced by decree in 1938. Every able-bodied Soviet citizen must have a labor book. It contains the following data: the name of the holder, age, education, profession and qualifications, a record of all his transfers and their reasons, and his rewards. According to Article 6 of the 1938 Decree every employee must present his labor book to the management. Thus the labor book provides a convenient means of checking the labor record of an employee. The labor book must be surrendered to the management for the whole period of employment.⁵⁴

Certain employees must also surrender to the management their passports, without which they cannot change their place of residence. They receive in exchange special identity cards.⁵⁵

The management must mention in the passport of the employee the fact of his being hired or released. Only persons with passports duly mentioning their employment at a given place are given lodgings by the managers of publicly owned houses or owners of private houses. Otherwise they must be refused lodgings. Moreover, they may be expelled by the militia from a town or industrial settlement.⁵⁶ Functionaries who do not observe these rules may be fined or sentenced to correctional labor for up to six months. The Decree of January 18, 1941, determined that town juveniles or peasants who have been recruited for industrial work must produce a

certificate of residence issued by the house manager or the rural soviet, since they have not yet labor books (Article 3).

LEGAL TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

Soviet State employees, including industrial workers, were frozen to their jobs during the long period from 1940 to 1956. They could not quit their place of employment except by permission, which the management could grant only if the release did not harm the work of the establishment. The situation was changed in 1956 when new legislation restored to Soviet employees the former right to quit a job after a two-week notice given to the management. In this case, the employee loses his right to the annual vacation if he does not begin working at another enterprise within one month.

There are specified cases where the management may unilaterally discharge an employee. They are as follows:

1. The liquidation of a particular enterprise or the reduction of personnel.
2. Temporary interruption in production lasting longer than one month.
3. Lack of qualifications on the part of the employee.
4. Application of the supreme disciplinary penalty of dismissal in the event of an employee's systematic violation of labor discipline.
5. The commission by the employee of a crime connected with his professional occupation or his detention for more than two months.
6. An employee's temporary incapacity to work if it has lasted for more than two months.
7. The transfer of an enterprise to another locality or if the job of an employee is liquidated, and if the worker refuses to change his domicile or accept another job.
8. Discharge of an employee hired as a replacement, to make room for his predecessor if the latter is restored to his occupation by virtue of the decision of the factory Labor-Disputes Commission or of the courts.
9. In case of a willful absence from work.

In the case of the reduction of personnel, the management should retain employees who have two or more dependents or in whose family there is no other wage earner, as well as employees who are reserve or retired officers or who attend evening technical classes, but only if they have equal qualifications with those to be dismissed. Otherwise the interests of the State come first.

An employee dismissed because of detention for more than two months has the right to be reinstated to his job if he is acquitted. He

must also receive up to two months of back pay. For the rest of the time he has spent in preventive detention he receives no compensation.⁵⁷ In the case of discharge for lack of professional capacity or any other reason, "the management must obtain the assent of the Appraisal-Conflict Commission before dismissing the employee."⁵⁸ This Commission (now called Labor-Disputes Commission) is composed in equal numbers of representatives of the management and of the plant workers. If this Commission does not agree, the management may still appeal to the courts and request them to dissolve the contract of employment.

An employee may contest a dismissal by appealing first to the Labor-Disputes Commission. If the two sections of the Commission fail to reach a decision, the employee may take his case to the courts. If he is reinstated, he is entitled to compensation for a period "not exceeding twenty working days."⁵⁹ The whole procedure may take much longer than 20 days in which case the employee bears the financial loss for the rest of the time he has been out of work unless the courts acknowledge that his discharge has been due to a decision contrary to law. Then he will be entitled to damages for the remainder of unpaid wages; these damages should be paid by the enterprise according to Article 88 of the new *Principles of Civil Legislation*.

A worker must be discharged at the request of 1) the district committee of his trade union, but he may appeal to the next higher organ of the same trade union; 2) the Committee of Party-State Control; 3) the courts, which may include dismissal in their decision as an additional penalty; 4) the Armed Forces, calling the employee into service.

The power of management to discharge employees often leads to abuses. "The discharge is used sometimes by the individual executives-bureaucrats as a means of getting rid of people who have criticized the defects in work and who have tried to eliminate such defects."⁶⁰

Usually two weeks' notice is required before firing; or, if an employee is discharged without notice, the management must pay him an indemnity equivalent to the two-week average wages.

In the cases of a discharge at the request of the trade union, of the Committee of Party-State Control, of the industrial inspection, or by virtue of a judgment, neither indemnity nor any notice is required. The discharge indemnity is not paid to persons released at their own request.⁶¹

An employee who lives in an apartment house belonging to his enterprise or institution (if this enterprise or institution is included

within the lists established by the Council of Ministers of the USSR or by the Council of Ministers of a Union Republic) and who has been released from employment at his own request or discharged for the violation of labor discipline or for the commission of a crime may be evicted by the judicial decision. His former enterprise or institution is then under no obligation to provide him other housing accommodation (Article 62 of the *Principles of Civil Legislation*). In view of the notorious housing shortage, this legal provision is an additional penalty for disciplinary or criminal offenses but is also a measure calculated to discourage the employees from requesting their release.

The repeal by the Edict of April 25, 1956, of former criminal responsibility (imprisonment) for abandoning one's job without express permission of the management and the simultaneous permission granted to the employees to request their release after a two-week notice revived the old problem of fluidity of labor. Stalin tried to stop it by progressively increasing the sanctions for transfer to another enterprise without the management's permission and ended in 1940 by declaring it a criminal offense. His successors relinquished this drastic weapon of coercion. But Khrushchev bitterly complained in November, 1962, that fluidity of labor again plagued the Soviet economy. He asked that employees who stayed on their jobs for long periods of time be granted various rewards such as priority in the assignment of better housing accommodation, longer annual vacations, bonuses, and citations.

COMPULSORY TRANSFER TO ANOTHER JOB

"According to the general rule established by Article 37 of the Code of Labor Legislation, the transfer of a worker or an official from one enterprise to another or from one locality to another, even if such a transfer is connected with the displacement of the whole enterprise or office, may take place only with the consent of the employee himself."⁶² This statement should be taken with a grain of salt, because the monopolistic totalitarian State has various nonlegal ways to exert pressure. But such is the legal position. The general legal rule, however, had until 1956 one important exception, namely, it excluded managerial, engineering, and similar employees, as well as highly skilled workers. This exception was established by the Edict of October 19, 1940. Noncompliance with an order of transfer was a labor crime according to Article 5 of the same Edict of October 19, 1940. The punishment was imprisonment for up to four months. This edict was repealed in 1956.

There are cases where an employee may be transferred com-

pulsorily to another job within the same enterprise. The reasons in each case are different:

1. An employee may be temporarily transferred because of the requirements of production.
2. An employee may be temporarily transferred to a lower paid job as a measure of discipline.
3. An employee temporarily incapacitated by sickness or accident should be offered a more suitable job.
4. A pregnant woman must be offered a lighter job during the period of pregnancy which is not covered by her maternity leave. She receives the same wages as before.
5. Unlike the four preceding cases, an employee may be demoted permanently to another, lower paid job as a severe measure of disciplinary penalty. Otherwise, an employee cannot be shifted permanently to another job even within the same enterprise without his consent unless the new job would still be within the same category of professional qualifications and skill.⁶³

DISCIPLINARY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INFRACTIONS OF LABOR DISCIPLINE

"Labor discipline in capitalist society," writes a Soviet author, "is founded on the worker's fear of losing his morsel of bread. . . . V. I. Lenin justly called this type of discipline, 'the discipline of hunger.'"⁶⁴ It is true that the supreme penalty which may be applied by a capitalist employer to his employee is dismissal, a penalty relative to the availability of other jobs. In Soviet society the goal is to employ every able-bodied citizen in some job—the worst being in a correctional labor camp.

However, the problem of labor discipline exists as much in the so-called socialist society as it does in a capitalist. The trend of Soviet labor legislation shows that the Soviet State has solved the problem by using coercion.

While the penalties have been growing in severity, the power to inflict them has been shifting from the hands of fellow workers to those of the managers. The transfer of disciplinary powers exclusively to the managers has the objective of enhancing their prestige in the eyes of the employees. A parallel evolution is reflected in the 1933 transfer of the regulation of wages from the field of collective agreements between the management and the local trade union to the State's exclusive jurisdiction.⁶⁵

One could observe until 1956 the same trend in the increasing penalties attached to the labor offenses most resented by the Soviet

State: willful absence from work and willful dereliction of work. Willful absence basically meant tardiness, while willful dereliction meant abandoning one's job without the permission of the management. Between 1940 and 1956 labor discipline among the proletarians was enforced under the threat of criminal prosecution:

Struggling with all the means for a further intensification of the productivity of work, the socialist State wages the daily and incessant battle against those who commit infractions against the socialist discipline of labor. . . . The Criminal Code assists in this struggle for the socialist discipline of labor. . . .⁶⁶

Willful absence could at that time be a disciplinary or a criminal offense, depending on the length of the absence and also on the frequency of such absences. Rule 26 of the then Standard Rules of the Internal Labor Order stated:

A worker or an official who comes to work late without legitimate reasons, or who departs from work before the beginning of the lunch intermission, or who comes late after the lunch intermission, or who departs from an enterprise or office before the appointed time for the end of the work, or who loiters during the working time is liable in each case to an administrative sanction: observation, reprimand, severe reprimand, transfer to another lower paid job for up to three months or demotion to a lower paid job.

The management was empowered to administer the penalties.

But before 1956 if an absence lasted longer than 20 minutes or took place repeatedly during a definite period of time, it became a criminal offense, punished according to Article 5, Paragraph 2 of the Edict of June 26, 1940. This law was applicable to the following cases of willful absence: 1) coming to work more than 20 minutes late; 2) leaving more than 20 minutes before the appointed end of the work time; 3) beginning lunch more than 20 minutes too early or coming back from lunch more than 20 minutes too late; 4) reporting for work in a state of intoxication; 5) sleeping or loitering for more than 20 minutes during work time; 6) committing any of the above offenses with a loss of work time involving 20 or less minutes, if such offenses were perpetrated three times within the same month or four times during two consecutive months.⁶⁷ In these six cases punishment was meted out to the culprit by the courts.

Punishment for willful absence was constantly increasing in severity, but this was only one of the symptoms of the general tightening of labor discipline by all possible means of coercion. "It has been

the general tendency in the development of our labor law concerning labor discipline to increase progressively the legal responsibility of workers for the infractions against labor discipline. . . ."⁶⁸

If a willful absence was qualified as a criminal offense, the penalty was correctional labor at the place of employment for up to six months with a reduction of wages up to 25 percent. In practical terms this was a fine. Soviet authors protested that their labor system did not know fines, but this was one of several cases of Soviet fines applicable to the "proletarians." Only this was a fine which varied with the size of the wages of the convicted employee.

The crime of willful absence was not committed if the absence was due to: 1) serious illness or death in the immediate family; 2) quarantine of the employee's home; 3) natural calamity; 4) execution of State duty, such as serving as a people's court assessor; 5) summons from courts or public administration authorities; 6) interruption or delay in transportation, if caused by unforeseeable reasons. This enumeration established by order of the People's Commissariat of Labor on December 17, 1940, was not exclusive; the court could consider another similar reason. For instance, if an employee was detained by the authorities through no fault of his own, he could not be prosecuted for willful absence. If, however, he was detained by the militia as the cause of a street accident, he was liable to judicial prosecution not only for the accident but also for willful absence—which might have been considered by a Western observer as not willful.

In the event of illness, the facts should have been certified by a doctor or, if this was not possible, by witnesses. If such a person reported an employee to be sick while the latter was actually in good health, he "should be held responsible as an accomplice to the offense of intentional willful absence."⁶⁹

The offense of willful absence could be committed even by negligence and without guilty intention. If an employee came late to work because the last streetcar or bus was filled to capacity and he was not admitted, he was held responsible because he should have known that Soviet streetcars were usually filled to capacity and he should have tried to catch an earlier streetcar. If one was late because of the fault of another person, he was not held responsible:

For instance, two workers have overslept and have been late at work for more than twenty minutes. . . . (But if one) has overslept because of the hooligan act on the part of his neighbor (for instance, the latter moved back the hands of the clock in the worker's bedroom) and has been late without a fault of his own,

he may not be prosecuted for willful absence without legitimate reasons because of the lack of his own culpability.⁷⁰

Any person over 14 gainfully employed as a white-collar or industrial worker could have been prosecuted for willful absence.

A second offense of willful absence committed while a person was serving a penalty for the first infraction was punished similarly, by a reduction of wages. But if the same offense was committed for the third time while the employee was serving a penalty for the second, this third willful absence was treated as a willful dereliction of work and was punished by imprisonment for from two to four months (Article 5, Paragraph 1 of the Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of June 26, 1940):

Willful dereliction of work by an official or a worker consists in the termination of one's work, and in abandoning one's job without the permission of the management of the enterprise or office. It is immaterial whether the guilty person has informed the management in advance but has not received the required permission or whether he has left his job willfully without informing the management at all. In other words, willful dereliction of work consists in a unilateral, i.e., without the consent of the management, termination of a labor contract by a worker or an official.⁷¹

There lay the main, criminal sanction guaranteeing the stability of Soviet manpower. The threat of imprisonment for two to four months was intended to deter the toiling masses, who were supposed to rule the Soviet Union, from transferring to another job or locality without the permission of the management. The Soviet toiler was the serf of the State and had to stay where he was assigned to work.

A one-day absence might have been either a willful absence or a willful dereliction of work, depending on the intention of the employee. He might have intended to abandon his job but after having some afterthoughts decided to go back to work on the following day. In such marginal cases "one must elucidate the subjective attitude of the absentee during the period of his absence."⁷² The length of absence was immaterial as long as his intention of abandoning his job was established.

It is immaterial what have been the reasons . . . the wish to remain idle, the desire to have a better paid or a lighter job, the bad relations with one's superiors or colleagues, the intention to change one's place of residence or one's specialty, etc.⁷³

A young alumnus of a higher, a technical-secondary, or a vocational

school who was assigned to, or an employee who was hired by, an enterprise or office and who did not report for work, was prosecuted for willful dereliction of work. Furthermore, employees who violated the rules of labor discipline with the intention of being discharged in order to look for another job were also prosecuted for willful dereliction.

One may note that the wartime Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of December 26, 1941, raised the penalty for willful dereliction by the employees of the defense industries to imprisonment from five to eight years.⁷⁴

The application of the Edict of June 26, 1940, depended largely on the management of an enterprise or on the heads of offices. These managers were "compelled to forward directly to the people's court . . . all the materials . . . not later than on the following day after the discovery of willful absence or of willful dereliction of work."⁷⁵ Managers who failed to report the guilty employees, or who employed persons hiding from legal responsibility after having willfully abandoned their enterprise or office, exposed themselves to criminal responsibility. The type of penalty inflicted in such cases was not specified by the Edict of June 26, 1940. They were punished, therefore, according to Articles 109, 111, or 112, Paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code. These articles dealt with various forms of abuse of official powers by functionaries and established the penalties of deprivation of liberty for not less than six months (Article 109), for not more than three years (Article 111), or of correctional labor for up to one month, or of dismissal from the occupied post, or of a public reprimand (Article 112, Paragraph 2), depending on the particular circumstances.

Cases of willful absence or dereliction of work were within the jurisdiction of the people's court, with one notable difference. The composition of the court did not include the two assessors. A people's judge must consider his post a full-time job; he may hope to be reelected. He knows that he may be recalled. He further knows that he holds his post at the pleasure of the Party. Therefore, from the Party's point of view, he is a reliable person. The assessors, on the other hand, continue to work at their previous place of employment. They have no reason to attach undue importance to the honor of being people's assessors. Therefore, they may be inclined to be more independent-minded than a people's judge, as far as any citizen of a totalitarian State might be independent-minded. The safest course for the State was to eliminate the people's assessors from the trial of those cases.

The cases were expedited very swiftly. Originally the people's

court was to try such a case within five days. On October 22, 1942, the People's Commissar of Justice reduced the waiting period to two days for cases of willful absence, and three days for cases of willful dereliction of work.⁷⁶ The desire to mete out swift punishment to guilty workers was so strong that the decision of the people's court became executory on the day of its being rendered, in spite of a possible appeal by the convicted person.⁷⁷ This fact was important in the case of willful dereliction of work. In a willful absence the deducted part of the wages might be returned if the judgment was quashed or modified by a superior court. But nothing could be done retroactively about the time a person wrongly convicted for willful dereliction of work spent in jail, even if the judgment was reversed.

One might think that the people's courts would have handled labor cases with leniency. This expectation is hardly supported by the directives issued to courts:

The Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the USSR condemned the practice of courts which had been taking into consideration, as an excuse for inflicting light punishments, such factors as the good record of the accused . . . or the fact of his having been a Stakhanovite, a model worker, etc. . . .⁷⁸

It is edifying to see the Supreme Court of the so-called State of the workers and peasants denounce a fine of up to 25 percent deduction of wages for up to six months as being a mild penalty for a tardiness which might not have lasted more than twenty-one minutes. Still, Soviet writers dared to say that Soviet legislation "in contradistinction to the factory legislation of Tsarist Russia or of the bourgeois countries, forbids, as a rule, infliction upon the workers and officials of any pecuniary penalties, that is to say, fines, for breaches of labor discipline (Article 43 of the Code of Labor Legislation). . . ."⁷⁹ However, the Supreme Soviet itself in its decision of August 15, 1940, acknowledged plainly that the reduction of wages inflicted by the courts "is equivalent to the payment of an insignificant fine."⁸⁰

Such a fine was not the only penalty inflicted on an employee guilty of willful absence. Convicted employees "lose the continuity of their working record and are deprived of the right to temporary disablement allowances for a period of six months beginning with the date of the judgment."⁸¹ Those additional penalties were not light in themselves. A Soviet employee was required to have eleven months of uninterrupted service with the same enterprise in order to be granted a two-week vacation. Tardiness of twenty-one more minutes entailed in case of conviction delay of the annual vacation by as many months

as the duration of the correctional labor to which the employee was condemned by the courts. The second additional penalty might also have been rather painful. If the convicted employee fell sick or had a labor accident and was partially incapacitated, he could not claim the usual allowance from the State social insurance for the duration of six months beginning with the date of the judgment.⁸² Actually, he had to suffer all the consequences attached by law to correctional labor.

The period of time of correctional labor is not included within the length of the work record of the convicted, within the time required for the determination of his professional qualifications, within the length of service which entitled him to receive [old age] pension and other privileges or advantages (increased rates of wages in proportion to the length of the work service, additional vacations, etc.). The payment of the supplements to wages for long service is suspended for the duration of correctional labor. . . .⁸³

Stalin in 1930 said that the Soviet system “. . . makes work a matter of honor, a matter of glory, a matter of distinction, and of heroism, while it was considered in the past as a shameful and heavy burden.”⁸⁴ One could add that he made work also the subject of criminal law.

This shameful criminal responsibility for willful tardiness or willful dereliction of a job was finally abolished in 1956. Since that year the Soviet employee is punished for tardiness by disciplinary penalties inflicted by the management and is free to quit his job after a two-week notice. Thus Stalin's successors returned to his own pre-1940 standards after sixteen years of existence of this Draconian legislation.

Article 23 of the present Standard Rules of Internal Labor Order, enacted on January 12, 1957, has greatly restricted the concept of willful absence.⁸⁵ It is no longer the tardiness of several minutes which is now a minor breach of labor discipline but: “absence from work, without valid reasons, during the whole workday. Workers and officials who appear at work in the condition of intoxication are also considered willfully absent.” The same Article provides for the following gradation of punishments: disciplinary penalties of varying severity, deprivation for up to three months of the periodical supplement to wages for the length of service or reduction for up to 25 percent of a single recompense for the length of service, and dismissal with the pertinent annotation in the employee's labor book.

Article 24 adds that the manager may at his own discretion refrain from inflicting the disciplinary penalties provided for willful absence or any other infraction against labor discipline and instead submit the case to the comradely court.

The Rules also determine the scale of rewards for deserving employees (Article 19): expression of thanks, certificate of distinction, mention in the book of honor or on the board of honor, bestowing of title of best worker in his profession, cash bonus, and a costly present. The manager may not reward his employees without the assent in each case of the factory trade-union committee. Interestingly enough, he is not required to secure this assent if he applies disciplinary penalties.

The spirit of labor discipline enforced in the socialist State is eloquently reflected in Article 10 of the Rules which defines the obligations of workers and officials as follows:

"Workers and officials must:

"A. Work honestly and conscientiously;

"B. observe labor discipline and the rules of internal labor order; punctually come to work; observe punctually and without any infractions the established length of workday; use the whole worktime exclusively for productive work or for office duties; implement the instructions of the management on time and exactly;

"C. implement on time and careful work prescribed by orders or by assigned tasks; fulfill the norm of output and strive for its over-fulfillment; strictly observe the technological discipline, not allow for a defective output, and strive for the high quality of work;

"D. protect socialist property: machinery, machine-tools, instruments, raw materials, working clothes, and others;

"E.

"F. keep one's working place in order and clean, protect the cleanliness of the shop and of the whole plant, and surrender one's working place to the next worker in working order and clean."

Factory workers must duly register their arrival and departure (Article 14). Article 18 makes clear that the worktime should be used only for the fulfillment of the norm of output: "It is forbidden in work-time to: a. distract workers or officials from their work, and to call them away or free them from work for the implementation of social duties; b. convoke meetings, assemblies, or conferences of any kind to discuss public affairs."

The disciplinary penalties for infractions of the provisions of labor discipline are listed in Rule 22 of the Standard Rules of the Internal Labor Order. These penalties are: "a) observation, b) reprimand, c) severe reprimand, d) transfer to another lower paid job or demotion to a lower post for a period of up to three months."⁸⁸

The last and most severe penalty is the discharge applicable to employees who have committed several labor infractions. The penalty should be inflicted within a month after the discovery of the infraction

and not later than six months after its commission. The personal pride of the employee is not spared if he incurs a disciplinary penalty, because "the penalty should not only be brought to the attention of the worker concerned, but also should be made publicly known. . . . This publicity guarantees wide educational impact of the penalty."⁸⁷

Although the general requirements of labor discipline are strict enough, they were made more stringent in Stalin's time for employees of certain branches of production, such as "railway, fluvial, maritime and streetcar transport, civil aviation, enterprises of communication, municipal power stations, and some other limited categories of employees."⁸⁸ For instance, the Charter concerning the discipline of railroad employees provided, in addition to the usual disciplinary penalties, the following:

Arrest for a period of up to ten days with the obligation to perform the usual duties and without payment of wages for the duration of the detention, transfer to another lower paid job for up to three months, demotion to a lower post, degradation to a lower personal rank.⁸⁹

Imagine a locomotive engineer in a Western country being imprisoned for ten days without pay for disobeying the orders of his immediate superior. It seems fantastic under capitalist conditions, but it was for several years a reality for the transport employees of a socialist State created by a proletarian revolution.

The Soviet bureaucracy of higher rank are liable to disciplinary responsibility in the so-called hierarchical order. This means that, unlike other employees, they have no recourse to the Labor-Disputes Commission or to the courts, but may appeal against a disciplinary penalty only to the hierarchical superior of the immediate boss who has inflicted that punishment. The superior's decision is final. Penalties for bureaucratic executives are: observation, reprimand, demotion to a lower post for a period up to one year, or dismissal.⁹⁰

Soviet employees bear criminal responsibility for the divulgence of—

information of military nature . . . information of economic nature . . . [such as] . . . any information that is defined as a State secret by the Council of Ministers of the USSR and relating to the industries as a whole or their particular branches, to agriculture, trade or transportation, to the condition of the currency funds, current balance of payments and current financial plans of the USSR, to the place or manner of safeguarding and transporting precious metals belonging to the State Fund,

currency funds, banknotes and coins, to plans or draft plans concerning the importation or exportation of merchandise, amount of export reserves of particular merchandise, to geological reserves and extraction of nonferrous or rare metals, to discoveries, inventions and technological improvements of nonmilitary nature, to discoveries, inventions and improvements as well as research and experimental work in all fields of science, technology and national economy until such time when such work would be completed and permission for publication of the results would be granted. . . . Any other information that may be declared by the Council of Ministers of the USSR as not being susceptible of divulcation" (The Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 8, 1947).⁹¹

Any economic, scientific, or technological information is thus declared to be a State secret unless published by the Government.

If such information is imparted treasonably, the guilty person is liable to capital punishment; this is applicable in peacetime as well as in war. If there is no treasonable intention, the penalty is still very severe—2 to 8 years' imprisonment.

The Edict on State secrets of June 9, 1947, actually invites Soviet citizens to avoid like hell-fire any topic of conversation connected with their current work, because an average employee cannot guess what is classified or not classified information when practically everything is classified by the Decree of 1947.⁹²

The Soviet officials have great powers but are also liable for a heavy criminal responsibility. The new Criminal Code, introduced in 1961, enumerates several crimes which they might commit and probably do commit such as:

1. The factory manager, the chief engineer or the head of technological control is held responsible for an industrial output which is defective or does not meet the specifications or consists of incomplete goods. The punishment is confinement up to three years, correctional labor up to one year, or dismissal, if the offense has been committed more than once or on a large scale (Article 152).

2. False reports on the implementation of plan of production or other acts which may harm the national economy are punished by imprisonment for up to three years (Article 153). The similar offense of inserting false data in the official reports is punished by imprisonment up to two years, correctional labor up to one year, or dismissal (Article 175).

3. The manager of a State store or storehouse or any similar State

establishment, who sells knowingly products of defective quality or incomplete products, is punished by imprisonment up to one year or by a fine of up to 100 rubles (Article 157).

4. Abuse of official power to the prejudice of the State or other public interests or of the rights and interests of citizens is punished by the deprivation of freedom up to three years, correctional labor up to one year, or dismissal. If this offense is committed under aggravating circumstances, the penalty is raised to imprisonment up to eight years (Article 170).

5. The nonperformance or incorrect performance of official duties, if due to carelessness or lack of sense of responsibility and if it results in a serious harm for State or other public interests or for the rights and interests of citizens, is punished by confinement up to three years, correctional labor up to one year, or dismissal (Article 172).

6. The official who accepts bribes is punished by confinement from three to fifteen years and in particularly serious cases by death (Article 173). The person who bribes an official is punished by deprivation of freedom for three to eight years and, if the offense has been committed more than once, by confinement for seven to fifteen years (Article 174). The person who serves as an intermediary in bribing is punished by imprisonment for two to eight years; if he is a recidivist, by confinement for seven to fifteen years (Article 174, 1). Bribery must be a common plague of the Soviet society, because these very severe penalties are reinforced by the additional penalty of exile which the courts may inflict in cases of aggravating circumstances; the criminal may then be exiled, after having served his sentence of imprisonment, for periods varying from two to five years.

PECUNIARY RESPONSIBILITY

The trend towards increasing the responsibility of the employee has manifested itself also in the field of pecuniary responsibility for damages an employee might cause to his enterprise or office. Originally, in 1922, "a limited pecuniary responsibility of the worker was established which could not be higher than one-third of his [monthly] wages. . . . Later on, the full pecuniary responsibility [to the extent of the actual value of the damages] was introduced in a number of cases. . . . Finally, in a number of cases an increased pecuniary responsibility was established, up to the fivefold amount of the actual damage (for damages caused to property of the enterprise and to materials entrusted to the worker)."⁸³ The employee is materially responsible if the four following conditions have been fulfilled:

- 1) his act (or omission) is illegal, that is to say, represents a

violation of the obligations imposed by existing legislation . . . contracts, or directives of the management; 2) existence of material damages; 3) causal connection between the act (or omission) of the worker and the material damages; 4) the fault of the worker (intentional or negligence).⁹⁴

Full material responsibility is borne by the employee if he has caused those damages by a criminal act. "Criminal conviction of the employee is not indispensable in all cases to establish his full material responsibility."⁹⁵ The employee may not be prosecuted, but the management will be informed by the State procurator to the effect that he has committed the criminal act and should bear full pecuniary consequences. This seems to be a rather informal procedure, difficult to understand by people who are familiar with the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution: "No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property without due process of law." Suppose the Soviet investigating officer commits an error; the employee will not be given the benefits of a full judicial trial, but will have to pay for the consequences.

The other case of full material responsibility is that where existing laws provide for such responsibility. For instance, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of January 15, 1949, imposed full pecuniary responsibility on cashiers for all losses caused by "their careless, negligent, or intentional acts."⁹⁶

The third case of full material responsibility occurs when an employee accepts it in his contract of employment. His full responsibility requires the existence of his personal fault, for instance, carelessness. However, this fault is presumed unless the employee can prove otherwise.

In several cases the State may recover an indemnity which exceeds the actual value of the damages. Then, the augmented indemnity conceals a fine as well. Increased pecuniary responsibility exists in the following cases:

- 1) If raw materials, half-finished goods, manufactured articles, tools and other instruments, or working clothes entrusted to the worker are stolen, intentionally destroyed, or damaged, the employee is responsible to the extent of the fivefold value of those articles.

- 2) Loss or spoilage due to the employee's negligence of the same articles (except for the spoilage of raw materials, half-finished goods, and manufactured articles) is punished by an indemnity equivalent to the fivefold value. The indemnity for the spoilage of raw materials, half-finished goods, or manufactured articles if due to negligence is limited to the actual value and must not exceed two-thirds of the employee's average monthly wage.

The compensation in all cases is deducted by the management of the enterprise from current wages or salaries. However, the employee has recourse to the Labor-Disputes Commission and eventually to the people's court. These deductions may in no case exceed 25 percent of the employee's wage or salary. If other deductions (for example, to satisfy an adjudicated claim to alimony) are also being made, the total may not exceed 50 percent. Deductions are made till the whole sum has been recovered.⁹⁷

3) Collective farmers and the employees of State farms are responsible to the extent of the threefold value at the State prices for the loss of cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, and horses, if such a loss is due to carelessness. If it is intentional, they have to pay at the free market prices. The extra indemnity is obviously a fine. Still Soviet specialists insist that "one cannot consider as correct the rather widespread opinion that the part of the indemnity which surpasses the nominal value of the lost or stolen article has a penal character and represents a fine."⁹⁸ The "rather widespread opinion" is probably held by the Soviet employees.

The pecuniary responsibility is reinforced by the criminal. The Edict of December 29, 1961, states: "The criminally careless handling or maintenance of tractors, trucks, combines, and other agricultural machinery, which belong to a state or collective farm or to any other state or cooperative institution, if it causes the spoilage or breakdown or loss of parts, is punished by deprivation of freedom for up to one year or by correctional labor for the same period of time. The same acts if committed several times or only once but with resulting great damages are punished by the deprivation of freedom for up to three years."⁹⁹

Managerial officials bear the same responsibility as workers. Moreover, the management is responsible materially in the following cases: 1) to the extent of actual losses but not in excess of the total average monthly salary for damages caused by the incorrect organization of accounting for, or of protecting, raw materials, half-finished goods, manufactured articles, tools, and other instruments entrusted to the use of the workers or kept in storage under the management's supervision; 2) to the same extent, for not taking all necessary measures to prevent spoilage, theft, or destruction of the same property; 3) to the same extent for damages caused by not taking all required steps to eliminate stoppage of production; 4) to the extent of three months' earnings for damages to the enterprise caused by an irregular discharge of an employee to whom the enterprise must pay wages for the period of his forced idleness.¹⁰⁰

PROTECTION OF SOCIALIST AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

The Soviet civil law recognizes the following categories of property:

1. State (people's) property which includes land, subsoil and its resources, water, forests, factories, mines, power stations, transportation, banks, means of communication, all State-organized enterprises, the bulk of housing in the urban settlements, and any other property which the State owns.

Land, subsoil, forests, and water may not be owned by anyone else. Other juristic or physical persons may only use land with the State's assent. For example, the collective farm uses the land which it cultivates, and a private individual rents from the State the plot of land on which his dwelling is erected.

State property is one kind of socialist or public property.

2. The other kind of socialist property is cooperative. Cooperative property is mainly that of collective farms which may own buildings, agricultural machinery, cattle, subsidiary enterprises, the agricultural produce, cash capital, and any other property related to their economic or welfare activities.

3. The joint family property of the collective-farm household. This property includes the family dwelling, house, cattle within the limits established by law, fowl, small agricultural implements, and the produce from the adjoining plot of land assigned for the family use. The collective farmer may not own any property which law reserves for exclusive ownership by the collective farm, for example, agricultural machinery.

4. Personal property (which is called in other countries private property) may not include anything that brings income. It consists of any property destined to satisfy the personal material or cultural needs of individuals which has been acquired either by their own work or by gifts or inheritance. Personal property includes the dwelling house if it is for one's own use, household objects, other consumer goods such as an automobile or other personal means of transportation, furniture, clothing, earned income and savings, and copyright and patent rights in the case of writers and inventors.

Material responsibility insures the State against damages caused by an employee. But the State is not adverse to applying Draconian penalties to those who dare to tamper with sacred socialist property. Between 1932 and 1947 the matter was regulated by the joint Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of August 7, 1932. This decree established the death penalty and confiscation of all property of the convicted

"plunderer" of State, collective farm, or other public property. In the event of extenuating circumstances, the courts could replace capital punishment with deprivation of liberty for at least 10 years.¹⁰¹ The law of 1932 was replaced by the Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 4, 1947. This edict moderated the penalties somewhat but did not sin by a too great softness of feelings. The term "plunder" continued to cover any unlawful attempt at misappropriating socialist property, including robbery, theft, misappropriation, embezzlement, fraud, as well as the various modes of destruction of such property. The Soviet State is pitiless when it comes to punishment for tampering with socialist property, which is, according to Article 131 of the Soviet Constitution, "the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system. . . . Persons committing offenses against public, socialist property are enemies of the people."

The severity, however, of the penalties against all possible illegal acts upon socialist property should not lead to the hasty conclusion that the Soviet State does not adequately protect private property, a consideration of particular importance for well-paid higher dignitaries. Actually, on the same day (June 4, 1947) the law on socialist property was enacted, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet adopted another edict which reinforced the protection extended to personal property of private individuals. For the theft of personal property this edict provided the penalty of confinement for five to six years; for robbery accompanied by violence, ten to fifteen years and the confiscation of the whole property of the convicted; for robbery committed by a gang, or for the second time, or accompanied by acts or threats against the health or life of the victim, fifteen to twenty years. Certainly these penalties would not be considered very mild even by the most capitalistic defender of private property. The nondenunciation of such a crime was punishable by one to two years' imprisonment or by four to five years' exile to a distant area of the USSR. A high-salaried Soviet bureaucrat or dignitary could not honestly complain that his accumulated personal property was not given adequate protection by the State.

But the State protected even more effectively the socialist property. The Edict of June 4, 1947, relating to socialist property, established such penalties as: 1) for theft, misappropriation, embezzlement, or any other form of plunder of State property—confinement for from seven to ten years, with or without confiscation of the personal property of the convicted; 2) for the same crime committed a second time, or by an organized group (a gang), or for an important amount—confinement to a camp for ten to twenty-five years, with confiscation of property; 3) for the same acts of plunder, committed to the prej-

udice of a collective farm, cooperative, or other public property—confinement for from five to eight years, with or without confiscation of property; 4) for the same acts to the prejudice of the collective farm, cooperative or other public (but not State) property, if committed a second time, or by a gang, or for a large amount—confinement for from eight to twelve years, with confiscation of property; 5) for the nondenunciation to public authorities of the preparation or commission of any criminal act mentioned in the edict—confinement for two or three years or exile for from five to seven years.¹⁰²

The post-Stalinist legislation proceeded in two directions. On the one hand, a first or insignificant offense of petty larceny of State or other public property may now be referred to a comradely court. Petty larceny must be criminally prosecuted if the means of censure applied by the comradely court proves ineffective and a second offense is committed. On the other hand, the Edict of May 5, 1961, reestablished capital punishment for pilfering on a large scale of State or other public property.¹⁰³ In case of extenuating circumstances the death penalty may be replaced by confinement for up to fifteen years with confiscation of the criminal's property. Those who have been condemned only to confinement may not be released on parole. The death penalty is also applicable to robbery if personal or public property has been looted.

The new Criminal Code, introduced in 1961, codified the various legal provisions concerning the protection of socialist property. It equalized the penalties for crimes against the State and other public property ("other public property" means primarily property of collective farms and public organizations); each crime is now liable to the same penalty whether it has been committed against State or other public property. It also made a careful distinction between the various crimes directed against socialist property.

Article 89 punishes theft of State or other public property by deprivation of freedom for up to three years or by correctional labor for up to one year; if the theft is committed for the second time or by a group of persons, by confinement for up to six years; if committed by a dangerous recidivist or on a large scale, by confinement for five to fifteen years.

Robbery of State or other public property is punished by the deprivation of freedom for three to ten years; if committed under aggravating circumstances, by confinement for six to fifteen years with or without the additional penalty of exile (Article 91).

Misappropriation or embezzlement of the same property, if committed by a person to whom this property has been entrusted or by

the ill use of official duties, is punished by deprivation of freedom up to four years, correctional labor up to one year, or prohibition of exercising functions related to the protection of socialist property. If the same crime is committed under aggravating circumstances, the penalty is increased to confinement for up to fifteen years (Article 92).

Misappropriation by fraud is punished by confinement up to three years or by correctional labor up to one year; if committed under aggravating circumstances, by confinement for up to fifteen years (Article 93).

Pilfering of State or other public property on a particularly large scale is punished by deprivation of freedom for eight to fifteen years with the additional penalty of exile or by death (Article 93, 1).

Petty pilfering of the same property is punished by confinement up to six months, by correctional labor up to one year, or by public censure. But if the petty theft is committed by a person formerly convicted of stealing public or personal property, the penalty is raised to confinement up to two years (Article 96).

The Criminal Code also penalizes for other acts detrimental to socialist property which do not involve any misappropriation. For example, Article 98 punishes intentional destruction or spoilage by correctional labor up to one year or by a fine up to 100 rubles, notwithstanding the obligation to pay the damages. The same crime, if committed under aggravating circumstances (such as arson or a crime causing great losses), is punished by confinement up to ten years. Careless protection of State or other public property by persons who are officially responsible for it, resulting in its pilfering, loss, or spoilage, is punished by Article 100 by deprivation of freedom up to two years, by correctional labor up to one year, or by public censure.

The new Criminal Code has not forgotten protection of personal property. The theft of personal property of citizens is punished by confinement up to two years or by correctional labor up to one year. If committed under aggravating circumstances (for the second time, by a group of persons, with special instruments, or if the theft has caused large losses), it is punished by deprivation of freedom up to five years. A dangerous recidivist is to be imprisoned for four to ten years (Article 144). Robbery is punished by confinement for three to ten years; if committed under aggravating circumstances, by imprisonment for six to fifteen years with or without the additional penalty of exile (Article 146). Misappropriation of personal property by fraud is punished by confinement for up to two years and, in the case of aggravating circumstances, by imprisonment up to ten years

(Article 147). Intentional destruction or spoilage of personal property is punished by correctional labor for up to six months or by a fine of up to 100 rubles; the court may in addition compel the culprit to pay damages. If this offense is committed by arson or by other dangerous means or has resulted in serious consequences, the penalty is deprivation of freedom for up to eight years (Article 149). No doubt personal property remains adequately protected.

Although general criminal responsibility begins at the age of 16, for certain crimes it starts at 14. The Statute of December 25, 1958, on the General Principles of Criminal Law makes minors aged 14 to 16 fully criminally liable, among other serious offenses, for intentional destruction or spoilage of State, other public, or even personal property, if these acts have serious consequences.

The Supreme Court of the USSR in its decision of February 17, 1948, instructed the courts not to prosecute minors by virtue of the Edict of June 4, 1947, for small larcenies, "for instance, the theft of fruit from an orchard or of vegetables from a kitchen garden."¹⁰⁴ This advice was not superfluous, because Soviet courts had tended to apply the severe Edict of 1947 even to cases such as that of a certain G. who "was condemned to confinement for seven years to a correctional labor settlement for juveniles by the military tribunal of the Moscow-Ryazan railroad . . . for having stolen seven kilograms of flour from a railroad truck after having forced a wooden latch. . . ." ¹⁰⁵ Seven years for seven kilograms of flour seems to be a high price for Soviet flour—especially if one takes into account that the age of the criminal was 14 when his conviction was reexamined by the Supreme Court. This reminds one of the fateful theft of a loaf of bread by young Jean Valjean in Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*. Only the case of G. took place in the twentieth century in the so-called socialist State.

REWARDS—SOCIALIST COMPETITION

One may wonder whether Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels would have felt happy about a type of paradise for proletarians where such severe penalties hang over the heads of the toilers. It is true, however, that the Soviet State approaches its employees not only with a big stick but also with a piece of sugar when they vastly overfulfill the norms of output. The State is interested, first of all, in the greatest production and, second, in the stability of manpower. These two considerations govern the whole policy of rewards, whether pecuniary prizes or inexpensive medals and expressions of appreciation.

Achievement of better results is daily encouraged by piece-work

and progressively increasing rates, which make wages dependent on the actual output of each worker, and by apportioning the benefits of social insurance according to the length of service in general or with a particular enterprise. Special rewards are given to enterprises which come out victorious in the race of socialist competition, i.e., the race among enterprises of the same branch for the fulfillment or overfulfillment of the plan of production. These rewards are cash prizes. The prizes vary in amount. Three enterprises receive, depending on their respective results, the first, second and third prize. If the prize does not exceed 2,000 rubles, it is entirely distributed in bonuses granted to those employees who have contributed most to the victory of their enterprise. If it is higher than 2,000 rubles, 60 to 70 percent is used for individual bonuses, and the remainder is invested in the improvement of the employees' housing and welfare conditions. The managers, assistant managers, chief engineers, and chief accountants receive bonuses which amount for the first prize to 50 percent of their salary, for the second prize to 40 percent, and for the third prize to 30 percent.

The prizes are granted on certain conditions fixed in 1959, namely fulfillment or overfulfillment of the plan for lowering the cost of production and for improving its quality, fulfillment of the plan of output according to the planned specifications, use of prescribed new technics, modernization of equipment calculated to increase labor productivity, and punctual delivery of products to other economic regions and for All-Union needs. These conditions of success in the socialist competition indicate by implication the various frauds which formerly had allowed competing enterprises to win in fulfilling or overfulfilling the plan of production at the expense of other considerations.¹⁰⁶

Moreover, a victorious enterprise receives a Red Banner of one kind or another, depending on the territorial level on which the competition has taken place. The Red Banner does not greatly improve the welfare of the employees, but the prizes have a practical meaning.

Socialist competition is the daily fact in the life of the Soviet worker. Any opportunity to initiate, through Party members, socialist competition is good. It might be the anniversary of the October Revolution or of a victory in the last war or what not. One may doubt whether the rank-and-file workers enjoy contributing the necessary extra effort. After all, only three out of the many competing enterprises may win prizes, the others having to make a great effort for nothing. Also, only outstanding workers get cash bonuses out of the prize, the

rest having to be content for their trouble with the Red Banner adjudicated to their plant.

The craze of socialist competition invaded in the past such fields as education and science where the results of work cannot be measured by the quantity of output. Actually, the People's Commissar of Education of the RSFSR had to forbid in 1944 socialist competition among schools. He wrote:

... The conclusion of agreements between the teachers, students and schools, with the goal of producing a 100 percent quantity of students making normal progress and a definite percentage of students with excellent or good grades, has resulted in an artificial raising of grades to make them satisfactory, in lower requirements presented by teachers to their students, and in a lower concept of the teacher's educational task at the school.

. . . ¹⁰⁷

The former leader of the trade unions, V. V. Kuznetsov, stated at the 1952 Congress of the Party another example of the folly of socialist competition:

Some of the medical establishments have organized competition among the doctors in respect to medical treatment itself. . . . (Amusement in the hall.) In this race for the "fine" results the medical treatment of the workers and officials might have been, of course, adversely affected.¹⁰⁸

The most fashionable socialist competition of today is between individual workers or between brigades, shops, and shifts at the same plant. Millions of workers and hundreds of thousands of brigades and shops are taking part. It is impossible to know whether this enthusiasm is genuine or synthetic and due to pressure by trade unions, the Party, and the management. In any event the Party Central Committee on May 28, 1960, instructed all Party, trade-union and Komsomol organizations as well as the public administration to generalize by all means "this patriotic movement of our time." The winners receive the title of Shock Worker or of the Collective of Communist Labor. The purpose of this competition is to ensure the fulfillment or overfulfillment of planned output and to stimulate a rise in labor productivity. The results obtained by shock workers or shock brigades set the example for other workers.

Individual achievements are encouraged by various rewards, like mentioning the name of the employee on the honor roll of his enterprise, granting the certificate of good work, bestowing the title of

"Best Machinist," "Best Coal-Hewer," etc., or the medal of "The Excellent Achievement in Socialist Competition."

For the shock workers whose records are nationally known, there are medals "For Labor Prowess," and orders of "The Badge of Honor," "Labor Red Banner," or, the highest, of "Lenin." The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR may also grant the title "Hero of Socialist Labor," "Hero" having a meaning somehow corresponding to the British title of knight.

A long record of work is rewarded by similar titles and decorations. The intelligentsia is not forgotten in the distribution of rewards. Titles such as "Meritorious Scientist," "Meritorious Artist," or "Meritorious Teacher" are granted by the Republican authorities, while the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR bestows the titles of "People's Artist of the USSR," "People's Scientist of the USSR," etc. More important than these, the Council of Ministers of the USSR annually distributes large cash prizes (Lenin prizes, formerly Stalin prizes) to people who have become eminent in their field.

Titles and decorations being rather inexpensive, the Soviet Union has become the country with the highest number of people having honorary titles or wearing medals and orders. The chests of the highest Soviet civil and military dignitaries are so heavy with decorations that a marshal of the French Empire would have felt jealous. Even students of secondary schools receive a variety of medals. Perhaps the Soviet regime, following Tsarist practice, wishes to teach these future members of the upper and middle classes to appreciate the value of decorations.

NOTES

1. A. A. Askerov, N. D. Durmanov, M. P. Kareva, V. F. Kotok, I. D. Levin, and I. P. Trainin, *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvennoe Pravo*, Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Moscow, 1948), p. 107.

2. *Pravda*, November 2, 1961.

3. J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Foreign Languages Publishing House (Moscow, 1940), pp. 134-135.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

6. M. A. Arzhanov, S. F. Kecheikian, B. S. Mankovskii, and M. S. Strogovich, *Teoriia Gosudarstva i Prava*, Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 224.

7. J. Stalin, *op. cit.*, pp. 565-566.

8. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan, V. M. Dogadov, G. K. Moskalenko, and A. E. Pashernik, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 123.

9. *Loc. cit.*

10. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan, I. T. Goliakov, S. S. Karinskii, and G. K. Moskalenko, *Zakonodatel'stvo o trude, Kommentarii k zakonodatel'stvu o trude SSSR i Kodeksu Zakonov o Trude RSFSR*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 25.

11. N. G. Aleksandrov and G. K. Moskalenko, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, 2nd edition, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 28.

12. I. I. Evtikhiiiev and V. A. Vlassov, *Administrativnoe Pravo SSSR*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1946), p. 278.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 278.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 272.

15. N. G. Aleksandrov and G. K. Moskalenko, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

17. The text is reproduced in *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 1960, pp. 156-158.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

19. *Zapisnaia Knizhka Partiinovo Aktivista*, 1960, pp. 149-151.

20. *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, No. 9, 1958.

21. S. S. Askarkhanov, *Trudovoe Zakonodatel'stvo. Spravochnik Narodnovo Sudii*, Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 160.

22. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, pp. 175-176.

23. N. G. Aleksandrov and G. K. Moskalenko, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

24. The Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of March 8, 1956: *Pravda*, March 9, 1956.

25. *Pravda*, May 8, 1960.

26. A. E. Pasherstnik, *Pravovye Voprosy Voznagrazhdeniia Za Trud Rabochikh i Sluzhashchikh*, Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 179.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

28. N. G. Aleksandrov and G. K. Moskalenko, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

29. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 189.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

31. *Loc. cit.*

32. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

33. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 218; N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude*, p. 164.

34. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 182.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

37. *Loc. cit.*

38. *Loc. cit.*

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

41. A. E. Pasherstnik, *Pravo na Trud*, Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Moscow, 1951), p. 27.

42. *Loc. cit.*

43. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, pp. 277, 281.
44. N. G. Aleksandrov *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude*, pp. 277, 281.
45. *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 2nd edition, All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (Moscow, 1949), p. 541.
46. S. S. Askarkhanov, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
47. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude*, p. 24.
48. N. G. Aleksandrov and G. K. Moskalenko, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
49. A. E. Pasherstnik, *Pravo na Trud*, *op. cit.*, p. 212.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-213.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
53. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude*, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
54. S. S. Askarkhanov, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
56. See Part IV.
57. S. S. Askarkhanov, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
58. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude*, p. 45.
59. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 159.
60. A. E. Pasherstnik, *Pravo na Trud*, p. 48.
61. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 154.
62. A. E. Pasherstnik, *Pravo na Trud*, p. 46.
63. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, pp. 135-140.
64. Z. A. Vyshinskaia, *Prestupleniia v oblasti trudovykh otnoshenii*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 6.
65. N. G. Aleksandrov and G. K. Moskalenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 37 ff.
66. A. A. Gertsenzon, I. T. Goliakov, V. D. Menshagin, B. S. Osherovich, B. S. Utevsii, and Z. A. Vyshinskaia, *Ugolovnoe Pravo*, 2nd edition, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 275.
67. Z. A. Vyshinskaia, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
68. *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 1949, p. 53.
69. Z. A. Vyshinskaia, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
71. B. S. Utevsii, *Ugolovnoe Pravo. Biblioteka Narodnogo Sudii*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR, 2nd edition (Moscow, 1950), pp. 231-232.
72. Z. A. Vyshinskaia, *op. cit.*, p. 75.
73. B. S. Utevsii, *op. cit.*, p. 233.
74. N. G. Aleksandrov and G. K. Moskalenko, *op. cit.*, p. 257.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 262.
76. B. S. Utevsii, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-239.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
78. *Ibid.*, pp. 234-235.
79. N. G. Aleksandrov and G. K. Moskalenko, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

80. B. S. Utevsii, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-235.
81. S. S. Askarkhanov, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
82. B. S. Utevsii, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.
83. *Loc. cit.*
84. J. Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma*, 10th edition, p. 393.
85. *The Standard Rules of Internal Labor Order* of January 12, 1957, are reproduced in *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 1960, pp. 150-155.
86. S. S. Askarkhanov, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
87. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 273.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 278.
90. *Ibid.*, pp. 275-276.
91. *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 1949, pp. 73-74.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
93. N. G. Aleksandrov, V. M. Dogadov, P. D. Kaminskaia, and A. E. Pasherstnik, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.
94. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 283.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 286.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 287.
97. *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 1960, pp. 186-187.
98. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 290.
99. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 1, January 5, 1962.
100. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 293.
101. *Ugolovnyi Kodeks*, Moscow: 1947, pp. 105-106.
102. A. A. Gertsenzon, I. T. Goliakov, V. D. Menshagin, B. S. Osherovich, B. S. Utevsii, and Z. A. Vyshinskaia, *op. cit.*, pp. 348 ff.
103. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 19, May 11, 1961.
104. Z. A. Vyshinskaia, *Ob ugovnoi otvetstvennosti za khishcheniie gosudarstvennogo i obshchestvennogo imushchestva*, *Library of the People's Judge and of the People's Assessor*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1948), p. 14.
105. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.
106. *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 1960, pp. 120-121.
107. A. M. Danev, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
108. *Pravda*, October 11, 1952, p. 6.

CHAPTER TWO

Wages, Salaries, Bonuses Social Stratification

THE MERIT of a manual worker is measured by a yardstick called the norm of output, an indispensable part of the Soviet mechanism of wages, which are mainly piecework wages, designed constantly to increase labor productivity. "Piecework wages represent the fundamental system of compensation for manual workers. This system embraces the majority of workers: 71 percent of enterprises of the Ministry of Machine and Instrument Making Industries, 83 percent of those employed by the cotton industry, 92 percent of the workers in the lumber industry, etc."¹ Piecework wages mean that the worker is paid according to his actual output.

THE NORM OF OUTPUT

The norm of output helps to control the worker's output because it represents the obligatory minimum output within a given period of time. Thus, the worker is checked in two ways: by the length of the workday, which secures the worker's daily presence on the premises for certain hours, and by the norm of output, which guarantees that those hours are used productively.

"The norm of output is a quantity of articles of the prescribed quality or a number of operations which the worker is compelled to produce or to perform within a definite period of time (hour, day) under normal conditions of work. . . . For instance, a mason should lay 1,000 bricks in eight hours . . . a turner should turn out one bearing in twenty minutes."² After 18, juveniles are required to execute the norms established for adult workers.³

A worker is punished if he fails to execute the minimum norm, even though he has been at the plant throughout the seven hours. But if he completes the norm in six hours, he cannot leave the premises. He has to continue to work and overfulfill the norm.⁴ Rule 10 of the Standard Rules of the Internal Labor Order is clear: "[Workers are bound] . . . to fulfill the norm of output and to try to overfulfill this norm. . . ."

In other words, the worker is under two simultaneous obligations: to fulfill the minimum of output and to stay at the plant during the whole length of the workday, overfulfilling the norm. "The worker [must] use his work time to the maximum. Such a maximum output is always obligatory for the worker. . . . In other words, the overfulfillment of the norm of output becomes under certain conditions a legal obligation."⁵

What are the sanctions for nonfulfillment of the minimum norm? First of all, ". . . a worker who does not fulfill the norm receives wages proportionately lower. . . ."⁶ If the worker does not constantly execute his norm in good faith, he may be discharged or transferred to another job. If he does it in bad faith, the management may apply the various disciplinary penalties, including discharge.

From the worker's point of view the trend of Soviet labor legislation has been unfavorable. Norms are revised upwards yearly; the criterion used is the result achieved in the previous year by the shock workers; the ordinary workers have nothing to say. The norm is imposed from above. The present situation has evolved from a more liberal stage which was abandoned for the sake of intense industrialization. Until the early thirties norms were based on the achievements of average workers. "During the following years . . . [it was decided that] the determination of the norms could not be founded on the achievements of workers who lagged behind . . . but should be based on the results obtained by the conscientious, honest, and first-class workers who used the worktime and the available equipment fully."⁷

The Government, however, knows quite well that the achievements of the shock workers are accomplished under artificially favorable conditions. It would be foolish to ask the mass of workers to work out the same record amounts under normal work conditions. The shock workers' records serve only one purpose, namely, to stage a nationwide show in order to justify a new upward revision of the established norms. Stalin once said that the Stakhanovites were audacious innovators who knew "how to squeeze out of technic the maximum that might be squeezed out of it."⁸ One could alter somewhat his statement and say that the shock workers (formerly called Stakhanovites) are the tools of the Government used to squeeze the industrial proletariat to the maximum.

Until 1933 the norms were approved in each plant by the Appraisal-Conflict Commission. In that year this matter was left entirely to the discretion of the management. On December 25, 1935, it was formally established that "the services of the Stakhanovites should be enlisted extensively for establishing the norms."⁹ However, until 1939 the

management of the enterprise had to secure the formal approval of the new norms by the local trade union, although that approval was a mere formality, while the actual decision was taken by the management alone. This requirement was removed by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of January 14, 1939, which also fixed the procedure for the annual upward revision of the norms:

The [competent] minister and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions issue jointly the general orders concerning revision of the norms. . . . By virtue of such an order the heads of the principal departments together with the chairmen of the central committees of corresponding trade unions issue orders relating to the revision of the norms by particular enterprises. At the enterprises, the norms of output are approved by the manager on the recommendation of the heads of shops. Immediately after approval the norms become obligatory . . . for one year. . . . In some cases the norms are determined by the Government directly. . . .¹⁰

Norms are not always uniform for all the enterprises of the same industry because of varying conditions from one enterprise to another. In such cases only typical norms of output are indicated to be followed as closely as possible by the enterprises concerned.

Output may be increased either by the introduction of better machinery and methods or by forcing workers to produce more under the same technological conditions. The Soviet regime uses both means to increase production.

WAGES AND SALARIES*

Workers have nothing left to bargain for with the management of an enterprise because conditions of employment are regulated by the State, which at the same time represents the power of coercion and the person of the general employer.

Such matters as the level of wages, length of worktime, and norm of output are decided by the group of professional politicians who are not worried about their reelection. Still, the expert advice of the high bureaucrats of State, Party, and trade unions must be sought by professional politicians even in a totalitarian regime. Thus, the question of how much should be paid to workers is decided by Soviet citizens who belong to the high-income group and take good care of their personal well-being.

* See Addendum, p. 411.

The amount of wages of workers and of officials is determined at the present time by decrees of the Government (or on the basis of its directives), according to the State-planned regulation; this is done by applying the principle of differentiation depending on the importance, nature, and conditions of work. . . .¹¹

The regulation of wages is completely centralized, the competent authority being the Council of Ministers of the USSR. "The economic organs are obliged to observe strictly the approved limits of wages. . . . Persons guilty of willful increase of wages as well as of nonpayment of wages are subject to criminal responsibility."¹²

The total amount of wages and salaries to be paid by the State within a given year forms the so-called wage fund, which is part of the national budget. This fund is so fixed as to allow the State a very comfortable margin of profit above the over-all cost of production, which includes, among other items, wages. This margin represents the surplus value which is used for public expenditure (the cost of public administration, courts, the Armed Forces, capital investment for further industrialization, etc.). Marx talked abundantly about the surplus value retained by the private employer. In the socialist state surplus value exists just the same, but is retained by the state. The surplus value is quite sizable, as shown by a calculation made by a Soviet author. He assumed the average income of a white-collar or manual worker at 690 rubles per month, while he computed the value of the monthly output at 2,204.8 rubles. More than two-thirds was left to cover the other items of the cost of production and the State profit, or the socialist surplus value.¹³ These proportions are valid today even though the average wage amounts to 100 rubles (formerly 1,000 rubles) per month.

Each enterprise is allocated part of the national wage fund in proportion to the number of its employees and according to State fixed rates for each category of employees. If by any chance a given enterprise shows a loss, the employees must be paid, nevertheless, according to the same general rates applicable to other enterprises of the same industry.

There lies the economic superiority of the city employees over the peasants. "While wages do not depend legally on the income of a given enterprise or office and are secured by the State plan . . . the characteristic feature of the remuneration of collective farmers consists in the decisive importance of the fact that the fund for their remuneration [depends] on the income of each particular farm."¹⁴

However, the wages of a worker may be higher or lower proportionately to his individual output, because this is the direct conse-

quence of piecework wages. This affects the over-all wage fund of an enterprise. The connection between the plant's output and its general wage fund is presented briefly but adequately in the following formula:

If the output corresponds to the plan, the enterprise receives 100 percent of the planned wage fund; the wage fund is correspondingly increased for overfulfillment of the plan; it is proportionately lowered in the event of the nonfulfillment of the plan of production.¹⁵

Soviet socialists do not rely on the Marxist promises of a new mentality to be produced by the socialist environment. They prefer to use two more reliable devices—disciplinary penalties and wages proportionate to actual individual output. A Soviet theorist candidly admits that “in the conditions of the socialist regime personal interest and material stimulus represent the principal factors of the development of public production. . . . Work does not represent as yet for all members of the society their first need in life.”¹⁶ “In addition,” the author continues, “Comrade Stalin stressed in an interview . . . that under socialism the toilers work, and tend to produce more and overfulfill the plan, not only because they govern and are the masters of production, but also because each of them is materially interested in the results of his own work.”¹⁷ Khrushchev would not repudiate this statement, and he never tires of stressing the importance of material incentive. The legend that the toilers are the rulers of the Soviet State and masters of production is, of course, a fairy tale denied by the whole of Soviet legislation and practice; as a result, the importance of material stimulus increases in due proportion.

The Soviet State did not guarantee prior to 1956 any minimum wages which would keep workers above the starvation line. “When a worker fails to fulfill by his own fault the established norm, his wages are paid according to the quantity and quality of his actual output without a guarantee to him of any minimum wages whatsoever (Article 57 of the Code of Labor Legislation).”¹⁸ The fault may be anything, from sheer laziness to a physical weakness.

Because compensation for work is determined in the USSR according to the quality and quantity of that work, existing Soviet legislation does not use the principle . . . practiced in some capitalist countries and which consists in determining wages by taking into consideration the family position of a worker: family allowances, the unequal wages for bachelors and married workers.¹⁹

If a Soviet worker has a large family and cannot meet his financial needs, the answer is simple—the wife and children over 15 years old should earn their living. “The work of the members of families contributes to the income and improves the material life of workers and officials.”²⁰ After all, “according to existing Soviet legislation, the obligation of an employer consists in the payment of the remuneration for executed work, but not in supporting an employee.”²¹ No capitalist employer would disagree with this statement. Since 1956 only unskilled workers have benefited by a guaranteed minimum of wages fixed around 300 rubles (now 30 new rubles), a monthly earning that barely keeps a family above the starvation line.

The criteria of wages being the quantity and quality of output, it is only logical that the Soviet system has vigorously repudiated the concept of equality of wages. Of course, the new upper and middle classes of Soviet society, which have incomes several times larger than the average wages of unskilled workmen and which form the backbone of the regime, have every reason to disfavor egalitarianism. Egalitarianism in income would upset the vested interests of the intelligentsia, which provides the levers for the execution of the policy formulated by the Party leadership. According to present-day Soviet doctrine, “equality of wages originated in the petty bourgeois mentality, in the mentality of an equal distribution of all goods, in the mentality of a primitive peasant communism,” while inequality of wages “secures the material interest of the worker in the quantitative and qualitative results of his work and thus stimulates increase of the productivity of labor. . . .”²²

The struggle against egalitarianism was started by Stalin’s “historic speech at the conference of economists” and in his other statements, which “inflicted a mortal blow on the concept of equal wages in theory and practice, and unmasked with full clarity its anti-Marxist content and practical harmfulness.”²³ In 1931 the All-Union Conference of the Party adopted the following resolution:

We must liquidate completely the rotten practice of egalitarianism in wages and must achieve the objective of making out of the piecework and bonus system the most important factor of the struggle for increased labor productivity and, consequently, also for the development of the national economy.²⁴

Consequently: “During 1931-32 new tariffs and new tariff qualification standards were introduced, which secured substantial differences between wages of skilled and unskilled workers, between wages for

light and heavy work. . . . The leading professions were favored. . . . A new attitude was adopted for the level of wages in various branches of industry . . . granting the first place in the scale of wages to essential and decisive branches of heavy industry. . . ."²⁵ This statement is somehow bashful, for it bypasses the whole question of very high salaries for the intelligentsia. But it is sincere enough to admit that workers in heavy industries are favored over workers in light industries, contrary to the socialist principle of equal wages for equal work.

Soviet authorities defend inequality of incomes by stating that the Soviet State cannot afford to distribute goods according to the needs of its citizens but according to the results of their work. Article 12 of the Constitution states this specifically: "The principle applied in the USSR is that of socialism: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.'" The trouble begins when one tries to find a common yardstick of work applicable generally to all workers and officials. What kind of common yardstick could measure the work of a manager, an office clerk, a coal miner, or a charwoman during the same seven hours of work? This problem is considered solved in the Soviet Union by using two criteria: quantity and quality. While the quantities of output are meaningless for mental effort, and are fairly meaningless for workers occupied in different industries, the quality of work is an arbitrary notion. Why should one consider the work of a baker as being of lower quality than that of a metal-worker? One can only declare honestly that one baker's work is of a better quality than that of another, simply by comparing the taste of the loaves of bread they produce. Any other comparison is unrealistic.

The Soviet Government does not feel embarrassed by such problems. Something else is meant by quality and quantity. Quantity of output serves as a criterion of the differentiation of wages only for workers occupied in the same occupation and the same industry; their monthly wages depend on the quantity of output of each of them. Quality, on the other hand, means the application of the law of supply and demand. The demand is that of the State. The State is prepared to pay higher wages in order to fulfill its own plan of production and in order to attract labor to certain industries it favors because of the requirements of its plan. By granting high salaries to white-collar workers it encourages the steady supply of the intelligentsia. By favoring skilled workers it encourages the acquisition of industrial skill by young people and increases the supply of qualified workers.

Therefore, the socialist state follows that same basic law of demand and supply which is familiar to capitalist societies, where wages and salaries are also regulated by the same law. Only, the application of this law is not left to a free interplay of social forces as in a capitalist society, but is regulated by the State, which is an all-powerful employer whose demand for labor must be satisfied and which can manipulate through legislation wages and salaries without any interference from trade unions.

In addition, the State, by its policy of wages and salaries, favors the growth of vested interests, which are the mainstay of any regime. The higher wages for certain categories of employees have an economic as well as a political reason. If one bears this fact in mind, he may easily understand why the manager of a factory or an engineer or a foreman has an income much higher than the rank-and-file workers of the same plant.

One may read with some incredulity the following statement: "The principle of equal wages for equal work is the foundation of the system of wages in the USSR."²⁶ The same writer contradicts his general statement when he comes to a detailed explanation of criteria for the differentiation of wages:

One must distinguish two forms of the regulation of wages: 1) by branches, . . . within the same branch by enterprises, and finally within the same enterprise; 2) . . . according to the territorial location of a given enterprise. . . . The socialist State uses wages as one of the most important economic tools for the correct distribution of manpower among the various branches of industry and among the particular enterprises, and as a means of attracting manpower toward the crucial branches of industry and the leading enterprises and of stimulating the stabilization of permanent personnel of employees. . . . The district regulation of wages is founded on the following factors: the national-economic importance of a given district, its distant location and conditions of existence in a given distant area. . . .²⁷

One may understand the higher wages for work in distant areas with difficult climate. But one cannot but contest the justice of higher wages for workers in one branch to the prejudice of workers performing equally heavy work in another industrial branch, or of the differentiation of wages for equal work, depending on the State classification of enterprises of the same industry.

The yardstick of quantity is the heart of the concept of piecework wages as distinguished from time wages. In the USSR, the wages of manual workers are regulated by two tariffs: either on the basis

of the time spent on work or by the quantity of output. However, a worker has to spend seven hours on the job even in the second case. Theoretically, a worker may choose the tariff according to which he will be paid. Actually, he is forced to choose the piecework tariff because its rates are higher than those of the time-tariff. As he has to work during the seven hours and fulfill—and, if possible, overfulfill—the minimum norm, it is in his interest to be placed in the piecework tariff with higher rates.²⁸ Since piecework rates are higher by 10 to 15 percent, it is not surprising that “more than 75 percent of all industrial and constructional workers are paid piece wages.”²⁹

This fact corresponds to the interest of the State. A pieceworker who overfulfills his minimum norm is paid additional wages. The timeworker, however, cannot claim extra pay even if he overfulfills the norm because he is paid strictly on the basis of the time spent at the plant. The pieceworker has an interest in the overfulfillment of the norm, and so does the State. It is true, therefore, that “the piecework wages are the fundamental and the most effective stimulus of the increase of the productivity of labor in the USSR.”³⁰ The socialists used, however, to complain that piecework was the most effective form of the exploitation of workers by the capitalists.

For certain occupations for which no norm could be reasonably established, time-wages must continue. Such workers are, for instance, white-collar workers, engineering-technical personnel and office employees, or workers whose work is such that encouragement of higher output might produce a deterioration of the quality of work.³¹ Of course, the most important exception is the white-collar workers.

The transfer of workers from the time-tariff to the piecework tariff does not depend on their choice alone. The Government must first approve the introduction of the piecework tariff by an enterprise.

There are actually two piecework tariffs: the simple and the progressive, the latter being favored by the Government. According to the simple tariff, the worker is paid the same amount for each piece of output before and after he fulfills the norm. Under the progressive piecework tariff the worker is paid according to the minimum rates until he fulfills the norm. After fulfillment, his extra output is paid according to higher rates, these being increased on a growing scale. For instance, a building worker who has overfulfilled the norm by 10 percent is paid for that part according to 15 percent higher rates; 30 to 50 percent above the norm is paid at 60 percent higher rates; more than 50 percent over the norm is rewarded by rates 100 percent higher.³² This rapidly growing progression of wage

rates stimulates the worker to produce as much as possible. But the State is in no danger of having to pay excessive wages. The norms are periodically revised upwards; workers may find it progressively more difficult to overfulfill the established norms.

The Soviet Government is currently engaged in studying a reform of wages and salaries. The steady process of technological improvement (assembly-line production, automation, etc.) has the same result in the capitalist and socialist societies. The worker is controlled by the machine he serves; the machine does not allow him to relax or to loiter. The machine also predetermines to a large extent the amount of actual output per worker. The scheme of wage computation that emerges from the Soviet discussions will consist in the future of somehow higher basic wages and much lower bonuses for overfulfillment of the norm of output. As the Soviet industrial workers have tended frequently to overfulfill the norm in order to increase their meager earnings, the new system with much lower remuneration for overfulfillment will probably result in a firm stabilization of wages at the present level. The State will henceforth look to better equipment for increasing output and an efficient control over workers.

The same reform is intended also to change the system of remuneration for the managerial class. Their basic salaries, at least in the higher brackets, will be lowered, while bonuses for overfulfillment of the plan of production and for economies realized on fuel, power, and raw materials will be sharply increased. The philosophy of this change will be the opposite of the one presiding over the reform of workers' wages. It will further encourage the managers, heads of shops, and foremen to do their utmost to increase production by forcing the employees under their control to work harder and by using better technological processes.

The same discussions on the reform of wages make it perfectly clear that the norms of output will be sharply raised.

At the present time the State pays the worker by calculating his output by the total monthly result. A worker might greatly overfulfill the norm during the first two weeks. If he later lags behind and does not overfulfill the norm for the month as a whole, he will not be paid the higher rates for the first fourteen days. He will be paid according to the minimum rates for the whole month.³³ This computation may be considered fair or unfair, but one cannot say that the Soviet Government particularly pampers its own proletarians.

Sometimes the piecework wage system is applied to the work of a group of workers if it is technically impossible to distinguish their individual results. In such an event the total output of the team of

workers is calculated on a monthly basis. The wages due to the whole team are distributed to its members according to the category of skill of each of them and according to the time each of them spent on the team work. But the Soviet State prefers "individual piecework which eliminates all egalitarian factors and the impersonal character of remuneration."³⁴

Workers are classified in various categories (seven, eight, or more) depending on their skill. Wages vary, depending on the industry, even for equally skilled workers. Wages are very unequal, the differences favoring skilled workers; the highest-category worker gets well over three times as much per day as his colleague in the lowest category. The notable difference between time and piecework rates encourages workers in each category to accept the piecework system.

"The allocation of each worker to a tariff category is determined by the management according to test work executed by the worker and in conformity with the tariff qualification standards."³⁵ New tariffs and new tariff qualification standards "cannot be introduced without permission of the Government of the USSR in each case."³⁶

Workers and officials who are occupied in distant northern areas with harsh climate receive a money supplement of 10 to 20 percent of their wages for every six months, every year, or every two years spent in those areas. The periods of time required for supplements are shorter or longer depending on the harshness of climatic conditions.

In certain cases supplements are added to salaries or wages for length of service.³⁷ Supplements are granted as a reward for learning foreign languages by the employees "of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and for certain other employees."³⁸ Probably among the "certain other employees" are those employed abroad for purposes not altogether friendly to foreign countries.

The prestige and power of the manager of the Soviet factory is greatly increased by the existence of the so-called enterprise's fund, which is another possible source of income for the employees. According to the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of August 9, 1955, the fund is fed as follows:

- 1) From the planned profit or the planned reduction of the cost of production, enterprises retain the following percentages as a contribution to the fund:
 - a) 6 percent in the steel, nonferrous metallurgical, coal-mining, oil, chemical, cement, and asbestos industries, and in the extraction of peat.

- b) 4 percent in aeronautic, shipbuilding, defense, engineering, automobile, tractor and other agricultural machinery, transport equipment, power station equipment, electrical, radio, paper and wood products, building materials, and communication equipment industries.
 - c) 1 percent in consumer goods and food-processing industries.
 - d) 2 percent in the textile industries.
- 2) From the profit or the economies on the cost of production above the plan, enterprises retain the additional percentages according to the following classes of industries:
- a) 50 percent in the industries listed above under a).
 - b) 40 percent in the industries listed above under b).
 - c) 20 percent in the industries listed above under c).
 - d) 30 percent in the textile industries.

A glance at these percentages shows that light industries are least favored because they produce consumer goods, while the Soviet Government is much more interested in heavy industries than in the current standard of living of its citizens.

Fifty percent of the fund may be spent on the extension of the enterprise, on the modernization of equipment, and on the building and current repair of the housing accommodations for the employees; the remaining 50 percent may be spent on improving the welfare services for employees or on covering travel expenses of deserving employees who are sent to sanatoria or rest homes, and on individual bonuses for outstanding workers and officials employed by the enterprise. However, in the "land of toilers" these bonuses and other benefits should never be "excessive." The total contributions to the fund should never exceed 5 percent of the planned annual wage-fund of the given enterprise. Bonuses should be distributed to the outstanding workers. But one may guess that, human nature being what it is, even in the Soviet Union the employee may be assisted in getting a bonus by having friendly relations with the bosses.

The estimate of planned expenditures from the fund is established by the manager in cooperation with the factory trade-union committee. The manager may assign part of the fund to the heads of shops who then distribute bonuses, at their own discretion, to the deserving employees of their shop.³⁹

In certain exceptional cases an employee may be paid the average wages for the periods of his short absence from the enterprise to perform public duties, for instance, those of a people's assessor, a delegate

to a Soviet, Party or trade-union assembly, or a witness. If he appears before the courts as a plaintiff or a defendant, his absence is excused but he will receive no wages.⁴⁰

The net wages of a Soviet employee may be much lower than his gross pay. The most usual deductions would be as follows: 1) income tax and the tax on bachelors and married people with only one or two children; 2) deductions due the State for damages caused to the enterprise; 3) deductions to cover public or private claims adjudicated by courts; 4) deductions for the period of correctional labor.

Deductions, as a rule, cannot go over 25 percent of current wages except in certain cases when they can reach 50 percent of current wages (to cover certain private claims such as alimony and State claims for damages). Deductions for correctional labor are not included in these percentages. "This is why it is quite possible that a worker who is doing correctional labor and also pays alimony may actually receive during the period of correctional labor less than 50 percent of his nominal wages."⁴¹

There are special rules relating to the computation of wages in the event of a breakdown of production or in the case of defective output. In case of a breakdown remuneration depends on the existence or nonexistence of fault on the part of the worker, including negligence without any malicious intent. If the worker is at fault, he receives no pay. If the breakdown of production is due to the lack of electrical power or the shortage of materials or the weather, the worker receives 50 percent and in certain heavy industries two-thirds of wages computed according to time (i.e. lower) rates.

If the defective output is the worker's fault, he receives no wages for a completely defective output and lower wages in case of a partly defective output. These lower wages are fixed by the management in proportion to the value of defective articles but may in no event exceed 50 percent of wages which otherwise would have been due.

If the defective output is caused by other reasons, the worker is paid, for a completely defective output, only two-thirds of time rates although he might usually earn piece wages. If the output is only partly defective, the wages are proportionately reduced but they may not be less than two-thirds of time-rate wages.

This system may produce the following results. The worker has worked hard without realizing that his output is defective; the fault might have been that of the engineering staff. Yet he will be penalized by being paid lower wages—lower not only because of the above-mentioned reductions but also because they will be calculated according to the time rates. The same unjustified penalty is borne by the

worker in case of a breakdown due to causes beyond his control such as lack of electrical power or shortage of raw materials. The worker is simply asked to underwrite from his pocket a part of losses suffered by the State. This is not even a fine, because the fine presupposes in the USSR, as in any other country, the fault of the person concerned.

The worker is obligated immediately to inform the management of the breakdown, of the factors known to him as being likely to produce a breakdown, and of the defectiveness of output. If he fails to do so, he is not paid for the period of breakdown or for the defective output. Moreover, he is punished by a disciplinary penalty for failing to report a breakdown and must pay damages for the materials wasted in the unreported production of defective articles.

"The management of an enterprise or office which has not taken all necessary measures to eliminate the breakdown or defective production is liable to disciplinary and criminal responsibility and is also materially responsible for damages caused to the enterprise or office."⁴²

Salaries of white-collar workers are not based on quantity of work but are differentiated according to quality, a very flexible notion which allows the Government to establish a wide scale of salaries on the basis of the following criteria: the public importance of a given post and, consequently, its rank, the length of the total service of the individual concerned, his education, and the location of the area to which he is assigned.⁴³

Salaries of managerial and engineering-technical officials are determined according to "the national economic significance of that industry, the relative importance of a given enterprise or a given shop within the industry, the territorial location of the enterprise, and the importance of each particular function . . . also according to the degree of education . . . and the length of service of the individual concerned. The existing scale of salaries . . . determines the upper and lower limits of the salary for each function with a sufficient difference between the two limits. This allows the management to fix in each case the actual salary according to the personal qualifications of the recipient, and stimulates the person concerned in improving the quality of his work."⁴⁴

This enumeration of the determining factors amply indicates that the socialist principle of compensation according to the quantity and quality of work is not followed religiously either for wages or for salaries. An engineer may be paid less for the same work than another man in the same profession only because he happens to be employed by a second-category enterprise.

BONUSES AND PERSONAL SALARIES

Quite often a salary represents only one source of income of the Soviet white-collar worker. The other source is the bonuses. Such bonuses may come from the manager's and the foreman's funds, from part of the socialist competition prize distributed among employees for their individual contributions toward the success of the enterprise, and from the bonus tariffs. The first two types are distributed by the management at its discretion. The third, however, follows the established tariffs according to certain standards of achievement. The tariff bonuses are usually destined for white-collar workers whose efforts might notably contribute to fulfillment or overfulfillment of the production plan. The Party and the Government attach great importance "to the bonus system as the best form of the application of the principle [of material encouragement] to leading employees" who determine indirectly the average quantity and quality of the output of the manual workers. "The amount of the bonus [increases] in proportion to the extent of the overfulfillment of the plan."⁴⁵

Bonuses are paid to the managerial, engineering, and technical employees, according to the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of August 29, 1946, on the condition that fulfillment or overfulfillment of the plan has not resulted in deterioration of some other aspects of production, such as lower quality or increased costs. Bonuses depend on the type of industry and the category of the enterprise, rank of the employee, and percentage of overfulfillment of the plan. Once again the familiar discrimination in favor of certain employees appears. Bonuses are higher for employees of the coal-mining, oil, chemical, and metallurgical industries and power stations, while they are lowest in consumer goods industries.

Enterprises of the same industry are usually divided into three categories. In each category the eligible employees are classified into two or three categories. For example, in a mechanical-engineering enterprise of the first (highest) category, a bonus of up to 37 percent is given to the first category of employees (managers and principal engineers, deputy and assistant managers, heads of important divisions, and foremen of leading sectors) for fulfillment of the plan and an additional 4 percent for each percentage point of overfulfillment. In the second category of enterprises the percentages go up to 30 and 3 percent respectively. In the third category of enterprises the bonus for fulfillment goes up to 22 percent and for overfulfillment, 2 percent for each percentage point.

For the second category of employees (the heads of secondary

divisions, assistant heads of shops and divisions, heads of sectors, foremen of the remaining sectors, senior constructors, senior engineers) the bonuses are as follows: in the first-category enterprises the fulfillment bonus goes up to 22 percent, in the second, up to 15 percent, and in the third, up to 15 percent. For overfulfillment the bonuses are 2, 1.5, and 1.5 percent respectively. In other words, the highest percentages are reserved for the higher employees.

Fulfillment or overfulfillment of the plan is computed usually each month for shops and each quarter for employees who are responsible for the production of the whole enterprise. All bonuses due for a given period (a month or a quarter) must not exceed 150 percent of the basic salary due for the same period.⁴⁶

True, the wages of shock workers might run into a few hundred rubles if these workers overfulfilled the minimum norm by a high percentage. But the shock worker is a rare phenomenon among millions of ordinary workers. Moreover, he cannot overfulfill the norm constantly and does it only for a limited period of time while placed under specially favorable conditions. Then he is liable to be withdrawn from work to demonstrate as a show worker his prowess at other factories.

The solidarity of the working class is also broken by the higher wages paid to the brigadiers of the workers' brigades. They get a supplement equivalent to 10 to 25 percent of the wages normally due a worker of the same category of skill.⁴⁷

The remuneration of the white-collar employees is not only basically higher than that of manual workers but such employees also receive a proportionately larger share from the enterprise fund and from the socialist competition prize which a given enterprise has won.

Managerial and engineering-technical employees may receive additional bonuses by virtue of the Decree of October 1, 1942; for having observed the established limits on the expenditure of fuel and electric power, they get a 10 percent bonus added to their monthly salary.⁴⁸ Moreover, a minister or head of a department may grant special bonuses for exceptional achievements which have resulted in higher output or greater economies.⁴⁹ All bonuses cannot exceed two monthly salaries; i.e., a successful manager may receive as many as three basic salaries. This upper limit does not include bonuses due employees of an enterprise which has won a socialist competition prize. Employees who devise new machinery receive bonuses for fulfillment or overfulfillment of the plan resulting from their discoveries.

In the state of the dictatorship of the industrial proletariat it is better to be a white-collar employee. This is bashfully acknowledged by

the Soviet specialists.⁵⁰ The manager of a successful enterprise adds bonuses to his high salary and may end up with a monthly compensation ten times higher than that of his subordinate skilled workers whose average wage reportedly is around 90 to 100 rubles.⁵¹ The skilled worker should still feel happy if he compares his lot not to that of his bosses at the factory but to that of unskilled laborers for whom a minimum wage was fixed only in 1956 at the very low level of 27 to 35 rubles. The average collective farmer earns about half the income of a skilled urban worker, between 45 and 50 rubles. This wide range of incomes is, of course, far removed from any "rotten egalitarianism." Since the reevaluation of the ruble in 1960 (one new ruble for ten old) the ruble is worth \$1.10 according to the inflated official Soviet exchange rate. By this rate of exchange Soviet prices are much higher than prices in the United States, especially for manufactured consumer goods including such necessities as clothing. Only the rent is very low: it does not exceed, for an average urban family, 5 to 10 rubles in the new housing projects and is even lower in the old, dilapidated and overcrowded houses which still form the bulk of urban housing accommodation. The modest income of the husband who belongs to the working class must be supplemented by his wife's earnings. Together they may earn on the average as much as 150 to 180 rubles. About 80 percent of women are gainfully occupied.

Occasionally, upper brackets of the intelligentsia may be granted the so-called personal salaries which by-pass the tariffs established for the functions which they might perform. Personal salaries are granted to persons whose functions are very important or whose activities are exceptionally valuable to the State. Personal salaries cannot exceed 150 percent of the normal salary established for a given function, except by decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. This matter is regulated by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of April 5, 1945.

Personal salaries may be granted not only to the heads of a collective unit, but also to eminent scientists, high justices, bureaucrats, and intellectuals individually outstanding.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION THROUGH DIFFERENTIATION OF INCOME

An Englishman who did not know French too well translated the French idiom *le bien-être général* as, "It is fine to be a general." In the Soviet Union it is fine to be a general or hold a corresponding civilian post. It pays off better than being a manual worker in whose name the October Revolution was made. This fact does not conform to the

high expectations of Karl Marx and Lenin, who insisted that the white-collar worker of a socialist State should be paid the average wages of an industrial worker. Lenin wrote on the eve of the October Revolution:

The workers, having conquered political power, will smash the old bureaucratic apparatus, they will shatter it to its very foundations, they will destroy it to the very roots; and they will replace it by a new one, consisting of the very same workers and office employees, against whose transformation into bureaucrats the measures will at once be taken which were specified in detail by Marx and Engels: 1) not only election, but also recall at any time; 2) pay not exceeding that of a workman; 3) immediate introduction of control and supervision by all. . . .⁵²

Actually, the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus is appointed and recalled from above, is subject to control from above, and is paid several times more than the workers.

In the Soviet Union the old bureaucracy was smashed and a new one created. New high dignitaries appeared and with them the high salaries and vested interests in the regime itself. The Party is vitally interested in cultivating the vested interests of the new upper class, the mainstay of the "socialist" State. Lenin complained before the Revolution that the Western socialists had "completely forgotten" Marx's teachings against "all monetary privileges in the case of officials" and for the "reduction of the remuneration of all servants of the State to the level of 'workmen's wages.'" Some 45 years later the disciples of Marx and Lenin would say that to mention the equality of wages and salaries would be "primitive naïveté."

Stalin once compared the Party to the mythological Antaeus, son of the Earth, who was invincible as long as he kept in contact with his divine mother. Antaeus was vanquished by Hercules, who lifted him up from the earth. Is Soviet bureaucracy the new Hercules lifting the Party above the proletariat, cutting off its living ties with the actual toilers?

The wide differentiation of wages of industrial workers is motivated by economic consideration of skill and efficiency but has the political effect of undermining the solidarity of the industrial class as a whole. For instance, there are eight categories of basic wages in the mechanical-engineering industry. The wages go up by 10 to 15 percent from one category to the next. A highly skilled worker in the eighth category earns a basic wage 2.7 times higher than his colleague of the lowest, first category. Of course, the bonuses for the overfulfillment of

the norm of output being calculated in proportion to the basic wages, the actual difference between the monthly remuneration of the two workers is, in fact, much more marked than the mere comparison of their basic wages would show.⁵³

The difference in incomes between an engineer and a highly skilled worker of the eighth category is, at the beginning of the former's career, favorable to the worker. This probably helps to create the impression that incomes of manual workers and those of white-collar workers blend imperceptibly at the boundary line. This illusion vanishes when one remembers the wide difference between the lower- and the upper-income limits of the two categories of employees.

The same illusion is nourished by the exceptionally high wages of the shock workers. But there are not many shock workers, nor can they perform their production feats regularly. However, the propaganda effect is there. Shock workers may earn high incomes, but this does not bring them into the stratum of the intelligentsia because their educational background is not comparable to that of the intelligentsia.

As a matter of fact, social stratification in the Soviet regime follows mainly the criterion of education. A person with a university education may hope to reach the summits of a Soviet career, if only he is loyal politically and is willing to embrace the Marxist-Leninist credo. The rewards are attractive in terms of prestige, titles, decorations, and money. Consider, for instance, the royalties paid to Soviet authors. One should bear in mind, however, that an author cannot have his work published without the approval of the State authorities.

TABLE I
ROYALTIES ON SOVIET PUBLICATIONS

Kind of Publication	Number of Copies	Rubles for Each Group of 40,000 Letters ⁵⁴
Artistic prose	15,000	150-300
Artistic prose in mass editions	75,000	200-300
Artistic story	75,000	100-150 each short story
Poetry	10,000	1-1.50 each stanza
Scientific	10,000	150-300
Higher school textbooks	25,000	150-250
Secondary school textbooks	200,000	100-200
Elementary school textbooks	400,000	100-150 ⁵⁵

The Soviet author of a technological invention which allowed for appreciable economies in the cost of production receives the fees shown in Table II:

TABLE II
REMUNERATION FOR DISCOVERIES, INVENTIONS,
AND RATIONALIZING PROPOSALS

Amount of Annual Savings (in Rubles)	Remuneration for Invention	Remuneration for Rationalizing Proposals
Up to 10	25% of the saving but not less than 2 rubles	13.75% of the saving but not less than 1 ruble
10-50	15% plus 1 ruble	7% plus 1 ruble
50-100	12% plus 2.5 rubles	5% plus 2 rubles
100-500	10% plus 4.5 rubles	2.75% plus 4.5 rubles
500-1,000	6% plus 25 rubles	2% plus 8.5 rubles
1,000-2,500	5% plus 35 rubles	1.75% plus 11 rubles
2,500-5,000	4% plus 60 rubles	1.25% plus 23.5 rubles
5,000-10,000	3% plus 110 rubles	1% plus 36 rubles
Over 10,000	2% plus 210 rubles but not more than 2,000 rubles	0.50% plus 86 rubles but not more than 500 rubles ⁵⁶

Top authors and scientists may also receive sizable Lenin prizes. Obviously, the intelligentsia is the privileged social stratum in the "land of the working class."

TAXES AND STATE LOANS

One of the deductions from the nominal salaries of the employees is in the form of the income tax. Income-tax rates vary from 2 percent on the lowest income to 13 percent for incomes of 1,000 rubles and more per month. If a dignitary has a high personal salary and many bonuses, he will still pay only 13 percent in tax.

The favors bestowed on certain people by the Soviet regime may be gauged from the list of exemptions from the income tax. The following categories of people do not pay any income tax: 1) members of the Armed Forces, including members of the frontier and convoy troops of the Committee of State Security; 2) Heroes of the Soviet Union, Heroes of Socialist Labor, citizens decorated with the USSR orders. Most of these people belong to the intelligentsia. If their annual income exceeds 600 rubles per year, they pay income tax only for the amount over 600 rubles.

People who earn not more than 60 rubles per month are exempted from the income and other direct taxes.

Originally the tax on writers and artists was higher than 13 percent, reaching 33 percent for incomes of 300,000 rubles (30,000 new rubles)

per year and beyond 33 percent for incomes still higher. Since 1949 the rates were reduced to 13 percent.

Another personal tax of minor importance was established by the Edicts of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 21, 1941, and of July 8, 1944. This tax is intended to penalize people who do not marry or who, if married, do not procreate many children. Children mean ever-increasing manpower in whose abundance the Soviet regime is deeply interested. Town people pay 6 percent of their monthly income if they are not married or if they are married but have no children, and 1 percent if they have one child. The corresponding rates for peasants are established in rubles, namely, 15 and 5 rubles annually, respectively. The comparison between the city and the rural rates indicates indirectly the low incomes of the peasants. These rates were lowered in 1960 by 40 percent for citizens earning monthly less than 70 rubles; this reduction benefited most collective farmers and a portion of industrial workers.

The Statute of May 7, 1960, solemnly promised further progressive reductions in the income tax and the tax on bachelors and married people without or with few children and a complete abrogation of these direct taxes beginning October 1, 1965. Soviet propagandists carried this "historic" news with great fanfare to all corners of the world without mentioning the fact that direct taxation plays a minor role in the State budget which is mainly fed by indirect taxes.⁵⁷ In any event, no splash was made two years later when an Edict of September 22, 1962, quietly adjourned *sine die* the former promise of reducing and finally abolishing direct taxes.⁵⁸ It is revealing for the low esteem in which the Party leaders hold the Supreme Soviet, supposed to be the supreme source of State power, that its solemn statute was cancelled simply by an edict issued by its Presidium composed of 33 high Party dignitaries.

Until 1957 State loans were to be subscribed in proportion to one's income and were usually paid in installments. For instance, the loan of 1952 had to be subscribed at the rate of three to four weeks' wages. For a low-paid unskilled worker this meant so much less money for the necessities of life; for the highly paid managerial personnel it only meant cutting off some luxuries.

The practice of compulsory State loans was discontinued in 1957, but this relief was "compensated" by the cancellation of the obligations issued under previous loans. As every Soviet citizen had to buy annually these obligations, he will never be repaid by the State, which thus arbitrarily annulled its debt, but will not be asked again to

subscribe to State loans unless the Soviet Government changes its mind. The citizen may feel skeptical; was he not promised repeatedly that the obligations he had bought with his earnings would be punctually repaid?

The main source of Soviet State revenue is the sales tax, called the turnover tax. This tax represents the major part of the retail price of every item, the rest being the cost of production. The revenue of the State from this source is particularly high. At dates 30 years apart the turnover tax constantly yielded around 50 percent of the total national revenue. In 1930 it was 45.9 percent; in 1932, 51.5 percent. In 1951 it was 53.4 percent according to the statement made by the Minister of Finance of the USSR, A. G. Zverev, when he presented to the Supreme Soviet the budget for 1951. It was 45 percent in 1958. The revenue from the turnover tax in 1951 was 244,619,000,000 rubles in a total State budget of 458,716,664,000 rubles. The revenue from the sales tax was so high that it could almost cover two of the main items of Soviet expenditure: capital investments, 178,474,000,000 rubles; and purely military expenditure, 93,376,000,000 rubles.

This tax structure cannot be considered democratic in the traditional sense of the word. People in the higher income brackets are "spared" by the lack of a stiff progression in the income tax rates. On the other hand, the high rates of the sales tax are, in the same sense, undemocratic because the same rate of sales tax is felt more by a poor man than by a rich one either in a socialist or in a capitalist State.

The turnover tax is paid by every Soviet enterprise on every article it produces. Eventually it is shifted to the individual buyer by being included in the retail price. In certain cases an item is taxed two or three times as it is processed before it reaches the consumer. The rates of the turnover tax vary, depending on the nature of goods, sometimes on the zone of sales, and on the eventual destination of the goods. For instance, articles destined for the other State establishments are taxed at a lower rate than the same articles destined for the individual consumer. "A number of goods are sold for further industrial processing at the wholesale prices, while the same goods are also sold to the population at much higher retail prices (flour, wheat, vegetables, oil, eggs, etc.)."⁵⁹

The individual buyer of consumer goods and foodstuffs pays also within the retail price another indirect tax, namely, the State tax on profits realized by its own enterprises. Every Soviet enterprise is expected to realize a profit according to the State plan. The profit is the difference between the cost of production and the planned invest-

ments, on the one hand, and the gross income of the enterprise on the other. The indirect tax on profits is usually 10 percent of the realized profits and is naturally shifted to the buyer of the commodities.

The same implicit discrimination of indirect taxes against the poor exists in respect to the Soviet "equal" tax on services—transportation tickets, laundries, hotels, etc. This tax varies. In some service enterprises, it ranges from 1 to 10 percent. Movie tickets are taxed from 30 to 55 percent, depending on the locality and other factors.

In brief, the various *indirect* taxes increase considerably the retail price of each commodity. It need hardly be proven that this arrangement affects adversely the workers and peasants of the Soviet Union whose incomes are considerably lower than those of the upper bureaucracy. The indirect taxation levied on the consumer explains the secret of Soviet industrialization. By increasing greatly the prices for consumer goods, indirect taxation provides the means for rapid industrialization while keeping the living standards of the population low.

The regime shows its favor toward the privileged upper and middle classes in another sector. There is no inheritance tax. This tax had existed and had a progressive scale of rates. It could affect the well-being of the successors of an upper-class man who could leave behind a home and appreciable savings. To strengthen the vested interests of the bureaucracy in the regime "the inheritance and gift tax was abolished."⁶⁰

TITLES OF RANK

The favors bestowed on the new upper and middle classes by the Soviet State are not only monetary. Their exalted position is enhanced also by a plethora of titles of rank. The trend started with the Armed Services. "The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars introduced in September, 1935, the military ranks which correspond distinctly to the military and other qualifications of each commander, to his authority, and prestige. . . ."⁶¹ The conditions of the Second World War hastened this evolution. On May 7, 1940, the following military ranks for the highest commanding personnel of the Red Army were established: "major-general, lieutenant-general, colonel-general, general of the Army, and Marshal of the Soviet Union. . . . The ranks of rear-admiral, vice-admiral, and admiral of the fleet were introduced for the highest commanding personnel of the Navy."⁶² The Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 24, 1943, divided the personnel of the Armed Forces into various categories, such as privates, sergeants, officers, and generals for the Army, and into ratings, petty officers, officers, and admirals for the Navy.

The Edicts of the same Presidium of January 16, 1943, and of October 9, 1943, divided the Marshals into two classes: Marshals of the Soviet Union and Marshals of a given arm, like artillery, aviation, armored forces, or engineering corps. This fine distinction, unknown to the capitalist states, surpasses even the inventive mind of Napoleon Bonaparte. This elaborate organization of military ranks may not be exactly the realization of the dreams of those ordinary sailors and soldiers who helped the Bolsheviks in 1917 to seize power in Russia, but those dreams are forgotten as much as the "primitive" egalitarianism of Marx and Lenin.

Generals, admirals, and senior officers of the Red Army, the Navy, the troops and organs of the Committee of State Security receive upon retirement a pension "calculated on the basis of the pay attached to their last function and including a supplement proportionate to the length of service, this being as follows: generals and admirals, 90 percent; senior officers, 80 percent.⁶³ This is an appreciable privilege compared to the old-age pension of ordinary Soviet citizens which ranges from 30 rubles to the maximum of 120 rubles per month.

The above-mentioned military persons are granted, moreover, at the time of their retirement, certain other favors:

Reserve and retired officers have the right to wear uniforms with the insignia of rank . . . buy foodstuffs and industrial consumer goods at the same prices at which these goods are sold to persons of the same rank in the active service of the Army or the Navy . . . continue to have the housing accommodation occupied at the time of retirement . . . have their children admitted to the Suvorov military schools and the Nakhimov naval schools. . . . The city and district soviets of the toilers' deputies must grant them, free of charge, plots of land for the purpose of building a dwelling house or of planting an orchard. . . . If these persons accept employment, their rights to the above-mentioned facilities and to the full pension are not affected, whatever might be the salary attached to their [civilian] employment.⁶⁴

These privileges speak for themselves, but one comment is in order. The children of those retired high-ranking officers are given priority of admission to cadet military schools, thus helping the growth of a military caste where the profession would eventually become a family tradition.

The restoration of military ranks was followed by the introduction of the old-fashioned titles of rank for civilian careers. A People's Commissar, whose title reminded citizens of the October Revolution, became a conservatively respectable Minister. Soviet diplomats re-

ceived titles familiar to capitalist diplomats, and similar to those used in Imperial Russia. It must be embarrassing for a foreign Communist to address with the word "Comrade" a Soviet Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, wearing a service uniform with stiff epaulets and embroideries. If the trend continues, "Comrade" will be replaced by "Excellency."

The Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of November 23 (10th, old style calendar), 1917, abolished all ranks. Yet, some twenty-five years later the Government of the same Party (is it the same?) reestablished the ranks with their traditional titles. The two policies reflect two social processes: destruction of the old intelligentsia and bureaucracy, and rebuilding of a new intelligentsia and bureaucracy.

During the years 1941-48 special titles (class ranks) were introduced for several categories of State officials of the following administrations: procurators, foreign affairs, transport, fluvial navigation, geology, maritime navigation, finance, metallurgy, coal-mining, communications. . . . The establishment of personal titles (ranks) and of uniforms for these categories of State officials aims at intensification of service discipline and increasing the prestige of these officials. . . .⁶⁵

One can hardly agree with this naïve Soviet comment: "The introduction of personal titles (ranks) does not mean, however, the re-establishment of bureaucracy."⁶⁶

The Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of September 16, 1943, bestowed the following titles of rank on Soviet procurators: Actual State Councillor of Justice (a rank corresponding, according to Soviet comments, to that of a general of the Army), State Councillors of Justice of the first, second, and third classes, Senior Councillor of Justice, Councillor of Justice, Junior Councillor of Justice, Jurists of the first, second, and third classes, Jurist of the third class having the rank corresponding to that of a second lieutenant in the Army. It is almost moving to see the present Soviet predilection for the Imperial tradition; then as now the civilian bureaucratic ranks were explained in terms of the corresponding ranks of the military hierarchy.⁶⁷

Other edicts in 1947 and 1948 established impressive ranks and titles with subtle distinctions for the bureaucracy of several branches from Fluvial Navigation to the Treasury and the Banks. A State Director General should not be confused with the State Director, or a State Councillor General of Financial Service with a State Councillor, and so on. And all this has happened in that socialist State where Karl Marx did not expect to find any trace of bureaucracy! To top it all, a

"Comrade Councillor of the Financial Service" may also have an "order" to enhance his prestige further in the eyes of ordinary proletarians.

The Party attaches such a great social importance to orders, medals, and badges of honor that the former Criminal Code, replaced in 1961 by the new one, punished persons who wore military decorations falsely by imprisonment for six months to one year.⁶⁸ The illegitimate wearing of civilian decorations was penalized less severely, usually "by correctional labor for up to three months or by a fine of up to 300 rubles with the confiscation of such orders or badges."⁶⁹

How can anyone then accept the official statement of the 18th Congress of the Party in 1939: "The class boundaries dividing working people of the USSR are being obliterated; economic and political antagonisms between workers, peasants, and intelligentsia are disappearing and are being obliterated."⁷⁰

THE NEW UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASSES

The impressive statements about the disappearance of class distinctions and the emergence of a new society are reserved for festive occasions. In daily life social stratification is developing quietly and effectively.

The Soviet Union being a dictatorship of professional politicians and bureaucrats, there is nothing surprising in the glorification of bureaucracy by Party propaganda.

In order to fulfill the tasks entrusted to the organs of the economic management one must have an adequate personnel. Comrade Lenin pointed, since the first days of the Great Socialist October Revolution, to the great importance of the organization and the quality of the personnel of the economic offices and enterprises. . . .⁷¹

The 18th Congress stressed the following in one of its resolutions:

Today when the political and economic positions held by socialist society in the USSR have been finally consolidated, the decisive factor is personnel, trained workers who have become masters of their respective crafts, the Soviet cultural workers who head the mass of the working people in their struggle for the complete triumph of Communism.⁷²

At the same Congress Stalin said:

The old theory about the intelligentsia, which taught that it should be treated with distrust and combatted, fully applied to the old, prerevolutionary intelligentsia, which served the land-

lords and capitalists. This theory is now out of date and does not fit our new Soviet intelligentsia. Our new intelligentsia demands a new theory, a theory that teaches the necessity for a cordial attitude toward it, a solicitude and respect for it, and cooperation with it in the interest of the working class and the peasantry. . . . Such is the position with regard to our new, socialist intelligentsia.⁷³

After eliminating the obsolete revolutionary terminology, which sounds false in the present Soviet reality, there remain these ideas: The new intelligentsia is necessary if the State and the Party leadership are to control the workers and peasants and maintain order; it must be treated with solicitude by its masters, the professional politicians, in order to assure its loyalty; to be most effective, it must have the respect of manual toilers. Hence, ranks, decorations, privileges, and high salaries are quite in order, although they were not the purpose of the October Revolution.

It is true that this new upper class emerged from the workers and peasants, because there were no other social classes left after the destruction of the old upper and middle classes. But what is there now in common between an industrial worker and a State Councillor or a factory manager? Their different backgrounds of education and different standards of living separate them and make them strangers to each other. But the Party wanted to have a hierarchical society without any "rotten" egalitarianism.

Of course, there is another extremely important aspect of this issue. The totalitarian regime is generous to its bureaucrats on two conditions: that they be intellectual and moral conformists and act strictly according to the Party line, and that they be efficient in their service to the State. The first condition is assured by a tight intellectual censorship that makes the life of educated people like that of well-fed birds in a gilded cage. The other condition is guaranteed by disciplinary responsibility and by criminal responsibility in the case of more serious offenses.

If the bureaucrat is a political conformist and works efficiently, he must be respected by the rank and file. Positions of authority in the socialist State are reserved for the intelligentsia. This idea was emphasized by the Central Committee of the Party when it censured the movie *The Great Life*, which depicted the postwar reconstruction of the Don Basin and showed manual workers becoming managers of the Soviet enterprises.

The film *The Great Life* propagates reaction, lack of culture, and ignorance. It has been completely without justification and

incorrect to show, as the authors of the film have done, the mass promotion to the leading positions of the technically illiterate workers with reactionary views and attitudes. . . .⁷⁴

The authors of the film had forgotten that they were not living in 1917. If reactionary means a person who looks backward towards the past, they were reactionaries in imagining that manual workers could occupy leading positions in the hierarchical framework of the new Soviet society.

The Party, however, strives constantly to keep the bureaucracy under strict control. Corruption has not been eliminated. "There are still some employees who defraud the State and who commit infractions against the Party and the State discipline, thus causing serious harm to the Party."⁷⁵ To check such "infractions" the Party relies heavily on a system of mutual control of officials belonging to various organizations of the same territorial level. The complicated system of mutual supervision should have been effective if it were not for the fact that the bureaucrats of a group of territorial agencies live together, are bound by class solidarity, and are linked by personal friendships. This fact was illustrated by the late M. F. Shkiryatov, who should have known, having been a prominent member of the Central Committee. He said at the 19th Congress of the Party:

Sometimes a complaint [by a citizen] needs to be immediately investigated, but it is the victim of red tape; it is sent from one office to another while the matter complained of remains unsolved. I shall mention one fact as an illustration. An employee of the Pilnen district food combine wrote to the district organizations, to the office of the food industry of the Gorky regional executive committee, and to the regional committee of the Party concerning disorders at the enterprises and the fact that the director of the combine persecuted people who denounced his misdeeds. His complaint eventually reached the Central Committee. What was disclosed as a result of the investigation? The employee's first complaint was sent to the office of food industry of the Gorky regional executive committee, but they did not care to take the matter in hand and transmitted the letter to the Pilnen district executive committee. The second complaint was addressed to the regional committee of the Party, but was transferred for investigation to the office of food industry of the regional executive committee from where it was sent to the regional executive committee. The latter sent it back to the office of food industry with instructions to proceed with an immediate investigation, but the instructions were not executed. What was discovered at the time of the verification of all these facts men-

tioned by the author of the complaint? The former director of the district food industry combine violated State discipline, systematically abused his official powers, and illegally appropriated for himself from the enterprise a large quantity of various raw materials and products. When two women workers of the combine who were members of the Communist Youth League denounced all this to the district organizations, the director started persecuting them by threatening them with discharge, by demoting them to an occupation that did not correspond to their qualifications, and finally by forcing them to quit the enterprise. Now he has been excluded from the Party.⁷⁶

The regime that favors but at the same time distrusts its own bureaucracy must cope with slanderers who send unjustified complaints. The same M. F. Shkiryatov said:

There are some complaints that only hamper legitimate criticism. I shall stop to consider the case of slanderers. It is necessary to talk about such people because they invent untrue accusations under the cover of criticism, write about nonexistent facts, and dream up all sorts of fairy tales, absurd rumors and all kinds of accusations supported by nothing. There are also persons who attempt, for their own personal reasons, to slander honest people maliciously. Such slanderers probably act according to the proverb: "Slander is like coal—if it does not burn, it will at least leave behind some dirt." I shall give such an example. We have expelled from the Party for slander a certain Baranov who has sent in five years over 120 denunciations to the Party and the Soviet organs. He presented unjustified political accusations against a large number of the officials of the Party and the Soviet organizations. About forty employees were busy with the verification of his complaints, which were investigated by the primary, district, and city Party organizations. The slanderer is being now prosecuted before the courts.⁷⁷

Another then eminent member of the Party, Poskrebyshv, formulated a similar denunciation of bureaucrats who suppress criticism of their activities.

Some of the honorable dignitaries abuse their powers in order to take revenge for criticism by subjecting directly or indirectly their subordinates to repression and persecutions. . . . Some directing persons think for some reasons that their subordinates may be criticized, but that the subordinates have no right to criticize their superiors.⁷⁸

The above do not cancel out the basic fact that the bureaucracy

is the mainstay of the regime. It simply means that the Party professional politicians want to retain their control over the State and society, including the bureaucracy.

HOUSING

A Soviet citizen may have housing either as the tenant of an apartment house owned by the State but administered by the local municipality, his trade union, or another public organization; or as a member of a building-housing cooperative; or as a tenant of an apartment house belonging to a State enterprise or office; or as a tenant of one room in a privately owned dwelling house; or, if he has the necessary income, as the owner of his private dwelling house.⁷⁹ An individual who has not been provided with housing by the institution which employs him must request housing accommodations from the housing office of the city soviet, which allocates space at its discretion. The individual citizen cannot complain to the courts that the accommodations assigned to him are insufficient for his family or too distant from his place of employment or unsatisfactory for any other reason. Such questions "are settled only in the administrative procedure."⁸⁰

The municipal housing office, the enterprise or office that grants housing accommodations, should be guided, if possible, by the housing norm, which is 9 square meters for a person. Assuming that the minimum housing norm could be observed in the crowded conditions of the Soviet cities, the norm implies that more than one person would live in an average apartment-house room. It might be a married couple or a family with children or complete strangers to whom the same room has been assigned.

Guided by the same minimum norm, apartments may be divided between two or more families.

Certain categories of persons are granted ampler housing accommodations, higher than the housing norm.

- 1) Persons who need additional housing space because of the responsible nature of their work (generals, admirals, and some other categories from among the members of the Armed Forces who have the officer's rank, writers, artists, composers, scientists, and such officials who have responsible posts listed especially, etc.); 2) persons who must have a separate room for themselves because of a disease (a list of illnesses justifying the allocation of a separate room is established jointly by the Ministries of Public Health and of Municipal Economy); 3) persons who have rendered special services to the socialist Fatherland (Heroes of

the Soviet Union, holders of decorations, etc.). The additional housing space is a separate room. If a separate room cannot be provided, the additional space is any space (even in a jointly occupied room) which is added to the minimum housing space but which may not exceed 10 square meters, and in the case of certain classes of employees (writers, artists, etc.), 20 square meters. The question of the allocation of additional housing space is settled in the administrative procedure.⁸¹

Except for the people afflicted with contagious diseases, the privilege of additional housing space is bestowed on persons usually pampered by the regime: high ranking officers, higher dignitaries, intellectuals, and also the shock workers because they are either decorated or are Heroes of the Soviet Union. An average worker or lower white-collar worker cannot expect additional housing space.

A citizen getting accommodations from the housing office of the city soviet may sign a five-year contract. "A separate contract is not concluded for a section of one room; hence, if two or several tenants live in one room, the contract is concluded jointly with all such tenants."⁸² Families, of course, are considered as one tenant.

The employees of an enterprise which has housing facilities are assigned housing space by the management, acting jointly with the trade-union factory committee, for the duration of their employment. The members of a housing cooperative have their apartments or rooms allocated by the cooperative. If an individual rents a room in a privately owned house, the contract is concluded between him and the owner on conditions freely established by the two parties.

The problem of finding housing accommodations may be totally eluded by people of high income who can afford their own private homes. The Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 26, 1948, provided this opportunity for well-to-do people. Citizens were granted the right to buy or build a one- or two-story house of one to five rooms, within or outside the city limits.⁸³ Such a house can be sold or bequeathed. Only if it is kept negligently or in disrepair may it be taken away by virtue of a judicial decision and transferred to a housing "fund" of the local soviet. The possession of a second cottage in a rural or health resort "is not contrary to law. . . . The cottage serves, by its very nature, the purpose of rest or of medical cure, and promotes that type of creative concentration of mental forces which is provided by the atmosphere of a forest park or of a rural locality far removed from the city noise and traffic."⁸⁴ Only upper-class people can afford a cottage. A manual worker presumably "enjoys" the city noise and traffic, especially after

the noise of his factory. This situation, of course, is miles away from the romantic period of 1918 when private ownership of real property in the cities was abolished.⁸⁵

A home may be acquired from the local soviet by paying in cash 20 percent of its value. The remaining 80 percent may be paid by monthly installments within two or three years. The buyer does not become the owner until the last payment. If two monthly installments are not paid, the local soviet may request the courts to dissolve the contract and to evict the tenant-prospective owner.

Whether the private home is built or bought by its owner, it requires the lease of a plot of land, all land being national property. He has to pay the local soviet a perpetual rent. The lease is in perpetuity. However, persons "who have rendered particular services" [one may safely read "the high dignitaries, including high ranking officers"] are exempt from paying any rent for the plot. Only their successors will have to pay the usual land rent.⁸⁶

The conditions of the purchase of a home are such that they preclude the possibility of an average manual worker owning such a house. One cannot imagine an average manual wage earner with his 1,200 rubles of annual income being able to pay in cash 20 percent of the value of a house and to repay the rest within two or three years. To build a house, a person without accumulated savings needs State credits, which are usually allocated by the manager of an enterprise. Since the credits are granted by the State bank through the enterprise, the enterprise must supervise the progress of construction and the punctual repayment of the bank loan.⁸⁷ Credits granted by the local communal bank must be repaid usually within three years. The interest is 2 percent, but it is increased to 4 percent for overdue installments. An employee must contribute 30 percent of the cost of the house, and he must remain with the same enterprise at least until the completion of the house. This is another way of assuring manpower stability. If the employee leaves before completion, the advanced credits are received by the bank in summary confiscation of building materials and the incomplete house. If the house has been completed but the employee leaves the enterprise before repayment of the credits, he may retain ownership if his own contribution in cash or labor plus installments already paid represent more than 50 percent of the value of the house. In such an event he must repay the remaining credits within six months; otherwise the property reverts to the enterprise, which sells it to another employee and then reimburses the bank for the loan and returns the contribution of the discharged employee within three months.

If, however, the employee is transferred to another enterprise by the Government, if he is called up by the Army, or if he has lost the ability to work, the credit contract remains valid, provided that he is willing to pay the installments punctually.

Thus, a manual worker who works well and is in the good graces of the manager may build himself a small home, but the credits for a five-room house would be beyond his capacity to repay.

Capitalist regimes have long recognized that it is in the public interest to promote acquisition of even small real property by as many citizens as possible. It is interesting to see a similar policy emerging in the Soviet Union, which has begun to encourage the development of vested interests in the regime by promoting private ownership of homes.

The housing rules were amended and improved by the new *Principles of Civil Legislation* enacted on December 8, 1961.⁸⁸ The main features of these rules are summarized below.

The contract of lease, if concluded for a determined period of time, is automatically extended at the request of the tenant. This rule applies also to tenants in privately owned houses except in the following cases: 1) if the contract of lease has been concluded for not longer than one year and has stipulated that the rented room must be vacated after the lapse of this period; 2) if the court determines that the rented room is needed for the personal use of the owner or members of his family. The tenant has the right to dissolve the contract at any time whether the house is publicly or privately owned. These legal provisions which protect only the tenant seem at first rather bizarre, but they reflect the great housing shortage in the Soviet Union. The problem is finding housing accommodations rather than tenants. This shortage is also visible in the low minimum housing-space norm of only nine square meters. Although the Government in recent years has been building apartment houses on a large scale especially in the larger cities, the improvement is not yet impressive, as may be seen in the increase of the minimum housing-space norm from the former $8\frac{1}{4}$ square meters to 9. The addition of $\frac{3}{4}$ square meter per person is not much.

The same housing shortage is reflected in another legal provision which authorizes the taking over by court decision of any "superfluous," i.e., in excess of the housing norm, space if it is a separate room. Prior to 1961 it could have been even a part of a room. The housing office of the city committee, if it discovers the existence of this spare room, advises the tenant that he has three months to find a co-tenant who is willing to occupy the room. The tenant legally has the alterna-

tive of asking the office to allocate other, smaller accommodations to which he may move rather than share his present apartment with a stranger. After three months the housing office assigns the separate room to any co-tenant it selects. This rule does not apply if the spare room is located within the apartment where a family lives and if access to it leads through another room.

The tenant may exchange his housing accommodations with another person. This transaction, especially practical if the parties live in two different cities and intend to move in the opposite directions, becomes valid after approval by the lessor (the city housing office, the administration of an enterprise or a cooperative house, or a private owner). The tenant may also sublet part of his apartment.

The tenant may be, as a rule, evicted only by a judicial decision and only after he has been provided with other suitable housing accommodations. This general rule allows the following exceptions:

1. If the tenant or his family systematically damage their apartment or room or make cohabitation with other co-tenants impossible, the housing committee and, if need be, the comradely court should take proper measures for improving their conduct. If these measures of social pressure and censure prove ineffective, the court orders eviction without providing alternative housing.

2. If the tenant and his family have been away for a long period of time and hence do not seem to need the apartment, or if he owns his own dwelling house available for his residence in the same city, or if he systematically refuses to pay rent at a privately owned house, the court orders eviction without supplying other accommodations.

3. The Federal and Union-Republican Councils of Ministers list those State enterprises and governmental institutions which have the right to ask the courts for eviction of their tenant-employees who have been discharged at their own request (this is another means for ensuring the stability of manpower) or for a serious violation of labor discipline or for the commission of a crime. There is no obligation in these cases to provide other housing accommodations. This rule is not applicable to war and labor invalids, to old-age pensioners, and to members of the family of servicemen in the Armed Forces, or of soldiers and partisans who perished during the last war or who died since the war while performing their military duties. These people must be offered other housing.

The administration may evict without a judicial decision only those persons who have illegally occupied housing space or in the case of a house in danger of collapsing. Other housing accommodations

must be provided in the latter case. The Stalinist legislation permitted administrative eviction in several other cases.

The rent for tenants in the publicly owned houses is fixed by federal legislation. The rent for tenants in the privately owned houses is determined by mutual agreement with the owner but may not exceed the maximum ceiling established by the Union-Republican laws.

The dwelling house may be owned as before by one individual or jointly by the whole family (the married couple and minor children). Each family may own only one house. The maximum permissible size of the house is determined by each Union Republic within the federal limit of 60 square meters of floor space. The size of the plot of land assigned for building a private house must not exceed 300 to 600 square meters within the city limits or 700 to 1,200 square meters outside the city. The State remains the owner of the plot and receives rent for it from the owner of the house.

Assignment of new plots of land for the construction of summer or suburban cottages was finally forbidden in December, 1960, to stop further abuses. The already assigned plots may be taken away if the cottage is used for illegal purposes such as renting to other people, a formerly frequent practice for gaining additional income. Article 99 of the Criminal Code forbade in 1961 the construction of a dwelling house or additions without the permit issued by public administration; the penalty is correctional labor for six months to one year and confiscation of the illegally erected structure. The owners of private homes must construct sidewalks within their plot of land and keep the plot and sidewalks in good order and their house in good repair.

Supervision of the conduct of tenants is entrusted not only to the militia, the courts, the comradesly courts, and the administration of the house, but also to the housing committees. These committees are organized by the trade-union factory committee for tenant-employees residing in the houses owned by their enterprise or governmental institution, or they are elected by co-tenants who rent their accommodations in the houses administered by the city soviet. The membership of these committees varies from seven to twenty-five persons. The manager of the house and the chairman of the local comradesly court must participate in the work of the committee. The house committee elects its chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary, but their appointment must be approved by the city executive committee and, in the case of a house belonging to an enterprise or governmental institution, also by the local trade-union committee. The members of the committee divide among themselves the various tasks

assigned to it. These tasks are as follows: encouraging socialist competition among the tenants for the best maintenance of the premises, assisting the house manager in discharging his obligations, keeping the house clean and in good repair, ensuring the good behaviour of co-tenants, organizing a parents' committee for children and juveniles, creating a Red Corner with Communist literature, disseminating Party ideology among the tenants, ensuring the punctual payment of rent and dues for public utilities, examining tenants' complaints, and so forth. The committee is obligated to follow the instructions of the local Party, trade-union, and Komsomol organizations and of the housing commission of the city soviet. Its activities are controlled by the trade unions and the city executive committee. The house administrator is appointed after the committee has been consulted. The committee reports at least once a year on its activities to the general meeting of all tenants.

The Soviet credit system is rigid not only in housing but also in installment purchases of commodities for long use. The right of ownership is transferred at the time of purchase, but the owner may not pledge or sell such goods until completion of the repayment. If he fails to pay three installments, the institution which sold the items may recover either the due installments or the object and a sum due for its use, by virtue of judicial decision. If at least 10 percent of the price has been paid, the object is not recovered, but the buyer is forced by the courts to pay immediately the remaining part of the price. The remaining price must also be paid at once if the object has been destroyed or substantially damaged by the buyer.

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

In Soviet society, where the individual's social rank is determined by the function he exercises, which in turn is predetermined by his education, the original roots of social stratification are found in the school system. A child's later career is largely fixed in advance by his completing only an eight-grade school, or his being assigned to a trade school and becoming a skilled worker, or his having the chance to enroll in a technical-secondary school and become a foreman, or having the good luck to be admitted to a university and eventually to become a member of the intelligentsia.

Between October 2, 1940, and September, 1956, education was free of charge only on the levels of the elementary and junior high schools. Otherwise, the citizens had to pay for the further education of their children, except if the children were outstanding and received State stipends.⁸⁹

The fees were as follows:

1. 200 rubles for each year of the last three classes of the secondary schools of general education or of the so-called technical-secondary schools, or of the teachers colleges if they were located in Moscow, Leningrad, or one of the capitals of the Union Republics.

2. 150 rubles if these schools were located in other towns or in rural areas.

3. 400 rubles per year at the schools of higher learning, if the schools were located in Moscow, Leningrad, or the other capitals of the Union Republics.

4. 300 rubles if these schools were located elsewhere.

5. 500 rubles at the higher schools of fine arts, drama, or music.⁹⁰

For an average worker to pay 400 rubles for fees plus living expenses of a child was a great expense, while for a better-paid member of the intelligentsia it was no problem. In other words, the average manual worker or peasant had to forego the idea unless the child got a State stipend because of a good school record.

Thus, the fees alone tended to favor a hereditary succession within the intelligentsia with the additional regular influx of such children of poorer families as were eligible for State stipends. To this fee problem one could add another discrimination, namely, that the villages had mostly only elementary or junior high schools, thus limiting greatly the chances of peasant children to reach secondary schools. Besides, the children of the intelligentsia lived in much better environments and had a better chance of having their minds awakened at an early age than the children of peasants or industrial workers.

The former Soviet school system did not afford an equal and fair chance to every youngster. A peasant's child normally had the opportunity to attend only an elementary school for four years and was through with his education at age 11. A year later State regulations required him to work on his collective farm. Normally, such a youngster would stay a peasant his whole life.

Compulsory education for all children from age 8 in all localities was first introduced in 1930. This age has been lowered since to 7. Thirteen years after the initial decree concerning compulsory universal education, another decree, that of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of July 14, 1943, confirmed openly the discrimination against rural children. City youngsters had the opportunity to stay at a seven-year school and complete their studies at age 14, that being the age at which a city boy or girl could ask the labor inspector for permission to work gainfully. On the contrary, the rural child was compelled by that decree to start work at age 12.

According to the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Party of May 15, 1934, there were three types of schools below the university level: the elementary with a 4-year program, the junior high with a 7-year program, and the secondary with a 10-year program. Theoretically, grades of the same level should have been the same quality at all schools; the four-year, the seven-year and the eleven-year schools all started their programs with the first grade. This equal quality, however, is impossible to achieve under any regime; a city eight-grade school, for example, had a better teaching personnel in its first four grades than a rural four-grade school.

The important practical question in a city was whether a child was enrolled in a junior high or a secondary school. There was no official criterion deciding this question. One may only guess that the background of parents and their personal influence had something to do with this decision vital for the child's future. Theoretically, a youngster who had completed junior high school could transfer to the eighth grade of the secondary school, the programs of the seventh grade at both schools being similar. But in practice, youngsters who had graduated from the seventh grade of a secondary school had priority over those applying for admission from junior high schools, and the enrollment was not unlimited. Only "15 percent of the vacancies in the eighth grade should be reserved for students coming from other schools."⁹¹ Another means of cutting down the enrollment in the last grades of the secondary school was the fee of 150 to 200 rubles, thus effectively eliminating from competition the children of very poor parents, except for those promising youngsters who received stipends.

All citizens of the USSR of both sexes who are from 17 to 35 years old, who have the certificate of the completion of the full program of studies of the secondary school, and who have passed the established admission examinations . . . have the right of admission to a school of higher learning.⁹²

Children of poor families had to overcome two problems before reaching higher bureaucratic careers: to be admitted to a secondary school, at least to the eighth grade among the lucky 15 percent, and to find the money for the payment of the fees. Of course, a gifted child had these two problems solved by the State stipends. People over 35 could take extension courses at the university provided they could combine earning a living with studies.

Extension teaching for young people was also provided. The exten-

sion classes were not exactly evening classes because the teaching took place in the morning, the afternoon, or the evening to suit the needs of young workers who worked any of the three shifts.

The school system with its fees distinctly favored children of well-to-do parents but reduced social mobility and thus did not allow the State to tap all the prospective talents. It was ended in 1956. All school fees (for the last three grades of secondary schools and for the universities) were abolished beginning with the 1956-57 academic year. At the same time the Government began to realize its program of introducing universal secondary education in all cities; the same education was scheduled to be extended to rural areas in some five to seven years.

The Soviet school system includes military academies, which have the program of a secondary school and in addition train future officers of the Armed Forces. Schools for military cadets were founded in 1943. They are of two types—military and naval. The military academies are named after General Suvorov, the brilliant commander of Catherine the Great and Paul I, who won his laurels in conquering Poland and vanquishing Turkey, in quelling a peasant uprising in Southern Russia, and in leading the Russian expeditionary corps into Italy and Switzerland to intervene against the armies of Revolutionary France. The naval academies were named after another Tsarist hero—Admiral Nakhimov. Each school is commanded by a high ranking officer, frequently a major-general.

The alumni of Suvorov and Nakhimov academies are destined to continue their military education at officers' schools and to become, as *Pravda* said, members of the corps of Soviet professional officers. They and the alumni of universities will form the future upper class. Therefore, they wear smart blue and scarlet uniforms, are taught ball-room dancing, bowing, heel clicking, and the kissing of ladies' hands. They are initiated into the manners of the prerevolutionary Russian upper class whose successors they are expected to become. Admission to these highly selective academies is difficult; in 1950 one youngster out of ten applicants was admitted to the Suvorov schools. Originally during the war those schools had to enroll the orphans of war heroes. Nowadays one may guess that the cadets are mostly sons of professional officers and other members of the upper class.

"Young specialists" (university graduates) and the alumni of technical-secondary and trade schools "are obliged to work for three years at a determined place of employment according to the order of the Ministry concerned."⁹³ The mobilization of young specialists for three years is not limited to university students who have had

stipends. A young specialist must report without fail to the place of his assignment. He cannot be admitted to further graduate studies. To do so he must obtain the permission of the appropriate Ministry.⁹⁴

Such restrictions on personal freedom are not entirely welcomed by the young people concerned: "There are in actual life . . . cases where some individuals who have graduated from schools try to evade the work assignment and to settle on their own at such an occupation that seems to them the most convenient. . . ."⁹⁵ But such Soviet citizens should remember that "the personal interests must be subordinated under any circumstances . . . to the general national interests. . . ."⁹⁶ If individual interests must always be sacrificed to those of the nation or the whole society, is it true, as Stalin told Roy Howard in 1936, that "we have built this society for the sake of true personal freedom, a freedom without quotation marks . . .?"⁹⁷

SCHOOL REFORM

The post-Stalinist period saw the rise and collapse of a great dream, namely of giving secondary education to every Soviet citizen. This dream was officially announced at the 19th and 20th Party Congresses and was no less officially repudiated in November 1958.

At the time of the 20th Congress there were three types of schools of general education: the four-grade elementary, the seven-grade junior high, and the ten-grade full-fledged secondary school. The 20th Congress, having proclaimed the ultimate goal of providing universal secondary-school education, then followed an effort to expand this type of education in the cities. At the same time the seven-grade school was becoming the normal type in the rural areas. However, Khrushchev conceded in 1958 that 20 percent of children did not go farther in their education than a four-grade school. One can guess that those underprivileged children lived in the remote rural areas, as for instance in Central Asia.

However, the ambitious goal of having every Soviet child attend a secondary school could have been realized in time, by stages beginning with the urban centers and ending with the rural areas. Yet this goal was officially abandoned in 1958. What were the reasons for this radical shift in Party policy?

Beginning in 1954, the number of graduates from the full secondary schools began notably to increase. All of them had at least theoretically the right to compete for admission to the universities and other institutions of higher learning. Yet the quotas of openings for freshmen are limited at such institutions, those quotas corresponding not only to the actual facilities (faculty, labs, classrooms, etc.) but also to the

expected State demand for manpower in each professional specialty. Thus, a great many graduates of secondary schools were barred from higher education and had to accept some sort of manual labor at factories, mines, or collective farms instead of pursuing their education. In 1957-58, 800,000 such graduates were refused admission. The total backlog for the years 1954-58 reached the impressive figure of 3.5 millions. This created for the Party a most serious social problem.

The Soviet society is basically European. It has inherited a great many European social patterns. Among these is a high respect for the university-educated man with the corresponding lack of enthusiasm for manual labor, and the traditional belief that the secondary school normally should lead toward higher education rather than represent an end in itself. The Soviet social stratification with education as its main criterion could not help but reinforce these patterns. Judging by Khrushchev's several speeches made in 1958, the Soviet citizen tends to think that it is more dignified to work intellectually rather than manually, and that a secondary-school graduate has some sort of moral right to go ahead with higher education instead of being sent to a factory or a collective farm. The Soviet youngster knows that if he is deprived of a university diploma he has no chance of becoming a member of the upper or middle class and will never enjoy high income and social prestige related to these classes. This mentality, which Khrushchev sarcastically called that of "white hands," produced in 1954-58 its foreseeable effects; these 3.5 million secondary-school graduates felt bitterly disappointed when told that there was no room for them at the universities and that they had to become industrial workers or farmers.

Their state of mind (and that of their families) is well depicted in the Joint Resolution, adopted on November 15, 1958, by the Party Central Committee and the Federal Council of Ministers:⁹⁸

"Many young men and girls who finish secondary school think of continuing their studies in higher or at least technical-secondary schools as the only acceptable way of life for themselves. . . . Some of them believe that it would be degrading for them to do physical work. Yet the constant expansion of secondary education leads naturally to a situation where an overwhelming part of young people finishing school must immediately take up productive work." The Resolution added: "This breeds dissatisfaction among a significant part of the youth and their parents." The annually increasing numbers of socially frustrated young people entailed a serious political risk for the regime.

Yet, the Party could do nothing to limit this vast frustration. The

quota of openings at the universities could not be significantly enlarged without a deterioration of their standards. Moreover, no country can afford to have its whole young manpower channelled into non-manual occupations. This is particularly significant in the Soviet economy which, being unevenly developed, has a much higher ratio of its manpower occupied in the primary and secondary industries rather than in the tertiary.

There was another economic consideration. If every Soviet child were to complete the full secondary education before starting his life career, young people would be greatly delayed in their coming to the labor market. In the Soviet Union, schooling begins at the age of seven. A youngster would be 17 when completing the secondary education (the present labor duty minimum age is 16). Military service and professional training would delay by a few more years the time when he would become a full-fledged productive member of the society. This time would usually coincide, if he did not go to the university, with the age of 19 or 20. The very quick pace of Soviet economic development did not allow for such a waste of young manpower.

A political consideration was probably also present in the minds of Soviet leaders. A university student, who comes directly from a secondary school and has never earned his living, cannot fully realize the risks of adult life and in particular the need in the Soviet society for utmost conformity in order to gain the daily bread, well-buttered for the university-trained people. He could be more tempted to express, within the walls of the university, nonconformist views or to ask indiscreet questions. After all, a number of Soviet students actually did it in 1956-57 at the time of the Hungarian and Polish events. The Party had an interest in preventing young people from marching continuously for 15 or more years along the sheltered alley of secondary and higher education, and in forcing them to earn their living at a relatively early age, while admitting them to higher education only after they had tasted the material need of conformity through living the actual life of a Soviet worker or farmer.

The Party decided in 1958 to sound a retreat from the grandiose plan laid by the 20th Congress. Khrushchev prepared the ground by his many pronouncements on the subject. The Joint Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Party Central Committee of November 15, 1958, solved the problem and outlined the reform of Soviet education.

After the bitter disappointment with the scheme of universal secondary education, the Joint Resolution was couched in cautious

terms. It avoided spelling out the details and left the final shape of the reform undetermined to safeguard the possibility of necessary corrections imposed by actual practice.

The instructions of the Joint Resolution were embodied in a statute which the Supreme Soviet dutifully approved on December 24, 1958.⁹⁹ This statute is the present foundation of the Soviet school system. It formulates the leading concepts and outlines the structure of education.

The preamble to the Statute emphatically denies the existence of social stratification in the Soviet Union, proudly saying that "Marxist-Leninist doctrine, supported by the whole practice of Communist construction in the USSR and also by the experience of other socialist countries, has dispelled the bourgeois myth of an inescapable and eternal coexistence, on the one hand, of the grey human mass whose lot is subordination and hard physical labor, and, on the other, a handful of men whom nature itself allegedly calls upon to do the thinking, governing, and developing of science, technology, literature and the arts." Any tourist can see with his own eyes in the Soviet Union that the "bourgeois myth" is as much a daily reality there as in other countries. The words for its description need be selected in a less elementary way than that used in the Statute. It is not nature but acquired education that calls upon certain people to govern, administer, and develop science, literature and arts, although native talent also plays its role in the selective process. The contrast is not a primitive one between a handful of men and the masses, but between a great variety of social functions with the accompanying gradual transition in education, prestige, and social responsibility from one stratum to the next. Social mobility exists in both the "bourgeois" and "socialist" societies and prevents the stratification from becoming hereditary. It is true that one criterion of the "bourgeois" stratification, wealth founded on private ownership of means of production, has been eliminated in the USSR. But children of Soviet intelligentsia enjoy a factual privilege in social competition with other children, as do the children of educated parents elsewhere. They get a better start in life by receiving early intellectual stimulus at the parental home. Children of influential Soviet parents have the same advantage as their counterparts in other countries. Khrushchev's complaints on this score are noted below.

Social prestige founded on education is so important that the Edict of June 15, 1946, introduced a distinctive badge which the alumni of schools of higher learning are entitled to wear. Less than two years after the enactment of the Statute of December 24, 1958, another

Edict of September 5, 1960, took the trouble of embellishing the design of the badge "for persons who have completed the State university education" or "studies at the Military Academy as well as at the military schools or departments of the civilian institutions of higher learning."¹⁰⁰ The "bourgeois myth" has vigorous life and refuses to die in the socialist countries despite denials by the Supreme Soviet.

The Statute is more realistic in emphasizing the growing need of Soviet society for workers capable of operating complex modern industrial equipment. This need, shared with other economically advanced countries, calls for a steady rise in the educational levels of the population. The Statute is equally realistic in stating: "The expectation that physical work will disappear in the Communist society following the automation of production is a deepest error. The gigantic technological progress will ineluctably lighten the physical work . . . which will, however, survive."

The Statute has established the following framework for Soviet schools:

1. The eight-year school compulsory for all children will enroll those aged 7 to 15. It will provide them with a background of general education and familiarize them with some trade, industrial or agricultural.

Young people who graduate from this school (which is a combination of elementary and junior high schools) may begin to work with the permission of the trade-union committee concerned or remain idle for one year. Labor duty begins at 16, while young people usually graduate from the eight-year school at 15. Further education is voluntary and should, if possible, be combined with earning one's living.

The Statute recommends a further widening of network of eight-grade and secondary boarding schools as well as of schools with extended day, i.e., schools which retain children for the whole day and provide them with both main meals.

2. If a young person is not ambitious enough to work gainfully and at the same time to attend evening classes in order to complete the secondary education, but if he is interested in improving his professional skill, he may be admitted to an urban or rural professional-technical (trade) school. Each of these schools trains for a different specialty and combines school training with practical work at a nearby factory or farm. These schools offer either day or evening courses. The program of urban schools varies, depending on the trade for which training is given, from one to three years; rural schools offer programs of one to two years.

Formerly students at the trade schools were supplied with uni-

forms and board. The Statute replaces it with wages which students receive for productive work done at school.

In case a young man or woman is not admitted to this professional-technical school, he may improve his skill on the premises of the plant. The managements of factories are obligated to organize training courses for the improvement of qualifications of their employees.

3. Secondary education (the three years above the eight-year school) is provided by the following types of schools:

a. Evening or shift schools for working-class or rural youth who are occupied at factories, mines, collective or State farms, and similar enterprises. Young people who take these evening courses should be given a shorter workday or workweek. However, the programs for rural schools should not impede the work of young peasants during the intensive seasonal agricultural labor.

b. Secondary schools of general education which must also train their pupils in one of the various professional occupations. These schools may have their own workshops or use the facilities of the nearest industrial plant or farm.

c. The technical-secondary schools where general education is combined with professional training for such jobs as those of technicians and foremen (the intermediate social stratum between workers and peasants, on the one hand, and the intelligentsia, with higher education, on the other). Depending on the specialty for which a technical-secondary school trains, admission is granted to graduates from either eight-year or secondary eleven-year schools.

The technical-secondary schools are mostly correspondence or evening schools attended by students who are earning their living as industrial workers or farmers. The candidate who already works in a profession related to the specialty which he wants to study is assured of priority in admission.

These three types of schools providing secondary education are unequal in spite of appearances. A young worker or farmer will find it hard to combine with his daily work regular attendance at evening classes of the school for working-class or rural youth. If he has the required stamina, it will probably take him more than three years to complete studies and obtain a diploma.

The student at the technical-secondary school is usually expected to remain a foreman or a technician throughout his life, unless he has the ambition and strong will to take further evening or correspondence courses and study for a higher-learning diploma while gainfully occupied.

The student at the secondary school of general education occupies

the most favorable position. He learns some trade, it is true, as a sort of hobby, but his main job is to acquire a general education without being distracted too much by the training in a trade. Above all, he does not simultaneously work at a factory or a farm, unlike most of his contemporaries of the same age. Studies are his main occupation.

The Statute does not specify the criteria to be used to decide which young people aged 16 should be sent to factories and farms and given the chance of enrollment, if they wish, in the evening schools for working-class or rural youth, which should be assigned to the technical-secondary schools, and which should be admitted to regular secondary schools of general education. Probably the decision is the result of grades received in the universal eight-year school but also possibly of the social position of parents who, if they occupy important posts, have the latitude to exert behind-the-scene pressure on the officials in charge of selection.

This is a very important question. A youngster sent to the factory or farm after graduating from the eight-year school will, in most cases, forever remain an industrial worker or a peasant. Another, admitted to the technical-secondary school, will probably be a technician or a foreman, also for the duration of his life. Only a minority ("the handful," to use the words of the Statute), those lucky enough to be admitted to a regular secondary school, have the full chance, if they work diligently, to enter a university or a professional school of the same level and eventually to join the Soviet upper and middle classes. The others may squeeze in like the rich and the camels of the Gospel—through the needle's eye—and enter this realm of intelligentsia by great effort, combining professional work with evening or correspondence courses. In fact, the Soviet needle's eye is wide enough for those who have the stamina for this sort of dual work. The students of regular secondary schools have to carry out only one kind of work, their school studies. This cannot be called equality of opportunity in the fullest sense of the words.

The Statute has not lost sight of the State need for university graduates, young specialists as it calls them. It recommends the enrollment of enough students in the secondary schools of general education to ensure that the facilities of institutions of higher learning be fully used and the requirements for specialists be completely satisfied.

4. Admitted to schools of higher learning are persons who have received secondary-education diplomas. (As mentioned above, there are schools of various types which issue these diplomas.) However, a diploma does not suffice, because Article 28 of the Statute says: "Candidates are admitted to the higher schools on recommendation

by the Party, trade-union, Komsomol, or other public organization, and by the managers of industrial enterprises as well as the managing boards of collective farms." This provision implies that the candidate must meet two requirements: professional aptitude and political loyalty. One can be sure, for instance, that a young person who is not a member of Komsomol will find it hard to be admitted. Moreover, candidates must pass the admission examination. Candidates with the experience of professional work have priority; this does not preclude the admission of able alumni of regular secondary schools who never earned their living and were familiarized with a trade only as an accessory to their class studies.

The Statute makes the following provisions for training various types of specialists:

a. Future engineers should in most cases work at a factory and study by correspondence or in evening classes during the first two years. However, if engineering training requires from the very beginning the learning of complex theoretical subjects or constant attendance at laboratories, students spend the first two or three years at school after which they must spend the following year working at an enterprise in their technological profession in order to acquire practical knowledge. Then they return to school and resume their studies.

b. Future agronomers and other agricultural specialists study at the institutes organized on large State farms where they also perform practical work.

c. The full-fledged universities, as contrasted with specialized professional schools, should devote their principal attention to training specialists in mathematics, biology, physics, and chemistry. They also have departments for other natural sciences and for social sciences. Students should be given opportunities to acquire practical familiarity with their future specialties. Students in social sciences are required to get some experience in manual work.

d. All future schoolteachers are expected to have diplomas of higher learning.

e. Medical students should be recruited, first of all, from junior hospital personnel or among persons who have already completed secondary medical studies. They are required to combine studies with practical hospital work.

f. Students at the secondary or higher schools of music, plastic arts, drama, and ballet should, if possible, combine their studies with earning their living. The Statute gives preference in admission to people who exercise professions unrelated to music, arts, drama or

dance, in the hope, as it says, that this prospect will help in discovering latent talents.

The objectives of universities and other schools of higher learning are formulated as follows: training future "young specialists" as well as future research and teaching personnel and helping them in "mastering the latest knowledge achieved by the native [Soviet] and foreign science and technology"; proceeding with research; offering the opportunity for postgraduate studies; and spreading the "scientific and political knowledge" among the laboring masses.

Ideological indoctrination is not forgotten. The Statute has this to say, for example, regarding secondary schools: "The school must instill in students love for knowledge and work, respect for the working people, Communist world-outlook, selfless devotion to the Fatherland and the [Soviet] people, and proletarian internationalism." Another Article specifies for the benefit of universities and professional schools of the same level that future specialists should "be brought up in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist doctrine," which is a compulsory academic subject for all students.

The Statute of 1958 did not plan to ensure a universal education higher than eight-year school. However, the 22nd Congress revived, in 1961, the former concept of a universal secondary education with an eleven-year program. The new Party Program, adopted by the Congress, formulated a cautious outline for a gradual progress over the coming years towards the final goal of extending secondary education to all Soviet citizens. The first decade, ending in 1970, should bring all children into secondary schools. This goal might prove rather difficult, especially in the rural areas. The Program implicitly concedes this difficulty by planning to provide, during the decade of 1961-70, the opportunity for completing an eight-year education to all young people who have not had the chance to attend the eight-grade school. The compulsory, universal eight-year schooling for all had been officially in effect for several years prior to the 22nd Congress. Yet the Congress deemed it necessary to offer the opportunity for completing the eight-year education to young people who should have done so as children.

The goal of universal secondary education is to be achieved mainly through evening classes for students simultaneously earning their living. Universal secondary education is to become the condition of the whole Soviet population in the following decade of 1971-80. It is possible that this program will be implemented by creating two types of eleven-year schooling: one with a great stress on trade-training for the mass of young people, and the other of a truly general education

for the selected minority eventually to be admitted to the university. Only the future will tell whether the Party will be more successful this time than before and whether the universal extension of secondary education will be paid for by the lowering of its quality.

Admission to the institutions of higher learning is screened by a stiff entrance examination. Khrushchev complained in 1958 that the former system of such examinations did not prevent influential parents and their friends in education from manipulating the results and gaining admission for their offspring, even if they were less qualified than the children of ordinary parents. This was done in two ways. First, young people who received gold and silver medals for excellent grades in high school were exempted from the entrance examinations; it was the job of the high school principal and teachers to make sure that children of important parents had grades required for such medals. Second, the university authorities managed to grade more leniently entrance examination papers signed by the son or daughter of influential parents. These two malpractices denounced by Khrushchev indicate the class solidarity of the intelligentsia and the power of the upper class. The present school system eliminates the privilege related to medals; henceforth every candidate must take the entrance examination. The examination papers are no longer signed with the candidate's family name but with a code sign which is meant to assure the anonymity of candidates and thus the impartiality of the examining committee.

SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND EDUCATIONAL IDEALS

The Soviet society, being conservative, has decidedly rejected any so-called progressive education. It prefers the old-fashioned system that produces disciplined citizens. There is a lot of common sense in the basic concept, but it is applied to train not disciplined and responsible citizens but serfs of the professional politicians, serfs not allowed to think for themselves.

Students who violate the rules of discipline may suffer various penalties from observation and reprimand to expulsion for up to three years or transfer to a school with a special regime.¹⁰¹ Expulsion for a year or more means that the student cannot be admitted to any other equivalent school. The discipline among students of schools of higher learning is enforced by their own comradely courts.

The Communist Youth League must foster the authority of the teacher. This method is far removed from the first years of the Bolshevik regime when the students ran the school. For instance, the 12th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of that League resolved

that "the main task of Communist Youth League school organizations is to assist the teacher in his educational work and to educate the school students as conscientious, disciplined, and thoroughly developed citizens who will be ready to face any difficulties and trials and to execute any work required by the Fatherland. . . . The Plenary Session expects each student who is a member of the C.Y.L. to take a conscientious and honest attitude toward learning, to observe strict discipline, and to cultivate organizational spirit. . . ." ¹⁰²

Discipline is enforced also outside of school life. For instance, attendance at movies is strictly controlled in order to prevent boys or girls below age 16 from going to a movie at night. "The directors of the schools may grant permission to students to go to the movies or theaters only after the school time, and only in an organized manner in the company of adults, or teachers, or the leaders of the Pioneers. . . ." ¹⁰³

At the same time young people must be patterned according to standards established by the Party. The schools and the parents must cooperate in rearing young people as Soviet patriots, loyal Communists, and militant atheists. ¹⁰⁴

The same concept is applied at all levels, from the kindergarten to the university. According to the order of the People's Commissar of Education of the RSFSR of December 15, 1944, kindergartens should "train children in the habits of good order, inculcate in them a sense of organization, teach them good conduct among children and adults, respect for adults and the love of their parents, develop in them love of the Soviet Fatherland, of their own nation, of her leaders, of the Soviet Army. . . ." ¹⁰⁵

At the university or equivalent level students must abide by the following rules of March 6, 1944:

. . . 6) Students of the same year in a school are divided into groups for the purpose of attendance at practical exercises, at laboratories, at clinics and workshops. The director of the school determines the composition of each group. . . .

7) The director appoints, on nomination by the dean, a senior of each group from among the best and the most disciplined students of that group.

8) The senior is subordinated directly to the dean of a department and enforces within his group all directives and instructions of the dean.

9) The functions of the senior include: a) personal verification of the attendance by his group of students at all school occupations; b) presentation to the dean of a daily report concerning absentees and those who have been late for school occupations,

with mention of the alleged reasons in each case; c) supervision during class hours and at the time of practical exercises over the school discipline of his group and over the care they take of school equipment; d) punctual reception and distribution of textbooks and school aids among students of his group; e) informing the students of any alterations in the dean's instructions; f) appointment of a student on group duty according to daily rotation.

10) Instructions of the senior within the above-mentioned limits are binding on the students of his group.

11) Each group has its diary of an established pattern; the senior keeps it and enters into it notations concerning school attendance by the students of his group.

12) Every student must do his homework, his laboratory and other assignments within the time limits established by the plans of the corresponding course. . . .

13) Each student must pass the midterm and final examinations at the dates determined by the school program. . . .

16) Students must greet the instructor who enters the classroom by rising. Students must also stand while answering the instructor or asking him questions. . . .

29) Any infraction against school discipline committed by a student is punished by a disciplinary penalty.

30) If a student disturbs the class in its work the instructor should reprimand him. If necessary the instructor may ask the student to leave the classroom and may report him to the dean or to the deputy director in charge of the school instruction.

31) Infractions committed by students against school discipline are punished by the following penalties: a) observation, b) reprimand, c) severe reprimand. . . .

33) Students who do not systematically attend the school occupations without valid reasons, who systematically violate the rules of the school's internal order, or who commit acts that discredit them are expelled by the director's order.¹⁰⁶

The results of this intensive and continuous effort of civic training are not always satisfactory from the point of view of the Soviet leadership. N. A. Mikhailov, a former Secretary of the Communist Youth League, complained bitterly in 1952 that there are facts which "give evidence of the attempts at influencing our youth in an alien spirit. The survivals of the past in the conscience of people make themselves visible. One may observe at some enterprises the facts of the violations of labor discipline by young workers. In the cities and in the villages there are among the young people loafers who commit infractions against the rules of socialist coexistence. Some young men and girls

fall under the influence of religion."¹⁰⁷ Eleven years later, in June, 1963, the Central Committee heard from its members the same complaints.

Since the last war, one Soviet educator has been presented as a shining example of sound views on rearing children and young people. His name is A. S. Makarenko, a former official of the Ministry of the Interior, who died in 1939. His articles and lectures have been reprinted under the title *Selected Pedagogical Works of A. S. Makarenko*. Here are some of his views:

A teacher without authority is inconceivable . . . the very meaning of authority consists in that it requires no proof, that it is accepted as the unchallenged virtue of the older person; it is the latter's power and worth as seen through the simple eyes of a child. The father and mother should have this authority in the eyes of the child. . . . Authority is essential in the family. . . . The only sex life acknowledged by socialist morality as being normal and morally justified is that based on mutual love and manifested in the family, i.e., in an open and civic union of man and woman, a union that has two goals: human happiness and the birth and upbringing of children. . . . We must raise our children to regard love as a serious and profound feeling, to find their joy, love, and happiness in the family. . . . The second most important factor is the general fostering of love in a child. If, on growing up, the child has not learned to love his parents, brothers and sisters, his school, his country, if the rudiments of a coarse egoism have been encouraged in his character, it is difficult to imagine him loving the woman of his choice. Such people often exhibit the strongest sexual feelings, but are always inclined not to respect the one who attracts them, not to value her spiritual life, nor even to be interested in her. They, therefore, easily change attachments and are very close to ordinary perversion. . . . Of course, it is difficult to picture a good school group without good discipline. . . . Care for parents must be fostered in children, the simple and natural desire to refuse a personal pleasure as long as one's father or mother is deprived [of necessities of life].¹⁰⁸

These views are not new and were followed by many societies before the October Revolution. It is interesting, however, to see that they are fostered by the Soviet regime as a means of building a conservative society founded on strict discipline. In the USSR, the prestige of parents and teachers has only one limit—the interest of the State.

SOURCES OF SKILLED AND UNSKILLED MANPOWER

Schools supply the State with a steady flow of managers, engineers, foremen, and skilled workers to various branches of economic production. Unskilled manpower is plentiful in the villages. "The collective farms have become an immense pool of manpower for industries."¹⁰⁹ Workers are recruited there by State agencies.

Until 1947 recruiting agencies of various ministries were allowed to compete for rural manpower in the same districts. This situation was propitious for the peasants, who could choose the industry in which they would work. But the Party did not like it. *Pravda* on June 29, 1947, condemned "the unhealthy competition between the economic organizations." In 1947 the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR established a new system of recruitment of rural labor. It was centralized in the hands of one of the governmental departments which operates in the field through its own local offices after concluding contracts with the industries concerned as to the amount and type of manpower they need. This system has a great advantage for the State because it leaves no choice to the peasant; he must either accept the contract of employment in the only industry for which the State agency recruits in his particular district or stay in his village.

Recruiting agents conclude one-year contracts with individual peasants, the collective farms having no right to retain the peasants. The human material of interest to the State is men between 16 and 55 and women between 18 and 50. Once a peasant signs a contract with the recruiting agents, he receives a passport, which is the key to any city or industrial settlement, normally denied to peasants.

NOTES

1. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 203.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 204-205.
3. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude, op. cit.*, p. 64.
4. A. E. Pasherstnik, *Pravovye Voprosy Voznagrazhdeniia za Trud Rabochikh i Sluzhashchikh*, p. 234.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 234.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.
8. J. Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma*, 11th edition, p. 496.
9. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude, op. cit.*, p. 62.
10. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo, op. cit.*, pp. 206-207.

11. N. G. Aleksandrov *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude*, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
12. N. G. Aleksandrov, V. M. Dogadov *et al.*, *Voprosy Trudovogo Prava*, p. 241.
13. L. E. Gurin, *Voprosy organizatsii zarabotnoi platy na mashinostroitel'nykh predpriyatiakh*, State Scientific-Technical Publication of Mechanical Engineering Literature (Moscow, 1950), pp. 199, 235.
14. N. G. Aleksandrov, V. M. Dogadov *et al.*, *Voprosy Trudovogo Prava*, *op. cit.*, p. 248.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 245.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
19. N. G. Aleksandrov, V. M. Dogadov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 194.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
22. N. G. Aleksandrov and G. K. Moskalenko, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
23. A. E. Pasherstnik, *op. cit.*, p. 200.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
25. A. E. Pasherstnik, *op. cit.*, p. 221.
26. L. E. Gurin, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
28. A. E. Pasherstnik, *op. cit.*, p. 214.
29. L. E. Gurin, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
32. A. E. Pasherstnik, *op. cit.*, p. 253.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 254.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
36. *Loc. cit.*
37. N. G. Aleksandrov *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 214.
38. N. G. Aleksandrov and G. K. Moskalenko, *op. cit.*, p. 213.
39. *Spravochnik Profsoiuznogo Rabotnika*, 1957, pp. 31-38.
40. A. E. Pasherstnik, *op. cit.*, p. 169.
41. N. G. Aleksandrov *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude*, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-156.
42. N. G. Aleksandrov *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, pp. 216-217; see also S. S. Asarkhanov, *op. cit.*, p. 79, and N. G. Aleksandrov *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude*, pp. 88-89.
43. A. E. Pasherstnik, *op. cit.*, p. 259.
44. L. E. Gurin, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.
45. A. E. Pasherstnik, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-269.
46. L. E. Gurin, *op. cit.*, p. 152.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
48. N. G. Aleksandrov and G. K. Moskalenko, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
49. N. G. Aleksandrov *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude*, p. 76.
50. A. E. Pasherstnik, *op. cit.*, pp. 277, 279.
51. The Soviet Government does not publish figures for average wages. The estimates mentioned in this paragraph are taken from the *Economist*, June 1, 1963.
52. V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, Foreign Languages Publishing House (Moscow, 1949), pp. 155-156.

53. L. E. Gurin, *op. cit.*, pp. 34, 86.
54. Approximately 20 printed pages.
55. M. I. Movshovich, *Vyshshaia Shkola. Osnovnye Postanovleniia, Priказы i Instruktsii*, 2nd edition, The Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR, Publication of the State Publishing House, "Sovetskaia Nauka" (Moscow, 1948), pp. 237-240.
56. Decree of April 24, 1959, reproduced in *Sobranie Postanovlenii Soveta Ministrov SSSR*, No. 9, 1959.
57. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 18, May 12, 1960.
58. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 39, September 28, 1962.
59. I. A. Chistov, V. V. Lavrov, N. N. Liubimov, V. K. Raykher, N. N. Rovinskii, B. A. Sorkin, and D. B. Valler, *Finansovoe Pravo*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1946), p. 83.
60. K. N. Plotnikov, *Biudzhët Sotsialisticheskogo Gosudarstva*, State Finances Publishing House (Moscow, 1948), pp. 281-282.
61. I. I. Evtikhiiev and V. A. Vlassov, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 164-165.
65. S. S. Studenikin, *Sovetskoe Administrativnoe Pravo*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 97.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
67. I. I. Evtikhiiev and V. A. Vlassov, *op. cit.*, p. 167.
68. B. S. Utevskaia, *op. cit.*, p. 255; see also *Ugolovnyi Kodeks*, pp. 123-124.
69. *Ugolovnyi Kodeks*, Moscow: 1947, p. 86.
70. *Resolutions of the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bol'sheviks)*, Foreign Languages Publishing House (Moscow, 1939), p. 43.
71. I. I. Evtikhiiev and V. A. Vlassov, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
72. *Resolutions of the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bol'sheviks)*, p. 40.
73. J. Stalin, *Report on the work of the Central Committee to the 18th Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B)*, delivered on March 10, 1939, Foreign Languages Publishing House (Moscow, 1939), pp. 29, 31, 51, and 52.
74. The Resolution was reproduced in *Bol'shevik*, August, 1946, No. 16, pp. 50-53.
75. *Pravda*, October 7, 1952.
76. *Pravda*, October 13, 1952.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
79. V. I. Serebrovskii, Z. I. Shkundin, and M. V. Zimeleva, *Grazhdanskoe Pravo*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR, 3rd edition (Moscow, 1947), p. 237.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
81. V. I. Serebrovskii *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 239.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
83. I. L. Braude, *Pravo na Stroenie i Sdelki po Stroeniam po Sovetskому Pravu*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1950), p. 121.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
85. I. L. Braude, S. L. Fuchs, M. A. Gurvich, N. D. Kazantsev, A. N. Nikitin,

G. H. Polianskaia, A. A. Ruskol, I. V. Pavlov, *Zemel'noe Pravo*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 282.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
87. The building credit system is explained in V. I. Serebrovskii *et al.*, *Grazhdanskoe Pravo*, pp. 316-317.
88. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 50, December 15, 1961.
89. All children in secondary schools must pay for their own textbooks.
90. A. M. Danev, *op. cit.*, pp. 456-457.
91. A. M. Danev, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
92. M. I. Movshovich, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
93. S. S. Askarkhanov, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
94. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 134.
95. A. E. Pasherstnik, *Pravo na Trud*, p. 170.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 173.
97. A. A. Askerov *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
98. The Joint Resolution, reproduced in *Pravda*, November 16, 1958.
99. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 1, January 1, 1959.
100. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 36, September 13, 1960.
101. A. M. Danev, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
102. *Ibid.*, pp. 139-143.
103. *Ibid.*, pp. 153-154.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
106. M. I. Movshovich, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-98.
107. *Pravda*, October 7, 1952.
108. A. S. Makarenko, *Selected Pedagogical Works*, quoted in *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, 1949.
109. A. E. Pasherstnik, *Pravo na Trud*, p. 123.

CHAPTER THREE

Trade Unions, Labor Disputes, Social Insurance

THE SOVIET trade unions are tools of the Party. The Party, being an elitist organization, needs to maintain contact with the average citizen through so-called public organizations, such as the trade unions.

TRADE UNIONS

The leadership of the Soviet trade unions, the government, and the public administration are all composed of Party members. It is only logical that the management of enterprises which follows the State directives cannot clash with the trade unions on any issue. The solution of every important question of labor relations is decided by the highest Party leadership.

The Party does not try to conceal its tight control over trade unions. For example, the Party Central Committee stated on December 17, 1957, in a directive addressed to the trade unions: "The strength of Soviet trade unions derives from the fact that they follow the Leninist policy of the Communist Party which is the life-giving foundation of socialist society. Trade unions can successfully carry out their tasks only if the Party directs, helps, and supports them."¹ The 12th Trade-Union Congress assured the Party in March, 1959, that: "The Soviet trade unions will increase their contribution to the great venture of building Communism in our country by rallying even more closely the working class and the Soviet intelligentsia behind the Communist Party."²

There is no room for any of the traditional activities of trade unions conceived as the defenders of the employees against the employer. The employer is the State, controlled by the Party. So are the trade unions. Moreover, Soviet leaders insist on a convenient fiction—the State is that of the toiling masses—why should the toilers, and their trade unions, oppose their own State?

Wages, length of work time, extent of social insurance, and other aspects of the labor problem being regulated by the Party through its

State machinery, traditional trade unions have become superfluous. Of course, strikes are unthinkable because they would represent counter-revolutionary activity. Nevertheless trade unions were not abolished in the Soviet Union; simply, their objectives were revised. They became parts of the State machinery, supervising the execution of State labor legislation, controlling the workers' observance of discipline, driving the workers towards greater productivity. From being weapons of the workers they have become tools of the general employer, the State.

The proportion of Party members and candidates being only 5 percent out of the total population, the Party keeps in contact with the more than 70 million Soviet employees through organizations open to all employees, the trade unions. The Trade Union Charter of 1959 says: "The Soviet trade unions perform their entire work under the leadership of the Communist Party, the organizing and directing force of the Soviet society. The trade unions of the USSR rally the workers and office employees behind the Party. . . ." They are not expected to argue with the Party and the State, but to channel orders from the top leadership of both the Party and the State to the working masses.

The Party encourages membership in the trade unions in order to reach as many industrial workers and other State employees as possible. The system of social insurance is so organized as to grant better treatment to members of trade unions.

The membership fees are not unduly high. They range from $\frac{1}{2}$ percent of wages if the monthly earnings do not exceed 50 rubles, to 1 percent from monthly wages and salaries higher than 70 rubles. In other words, agricultural laborers on State farms and unskilled workers contribute $\frac{1}{2}$ percent of their wages, and the bulk of skilled workers and office employees, 1 percent.

Well over 90 percent of workers and other State employees are trade-union members.

The Charter of Trade Unions, as amended by their 12th Congress in 1959, says: "The main task of trade unions consists in mobilizing the masses in the struggle for a further, mighty development of all branches of national economy, for a further strengthening of the economic and military power of the Soviet State, for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of national economic plans, for technological progress, for a constant increase in labor productivity, for the greatest thrift on all levels of national economy, for the utmost use of all potential resources in order to increase the industrial and agricultural output, and for a constant rise in the standards of material and cultural well-being of the toilers."³ The most revealing part of this statement is the last place assigned to the task which is the main one of free trade

unions: the protection of well-being of their members. Except for this mention, the whole statement refers only to those goals which are of primary importance to the State. The Charter emphasizes the various means by which trade unions can achieve these goals, such as educating their members "in the spirit of Soviet patriotism," and the organization of socialist competition.

Trade unions also have functions other than helping the State increase and improve production. Their highest body, the All-Union Central Council, which is composed of high ranking Party members, is the trusted adviser of the Government on "planning and regulating wages and salaries of workers and office employees, devising the system of compensation for work and of bonuses, implementing the socialist principle of compensation according to the quantity and quality of work, introducing progressive, technological norms of output," and so forth. The Council also takes part in the governmental processes of devising plans for further economic development. Its functions are in this respect those of a governmental agency.

Trade unions are in another respect a branch of State administration, because they are entrusted with the implementation of certain aspects of legislation: this is the matter of making economies on State expenditures. These administrative functions are performed on the plant level by unpaid trade-union members who do it after their hours of professional work. The trade unions control the execution of laws pertaining to the safety of work and sanitation on the premises of the factory; they also implement the legislation on social insurance and administer the network of sanatoria, rest homes, and clubs for State employees, as well as help the factory management in finding and improving housing accommodations for their members. They also carry among their members "ideological-political" propaganda and cooperate in "the mass enlisting of women in the State, economic, and social activities." Finally, they conclude collective agreements with the factory management; the only trouble is that there is nothing left for collective bargaining, as the conditions of work, including wages and worktime, are regulated by State laws.

However, even in the Soviet Union, trade unions are left a narrow margin of action in the direct interest of the employee. They cannot challenge the State labor policy, but they may dissent with the management as to the interpretation of a particular State regulation. In such a case, they act as the employees' representatives against the management of a particular enterprise. Labor conflict in the Soviet Union never means conflict between the employee and the employer, since the

latter is the State. It means only a dispute over the interpretation of the will of the State.

The Charter lists the rights and duties of a trade-union member and, significantly enough, stresses that the member "must observe strictly State and labor discipline."

Every State employee, whether he is a worker (including agricultural laborers on the State farms) or an office employee, as well as students of the higher or technical-secondary schools, may become a member. The advantages offered to trade-union members are as follows: social-insurance allocations higher than for nonmembers; first priority in admission to the sanatoria, rest homes, and vacation places for themselves and their families, and for their children, to nurseries, kindergartens, and Pioneers' camps; free medical help; and the use of cultural and sport facilities for themselves and their families. The member may be punished for the violation of the Trade-Union Charter, nonpayment of dues during a period longer than three months, lack of discipline, and other misconduct by a disciplinary penalty (warning or reprimand) and, in serious cases, by expulsion. The total membership has now reached 66 million, an imposing figure but one due to the obvious advantages of being a trade-union member.

The structure of the trade unions follows the usual pattern, "the lower organs (being) subordinated to higher ones," with the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions being the top commanding body because of the rare convocation of the national congresses. The Charter says that the Congress shall convene "at least once in four years." As a result, the implications of another provision of the Charter become obvious. This other provision states: "The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions directs the entire activity of the trade unions in the intervals between the All-Union Congresses." Actually, the real power is vested in its Presidium and its Secretariat, both easily controlled by the top Party leadership.

All the members employed by the same enterprise or institution, whatever their craft or occupation, belong to the same trade union; there is one trade union for each industry. The primary organization is formed at each plant or office. If a factory is large enough, the primary organization is subdivided into shop organizations which in turn are subdivided into groups, each for a working brigade. The general meeting of members of the primary organization elects the factory trade-union committee which is the most important local body. It is this committee which performs the trade-union functions on the level of a factory. It represents the employees in relations with the

management, concludes collective agreements, organizes socialist competition jointly with the management, supervises the implementation of legislation on the safety of labor, and administers social insurance. It elects its chairman, vice-chairman and the treasurer.

The upper structure is complex and corresponds to the new Party structure which separates urban Communists from rural Party members (see above). The trade unions for all industrial workers and other urban employees within a region are united together. Similarly the trade unions for State-farm and other rural employees are combined together in a parallel but distinct regional organization. Each of these two separate regional organizations is administered by its own regional council elected by the regional conference. Hence, there are two regional conferences and two regional councils for each region.

All the regional councils of both types are in turn subordinated to the Union-Republican council elected at the Union-Republican conference. Each Union-Republican council has two bureaus, one for the industrial and other urban trade unions and the other for the rural trade unions. The current work of regional and Union-Republican councils is expedited by their presidia.

This territorial organization exists side by side with the functional one. Each trade union (there are altogether twenty-two unions for State employees, urban and agricultural), has its own regional and Union-Republican conferences and committees, and, at the top, its own national congress and its own central committee. One of the main functions of each central committee is to assist the government in fixing and raising the norms of output for the industry whose workers are members of that particular trade union. As usual in the Soviet practice, the central committee delegates its powers to its presidium which carries on current work.

These three parallel structures (the regional councils for urban employees, the regional councils for rural employees, and the committees for each particular trade union) are topped by the All-Union Congress and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions which retains in fact the supreme authority over all trade-union activities. The Central Council is assisted in its work by two bureaus, one for the trade unions of industrial and urban employees and the other for rural employees.

It is important for any totalitarian regime to take care of the leisure time of its citizens, so that they will have little time to think and contemplate. The Nazis invented Strength through Joy, the Fascists the program of After Work Time. The Soviet trade unions

are required by the Charter "to carry out the educational and mass-cultural work among workers, office employees, and their families; help the trade-union members in raising the level of their political-ideological convictions and of their general education; spread among them political and scientific knowledge; conduct a wide production-technological propaganda; organize their own press; found clubs, houses and palaces of culture, sport associations, Red Corners, and libraries; encourage workers and office employees to participate in artistic activities, physical culture, sports and tourism." All these objectives are praiseworthy except that the Party outlines the programs of activities and limits individual initiative by its own ideological concepts and its official standards of beauty. The principal pre-occupation is to keep trade-union members busy during their leisure time which in any case is partly filled by their participation in the innumerable committees of all sorts which have mushroomed in the post-Stalinist period. The factory trade-union committee alone has several sub-committees such as the committee for cultural activities, the committee for housing problems, the commission for work with the employees' children, the commission for problems of wages (it supervises the exact implementation by the management of State wage regulations), the commission for the encouragement of employees' initiative in making inventions and suggesting improved methods of production, the commission for the safety of labor, the commission for the improvement of supply of consumer goods and of factory canteens, the commission for social insurance, the commission for labor disputes, and the commission for socialist competition. All these commissions are recruited from among the "activists." In fact, they are so numerous that a large portion of employees must participate in them and play the role of activists whether they like it or not. This in itself should keep the employees rather busy in their after-work time.

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS

The traditional function of free trade unions is collective bargaining with the employers for the conclusion of collective agreements. The Soviet trade unions no longer perform such a function, at least not as it is generally understood in free-enterprise countries. This is the formal explanation:

The determination of the rates of wages represented the main content of the collective agreements at the time those rates were not yet established by the decrees of the Government. This is why the passage to other forms of legal regulation of wages,

justified by consolidation of socialist planning, eliminated the need of concluding collective agreements with the purpose of determining the rates of wages. . . . For these reasons, collective agreements were not concluded for several years.⁴

In 1947 there was a shift in Party policy. It was decided that collective agreements should be revived to make management and workers understand exactly what was expected of them by the State. Interestingly enough, the return to the practice of collective agreements was *ordered* by a Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on February 4, 1947.

These collective agreements are not the result of free bargaining between trade unions and enterprises. The Decree stated that collective agreements were reestablished

in order to secure fulfillment and overfulfillment of the production plans, a further rise of labor productivity . . . as well as an increase in the responsibility of the economic and trade-union organizations for the amelioration of the material existence and the cultural welfare of the workers, the engineering-technical and other officials of the enterprises. . . .

The decree further made clear that "the collective agreements . . . should conform with the State plans . . . as approved for each Ministry." The Ministries and the trade unions were cautioned not to include in the collective agreements "any systems of remuneration . . . which have not been enacted by the Government."⁵

Each particular agreement has to follow the pre-established pattern for each industry, a pattern determined by the highest hierarchy. Any collective agreement which does not conform "to existing labor legislation or to the approved State plans" cannot be registered by the regional trade-union council and the regional council of national economy, unless it is "duly amended."⁶ An unregistered agreement is null and void.

The content of a Soviet collective agreement is foreign to anything known to the West. The collective agreements include:

- 1) duties of the management . . . apt to contribute toward fulfillment and overfulfillment of the State plan . . . increase of output, lowering of the cost of production, and raising of the productivity of labor;
- 2) duties of the management and the factory-shop committee concerning socialist competition and labor discipline;
- 3) duties of the management relating to improvement of safety of labor, conditions of housing, working equipment, and cultural services for the workers;
- 4) duties of the management concerning training of the personnel on the

premises of the enterprise. . . . Moreover, the collective agreements include the system of wages, as determined by the Government.⁷

Here lies the key to the understanding of the whole practice of collective agreements—they are the reminders of the respective obligations of the management and of the employees, as determined by the State. Naturally, the conclusion of the agreement is accompanied by intense propaganda on the premises of the enterprise. The propaganda aims at reminding the employees and the management of their precise obligations as established by the State.

It should promote a more active participation of the large masses of workers, engineers, technicians, and other officials, in the productive life of the enterprise, in the struggle for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the production plan, for a rise in the productivity of labor, and for further improvement of the material conditions of the existence and cultural welfare of the workers.⁸

The collective agreement is in most of its aspects an additional whip to stimulate the employees.

LABOR DISPUTES—LABOR-DISPUTES COMMISSIONS

The concept of a dispute between the workers and the State as the employer being unknown to the Soviet idea of labor relations, the only dispute that is legally recognized is that between an individual employee and the management, concerning the interpretation and application of State regulations in a particular case. Of course, both parties to a dispute may be in good faith, but the Soviet regime being based on absolutes cannot admit the existence of relative or subjective truths.

The basic reason of labor conflicts at socialist enterprises and offices . . . is the existence of survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of the individual citizen. Such survivals may manifest themselves in the bureaucratic distortions of labor legislation by some representatives of the management . . . [and] in the tendency on the part of some unscrupulous and dishonest workers to give to the State as little as possible and to receive from it as large a remuneration as possible. . . .⁹

The organ for the mediatory settlement of those disputes is the Labor-Disputes Commission (formerly known as the Appraisal-Conflicts Commission). The composition, prerogatives, and procedure of the Commission are regulated by the Edict of January 31, 1957 (*Spravoch-*

nik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika, 1960, pp. 319-325). The Commission is organized at every enterprise or office where there exists a factory trade-union committee. At small plants which have no factory committee of their own, there is no Labor-Disputes Commission; several of these plants are combined under the jurisdiction of one Commission. Conversely, at the large plants, each shop or shift may have its own L.D.C. if there are corresponding shop or shift trade-union committees. In other words, an L.D.C. corresponds usually to a trade-union committee.

The composition of the L.D.C. is based on equal representation of the management and the factory or shop committee.¹⁰ In the years between 1928 and 1933, the L.D.C. served as the meeting ground for the management and the trade-union committee of a given plant to discuss and agree on norms of output and rates of wages. With the State regulating both matters from above, the L.D.C.'s jurisdiction had to be singularly restricted.

The work of the Commission consists in mediation of disputes over such matters as: a) the amount of compensation due for the vacation period that an employee had to defer on orders from the management; b) the transfer of a worker by the management to another job and the remuneration due in this connection; c) the amount due for output below the minimum norm, for a period of breakdown, or for a defective output; d) the discharge for lack of professional qualifications or for systematic nonexecution of labor duties; e) compensation due to a worker for the use of his own tools; f) amount of bonuses claimed by the employee; g) amount of deductions taken by the management to recover damages, except in cases within the jurisdiction of the courts; h) remuneration for overtime work; i) alleged nonexecution by the management of its duties concerning the welfare of employees.

It would be a singular delusion to think that the L.D.C. has great freedom in deciding these cases, for it is controlled by State legislation or by the State-approved budget of the enterprise. The Commission may only verify whether the management has correctly interpreted those regulations in a particular case. Even so, the L.D.C. is of a certain value to the employee. It may not protect him from the general employer, the State, but at least it can give him some protection from the whims or the bad faith of the managers. The managers may only be persuaded, not compelled, because half of the members of an L.D.C. represent the management and the other half, the trade-union committee.

Every labor dispute must first of all be submitted to the L.D.C.

To safeguard equal representation on the Commission, the chairman and the secretary are alternately appointed by the management and the trade-union committee. An employee who has presented a case before the L.D.C. may ask before examination of his case for the exclusion of a member of the L.D.C. His reasons and his request are accepted or rejected "by the factory-shop committee in respect to the workers' representatives and by the management in respect to the management delegates."¹¹ Thus, an employee who has a personal feud with a management delegate to an L.D.C. cannot eliminate him from the panel without the consent of the management.

If the examination of a case reveals abuses or incompetence on the part of the management, the employees' delegates must immediately inform the State procurator, thus providing the State with an additional means of checking upon its own bureaucracy.

All decisions must be settled by agreement of the two halves of the Commission. Thus, the L.D.C. is by no means superior to the management. Its role is that of a mediator, not of an arbitrator.

If the Commission is unable to settle a dispute because of disagreement between its two halves, or if the employee is dissatisfied with its decision, he may submit his dispute with the management to the factory trade-union committee. The committee settles the dispute in the former case and either confirms the settlement arrived at by the Commission or quashes it and renders its own decision in the latter case. If the employee feels unhappy about the decision of the factory committee, he has the right to submit his case to the people's court which finally settles the dispute. The management, which does not participate in the settlement of the dispute by the factory committee and only acts before the committee as a party, also has a means of defending itself against the committee's decision which it considers contrary to the existing legislation. It may appeal the committee's decision to the people's court.

Certain labor disputes are beyond the jurisdiction of the L.D.C. If an employee has been discharged with the assent of his factory trade-union committee, he may appeal directly to the people's court, by-passing the usual procedure before the L.D.C. Labor complaints of higher officials concerning such matters as their discharge, transfer to another post, or disciplinary penalties are settled in hierarchical order by appealing from the decision of the immediate superior to the higher ranking superior. Included among those State employees are: managers of enterprises and directors of State institutions and agencies, chief engineers, medical doctors, accountants and other chief specialists, heads of shops, foremen, higher public executives,

editors in chief, professors of schools of higher learning and senior research workers, procurators and investigators, actors, and professional members of orchestras and choruses.

ANNUAL VACATIONS

Soviet State employees have the right usually to a two-week paid vacation after eleven months of uninterrupted service. The period of correctional labor is not counted toward the eleven-month period, although the employee continues to work at the same enterprise at reduced wages.

During the vacation the employee is paid at the rate of the average wages earned during the previous twelve months.¹² The usual duration of the annual vacation is twelve working days; for juveniles below age 18, it is a full calendar month or at least twenty-four working days.

Certain types of employees are given longer vacations. For instance, workers employed in mining, metallurgical, chemical, textile, building-materials, transportation, or important construction industries have the right to three additional workdays of vacation if they have been employed at the same enterprise for at least the previous two years. Also, the higher bureaucrats with the so-called unregulated workday receive an additional vacation of twelve workdays, or have, in other words, a full month's vacation each year. Intellectual employees have a longer vacation up to one month. Employees in the Far North are entitled to longer vacations, up to twelve additional working days.

The annual vacation is granted by rotation throughout the whole year. Only juveniles below 18 and teaching personnel always receive their leaves in the summer. Usually, about 8 to 9 percent of the employees of an enterprise are simultaneously on vacation leave, but no more. The management may retain an employee for production requirements, but the period of unused vacation in one year must be added to the vacation of the next year; in any event the vacation may not be refused in two consecutive years.

The order of rotation and other problems relating to vacations are settled by agreement between the management and the factory trade-union committee; any dispute pertaining to those matters is submitted to the L.D.C.

The Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of July 8, 1944, added a maternity leave of thirty-five calendar days before the child's birth and forty-two days after it. A new Edict of March 26, 1956, extended it to fifty-six days before and fifty-six days after the birth.

ADMINISTRATION OF LABOR PROTECTION AND
SOCIAL-INSURANCE LEGISLATION

Since 1933 the State social insurance has been administered by the trade unions. This administration is carried on at each plant by the factory trade-union committee if the total number of employees does not exceed 300. Otherwise the factory (shop) committee appoints from among trade-union members the social-insurance commission, which should include not only workers but also office employees, engineers, and factory doctors. The chairman of the factory (shop) committee assumes the functions of chairman of the commission. The commission authorizes the management to pay the social-insurance allowances and determines in each case their amount according to the existing legislation, controls the managerial decisions regarding the computation of the length of service of the employees if this length influences the size of allowances, assists sick employees and their families, checks on the sick employee's observance of prescribed treatment, issues passes to sanatoria and rest homes, admits employees' children to nurseries, kindergartens, and Pioneers' camps, and helps the employees in obtaining their old-age pensions. The commission is divided into working groups, each charged with a specific function. The insurance allowances are paid by the management on the commission's instructions. The employee may appeal from the commission to the factory trade-union committee.

The State administration takes care of people who are no longer connected with any enterprise, such as old-age pensioners or totally disabled invalids.

The enforcement of laws on safety of labor is also entrusted to the trade unions. Each regional or Union-Republican trade-union council has its own department of safety of labor which includes medical doctors and professional inspectors among its employees. The inspector must have higher or technical-secondary education and the experience of practical industrial work. He supervises the conditions of safety and public health on the premises of plants located within his jurisdiction. At each plant the administration is performed by unpaid trade-union members. The factory trade-union committee appoints its own commission for the safety of labor. This commission, recruited from trade-union members, should include public (unpaid) inspectors, shock workers, and engineers. One of the members of the factory committee acts as the commission's chairman and also as the principal public inspector for the whole plant. The commission mainly performs the following functions: it controls the managerial decisions

concerning worktime, days of rest, vacations, protection of women's and juveniles' labor, and overtime work; assists the management in implementing the provisions of collective agreement regarding safety of labor; supervises the sanitary conditions on the premises. It is helped in its work by groups of trade-union members formed for each shop or brigade and by public inspectors. The public inspector is elected in open ballot by his colleagues who also are trade-union members. He is in charge of supervising safety of labor and sanitary conditions within the sector of the plant where he and his electors work.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOCIAL-INSURANCE FUND

"One must stress one of the most important and fundamental differences between the Soviet and the capitalist social-insurance systems; it consists in the fact that contributions to social-insurance funds are paid in our country only by the enterprises and offices, but never by the workers and officials themselves."¹³ This statement appears imposing at first. However, it cannot stand careful analysis. The State by regulating salaries and wages can reduce them in such a way as to recover the social-insurance funds. Actually, any other State would be in the same position if it nationalized its industries. One should also remember that social insurance does not cover the peasants, who have to take care of their needs through collective-farm mutual-aid funds.

Each enterprise must contribute toward the State social-insurance funds. The tariffs are determined by the Government in proportion to the payroll of the enterprise and the probability of accidents or diseases. For instance, the oil-industry enterprises contribute 8 percent of their wage funds; scientific institutions, 4 percent. The contributions are entered in the State Bank accounts of the corresponding trade union. The social-insurance commissions of the trade unions authorize payments from the fund, which are made by the factory concerned, with no extra pay to the clerical personnel. This procedure means economy for the State.

The Decision of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions of February 29, 1960, compelled employers other than the State enterprises to pay social-insurance contributions to the State fund on behalf of persons whom they hire for work.¹⁴ These employers are of two sorts: religious communities, and private individuals. Religious communities are placed by Soviet law in a peculiar situation. This law denies them the status of juristic persons. State enterprises and other State institutions which have their own autono-

mous budget separate from the general State budget, collective farms and other cooperatives, and public organizations such as the Party, trade unions, or Komsomol are recognized juristic persons and may act before courts as defendants or plaintiffs as well as own their own property.¹⁵ All these rights are denied to the religious communities which legally exist on the sufferance of the State. However, the All-Union Central Council imposed on them the legal obligation to pay for the social insurance of their employees without any counterpart, as for instance, the right to sue their employees before courts for a breach of contract of employment. Private individuals obligated to pay social-insurance contributions, are those who employ, as the Council says, "domestic servants, nurses, chauffeurs, secretaries, typists, stenographers, guards [of their house or other property], gardeners, etc." There is no better proof of the existence of an upper class in the "socialist" society than this provision which enumerates the kinds of personal servants and assistants only a wealthy person can employ in a "capitalist" country. These employees, as well as those of religious communities, are paid their social-insurance allowances by the district or city committee of the trade union of local industries and communal economy. These allowances are paid directly from the State fund and indirectly from their employers' contributions regularly made to the State Bank.

TEMPORARY DISABILITY (SICKNESS OR ACCIDENT) INSURANCE

An employee who is temporarily incapacitated by an accident or illness may be excused from work only on the strength of the certificate issued by the factory or other authorized doctor. He then begins to receive the allowance which is always paid independently of the length of his total employment or his employment with the particular enterprise where he works.¹⁶

However, the temporary disability allowance is denied for six months to employees who have been discharged following a serious violation of labor discipline or commission of a crime. They retain the right to this allowance only if their disability is due to a labor accident or an occupational illness. Employees released at their own request also lose for six months the right to social insurance in case of a temporary disability (except in the case of a labor accident or occupational illness) unless they are reemployed at another enterprise within one month.

The allowance is paid until the employee recovers his full ability to work or until he is granted the pension for permanently incapacitated invalids. If the disabled employee is capable of performing

lighter work, he is temporarily assigned to another job. If the compensation for this work is lower than his usual wages, he will receive the allowance for two months at the most. During these two months his temporary wages and the allowance may not exceed the level of his former wages.

The amounts of allowances for temporary disability vary according to the following rules:

1. They should be equal to the former average wages if the disability is due to a labor accident or an occupational illness. Nonmembers of trade unions have the same right.

2. They are lower than the former wages in cases where the disability is due to causes other than a labor accident or an occupational disease. Members of trade unions have the right to the following rates which vary in relation to the length of their employment with the same enterprise (an indirect means of stabilizing the manpower): 1) less than three years, 50 percent; 2) between three and five years, 60 percent; 3) between five and eight years, 70 percent; 4) between eight and twelve years, 80 percent; 5) over twelve years, 90 percent. Juveniles less than 18 years old always have the right to 60 percent of wages and invalids of the last war, to 90 percent, in both cases independently of the length of employment with their present enterprise.

Employees who are not trade-union members receive half the amount which is due members. In any event the allowance must not be lower than 30 rubles per month in the urban settlements or 27 rubles in the rural localities (the latter provision refers mostly, though not only, to agricultural laborers on the State farms). The allowance may not be higher either than the former average wage or salary or than 10 rubles per day. If the average former compensation included bonuses, the allowance is computed on the maximum basis of two monthly salaries or twofold piece-rate or time-rate wages, although the average income of the disabled employee might have been higher than this maximum ceiling. This ceiling does not apply to allowances paid during temporary disability due to a labor accident or an occupational illness; the employee must then be paid his full former average compensation, including all bonuses, whatever the total amount of that compensation might have been. The average salary or wages taken into consideration for the computation of the amount of allowance are those which the employee was paid during the two months prior to his temporary incapacitation.

The employee loses the right to the allowance in the following cases:

1. If he does not observe the prescribed medical treatment or fails to appear for the periodical checkup. The length of this penalty is fixed by the social-insurance trade-union commission.

2. In the case of temporary disability due to intoxication or to consequences of intoxication (for instance, if the employee has been beaten in a drunken brawl), the employee who has no dependents receives no allowance at all. Others who have dependents (a spouse, children, or parents) do not receive any allowance for the first ten days and thereafter only half the amount. This collective penalty, which may affect completely innocent dependents, indicates the serious Party preoccupation with one of the social plagues of the Soviet society, alcoholism.

The social-insurance trade-union commission allocates the allowances and fixes their amounts and the period during which they should be paid. The management pays the allowances on the commission's orders.

If the employee dies before he has been paid all the allowances due him, the remainder is paid to his dependents: minor children, brothers or sisters less than 18 years old, the spouse, and parents if they lived with him.

The allowance, calculated in the same manner, is paid in two other cases: if a quarantine ordered by the public health authorities confines the employee to his home, or if a member of his family is sick and his presence is absolutely necessary at home to take care of the relative. In the latter case the allowance is paid if no other member of the family can nurse the sick person. The law makes it perfectly clear that the domestic servant is not considered a member of the family. This clarification is of no significance for the industrial workers or lower office employees who cannot afford to have a domestic servant. It is of moral comfort to the upper-class employees who are thereby allowed to stay home and sit by their sick relative. The allowance is paid for three days, but this period may be extended in exceptionally serious cases. The same allowance is paid to mothers who reside at a hospital together with their sick minor child.

The sick employee may be sent, if need be, to a sanatorium or a rest home. In March, 1960, all sanatoria and rest homes were placed under the administration of trade unions. Employees sent there by the decision of the social-insurance trade-union commission usually pay at least a part of the costs as determined by the same commission. Priority is ensured to members of trade unions, workers who have invented better methods of production, workers who perform especially important functions, and engineers.

The social legislation penalizes certain persons regarding temporary disability allowances:

1. The period of correctional labor, if labor is performed at a place other than the usual place of employment, is not included in the length of employment with the same enterprise, an important consideration for the determination of the amount of allowance due to causes other than a labor accident or occupational illness. Moreover, persons who perform this sort of correctional labor are deprived for six months of the right to any allowance.

2. Persons who perform the correctional labor at their usual place of employment receive the allowance, but it is calculated on the basis of reduced wages paid during the period of correctional labor. This reduces the allowance by up to 20 percent.

3. Persons preventively arrested for the duration of a preliminary investigation or trial have no right to the temporary disability allowance.

The actual amount of allowance may be reduced, as the wages may be, by legally allowed deductions, for instance, the payment of damages or alimonies adjudicated by courts.

Persons employed by the religious communities or by private individuals receive the allowances for temporary disability or other social-insurance allowances (for example, in case of pregnancy or birth of a child) according to the general principles applicable to the State employees.

The employee who has been permanently incapacitated due to the fault of management has the right to damages. The amount is fixed by the management, but the employee may appeal to the factory trade-union committee, and, if he is still dissatisfied, to the people's court. The dependents of an employee who died in these circumstances may seek damages by following the same procedure.

"The workers and officials as well as other citizens receive free medical help."¹⁷ This is the only social-insurance assistance extended even to the underprivileged peasants, within, of course, the limits of available medical personnel.

DISABILITY INSURANCE

If an employee is disabled totally or partially by illness or accident, he has the right to a pension. The amount of pension depends on several factors:¹⁸

1. The degree of disablement. Invalids are divided into three groups: a) totally disabled who require constant care; b) totally disabled who do not require constant care; and c) partly disabled.

2. The reason of disablement. Pensions are higher if the disablement is due to a labor accident or a professional disease, and lower in other cases.

3. In the case of disablement due to causes other than a labor accident or an occupational illness, the amount of pension depends on the length of employment, age and sex of the recipient, and the type of occupation. Those employed in the underground or unhealthful occupations have the right to higher pensions. The age and sex of the employee are taken into account for the requirement of a shorter or longer period of employment which in turn affects the amount of pension.

4. The size of average wages prior to disablement, because pensions are calculated in percentages of wages.

The law has fixed minima and maxima pensions for various kinds of invalids:

1. Those who have been disabled by a labor accident or an occupational illness receive monthly, in the first group of disablement, at least 36 rubles and at most 120 rubles; in the second group, from 28.50 rubles to 90 rubles; in the third group, from 21 to 45 rubles.

2. Those whose disablement is due to nonoccupational causes receive pensions which vary between two ceilings: for the first group, between 30 and 90 rubles; for the second group, between 23 and 60 rubles; for the third group between 16 and 40 rubles.

Invalids of the first group (totally disabled and requiring constant care) always receive their full pension whatever their other income might be; the same holds true for invalids of the second group (totally disabled but not requiring constant care) if they earn not more than 120 rubles monthly. Invalids of the second group who earn more than 120 rubles, as well as invalids of the third group (partly disabled), receive a pension which, if added to their present wages, does not exceed the wages they were paid prior to their disablement. The invalids of the third group must be paid, in any event, half of their pension if they earn monthly not more than 120 rubles.

Invalids of the first group (totally disabled and requiring constant care) must undergo medical examination every year; those of the other two groups, twice a year.

OLD-AGE INSURANCE—PENSIONS FOR SURVIVING DEPENDENTS AND THE FUNERAL ALLOWANCE

Old people who are not peasants have the right to an old-age pension. All men who have attained age 60 and have been earning their livelihood as State employees for at least 25 years and all women

who have reached age 55 and have worked for at least 20 years have the right to an old-age pension. Men and women who have been occupied for the required period of time (from 15 to 25 years depending on sex and occupation) in underground or unhealthful work acquire the same right at a lower age of 45 to 55 (also depending on their sex and the nature of their particular occupation). At least half of their total employment must have been spent in an occupation which gives the right to this privileged treatment. Women who have given birth to at least five children have the right to the old-age pension at the age of 50 and after 15 years of employment, only if all five children are alive and are less than 8 years old.

The amount of an old-age pension depends on the following two factors:

1. The last average wages, because the pension is calculated in percentages of wages.

2. The nature of the occupation. Those who have been employed underground or in conditions harmful to health receive higher pensions.

The minimum old-age pension is 30 rubles per month, and the maximum is 120 rubles. The minimum is much less than the average income of a skilled worker who earns around 90 to 100 rubles and usually must be helped by wages earned by his wife.

The pension is raised by 10 percent for those who have been employed by the same enterprise for at least fifteen years, for men who have worked at all places of employment for 35 years, and for women who have worked altogether for at least 30 years. However, the amount of pension may not exceed even in these cases the maximum of 120 rubles per month. The maximum ceiling does not apply to retired military and naval officers, scientists, and the so-called personal pensioners who have been granted a retirement pension by a special decision of the Government. All those pensions are much higher than the pensions for the rank-and-file employees.

Payment of the old-age pension is suspended if the recipient continues to work. However, if his wages do not exceed 100 rubles monthly, he will receive in addition a pension of 15 rubles.

After an employee's death, his dependents who are unable to work have the right to a pension. Such dependents are: 1) children, brothers, sisters, and grandchildren less than 16 years old (less than 18 if they attend a school) or older, if they are disabled; 2) spouse and parents if they are disabled or have reached the age of 60 for men or 55 for women; 3) the spouse or one of the parents, whatever his age and working capacity, if he or she must stay at home to take care of children, grandchildren, brothers, or sisters of the deceased who

are less than 8 years old; 4) grandparents if no other surviving member of the family is obligated by law to support them.

Children supported by both parents have the right to the dependents' pension if one parent dies even though the other continues to work.

The size of the dependents' pension varies in relation to the following factors:

1. The reason of death of the breadwinner. A labor accident or an occupational illness which caused his death entitles the dependents to a higher pension.

2. The number of dependents. However, the pension remains the same if the number of dependents is three or more but is proportionately lower for two or one.

3. The occupation of the deceased. The survivors of a person who was working underground or in an industry harmful to health receive a pension higher than others.

The maxima dependents' pensions are fixed as follows: 1) three or more dependents, for death from occupational causes, 120 rubles, and from other causes, 90 rubles; 2) two dependents, for death from occupational causes, 90 rubles, and from other causes, 60 rubles; 3) one dependent, for death from occupational causes, 45 rubles, and from other causes, 40 rubles.

The minima dependents' pensions are the same regardless of the cause of death: 1) three or more dependents, 30 rubles; 2) two dependents, 23 rubles; 3) one dependent, 16 rubles.

The Statute of July 14, 1956, which fixed the present rates of pensions for disablement, old-age, and death of the breadwinner clearly excludes collective farmers from the benefits of State social insurance by confining the circle of beneficiaries to "workers and office employees" and their families, i.e., to State employees. Collective farmers legally are not State employees but members of cooperatives.

The State contributes to the cost of funerals of its employees or of members of their families. The allowance is 20 rubles for a city funeral and 10 rubles for a rural one; half of either allowance is paid for the funeral of a child below the age of 10.

All possible disputes concerning social insurance are decided, without any interference by the courts, by the superior administrative organs of the trade unions; the decision on the appeal is final.¹⁹

MATERNITY ASSISTANCE

Maternity allowances, which are paid only to those expectant mothers who are State employees, form another type of social insurance. Peasant women and housewives who are not gainfully employed

are not entitled to them. The allowances are paid for the whole duration of the maternity leave (112 days).

The rates are as follows:

1. Full wages are paid to members of trade unions who have been employed for three years, including at least two last years with the present enterprise; or who are less than 18 years old and have been employed by the same enterprise for at least one year; or who were partisans in the last war or are war invalids; or who are decorated; or, finally, who are shock workers and have been employed at least for one year.

2. Three-fourths of the average wages for the first twenty days of the maternity leave and full wages for the remaining period are paid to women who have worked for two years with the present enterprise, but whose total employment career is less than three years; and to women who are less than 18 years old and have been employed for less than one year.

3. Two-thirds of the wages for the first twenty days and afterwards full wages are paid to all women who have been employed by the present enterprise for one to two years.

4. Two-thirds of the average wages are paid during the whole maternity leave to women who have been with the same enterprise for less than one year.

5. Nonmembers of the trade unions are always paid two-thirds of their average wages.

The discrimination against nonmembers of trade unions may affect primarily peasant women employed in industry for one year, because they cannot be admitted to a trade union. The other distinctions aim mainly at stabilizing manpower.

The temporary disability allowance is paid to women who have undergone an abortion, even if the abortion has been performed under conditions forbidden by law (by incompetent person and outside a hospital) if it has been made before the 196th day of pregnancy.

State employees who are the parents of a newly born child and whose combined wages do not exceed 50 rubles per month receive an allowance of 30 rubles if the father or mother has been employed by the same enterprise for at least three months. This 30 rubles is divided as follows: 22 rubles are paid immediately at the birth of the child and the remaining 8 rubles when the baby has reached the age of five months.

If the child is illegitimate and the unmarried mother does not work or works at a collective farm, no State allowance is paid at all. If the father of the legitimate child is a State employee but the

mother is a collective farmer, only 12 rubles are paid. This is one of many illustrations of the underprivileged treatment of Soviet peasants.

THE TWO PYRAMIDS: INDUSTRIAL MIGHT AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

The Soviet system of social insurance has one advantage: its wide coverage of practically all risks. Its weakness is the low amounts of pensions, showing that the State has little interest in citizens who have ceased to be economically useful, and also reflecting the low level of average wages. The other self-evident defect is the restriction of social insurance to State employees and the exclusion of collective farmers.

The whole of Soviet labor legislation reflects a systematic effort to prevent egalitarianism in the Soviet society. It is a society of unequals and it is meant to be so. Soviet leaders are spellbound by the image of a Russia growing up to the stature of the most powerful industrial State as a means of imposing the Communist system on the whole world. But the means overshadows the end. Without denying that world revolution continues to remain the ultimate purpose of Soviet foreign policy, one may wonder whether the growth of the industrial might has not become the main goal of the Soviet leadership. Since the powerful forces of other States impose definite limitations on the realization of the ultimate aim of world domination, the national interests of Russia, too easily confused in Soviet minds with the Communist cause, and the fever for industrialization, come to the front.

But this result has been achieved at the expense of the freedom and standard of living of the average Soviet citizen. He has become a means of achieving the end of making Russia industrially powerful. When one analyzes the labor legislation, he may wonder whether the Russians who contributed to the October Revolution, many of whom hoped to build a better world, did not commit a tragic mistake. The result of the October Revolution was to produce a world where professional politicians, with the assistance of the bureaucracy, are forcing the common man to build with his toil a grandiose pyramid of industrial power. The leaders of the Party, ironically called that of the toiling masses, act like the Pharaohs of Egypt; they are fascinated by the size of the pyramid, forgetting the fate of those they force to build it.

They know, however, that in the shadow of the industrial pyramid there has been growing another, that of social stratification, founded on the twin principles of inequality and hierarchy. Soviet society of

today is such a hierarchical pyramid: at the top are the professional politicians, leaders of the Party and the State, who could be removed from the top only by another revolution. Directly beneath them is the upper bureaucracy of the Party, the State, and the various so-called public organizations; the lower stratum is represented by skilled workers and lower white-collar employees, while the base is formed by millions of unskilled workers and peasants, those forgotten men of the regime. Differences in education and professional knowledge serve as the main criteria for allocating the positions within the hierarchical pyramid, built on the foundation of strict obedience of the lower stratum to the higher.

A wide differentiation of incomes marks the place of everyone, while it makes members of the higher and those of the lower social class strangers to each other. The pyramid is hierarchical in nature, reminding one of the stratification of medieval society, but superior to it by the greater efficiency of the modern state in enforcing the hierarchical order. A medieval man could rise above his estate by becoming a priest and acquiring education; university education is the key to the same process in the Soviet society. But in both societies only a small minority could take hold of the key. One may wonder whether the human price of building such a society—social inequality, discrimination against the unskilled and the peasants, and lack of individual freedom—is not too great.

A Soviet author says, perhaps without conviction, that "in the USSR there is no antagonism between the interests of society and those of the individual."²⁰ It all depends on the individuals he has in mind. There is daily antagonism between the interests of the individual worker or peasant and those of the State acting as a general employer or distributor of incomes, but there might be no antagonism between the State and the high dignitary with an upper-bracket income, especially if he is a complete intellectual conformist. The worker, forced by piecework, the norm of output, and other devices to slave for the State, could answer his learned co-citizen with the words written by Lenin apropos the consequences of Taylor's methods of rationalizing production in capitalist countries:

And eventually, during the same 9 to 10 hours of work they squeeze out of the worker three times more work, they drain off pitilessly all his forces, they suck off with thrice-increased speed every drop of the nervous and muscular energy of the hired slave. Will he die earlier? There are many others behind the gate!²¹

There are many others behind the gates of the Soviet factories, too: the annually recruited unskilled peasants and skilled graduates of various schools from the trade school to the university. The words of Lenin fit too well the present Soviet reality.

NOTES

1. *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 1960, p. 22.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.
3. The Charter is reproduced in *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 1960, pp. 220-236.
4. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude*, p. 15.
5. *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 1949, pp. 139-140.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 144-145.
7. N. G. Aleksandrov and G. K. Moskalenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.
8. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 168.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 298.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
12. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 221.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
14. This decision, which regulates all matters of contributions to the social-insurance fund is reproduced in *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 1960, pp. 387-405.
15. *Principles of Civil Legislation*, in *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, No. 50, December 15, 1961.
16. All matters of social insurance, except for pensions, are regulated by the Decision of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions of February 5, 1955, as amended on December 1, 1958, which is reproduced in *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 1960, pp. 335-378.
17. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 346.
18. The Statute on Pensions of July 14, 1956, is reproduced in *Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika*, 1957, pp. 321-335.
19. N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 334.
20. A. E. Pasherstnik, *Pravovye Voprosy Voznagrazhdeniia za Trud Rabochikh i Sluzhashchikh*, p. 108.
21. Quoted in N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*, p. 175.

Part Four: The Peasant and Collective Farming

CHAPTER ONE

Nature and Organization of Collective Farms

SOVIET writers often state that the USSR is a democracy—"a Greek word which is defined in Russian as the government of the people" or "at least of the majority of the population."¹ A. Ya. Vyshinskii once expressed the same thought more precisely: "The Soviet State, as a new type of State, is without precedent in its new development of democracy, a socialist democracy. This Soviet democracy subordinates the mastery of the society to the will of the majority of workers and peasants . . . all of whom participate in the government of the State."² These assertions, however, seem to contradict another current Soviet dictum, that of the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the working class "[which] has always remained the characteristic and fundamental feature of the Soviet socialist State. . . ."³

The new Party Program adopts a no less ambiguous attitude, because it says, on the one hand, that the "proletarian democracy has increasingly become a nation-wide democracy," but also asserts, on the other hand, that "the working class [the proletariat] will fulfill its function as the leader of the society when Communism will be built up and classes will disappear." For the time being, the working class retains its leadership within the Soviet democracy. Yet the working class is not the whole urban population, while the latter population amounts only to 52 percent of all Soviet inhabitants.

THE "ALLIED" CLASS—THE CHARTER OF COLLECTIVE FARMS

The same contradiction exists within the Constitution, where Article 1 states that "the USSR is a socialist State of workers and peasants." Article 3 states that "all power in the USSR belongs to the working

people of town and country," while Article 2 asserts that "the political foundation of the USSR is the Soviets of working people's deputies which grew . . . as a result of . . . the conquest of the dictatorship by the proletariat."

However, this theoretical inconsistency between the idea of Soviet democracy and the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat is resolved in practice by the Communist Party's existence. Stalin said: "This particular form of alliance [between the workers and the peasants] consists of the fact that one single party, the party of the proletariat, the Party of the Communists, which does not and may not share its leadership with other parties, is the leader of the State, the leader within the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat."⁴ Therein lies the solution. Actual power is vested neither in the majority of the toiling masses of town and country nor in the industrial workers. It belongs to the Communist Party, which is assured of a permanent political monopoly.

The class of peasants, "allied" with the industrial class, is in the great majority composed of collective farmers. Agricultural laborers on State farms who are State employees compose only a minor part of the peasant population. However, the great campaign in the fifties for cultivation of virgin and fallow lands in Kazakhstan, Siberia, Volga region and the Urals promoted the proliferation of State farms. Their number also has been increasing due to the conversion of collective farms into State farms. Khrushchev told the 22nd Party Congress that the total of State farms had increased between 1953 and 1961 from 5,000 to 8,000. By January, 1962, i.e., a few months later, the figure stood at 8,300. The multiplication of State farms, due to the cultivation of virgin lands and the conversion of collective farms, has been reflected in the percentage of arable land cultivated. This percentage grew from 18 in 1953 to 25 in 1957, to 29 in 1958, and to 43 in 1961. Collective farms in 1961 tilled only 57 per cent of arable land. The average sown area cultivated by the state farm amounts to 22,000 acres.

This evolution probably has been due mainly to the better results achieved on State farms. These results are in turn due to a more sensible compensation for labor. The peasant who is an agricultural laborer on a State farm has the status of a State employee. He belongs to the trade union, benefits from the State social insurance and has a paid annual vacation like industrial workers, and is paid hard wages proportionate to the nature of his occupation and the fulfillment or overfulfillment of the assigned norm of output. His re-

muneration until very recently was not affected by the hazards which affect the collective farmers' compensation for labor such as bad weather, drought or any similar cause of crop failure.

However, the new system of computation of wages for State-farm laborers introduced in 1961 the factor of hazard. The level of wages was made dependent not only on the nature of occupation and on the fulfillment of the daily norm of output but also on the quantity and quality of products, even if the quantity and quality were affected by nature. In animal husbandry as much as 80 percent of wages can depend on the productive results of work, whereas in crop production about 20 percent of wages is proportionate to the quantity and quality of crops. This new system might adversely affect the wages and reduce the labor productivity due to a lessening of material incentive. The productive results of agricultural laborers' work might be unexpectedly reduced or annihilated by factors which they cannot control. An epizootic might disable or kill animals which have been carefully tended; a drought or hail storm might destroy or damage crops in spite of the best cultivation. For the first time the Government shifted in 1961 some of the risks of agricultural production failure from itself to the State-farm laborers, a practice usual with collective farmers.

The post-Stalinist trend seems to point toward an eventual total conversion of collective farms into State farms. Yet the Party has not made up its mind. The total conversion would be costly, because it would entail the passage to hard wages for the collective farmers and the extension of State social insurance to them. In any event Khrushchev denied such intention in 1958, 1959, and again in 1961. He told the same story at the 21st and 22nd Party Congresses. Answering people who had wondered whether the post-Stalinist trend indicated the intention gradually to eliminate collective farms altogether, he said in his address to the 22nd Congress: "Some comrades ask: 'How will agriculture continue to develop, along the path of collective farms or State farms?' The Party holds that the construction of Communism in rural areas will proceed by developing and perfecting both forms of socialist production. One cannot counterpose one socialist form of farming against the other. . . . Both forms can produce excellent results."

Only the future will tell whether his denials will be eventually corroborated, as they have not been so far, by halting the process of conversion of collective into State farms.

The collective farmers work on collective farms (*kolkhozes*), officially considered as freely formed autonomous cooperatives. Yet

State coercion of peasants in 1929-33 to participate "freely" in collectivization has been acknowledged in one of the Soviet books most widely circulated in Stalin's lifetime:

This [mass collectivization] was the deepest revolutionary upheaval . . . equal in its consequences to the revolutionary upheaval of October, 1917. The peculiar nature of this revolution consisted in the fact that it was carried out from above, at the initiative of the State government. . . .⁵

A revolution initiated and executed by the government is hardly spontaneous. Soviet writers have never denied the mass deportation of millions of recalcitrant peasants:

The peasants expelled the kulaks from their land, impoverished them, took away their cattle and mechanical implements, and requested the Soviet Government to arrest and deport them. Mass collectivization thus signified liquidation of the kulaks.⁶

The term *kulak*, which means a relatively wealthy peasant, was conveniently applied to any peasant who resisted collectivization. Actually there were millions of peasants, many of them not affluent kulaks, who opposed mass collectivization by wholesale butchery of their cattle, which they refused to surrender to collective farms. The Decree of January 16, 1930, established the criminal responsibility of the kulaks for slaughtering their own cattle. Further proof of resistance by the poorer peasants is found in the official history of the Communist Party: "At some places kulaks and their agents succeeded in instigating the peasants to commit direct anti-Soviet acts."⁷

The Soviet Government employed various severe means to overcome peasant resistance. The joint (Party and Government) Decree of February 1, 1930, authorized the executive organs of the State to confiscate the property of the kulaks and to deport them. An individual peasant could not till his land without horses, since farm machinery was reserved to the State Machine-Tractor Stations, which cooperated only with collective farms. On April 13, 1938, a tax on horses owned by individual peasants was introduced by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Depending on the district, the amount of the tax was from 275 to 500 rubles for one horse, and from 450 to 800 rubles for more than one. The effect of the tax was prompt; between 1938 and 1940 the number of horses owned privately by peasants dwindled from 354,584 to 89,485. Their ex-owners had, of course, joined collective farms.

The question of how free peasants now are in drafting the charter of a collective farm is answered by this statement:

Collective farms may be formed and may function only according

to the conditions contained in the Standard Charter. The charter of a particular collective farm is drafted after the pattern of the Standard Charter, but a few provisions of the latter are given a more detailed expression in the former to suit the particular conditions of that collective farm.⁸

The first law called the Standard Charter of the Collective Farm was enacted on March 1, 1930. It was replaced on February 17, 1935, by the present joint Decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Party. The new Standard Charter was declared to be the result of decisions taken by the peasants themselves. Yet only a few hundred hand-picked shock workers, who came from 1,500 out of a total number of hundreds of thousands of collective farms, deliberated on it for five days (February 11 to February 17, 1935) under the personal supervision of Stalin. The Standard Charter regulates all aspects of the organization and functioning of a collective farm. "The charter of a collective farm which is contrary to the Standard Charter is null and void."⁹

A charter is presented for registration to the executive committee of the district soviet; if it does not correspond to the Standard Charter or if it is at variance with other legislation, it is sent back to the general meeting of the collective farmers for redrafting.¹⁰ Usually, to save time, the executive committee is represented at the general meeting by a delegate who supervises the drafting of the charter.

MEMBERSHIP IN THE COLLECTIVE FARMS

Any Soviet citizen at least 16 years old may become a member of a collective farm. Article 7 of the Standard Charter forbids the admission of kulaks and disfranchised or politically unreliable persons. This ban extends to their children, although the right to membership may be restored after several years of conscientious work. New members are admitted by the general meeting of the farm, but a person whose application was rejected may complain to the executive committee of the district soviet. This body has the right to resubmit the application at the next meeting.

Articles 9 and 10 of the Standard Charter require that a new member: 1) pay an admission fee of from 2 to 4 rubles, depending on the economic capacity of each peasant homestead; 2) transfer to the collective farm his working animals and the surplus cattle above the established norms, and all agricultural implements or devices for processing agricultural products. If a member should leave the collective farm, for example, to become an industrial worker, he receives a cash compensation equivalent to 50 to 75 percent of the official

evaluation of his socialized property. Of course, an individual peasant must also surrender his plot, which becomes part of the collective farm. A person who owned no farm at the time of his admission pays only the entry fee. Children of collective farmers become collective farmers at age 16 without paying the entry fee.

Article 2 of the Standard Charter includes a provision aimed at erasing from the peasants' minds even the memory of their individual land holdings: "All boundaries and hedges which have hitherto divided the plots of members of the *artel*¹¹ are to be abolished, and all individual plots and fields are to be converted into one huge field which is to be utilized collectively by the *artel*." Moreover, "the distribution of income among the collective farmers does not depend upon the value of their property which was socialized at the time of their admission to the collective farm. Every member . . . participates in the distribution of the income of the farm only in proportion to the quantity and quality of his work. . . ."¹²

Article 1 of the Standard Charter states emphatically: "The path of the collective farms, the path of Socialism, is the only right path for the toiling peasants." Collective farming serves the Communist aims because it tends to extirpate the tradition of individual husbandry, initiative, and enterprise from the minds of the peasants, and it substitutes for small peasant homesteads large socialized estates where mechanization becomes possible on a large scale. The social aspect of collectivization is evaluated in these terms:

It transferred the most numerous toiling class in our country, the class of the peasants, from the path of the individual economy, which bred capitalism, to that of the social, collective farm, socialist economy.¹³

LAND: NATIONAL PROPERTY—FORMER STATE MONOPOLY OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY

Although the Soviet State has promoted collective farms forcefully, the farms do not own the land they till. All land has been nationalized by the Decree of October 26, 1917. Article 2 of the Standard Charter states that "the land occupied by the *artel* is national State property . . . leased to the *artel* for an indefinite period, i.e., forever, and must not be sold or bought or sublet by the *artel*." The land, however, "may be taken away by a special decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR."¹⁴ In such a case the State must provide the collective farm with another tract of land and pay compensation for any loss incurred by the farm.

The right of the collective farm to use the land does not include

the right to exploit the subsoil. . . . Collective farms (like other land tenants) are free to exploit the minerals of general use (clay, sand, gravel, etc.) by applying the method of open surface extraction and only for their own economic use.¹⁵

The land "may not be used for other, nonagricultural purposes, such as the erection of industrial or commercial enterprises. . . ." ¹⁶ Furthermore, "industrial enterprises not connected with agriculture may not be owned by the collective farms."¹⁷

Collective farms could not own until 1958 their own tractors or other heavy agricultural machinery. Such machinery was concentrated in the so-called State Machine-Tractor Stations, which leased such machinery to the collective farms. One might think that the State monopoly of tractors and heavy machinery involved a principle of socialist doctrine, but this is not true. Even in the hands of the collective farms, it would have represented socialist property according to Article 5 of the Soviet Constitution. The State monopoly of tractors and other machinery in the M.T.S.'s was intended to give the State another means of controlling collective farms.

Only in March, 1958, the Soviet Government decided to abandon this monopoly of tractors and machinery and to proceed, over a period of five years, to sell these implements to collective farms. There were several reasons for this important reform. Firstly, the constant process of amalgamating the collective farms (their total number has been reduced from several hundred thousands to about forty-four thousand) made an average farm a large estate, managed by a qualified, superior staff; a Machine-Tractor Station served from one to three collective farms. The collective farm has on the average 15,000 acres of land and unites approximately 400 peasant households. Yet the management of agricultural operations was split up between the chairman of the farm and the director of the station. Common sense indicated that it would be more efficient to place all operations under one man, the chairman. Secondly, the transfer of machinery allowed for reduction of other personnel, especially this part that served the stations. Thirdly, the collective farms must pay for the tractors and machinery rather high prices fixed by the seller, the State. This allows the State to levy large funds from the farms and use them for further investment in industries. The sale of machinery is to a large extent motivated by this purpose of fleecing the farms of their savings (according to the Soviet calculations, one-third of their savings will be spent on this operation). The economic and political control which had been exercised by the stations over the collective farms served by them is being transferred to local Party organizations and the newly formed collective-State-farm

production agencies. The whole operation seems to be economically sound, while the State retains its upper hand even if the form of control has been modified.

The collective farms had to pay in kind for the services rendered by the stations. Now, with the machinery transferred to their ownership, this payment in kind has been abandoned. Yet Khrushchev expressly said in 1958 that the State would have to receive the same amounts of produce as before. The amounts of agricultural products, which had been supplied before as this payment, are now being levied in the new form of "sales" to the State.

STATE REGULATION OF WORK—LABOR-DAYS—
SOCIALIST COMPETITION—MATERIAL INCENTIVE

The statement that "the organization as well as the activities of collective farms are under the direct leadership of the Soviet State"¹⁸ is only too true. Every aspect of collective-farm life is regulated by the State, although such farms are called voluntary cooperatives. In particular, the State defines the amount of work required of collective farmers. Remuneration for agricultural labor is calculated on the same basis as that for industrial labor—namely, piecework (Article 15 of the Standard Charter). State regulations determine the minimum amount: the norm of output. A daily norm is fixed for each agricultural occupation according to the season. In certain operations which preclude the establishment of individual norms, the State establishes collective minima for the entire work-team of peasants. When the norm is fulfilled and work time yet remains, the peasant is expected to over-fulfill the norm as much as possible.

The Party and Government favor a constant rise in the norms. "At their general meetings collective farmers should elaborate and approve new and higher norms of output . . . determined by due consideration of the levels of output attained by the leading sections on the collective farm."¹⁹ Of course, this does not prevent the State from raising on its own the legal norms from time to time.

The collective farmer, unlike an industrial worker, is not paid wages fixed in advance. For the work accomplished each day he is credited by an annotation in his labor book of the earned labor-days (*trudoden*). The payment due to him at the settlement of the annual accounts will be determined on the basis of these units of computation. The number of *trudoden* reckoned for each workday depends upon the daily output of each collective farmer and the nature of his agricultural occupation. A collective farmer engaged in skilled work will be credited with more *trudoden* for his daily effort.

According to their skills, collective farmers are divided into nine (seven until 1948) categories. Each higher category of skill is credited with a quarter of a trudoden more than the one immediately below it. The first category (unskilled peasants) receive half of a trudoden, and the ninth, two and one-half.²⁰ In order to assist the collective farms to appraise work, the Government elaborated in 1933 standard appraisals of work in labor-days.

The change in 1948 from seven to nine groups of skills with corresponding remuneration is characteristic of the general Soviet trend toward an ever greater differentiation of income. For peasants this takes into account both their skills and the usefulness of their particular occupations to the State.

If a collective farmer shows better results than the legal minimum norm, he is credited with additional trudoden according to the scale of remuneration. However, many unskilled peasants cannot increase their minimum norm because their work is measured only by the time consumed, not by any visible result. Such is the situation of a night watchman, or a herdsman, who cannot earn more than half a trudoden in one working day. On the other hand "the collective farmer who performs skilled labor, such as ploughing, may attain an output worth several labor-days [trudoden] during his daily shift."²¹

The valuation of each agricultural job in labor-days being determined by State regulations, the differentiation in remuneration reflects definite State interests. The State's decision as to remuneration in labor-days is determined by the importance of the product involved and the availability of a given kind of manpower.

The brigadier, who supervises a "brigade" of collective farmers, records the trudoden earned by each member of his brigade. Once a week he enters the weekly total in the labor book of each farmer. Every month the board of management of the collective farm posts a list of the trudoden earned by each member during the month. The annual number of trudoden earned by each member is checked by the accountant, the brigadier concerned, and the chairman of the collective farm. These yearly figures then go to the general meeting of the collective farmers, where they are used as the criterion for portioning out the net income of the farm.

The annual total of trudoden credited to a collective farmer determines his claim to a share in the net annual income of the farm. But this income is unknown until the end of the agricultural year. In cash and in kind, a trudoden may mean twice as much on one farm as on another if the net income of one happens to double that of the other. Net income may also differ from one year to another. The collective

farmer can be sure of only one thing. His income will be comparatively larger if he has earned more trudoden. The variations in income often depend on factors beyond the control of the collective farmer, such as the size of sowing area and fertility of soil, the weather, etc. To visualize the aforementioned variations let us assume that farm A realized an income equivalent to 100,000 rubles, and farm B, 50,000. If the value of the trudoden is equal to 2 rubles in farm A, it will be 1 ruble in farm B. If farm B realizes only 40,000 rubles in the following year, the value of the trudoden will be 0.80 rubles. The Soviet commentators are right when they say that "the trudoden . . . does not represent a value determined in advance and equal for all the collective farms; its actual value depends on the size of the income of each collective farm."²² Therefore, it is false to say that "the trudoden expresses correctly the socialist principle: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.'"²³

Khrushchev said some time ago that the average value of a labor-day in 1958 was 1.70 rubles (cash and kind payments combined) (*Pravda*, June 21, 1958). This placed the income of an average collective farmer within the brackets of the lowest-paid section of the urban population, the unskilled workers. Besides, the unpredictability in the income of the collective farmer makes him much worse off than an industrial worker. The income of office employees or industrial workers is not affected by the income of their enterprises or offices. The discriminatory treatment of peasants is clearly summarized by a Soviet specialist on labor law:

The remuneration of the collective farmer is not reserved in advance; it is an integral part of collective-farm production and is paid out of the latter only at the end of the agricultural year. . . . The actual amount of remuneration remains unknown . . . because it is influenced by the quantity of crops and other economic results on each collective farm. . . . The amount of wages paid to a worker or an office employee for a unit of time (tariff rate, salary) or for the unit of output (piecework) is, however, known in advance. It does not vary with the income of an enterprise or office. . . .²⁴

A Soviet author must have had his tongue in his cheek when he tried to explain the economic insecurity of the peasants in the following manner: "members of collective farms do not receive remuneration for work fixed in advance, because they are the masters of the collective farms."²⁵ They are masters insofar as the uncertainty of their income is concerned; but in their obligations, regulated in every detail by the State, they cease to be masters.

The individual income of the collective farmer is derived from two sources: his share of the farm's net income in kind and cash and the produce of the small plot of land placed at his disposal to be exploited as a kitchen garden. The major source of income, of course, is his participation in collective-farm work at an average rate of 5 to 1. The relative importance of this major source of income is constantly increasing as the Party and the Government strive to reduce the economic role of the garden plots.

The distribution of the net income of the collective farm among its members occurs once a year. In the meantime the collective farmers receive advance payments to the extent set by law. Until 1956 the advances in kind were regulated by a joint Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Party of June 14, 1950, as follows:

15 percent in grain, 10 percent in rice, 5 percent in sunflower seeds, 15 percent in vegetables and potatoes of the total supply of each product to be conveyed to the State purchasing points.²⁶

By calculating the advances in proportion to the deliveries expected by the State, the decree attempted to unite State and peasant interests. By a joint decision of the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers dated March 10, 1956, the collective farms were authorized to pay monthly *cash* advances on the labor-days earned by the peasants, instead of advances in kind.

A collective farmer, like an industrial worker, is expected to use work time fully and to overfulfill the daily norm. But the Soviet State does not rely only upon the "enthusiasm" of the builders of socialism. It has established daily as well as yearly and seasonal minima of *trudoden* which must be earned by each collective farmer at least 16 years old.

For instance, the collective farmer in the cotton-growing district must earn no less than 30 labor-days by May 15, 45 labor-days between May 15 and September 1, 45 labor-days between September 1 and November 1; the remaining quota of labor-days may be earned after November 1.²⁷

Of course, the compulsory minimum of labor-days [*trudoden*], as one may see by its very name, constitutes only a minimum expected from a collective farmer. Fulfillment of that minimum does not release him from the obligation of continued participation in collective farm work.²⁸

If the seasonal minimum is not reached, the management board of the collective farm must punish the guilty farmer in the disciplinary

way. Moreover, "persons who do not achieve the obligatory minimum of labor-days do not receive advance payments in kind in view of their prospective earnings."²⁹ Therefore, a collective farmer who lags in fulfilling his seasonal minimum must tighten his belt until the end of the agricultural year and the final distribution of the net income of the farm.

"All able-bodied collective farmers who fail to execute the obligatory yearly minimum of labor-days are to be thenceforth deemed non-members of the collective farm. The rights of collective farmers are lost to them, including forfeiture of their adjoining plot of land."³⁰ The decision to expel the culprit is taken by the general meeting of the collective farmers. The collective farmer cannot appeal against such a decision in court.³¹

Soviet textbooks provide no answer to the question of the fate of such a peasant. It is unlikely that he would be admitted to another farm. If this were possible, a collective farmer could deliberately get himself expelled in order to try his luck at a more comfortable or affluent farm. The Soviet State does not like such fluidity of labor. The expelled farmer cannot go to the city either, because he does not possess a passport, which is a prerequisite for residence and employment in towns.

As was mentioned earlier, Soviet Republics have enacted new laws according to which persons living on "unearned income" are liable to be tried by their neighbors or people's courts and are punishable by deportation and correctional labor. These laws have already been applied to collective farmers guilty of nonfulfillment of the established norms. Such farmers have been deported for compulsory labor and "reeducation."

The rural child must start his working career at age 12. Young collective farmers between 12 and 16 years of age must earn at least fifty labor-days a year and must be provided with labor books similar to those of adult farmers.

The Party is in favor of frequent "reexamination of the norms of output and of the appraisal of work in labor-days, thus securing a higher remuneration for work on the more important tasks and a lowering of remuneration for second-rate work. . . ."³² The same goal is sought through socialist competition which "has become general in agriculture; almost all collective farmers and the workers and employees of the State farms participate in it."³³ In addition, "the further development of all forms of socialist competition, and thereby the mass application and generalization of the experience of shock workers

represent some of the essential means of achieving abundance [of agricultural products]."³⁴

Chronic shortcomings in the implementation of State plans for agricultural output have been forcing the Party in the post-Stalinist period to increase in various ways the material incentive offered to collective farmers. Khrushchev, who was associated with agriculture for many years and is a sort of expert on agricultural problems, does not need to be told that the solution of Soviet agricultural problems should be sought in greater investment. This investment would have to be of two kinds: direct, in the agriculture itself (better machinery and more fertilizers and other chemical products), and indirect, in the form of higher compensation for agricultural labor. But he is faced with the same problem which confronted Stalin. The armament race, heavy investment in the industrial expansion, and now costly space exploration eat up so much of State resources that not enough is left for agriculture, the perpetual Cinderella of Soviet economy. The collective farmers feel the pinch and are not inclined to increase their labor productivity. An outsider may see this problem vividly described by a Soviet novelist, Fyodor Abramov, in his recent novel entitled *New Life*.³⁵ This is the name he ironically gives to the collective farm which is his topic. The collective farmers are not interested in the collective work because they are paid so little for it, they try to spend as much time as they can "steal" from their collective duties on their "private" plots of land, and the hero of the novel, the chairman of the farm, saves the harvest only by promising the peasants "illegal" bonuses.

Since 1953, the Party has made several concessions to the collective farms, but always parsimoniously. The income of collective farms has been increasing owing to the rise in the prices which the State pays in its compulsory purchases of agricultural products; tax reductions; the lowering of State prices for agricultural machinery, spare parts, and gasoline; the taking over by the State in 1962 of the cost of transportation of purchased agricultural products to the procurement points; and the rise in the same year of prices it pays for livestock and poultry by an average 35 percent and for butter and cream by 10 and 5 percent respectively. All these measures help to increase the total income of collective farms and thereby the value of labor-days which depends, in the last analysis, on the profits made by the collective farm. Collective farmers are no longer required to sell to the State part of the produce from their adjoining plots of land.

As said before, collective farmers have received since 1956 monthly

cash advances on their earnings calculated in labor-days, and since 1958 collective farms have been encouraged to abandon the compensation computed in labor-days in favor of cash wages fixed in advance. However, the collective farm must be truly prosperous, as few are, and have sufficient reserve capital to afford this system of payment, because the Government encourages this practice but refuses to underwrite it in case of a failure of crops and subsequent inability of the collective farm to meet its cash obligations. Other collective farms are encouraged to pay for the labor-days totally in cash and to abandon the partial payment in kind. This directive is easier to follow, because agricultural products which remain after the compulsory sales to the State can always be sold at higher prices to the State, to State-controlled consumer cooperatives, or to private consumers in the nearby town.

If the collective farm can afford it (again, few of them are able to do so, and the State does not help in meeting this obligation), it is told by the Party to grant its members annual vacations and old-age pensions. The same results could be quickly obtained by the extension of the State social insurance to collective farmers, but the Party has so far stubbornly refused to underwrite the cost from the State budget.

NO STATE SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR PEASANTS

Should the collective farms be replaced by State farms and the collective farmers become State employees, they would have to be covered by State insurance. Under the present conditions, the State shifts the insurance burden to the collective farms themselves and denies their workers the benefits of State insurance. This is why Khrushchev vigorously denies that the Party intends to transform all collective farms into State farms. He says that neither the increases of land cultivated by the State farms nor the sale of machinery to the collective farms should be interpreted as the harbingers of such a transformation.

Peasants are excluded from State insurance by Article 120 of the Constitution, which limits social insurance "to factory and office workers." The State treasury will never tell a city dweller there is not enough money to pay him the established pension or allowance. The position of a peasant is altogether different. In case of old age, sickness, or disability, his own collective farm must support him with the resources of its assistance fund for needy and incapacitated members. If that fund is too meager, needy farm members have no recourse to State aid. This fund "is supplied from the collective farm's income

according to the decision of the general meeting of the collective farmers."³⁶ The general meeting, however, is not free in determining the amounts to be reserved for the fund. The State limits the annual contribution to the fund to 2 percent of the gross income of the farm.³⁷ Members of a rich farm fare better in this as in other respects than those who work on a farm with poor soil or bad climate.

The farmers are free to supplement the assistance fund by establishing out of their own personal resources an additional mutual aid fund. One would think that the allowances and pensions which are paid out of this supplementary fund would be administered freely by the members of the fund. This is not the case. The State intervenes again, although not contributing a penny to the fund, and rules that a member of the mutual aid fund must be refused assistance if he "persistently violates the labor discipline of the collective farm, or carelessly handles the property of the collective farm, etc."³⁸ The State does not hesitate to use the voluntary mutual aid fund as an additional means of coercion.

For incapacitation caused by a work-time accident on the collective farm the peasant has recourse to the courts to recover damages from the farm.

Peasants have no guarantee of having a two-week paid vacation every year, unlike the city employee or worker. Their work time, days of rest, vacations, lunch recesses, are left to the regulation of the farm, whose chairman may not be inclined to favor vacations or limitation of the workday, since he is responsible to the State for the total output of the farm.³⁹

OTHER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEASANTS

One has only to glance at Soviet legislation to find many more examples of discrimination against the peasants. For instance, a soldier who was a State employee in civilian life and who has been disabled during his military service receives a pension which is proportionate with his former earnings and must neither be lower than 38.5 rubles monthly for the first group of invalids (totally disabled and requiring constant care), 28.5 for the second group (totally disabled but not requiring constant care), and 21 rubles for the third group (partly disabled), nor exceed respectively 120, 90 or 45 rubles. Soldiers who had not been State employees in civilian life, i.e., collective farmers, receive in the same circumstances the same invariable amounts—38.5 rubles for the first group, 28.5 for the second group, and 21 for the third group. Their fixed pensions amount to the minimal pensions

granted to former State employees. Yet the condition for the grant is the same for all soldiers who receive pensions of the above amounts, namely, injuries suffered while on military duty.

The same discrimination is made in the case of disablement which occurred during military service but which was due to nonmilitary reasons. While the maximal pensions for invalids who were State employees may reach the upper ceilings respectively of 90, 60 or 40 rubles, the former collective farmers always receive only the minimal pensions guaranteed to the other military invalids, namely, 33, 23, or 16 rubles.

While the former earnings of State employees are taken into account for computation of pensions, the pre-military earnings of collective farmers are disregarded; their pensions are fixed by law, always at the same amounts.

An invalid disabled by an injury due to his performance of military duty might receive as much as 120 rubles per month if he is totally disabled, requires constant care, and had been a State employee. His colleague, who might have been totally disabled in the same battle or during the same sharp-shooting exercises, who also requires constant care, and who was a collective farmer in civilian life, will receive a pension of 38.5 rubles. Both are unable to earn a penny. The difference in the cost of living does not explain this inequality of pensions, especially as the law does not forbid the former State employee who has become a total invalid to settle in a village.

The Soviet Government vigorously encourages the present high birth rate. It assists mothers financially and generously bestows orders, medals, and honorary titles on mothers of numerous children. However, this policy does not prevent it from treating pregnant city women better than pregnant peasant women. Peasants get a shorter maternity leave and a smaller allocation during the period of pregnancy and motherhood. While the city worker is entitled to at least 112 days of leave before and after the birth, the peasant woman is freed from all work only "for a period of one month before and one month after giving birth, and during these two months she must receive remuneration equal to one-half of the average number of labor-days she normally earned."⁴⁰

An average peasant child completes an eight-grade school; his scholastic career usually ends there. Then he has the choice of either attending a night school for rural youth and trying to combine studies with farming or remaining a peasant for the rest of his life.

GOVERNMENT OF COLLECTIVE FARMS: GENERAL MEETING,
CHAIRMAN, MANAGEMENT BOARD, CONTROL COMMISSION—
ABUSE OF POWER BY LOCAL OFFICIALDOM

The collective farm has its own legal personality and organs: the general meeting, board of management, chairman, control commission, and several functionaries among whom brigadiers are the most important. The general meeting is "the highest authority in the management of the *artel*" (Article 20 of the Standard Charter). It has imposing powers. It approves the chartering of a new collective farm and all subsequent amendments to that charter; it elects the chairman, board of management, and control commission, and approves the annual plan of production and the budget of the collective farm; it consents to amalgamation with another collective farm and admits and expels members. However, decisions concerning the merger with another farm require approval of the executive committee of the district soviet.

The gradual merger of smaller collective farms into very large farms made difficult the holding of general meetings of all collective farmers. In 1956, the government authorized the practice of "indirect democracy," election by the general meeting of a smaller meeting of deputies to whom all the powers were to be delegated. This new system, adopted by many collective farms, is sometimes supplemented by general meetings of collective farmers held for each brigade in order to discuss matters of common concern.

Actually, the general meeting is a tool manipulated by the chairman of the collective farm and local State and Party officials. The unanimous agreement of a collective-farm general meeting is implicitly assured by Article 20 of the Standard Charter: "The resolutions of the general meeting are passed by a majority vote, and the voting is effected by a show of hands." One could scarcely expect a simple peasant to refuse publicly to raise his hand and so challenge a resolution introduced by a local dignitary.

Moreover, freedom of action of the general meeting is singularly restricted by State regulations. The general meeting must expel a member for nonfulfillment of the annual norm or systematic violation of labor discipline, because this is required by law. It approves the production plan, but this plan must fit into the State plan of a given district. It formally approves the norms of output, but they cannot be below the ones established by the State. Actually the general meetings have been for several years constantly prodded by the Party to raise "voluntarily" the norms and the seasonal and annual minima

of labor-days above the State-fixed standards. Finally, it is commonly admitted that true power is vested in the chairman:

The very process of collective work at the cooperative collective farms requires the strictest order. This order is secured by the single will of the leader (chairman or brigadier) who is elected or appointed by the organs of the internal self-government of the cooperative.⁴¹

The subdued position of the Soviet peasant soon produced natural results. Soviet officials ceased to concern themselves with the letter of the law and neglected to convoke general meetings of the collective farmers. Probably the farmers did not protest because it did not make much difference anyway. But the Party leadership attaches great importance to the outward trappings of democracy. When the Government and the Party learned in 1946 about the virtual abolition of the general meetings, they issued a joint decree on September 19, 1946. The decree is interesting because it is official testimony of how collective-farm democracy operated in practice. This decree pointed to—

the existence of serious violations. . . . Actually, all matters of the agricultural *artel*, including distribution of income, production planning, and disposal of all material resources, have been decided only by the management boards and the chairmen of the collective farms. . . . On many collective farms the general meetings . . . have not been convoked for several years. . . . The situation has become so outrageous that the chairmen of the collective farms are appointed and dismissed by the district Party and Soviet organizations without consulting the collective farmers. All this results in the chairmen of the collective farms losing the sense of responsibility toward the collective farmers. . . .⁴²

Nevertheless, a year later a Soviet textbook on collective farms contained a similar complaint:

The vast field of questions which should be decided by the general meeting requires a regular convocation of that meeting. Summoning it once or twice a year, as happens on several collective farms, represents an irregularity which testifies to the poor comprehension of collective-farm democratic principles.⁴³

The Party wants to uphold the outward paraphernalia of "peasant democracy," while it expects the peasants to vote unanimously in favor of its own instructions presented at the general meeting for formal enactment.

The management board, composed of the immediate collaborators

of the chairman, exercises more real power than the general meeting. Article 21 of the Standard Charter says:

For the operation of current business of the *artel* the general meeting elects five to nine members of the management board for a period of two years. Their number varies in proportion to the size of the *artel*. The management board acts as the executive committee of the *artel* and is responsible for its operation and the fulfillment of its obligations towards the State.

The board of management determines "the personal composition of the . . . brigades and the links. It prepares and submits to the general meeting . . . the norms of output. . . . It exercises daily control over the work of the permanent brigades, supervises the observance of labor discipline, imposes disciplinary penalties . . . and organizes socialist competition among the brigades."⁴⁴

The power to assign farmers to a brigade is noteworthy, since it involves the type of job and consequently affects the income of the farmer. This aspect of a peasant's life is also affected by the power of the brigadier, who "distributes work among the members of the brigade" (Article 14 of the Standard Charter). The citizens of the Soviet Union being no more angelic than the citizens of any other country, one may expect the management boards and the brigadiers to reserve the most lucrative jobs for their relatives and friends.

Disciplinary penalties are also important. According to Article 17 of the Standard Charter, penalties are as follows:

Inferior work—to be done again without remuneration in labor-days; warning; reprimand; reproof by the general meeting; posting the offender's name on the blackboard; fines to the extent of five labor-days; demotion to a lower-paid job or temporary dismissal from work.

If the punishment fails to produce effect, "the management board must submit to the general meeting a motion proposing the expulsion of an incorrigible member." Since the 20th Congress of 1956, the decision of the general meeting of the collective farm to expel a member does not need to be approved by the executive committee of the district soviet. One may note the imposition of fines which Soviet labor-law specialists frantically deny exist in the Soviet system. The peasant labor discipline is also enforced by the comradesly courts.

The Soviet peasant, like the worker, is treated by the government with a knout in one hand and pieces of sugar in the other. The main piece of sugar is, of course, bonuses for better or larger output. But there are also other rewards. These include the expression of thanks

by the board of management, trips to State rest homes for shock workers, medals and titles, including that of Hero of Socialist Labor.

The board of management must meet at least twice a month, and its decisions are taken by majority vote. The various members of the board are entrusted with such functions as overseeing field production, livestock farms, buildings, administrative personnel, and the like. A board member may be unseated by the general meeting. In fact, recall occurs only at the suggestions of State and Party organs which have been displeased with the member.

"The board of management and its chairman are responsible to the State for the punctual and complete fulfillment by the collective farm of its obligations. . . ."⁴⁵ Moreover, "the chairman and the board of management, possessing the status of functionaries, are criminally responsible in all cases of infractions. . . ."⁴⁶ Yet the collective farms are not State institutions, and its functionaries are not State employees.

The most important man on a collective farm is its chairman, who is also chairman of the board of management. He issues "instructions and directives to functionaries of the collective farm and all other collective farmers. The execution of those instructions and directives is unconditionally compulsory."⁴⁷ The chairman nominates from among the members a vice-chairman for appointment by the management board.

Soviet sources almost overtly acknowledge that the chairman, although formally elected by the general meeting, is in fact selected by local officials. The press organ of the Central Committee of the Party urged Party organizations to select the appropriate functionaries of the *artel*:

The Party organizations assist [*sic*] the collective farms in selecting the chairmen from experienced agricultural specialists, promoting the best collective farmers to the posts of leaders of various sectors of public production . . . and striving to secure respect for the democratic principles of collective-farm management.⁴⁸

The Party mentions simultaneously the Party selection of the farm leaders and the democratic principles, by-passing as usual with equanimity the obvious contradiction.

A chairman whose work pleases the State is to be reelected with the support of local Party and State organs. "Wherever the local organizations support the chairmen of the collective farms in their work, and where the same chairmen continue to work for many years, the organizational, economic, and political strengthening of the collective farms is achieved faster and with greater success."⁴⁹ This means

that chairmen are in fact selected and appointed, maintained in office, and reappointed by local officials in spite of the ostensible electoral procedure. "Of course, the district soviet and its executive committee may submit to the general meeting . . . the question of the dismissal of a chairman of the collective farm who does not ensure the correct direction of the farm, or of a brigadier who does not effect proper leadership. . . ." ⁵⁰ Even when the general meeting is called together, it can only confirm decisions already fixed.

The amalgamation of collective farms, which has been carried out since 1950 and 1951, must have deprived the general meeting of its last vestige of influence in the choice of chairmen. Present policy is to provide these enlarged collective farms with professionals, often young alumni of agricultural colleges, who are unknown to their future subordinates.

The Party regional committee solves the problem of the leading cadres of the collective farms by expecting from the Party, Soviet, and agricultural organs the confirmation of capable, politically reliable, and experienced chairmen and the prevention of unjustified changes. . . . ⁵¹

Sometimes the local officials choose the chairmen without even knowing them personally: "Occasionally weak and sluggish people are appointed as chairmen. This is caused by the fact that the regional Party committees . . . sometimes form their opinion of a man on the basis of written enquiries. . . ." ⁵² The chairmen are required to attend seminars organized by the Party committees to "nurture [their] political and cultural development." ⁵³

Chairmen are the aristocrats of the village. Their incomes place them among the intelligentsia, the true ruling class. The incomes, regulated by the Decrees of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Party of April 21, 1940, and April 19, 1948, come in two parts, one calculated in labor-days and the other in cash. Depending on the size of the arable land, the chairman is credited with 1,000 to 1,700 labor-days per year. His salary amounts to 40 or more rubles per month. This sharply contrasts with the remuneration of an average collective farmer who earns about 330 labor-days per year without any guaranteed cash payment. In order to encourage chairmen to remain on the farm, they receive supplements of from 5 to 15 percent more in labor-days for the length of service. They also receive bonuses for the overfulfillment of the plan. Nonfulfillment of the plan entails reduction of their compensation in labor-days by 1 percent for each nonfulfilled percentage point. But this deduction does not apply to their cash salary and cannot exceed 25 percent of their

compensation in labor-days. A very successful chairman of a prosperous farm makes annually (including bonuses) about 7,000 rubles, an income that places him within the Soviet middle class.

It is natural for most human beings to prefer light to hard work. Soviet collective farmers are no exception. Hence there has been a tendency to inflate administrative staffs, probably to provide lighter jobs for relatives and friends of the chairman, board of management, and local officials. The joint Decree of September 19, 1946, enumerated various abuses:

Pilfering the collective lands, plundering the collective-farm property, misuse of authority by the district soviet and Party officials. . . . Improper use of labor, caused by unjustified and extravagant increase of collective-farm administrative and managerial jobs. . . . Grafters and parasites often hide on useless, artificially invented jobs, avoiding productive work and [living] . . . at the expense of those collective farmers who till the fields and tend the cattle.⁵⁴

The chairman, members of the board, and accountant of the collective farm may be fined by the general meeting for illegitimate increases in administrative-managerial staff by a deduction of up to 10 percent of their total annual income in labor-days. Amalgamation of three, four, or more smaller farms aimed, among other things, at "the reduction of administrative-managerial personnel."⁵⁵

The same decree of 1946 pointed out that the management of various farms occasionally cheat the farmers in the distribution of farm incomes: ". . . some members do not receive the full compensation due to them in kind and cash in accordance with the labor-days they have earned, while others receive more than is due to them. . . ."⁵⁶ Such infractions could hardly have occurred without the benevolent "blindness" of local officials. After all, the administration of the farm is controlled from time to time by the control commission of the farm, which has to report to the executive committee of the district soviet. However, there are cases when State officials force the management of collective farms to commit irregularities for their own benefit.

On many collective farms, persons who have no relation to the farms whatsoever, such as orderlies, watchmen, and messengers of the village soviets . . . and district organizations, are supported at the expense of the collective farms.⁵⁷

Since the net income of the collective farm is divided up according to the *trudoden* earned by the members, the remuneration of other people cannot but reduce each farmer's share.

Local officials went even as far as "squandering of collective fields . . . in the form of illegal use by the local soviet and agricultural authorities of collective land of collective farms and even of its illegal seizure by all kinds of organizations and people. . . ." ⁵⁸ Investigations of some 198,000 collective farms revealed that up to January 1, 1947, 2,255,000 cases of illegal misappropriation of collective land were discovered, and 4,700,000 hectares were restored. Individual collective farmers were guilty of misappropriating 521,000 hectares to add to their garden plots; 177,000 hectares were in the possession of other persons, presumably local officials and their protégés.

Local officials are not adverse to taking away other collective property, namely, foodstuffs. The same decree says:

Grabbing of such property takes the forms of appropriating from the collective farms, free of charge or at a low price, collective cattle, grain, seed, fodder, meat, milk, butter, honey, vegetables and the like. . . . ⁵⁹

The evil continues to be mentioned in the Soviet press. Actually it is inherent in the system of complete subordination of the collective farms to the local organs of public administration on whose good graces depends the fate of the management boards, especially of the chairmen. *Pravda* on June 14, 1952, published an interesting report from the session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, which heard the same complaints about the same abuses which had been denounced six years earlier by the decree of 1946. Here are a few excerpts:

Pilfering collective lands of the collective farms took place frequently with the knowledge of the local organizations which tolerated allocating and even arbitrary seizure of those lands under the pretext of organizing all sorts of subsidiary farming, nurseries, etc. . . . There were discovered cases where responsible district officials acted as pilferers of collective-farm property. For instance, the former second secretary of the Leningorsk district committee of the Party, Marghiyev, misused his official position by keeping his own sheep on one of the collective farms and by using collective farmers' labor for the building of his own house. . . . Marsaghishvili, the former secretary of the Dmaniss district committee, was expelled from the Party and was taken to court for extortions from collective farms.

The organ of the Central Committee of the Party also complained in 1952 about the continuation of abuses often denounced by the Party and the Government:

However, even today the criminal acts of dissipating and pilfering public property of collective farms continue to be discovered despite the severe directives of the Party and the Government which aim at the protection of that property against any such attempts. . . . At some collective farms the public means are expended illegally on payment of personal debts of the collective farmers, and the property pilfered or damaged by careless workers is simply accounted for as a legal loss of the collective farm. The chairmen of some collective farms deliver gratuitously products to visiting representatives of various organizations without considering the interests of the *artel*. One also meets with overt stealing of public property on the collective farms. The criminal elements, who sometimes have reached leading positions, have organized a sort of mutual self-protection system, thereby preventing the honest collective farmers from unmasking infractions against the Charter of the agricultural *artel* and undermining the foundations of the public economy. . . . Sometimes the leaders of the Party and the Soviet organs indifferently by-pass such facts and do not even attempt to bring the responsible persons to severe justice, persons who actually commit counterrevolutionary acts. The Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Government indicated often that it was indispensable to terminate once and for all a practice which is foreign to the spirit of the Soviet people and which undermines the foundations of collective farming and brings about harm to our whole public weal. The Party and the Government demand that people who pilfer public property and their accomplices should be subject to the most severe and pitiless measures in order to eliminate from the public economy of collective farms all sorts of rogues and rascals who use the collective farms for their own benefit.⁶⁰

Eight years later, the Supreme Court of the USSR said in its directive of March 26, 1960, sent to courts:

"Produce, cattle, and other property obtained by organizations or individuals from the collective farms without payment or at clearly overly reduced prices in violation of the Charter of the agricultural *artel* must be adjudged to the collective farm in kind with return to the defendant by the collective farm of the money received for the property; with the plaintiff's consent the court may decide against the defendant for the money value of the produce or property at State retail prices [which are much higher than the prices paid by the State in compulsory purchases of agricultural products] or, in those cases where there are no State retail prices, at the prices existing on the market at a given locality on the day the suit was filed."

"Contracts whose purpose is to transfer collective-farm lands

openly or in a concealed form to organizations or individuals for rent must be held void . . . and the income received by the lessee from the use of the collective-farm lands as well as the rent received by the collective farm must be paid into the State treasury."

"In examining cases of suits of collective farms against organizations, other collective farms, or individuals for return of collective-farm property or for the payment of debts, courts must bear in mind that, although the general periods of statute of limitation on the bringing of actions apply to these legal relationships, still the court must in each case examine the reason why the period has been exceeded. Grounds for exceeding the period may be illegal interference of officials in the affairs of the collective farms, malicious use of authority by the chairman or members of the managing board of the collective farm, . . . and other circumstances causing a delay in bringing suit through no fault of the collective farm."⁶¹

This directive depicts by clear implication the intimidation of collective farmers by local State and Party officials who force them to allocate their lands for their own use, to sell at a lower price, or to give them produce without any charge. The chairman, who must remain on good terms with the officials who supervise his activities, cannot but yield to pressure. This is bribery. The rank-and-file collective farmers, who foot the bill by receiving lesser compensation for their labor-days from the collective farm's income thereby reduced, are too powerless to protect their interests. The action is filed in courts, if a sudden checkup by higher authorities reveals the existence of these abuses which are committed for the benefit of individual officials or their organizations such as the local Party committee or local public administration.

The evil is difficult to eradicate because local officials mutually cover up their abuses and often make ineffective the control of the central authorities.

All such abuses should have been prevented or denounced by the fourth organ of the collective farm—the control commission. According to Article 20 of the Standard Charter, this commission is elected by the general meeting, but its members must be approved by the executive committee of the district soviet. The latter organ is sure to place on the commission farmers who either act as informers against the management or know how to shut their eyes when it is convenient to the local officials. The control commission has three to five members, elected for two years. The various functionaries of the collective farm cannot be on the commission because their activi-

ties are subject to its supervision. This narrows the choice to humble peasants who do not have sufficient knowledge to check effectively the activities of the board unless to denounce crass abuses, thus acting only as a group of informers.

Article 25 of the Standard Charter gives an idea of the "great authority" of the control commission:

The control commission exercises control over all economic and financial activities of the management board, sees whether all revenues in cash and kind are duly credited in the books, if the regulations . . . on expenditure are observed, if the property of the *artel* is kept in good order, if there is no pilfering . . . or embezzlement of cash funds . . . checks carefully all accounts . . . reveals every case of cheating committed by the members . . . and all other infractions against the interests of the *artel* and of its members.

The commission must audit accounts four times a year. It must present its annual report to the general meeting. Although the commission members may not interfere with the management, they are allowed to assist at the meetings of the managing board in an advisory capacity. In actual practice, however, a simple peasant, as a member of the control commission, does not dare to act openly against the united front of his superiors—local officials, the chairman, and members of the board management.

BRIGADES

The rank-and-file collective farmers are grouped into brigades—the most important production unit on the collective farm. Some farms have, besides field brigades and livestock farms, brigades specializing in vegetable, fruit, cotton, or tobacco growing. Brigades are subdivided into smaller units called links. The official policy is "to prevent fluctuations in the personnel of these brigades."⁶² While the human and material resources of a field brigade are stabilized for at least one crop-rotation period, the livestock farm is formed for at least three years.

Since 1949, each collective farm is expected to have four livestock-breeding farms: a cattle, a sheep, a hog, and a fowl farm. Collective farmers are assigned to road-building and tractor brigades for at least one year. A collective farmer is assigned to a brigade by the management board, which thus holds in its hand his income prospects.

The brigadier is appointed for two years and "directs the brigade by virtue of the principle of one-man command."⁶³

The brigadier distributes work among the collective farmers . . .

taking into consideration the skill, experience, and physical strength of members of the brigade . . . and enters, at least once a week, in the labor book . . . the labor-days earned by each of the farmers according to the established rates.⁶⁴

The brigadier appoints the heads of the links, if a particular brigade is subdivided into links; submits to the management board the names of those who should be penalized or rewarded; organizes socialist competition; and is responsible for the property entrusted to his unit. His orders must be obeyed under the threat of disciplinary penalties. The brigadier receives a 5 percent bonus on the monthly earned *trudoden* for the third year, 10 percent for the fourth and fifth year, and 15 percent for each following year. He receives a 1 percent bonus for each percentage point his brigade overfulfills the plan of production. For each percentage point underfulfilling the plan, his monthly labor-day compensation is docked 1 percent, but the total deduction may not exceed 25 percent of his annual compensation. This system of bonuses and deductions must produce the mentality of a slave driver, interested primarily in overfulfilling the plan. The hope of gain is hardly moderated by the requirement that a brigadier must earn at least 25 percent of his earnings through manual work.

The tractor brigadier receives 150 percent of the average share of an ordinary member, from the collective earnings of the tractor brigade. The same concept of creating a slave-driving spirit among the foremen dictated the establishment of a bonus for the heads of links; for their effort to stimulate the productivity of their fellow laborers, they receive from 2 to 3 percent of the monthly total of *trudoden* earned by the members of the link.

In old Russia serfs were compelled to build roads for the State. The Soviet peasant, the modern serf, has also "to participate compulsorily and without payment [in such work] as the repair of embankments, building dykes, emergency assistance in case of a natural calamity, cartage of local materials, planting of trees along river banks protecting zones within the boundaries of the collective farm. . . . The law provides that every able-bodied collective farmer of either sex between the ages 18 and 45 for men and 18 to 40 for women must work on road building for six days a year. . . ."⁶⁵

Each collective farm has its own permanent road-building brigade. Members of that brigade are paid in labor-days by their collective farm from a fund determined as follows: From the earnings of all other members of the collective farm, an amount of labor-days is deducted which would have been paid to them for the compulsory

minimum of road building, or six days of work. The State spends nothing on the road-building brigades.

If the road-building obligation is not fulfilled, a complaint is presented to the people's court by the district highway office. A collective farm at fault is condemned to pay to the State a sum equivalent to the value in labor-days of the nonexecuted work. An individual peasant at fault is condemned to repay the State a sum calculated in the same manner.

The State also requires collective farmers to keep public order themselves without involving the State in the expense of paying permanent militiamen in the villages. For every 300 inhabitants, one "executive" is selected in rotation for a three-month term from among the villagers. The village executives are not paid for their services, although a peasant cannot refuse to perform these functions under the threat of criminal responsibility. They are considered public functionaries while on duty.

BONUSES

"There is the essential fact that the labor-day does not reflect completely and by itself the results of work."⁶⁶ Hence, in 1941 the Government and the Party inaugurated a new policy of bonuses to be added to the usual earnings of each farmer in proportion to the over-fulfillment of the production plan.⁶⁷ This policy was further elaborated by the Decree of April 19, 1948. A successful brigade may receive a 1 percent supplement for each percentage of surplus crops above the planned quantity. Or, it may receive part of the surplus crops as a bonus, e.g., 25 percent of the surplus grain, or half of the price paid by the State for the surplus crop of sugar beets and cotton.

The tractor brigade is allowed to share in the bonuses if the surplus of production is due partly to the mechanized operations performed by it side by side with the field brigade. Individual farmers may also receive bonuses for extra results. For instance, a milkmaid receives a bonus equivalent to 15 to 20 percent of the surplus milk above the planned quantity of 1,500 to 2,000 liters minimum.

Article 20 of the April, 1948, decree provides for another type of bonus, computed on the basis of the average results achieved by all the comparable brigades of a collective farm. A brigade which obtains results above the planned average gets a bonus. Conversely, a brigade is penalized if it produces below the planned average.

The third system of bonuses established by Article 24 of the same decree applies to vegetable growing and technical-cultural brigades and establishes compensation strictly proportionate to results.

The State encourages collective farmers to observe the established dates for each major agricultural operation by giving them a 100 percent bonus in labor-days for executing planned ploughing, harrowing, or sowing within the first six days of the established period; if they do it within the first eleven days, they receive a bonus of half the usual quota of labor-days.

This elaborate system of bonuses indicates that the attraction of personal gain is as important in a socialist society as in a capitalist one.

MACHINE-TRACTOR STATIONS

With the mechanization of Soviet agriculture, Machine-Tractor Stations became extremely effective means for controlling the collective farm's economic activities. Having a monopoly of tractors and heavier agricultural machinery, the M.T.S.'s were a "powerful lever for socialist reconstruction and the technical reequipment of agriculture."⁶⁸

The M.T.S.'s are State agricultural enterprises. They have their own tractor parks, combines, and all sorts of other agricultural machines. They have their own personnel of agronomers, mechanics, and other specialists. But, in contradistinction to the State farms, they do not dispose of any arable land and do not carry on any agricultural production. The agricultural machinery, the personnel of specialists, and other assets that are at the disposal of the M.T.S.'s are destined to serve the collective farms and to provide them with guidance. . . .⁶⁹

Finally, "the M.T.S.'s are placed under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR."⁷⁰

The M.T.S.'s having been State enterprises, one would have expected that all those employed by them would have been considered State employees, earning a fixed income independent of the income of the enterprise, and covered by State social insurance. But the Soviet State acted as a shrewd businessman. Until October, 1953, only the director, his assistant, the agronomers, mechanics, and other specialists were State employees. The tractor brigades which performed mechanized operations on collective-farm fields were composed of employees having the status of collective farmers. Until October, 1953, the directors' assistant was mainly a political officer, checking on the political reliability of the Station's personnel and the collective farmers of the neighborhood. He was expected to assume that the M.T.S. was "also an organizer of the collective-farming regime and a political leader of the collective farmers."⁷¹

Workers of the M.T.S. [were] divided into two groups according to their legal status: 1. regular employees who work there by virtue of labor contracts; 2. tractorists-collective farmers who are employed there by virtue of agreements concluded between the M.T.S. and the collective farms. The mutual relations between the M.T.S. and their regular employees [were] regulated by collective agreements concluded between the M.T.S. and the trade union of the workers of the M.T.S.'s and other agricultural enterprises. Labor legislation [extended] fully to the regular employees of the M.T.S. They [received] wages from the M.T.S. according to the existing rates.⁷²

Each collective farm in the radius of a given M.T.S. had to supply a contingent of collective farmers according to the specification of its director. From them he formed the tractor brigades. Retaining their status as collective farmers, the members of the tractor brigade were paid in labor-days by their farms for the work they performed for the M.T.S.

The members of the tractor brigade receive from the collective farm, in proportion to the quota of labor-days earned by them, their part of the products which are distributed by the farm to its own collective farmers, and get for each labor-day an amount of products corresponding to the value of the labor-day on that farm.⁷³

In October, 1953, the Government conferred upon the tractorists the status of State employees. The system of their remuneration was modified in consequence. Khrushchev expressed the hope that "many former tractorists will gladly return to work at the M.T.S. now that tractorists are included within the permanent personnel of the M.T.S. and receive a higher guaranteed remuneration."⁷⁴ This was considered a means for improving the productivity in agriculture by increasing the material incentive for the tractorists.

The tractorists enjoyed this higher status of State employees for barely four and a half years. In March, 1958, the Government decided to liquidate the Machine-Tractor Stations and, over a period of five years, to sell their machinery to the collective farmers. This entailed the return of the tractorists to the former status of collective farmers. To soften the shock for this most skilled fraction of the rural population, the Government ordered the collective farms to guarantee to the tractorists at least the same income they had enjoyed as State employees at the stations. This benefit of a guaranteed minimum income, denied to other collective farmers, was conferred on the tractorists at the expense of the farms but not of the State. The tractorists lost,

however, another benefit, namely, State social insurance, and as prior to the reform of 1953, have to rely in need on such aid as a collective farm is able to provide.

The tractorists have the right to bonuses for overfulfilling the plans, for saving fuel, etc. If the crops in the fields served by their brigade exceed planned production, they receive another bonus at the end of the year. But if the harvest is lower than planned, they are penalized by deductions which must not exceed 10 percent of their due wages.

The tractorists form an aristocracy among the peasants, their incomes being much higher than those of average collective farmers. Each tractor is served by a senior and a junior tractorist. The senior tractorist is responsible for the tractor and the trailer machines during the whole period of agricultural operations.

The relations between the M.T.S. and the collective farms were regulated by a standard contract which had to be followed in each particular agreement concluded between the M.T.S. and the collective farm. "The standard contract . . . is a legally binding norm which is enacted by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. . . . No deviations from the standard contract are allowed."⁷⁵ A Western-minded person may be surprised by the fact that the State, which owned the M.T.S.'s, dictated in advance as one of the contracting parties the terms of the contract to be concluded with the "autonomous" collective farms. It would have been less hypocritical to dictate openly the conditions of cooperation between the M.T.S. and the collective farms by a legislative act. But the comedy of concluding separate contracts was a part of the paraphernalia of the Soviet "democracy."

In practice the M.T.S.'s provided only machinery, expert advice, and the tractor drivers. Most of the other manpower was provided by the collective farms. As the crop of the collective fields depended on the quality of work not only of the tractorists but also of the collective farmers themselves, "the standard contract obligates the M.T.S.'s to include in their contracts a detailed description of all operations which the collective farms are bound to perform with their own implements, means of production, and draught animals. . . ."⁷⁶ In other words, the whole economic life of the collective farm was subject by virtue of the contract to the supervision of the M.T.S.

The collective farms had to pay the M.T.S.'s for their services in kind "according to the rates established by the Government of the USSR."⁷⁷ Here lay the second reason for the M.T.S.'s monopoly of agricultural machinery and tractors. The collective farm had to supply the produce due as payment in kind and as compulsory contribution

as a first priority after harvest. "The collective farm must bring the agricultural products due for the services of the M.T.S. to the appropriate railroad stations, harbors, elevators, and plants by its own means of transportation and at its own expense."⁷⁸

If a collective farm fails to execute payment in kind fully and on time, the standard contract establishes the following procedure for the recovery of payment: the latter is recovered in kind from the collective farm by an injunction of the people's court; in the event of willful nondelivery the guilty persons are prosecuted before the courts, while a fine amounting to half of the value of the nondelivered payment in kind according to the prices established for the compulsory contributions to the State is imposed on the collective farm; for the period of delay in the delivery the collective farm is charged 1 percent of that value for each ten days of delay.⁷⁹

The M.T.S.'s did not always work as they should. There were occasional complaints by the Party leadership that the M.T.S.'s tried to execute the contractual operations insofar as quantity was concerned without paying much attention to the quality of work.

The M.T.S.'s were subject to control on the part of special State inspectors who were officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and who had to verify on the spot the quality of the work performed by the M.T.S.'s. They could impose fines from 50 to 100 rubles on the guilty employees of the M.T.S. Although the M.T.S. was expected to control the collective farms, the regime needed, as usual, super-comptrollers to avoid too many abuses.

The Machine-Tractor Stations were gradually replaced beginning in 1958 by new Repair-Technical Stations with a much reduced personnel. The decision having been taken in the same year to sell the tractors and agricultural machinery to the collective farms, there was no reason to maintain the former Machine-Tractor Stations whose main functions, mechanized operations, were taken over by collective farms themselves. The reduced or new functions were entrusted to the Repair-Technical Stations and were defined as follows: 1) to supply on lease specialized machinery which collective farms need only occasionally and which they do not need to buy; 2) to sell to the collective farms, on behalf of the State, tractors, machinery, spare parts, and fuel; 3) to repair the machinery owned by the collective farms; and 4) to provide such technical or agricultural advice as the collective farms would request.

This new system did not last long, typically for the mania for reorganization characteristic of Khrushchev's leadership. In March,

1960, a new All-Union Administration was created with offices and workshops all over the country. It took over the functions of Repair-Technical Stations and now is in charge of selling to collective farms tractors, agricultural machinery, spare parts, fuel, and chemical fertilizers. Its workshops are in charge of repairing the machinery used by the collective or State farms. The Administration also supervises the maintenance and proper use of machinery by both types of farms.

NOTES

1. M. A. Arzhanov, S. F. Kechekian, B. S. Mankovskii, and M. S. Strogovich, *Teoriia Gosudarstva i Prava*, Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 247.

2. A. Ya. Vyshinskii, *Voprosy Gosudarstva i Prava*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), pp. 291-292.

3. A. A. Askerov, N. D. Durmanov, M. P. Karev, V. F. Kotok, I. D. Levin, and I. P. Trainin, *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvennoe Pravo*, Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Moscow, 1948), p. 107.

4. J. Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma*, 11th edition, p. 115.

5. *Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bol'shevikov)*. *Kratkii Kurs*, State Publishing House of Political Literature (Moscow, 1938), pp. 291-292.

6. N. D. Kazantsev, A. N. Nikitin, A. P. Pavlov, G. N. Polianskaia, A. A. Ruskol, and A. M. Turubiner, *Kolkhoznoe Pravo*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 72.

7. *Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bol'shevikov)*, p. 294.

8. V. K. Grigoriev, N. D. Kazantsev, I. V. Pavlov, P. P. Piatnitskii, A. A. Ruskol, and A. M. Turubiner, *Kolkhoznoe Pravo*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1950), p. 88.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

10. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

11. The term *artel* literally means association for common work; the term *agricultural artel* is used in practically the same sense as the collective farm (*kolkhoz*).

12. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

13. *Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bol'shevikov)*, p. 292.

14. I. L. Braude, S. L. Fuchs, M. A. Gurvich, N. D. Kazantsev, A. N. Nikitin, G. N. Polianskaia, I. V. Pavlov, and A. A. Ruskol, *Zemel'noe Pravo*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 183.

15. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

16. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

18. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

19. N. V. Vassiliev, *Sotsialisticheskoe Sel'skoe Khoziaistvo na Putiakh k Izobilitiu Produktov*, State Publishing House of Political Literature (Moscow, 1951), p. 62.

20. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 265-266.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 266.
24. N. G. Aleksandrov, V. M. Dogadov *et al.*, *Voprosy Trudovogo Prava*, pp. 248-249; cf. A. E. Pasherstnik, *Pravovye Voprosy Voznagrazhdeniia za Trud Rabochikh i Sluzhashchikh*, p. 161; and N. G. Aleksandrov, E. I. Astrakhan *et al.*, *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude. Kommentarii k Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude SSSR i Kodeksu Zakonov o Trude RSFSR*, pp. 6-7.
25. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
26. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 309.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 254.
28. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 280.
29. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 241.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
31. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 274.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 292.
33. N. V. Vassiliev, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
35. Fyodor Abramov. *New Life*. (English translation by David Floyd) New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.
36. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 304.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
38. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 305.
39. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 241.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
41. N. G. Aleksandrov *et al.*, *Voprosy Trudovogo Prava*, pp. 39-41.
42. Quoted in V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-314; and in N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 173.
43. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.
47. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 320-321.
48. I. Glotov, "Obshchestvennaya Sobstvennost'—Osnova Kolkhoznovo Stroya," in *Bol'shevik*, No. 10, May, 1952, p. 52.
49. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 183.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
51. N. Beliaev, "Podgotovka i vospitaniie predsedatelei kolkhozov," in *Bol'shevik*, No. 5, March, 1951, pp. 61-67.
52. *Loc. cit.*
53. *Loc. cit.*
54. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
55. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 328.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 327.
57. *Loc. cit.*
58. *Loc. cit.*
59. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
60. I. Glotov, "Obshchestvennaya Sobstvennost'—Osnova Kolkhoznovo Stroya," *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.
61. *Biulleten Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR*, 1960, No. 3, pp. 11-16.

62. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
63. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 282.
64. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 325.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
66. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 297.
67. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 270-273.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
69. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
71. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 384.
72. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
74. *Pravda*, September 15, 1953.
75. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
77. *Loc. cit.*
78. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

CHAPTER TWO

Collective Farms and the State

THE FIRST duty of a collective farm is to supply the State with agricultural products.

The most important obligation of the collective farms to the State is the restitution of seed advances, the delivery to the State of the compulsory contributions of products and of such agricultural goods as are due by virtue of contracts concluded with the State. . . .¹

Therefore, products are supplied to the State as a first priority before the collective farm is allowed to put aside anything for its own collective funds or to distribute its net income among the members according to labor-days earned by them. The quotas of products prescribed by law must be supplied, whatever remains for the consumption of the collective farmers. Crops vary from year to year, but these natural fluctuations do not affect the share of the State. *Pravda* of June 7, 1952, said in the title of its leading article: "The interests of the State are superior to everything!"; they are certainly superior to the interests of Soviet citizens.

CONTRIBUTIONS IN KIND

Until June, 1958, the sources of State supplies were the following: compulsory contributions in kind for which the State paid a low State-fixed price; deliveries on the basis of contractual agreements between the State and the collective farms; payment in kind to the M.T.S. for services rendered; and free sale to the State at higher prices.

Each year the collective farm had to set aside the quotas assigned to it for compulsory contributions.

Until 1940 the amounts of the compulsory contributions of grain and some other agricultural products by the collective farms were computed according to the plan of sowing of such cultures, the contributions of meat according to the number of cattle, of milk according to the number of cows, etc.²

This system was basically fair because it took into consideration the

probable amounts of products calculated in proportion to sown areas or existing cattle. But this system "had the basic defect that . . . [it] did not provide a stable basis, [it] resulted in the tendency among the collective farms to reduce plans of sowing . . . [it] did not stimulate the cultivation of new tracts of land through the ploughing of virgin soil, drainage of marshes, and rooting out of brushwood."³

To force the collective farmer to increase by all means the arable area and the amount of cattle, the State introduced in April, 1940, a new system under which "collective farms [should] supply contributions of grain products from each hectare of arable land possessed by the farms, according to the established norms. Kitchen gardens and new tracts of land which should be put under cultivation according to the State plan . . . are included in the total arable land which serves as the basis of the computation of compulsory contributions of grain to the State."⁴ The State was to be supplied with the full quota of products regardless of the size of harvest. If this harvest was low, the value of the labor-days would be low. It may not have been a humane system, but it was beneficial to the State.

From the arable land used as the basis of computation, only tracts of land cultivated with the so-called technical crops like cotton or sugar beets were excluded, such products usually being delivered to the State according to special contracts between the State and the collective farm.

The quotas were fixed by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. They could be increased or reduced for a particular district within a given region, territory, or Republic on the condition that the over-all quota due to the State from the whole region or Republic remained unaltered. Within a district the quotas were the same for all farms regardless of the quality of the soil, the manpower per hectare of arable land, or weather.⁵

The collective farms which were not served by M.T.S.'s had their quotas raised one-fourth. This penalty became obsolete with the amalgamation of the farms. A large collective farm was certain to use the services of a M.T.S.

The same method of computation applied to products other than grain or rice, such as potatoes, vegetables, seeds, hay, and tobacco. Delivery quotas regarding such products were higher for collective farms located near urban centers.

A similar system disregarding the actual assets of collective farms was introduced in 1939 regarding contributions of animal products. After the joint Decree of July 8, 1939, the supply of meat, milk, cheese, eggs, fats, hides, and horses for the army was computed on the basis

of all the land (arable land, orchards, kitchen gardens, meadows, and pastures) at the disposal of the collective farm. The annual quotas of meat varied from 0.5 to 4.5 kilograms per hectare of arable land. Average annual quotas were fixed for each region, territory, and Republic.⁶

The Soviet Government insists on increasing collective-farm livestock. The joint Decree of May 26, 1949, established privileges and penalties to promote this development. A collective farm which had the required minimum of animals on the required four livestock farms (cattle, sheep, hog, and fowl farms) was rewarded with a reduction of the compulsory contribution by 10 percent, while another farm which did not meet these requirements had its contributions increased by the same percentage.⁷ Khrushchev asserted that this policy of computing contributions in kind was fair and just, but the peasants may have had a different opinion. The Central Committee of the Party implied in its resolution of February, 1947, that there had been some discontent. It said:

Only the enemies of collective farming . . . may drag the Party back toward the former policy of contributions depending on the sown acreage, a policy which did not correspond to the interests of the development of agriculture.⁸

The quality of products delivered to the State should correspond to the established standards. Defective products are not accepted by the State and must be replaced. Contributions had to be delivered on fixed dates together with the payment in kind due to the M.T.S. The collective farm could not distribute any income to its members until all obligations to the State and the M.T.S.'s were met.

In June, 1958, the Party decided to abolish during the same year the compulsory contributions in kind. This followed another decision taken in March, 1958, to abolish the payment in kind for the services rendered by the Machine-Tractor Stations; of course, this payment could not be continued while the stations were being progressively liquidated and the machinery was being sold to the collective farms.

The Party Central Committee made it perfectly clear, however, that collective farms must continue to supply the State with the same, and possibly higher, amounts of agricultural products as were delivered in the past either in the form of compulsory contributions or as payment in kind to the Machine-Tractor Stations. It added that the total cost of the supplies should remain the same as before.

The new system, in force since the fall of 1958, consists in the so-called sales of products to the State. The fixed amounts of products

must be sold to the State as first priority exactly as was the case with the compulsory contributions and the payment in kind to the Machine-Tractor Stations. Prices are fixed by the State and vary from one district to another, depending on the probable cost of production. As the total sum of money reserved in the national budget for the purchase of agricultural products was not raised above the sum spent before the reform of 1958 in payment for contributions in kind, it is clear that the new prices are not much higher than those paid for the compulsory contributions. All in all, this "great" reform did not bring a penny more to the collective farms, which have to supply the State with the same amounts of agricultural products as before, regardless of what remains for the collective farmers themselves. This reform is not meant to confer a benefit on the peasants but aims at streamlining the State procedure of acquiring agricultural products. Instead of the former three ways of doing it (compulsory contributions, payments to M. T. Stations, and purchases of "surpluses"), there is only one procedure: the purchase at the State-fixed price of State-determined annual amounts of produce. As Khrushchev said, this allows for reduction in the State personnel who administered the former complex system of extracting agricultural products from the collective farms, and eliminates the disparity in prices, lower for compulsory contributions and higher for purchases of surpluses.

The present system of procurement of agricultural products operates on the basis of a national plan approved by the Federal Council of Ministers. This plan determines the national quotas of various products which the State will need for the supply of foodstuffs to the urban population and as agricultural raw materials for the light industries (for example, cotton) and the food-processing industries (for instance, meat). The quotas specify how much Soviet agriculture is expected to supply of grain of various types, potatoes, rice, sugar, sugar beets, meat, milk, eggs, wool, cotton, flax, hemp, tobacco, and other produce. These national quotas are divided between the Union Republics. The Union-Republican Councils of Ministers determine their own plans of procurement for the supplementary needs of each Republic. They also fix the dates on which the collective farms must supply the products required by the national and the republican plans of procurements. The republican quotas of supplies are in turn divided for each district, and eventually each collective farm is notified of the quotas of specified products it is expected to provide to the State. These quotas are fixed in proportion to the total acreage of land in the possession of the collective farm but not in proportion to the actually owned cattle or actually sown areas.

This whole operation is placed in the hands of a new State agency called the All-Union State Committee for Procurements which operates through its own nation-wide network. It prepares model contracts for the purchase of agricultural products of each kind. These models are approved by the Federal Council of Ministers. The collective farm, which has to conclude these contracts for procurement with the Committee's local office, has nothing left for bargaining. The text of the contract is fixed in the government-approved model, the quota of supply of each product is also determined in advance in accordance with the State plan, the prices to be paid are established by the federal government. All conditions of the contract are determined in advance by the buyer who is the State. The collective farm has to sign on the dotted line. If there are variations in prices depending on the local conditions, they also are determined by the Federal Council of Ministers for each particular zone of the country. The prices are supposed to cover the cost of production and leave a small profit to the collective farm.

The contract specifies the obligations of the collective farm, namely the quantity and quality of each product to be supplied and the date of supply. The procurement office pays on the conclusion of the contract a cash advance to help the farm in meeting its expenses prior to the delivery. The State covers the expenses of transportation of products to the procurement points.

Since 1955 each collective farm has been allowed to establish its own plan of production, i.e., to decide in the light of its own circumstances which crops to sow and how much, and how many cattle and which breeds to raise. However, this freedom of planning is restricted two ways. First, if Khrushchev makes a campaign, as he often does, to extend the cultivation of certain crops or to increase cattle-breeding, it is improbable that any collective farm may ignore his "advice." Secondly, the collective farm must, under any circumstances, meet the requirements fixed in the contract of procurement and, in its own interest, the needs of its collective farmers for foodstuffs.

The new system of procurements is administratively streamlined but is, from the point of view of the collective farms, essentially the same as the old one of compulsory contributions and is no less compulsory.

Failure of a collective farm to meet its obligations results in the coercive recovery by the State of the amounts due. The Government takes action before the courts which order the coercive recovery in kind and adjudicate damages for the breach of contract of supply.

The Soviet Government did its best in the years following Stalin's

death to reduce the adjoining plots of land left to a collective farmer's family down to the size of a small yard. It is highly probable that this goal was achieved by 1957. A small plot of half an acre can at best supply the collective farmer and his family with only some fruits and vegetables to supplement their own diet. There is very little left for sale to the town consumer. This process enabled the Soviet Government to show its "generosity"; it decreed in January, 1958, that compulsory contributions in kind from the adjoining plots were to be immediately abolished. The amount of such contributions must have shrunk to such small quantities, owing to the radical reduction in size of the plots themselves, that it was not worthwhile for the State to bother with the collection of such minuscule contributions.

DISTRIBUTION OF COLLECTIVE FARM INCOME

Once a year the general meeting of a collective farm distributes its gross income. This decision, like any other, is mainly a formality; the mode of distribution is determined by law.

The decision of the general meeting of the collective farmers which does not meet all the requirements of the Standard Charter (for instance, if the general meeting adopts a decision which would call for the distribution of the income in cash and in kind among the collective farmers before executing the public duties of the farm or before establishing all the Charter-prescribed funds to their total amount) is liable to be suspended and annulled. . . .⁹

The gross income must be distributed in the following obligatory sequence: 1) The procurement quotas of products (to be "sold" to the State) should be taken out of the products harvested by the collective farm and immediately delivered to the State. 2) The collective farm must pay in cash other obligations due to the State—income tax and insurance premiums—and also repay to the State any cash advances. According to the law of April 4, 1940, collective farms are compelled to take out State insurance on their farm buildings, chattels, means of transportation, produce, raw materials, livestock, etc.; the insurance covers the risks of fire, lightning, flood, and other calamities, and protects against crop losses from storm, hail, inundation, etc. The collective farms are also allowed to take out voluntary State insurance to cover the difference between the minimum coverage of the obligatory insurance and the real value of the insured property. 3) After executing all obligations to the State, the farm must provide for all collective farm funds established by law. These funds are: a) the seed

fund for the next year made out of the best seeds of the current year; b) the reserve seed fund which should be used only after a very bad harvest; c) the fodder fund for the collective farm livestock; d) the reserve fodder fund; e) the food fund to which 2 percent of the current crops is contributed, to be used in case of famine or other calamity; f) the fund of assistance to the needy and incapacitated members of the collective farm, to which no more than 2 percent of the gross annual income of the farm may be contributed in grain and other products; g) a cash fund for the productive needs of the collective farm, which is used for repairs, the purchase of seeds, fodder, fertilizers, fuel, and the like; h) a second cash fund for administrative expenditures (2 percent or less of the annual cash income); i) a third cash fund for the cultural needs of the farm, which is spent on the training of personnel, on nurseries, on radios, etc.; j) the indivisible fund, which should be increased each year by a contribution equivalent to 12 to 15 percent of the annual gross cash income, and used if necessary for the purchase of agricultural machinery, livestock, and building materials for the farm.

The indivisible fund represents in effect the reserve capital and savings of the collective farm. It is now being milked by the State through the sale of farm machinery at high prices fixed by the same State. Khrushchev did not make any secret of the Party's intention of channeling annually to State investments part of these savings through sales of machinery, fuel, and spare parts. He also said that the new system of purchases by the State of fixed quotas of products at arbitrarily determined prices was destined to provide another source of capital for investment in industries. The State determines the prices in both operations; it also fixes the retail prices at which it resells the agricultural products to the city consumer. Through all these transactions, the State realizes huge profits which it uses for the support of its mammoth bureaucracy and the intensive development of heavy industries, the burden being shifted to the peasant and the city consumer; the Party never asks these people whether they would prefer a slower pace of industrialization and a higher standard of living.

A collective farm is, further, expected to set aside a certain amount of products for sale on the free market, the latter meaning mainly the State-controlled consumers' cooperatives. Whatever remains in kind and in cash represents the net income of the farm, which is distributed among the collective farmers according to the labor-days and bonuses they have earned during the year. This income, together with what they produce in their garden plots, is used by the collective farmers for family needs and the feeding of the livestock they are allowed

to possess. If they have any surplus left, they may sell it at the nearest free market.

RURAL TAXATION

Collective farmers are liable to two taxes: the income tax paid by the collective farm itself, and the agricultural tax paid by the individual farmer out of his income from his adjoining plot.

The income tax is levied on the net income of the collective farm (the pertinent law was amended on December 18, 1958). As the actual value of labor-days earned by collective farmers depends on the size of the total net income of the collective farm, this tax is in the last analysis borne by the peasants although it is nominally paid by the collective farm. The rate is uniform and high, 12.5 percent from the assessed income of the farm; the maximum rate of income tax levied from individual citizens is only $\frac{1}{2}$ percent higher, whatever the amount of their income might be. The law of 1958 permitted deduction from the gross income of several expenditures necessitated by the operation of the collective farm such as the annual contributions to the various funds (seed, fodder, food emergency, and assistance to needy collective farmers); the payment to State repair shops for repair of machinery; the cost of fuel, electricity, care for sick cattle, and repairs of buildings; and the annual amortization of assets.

The agricultural tax on the income derived by the peasants from their adjoining plots and the sale of products in the free market is based since August, 1953, on each one-hundredth of a hectare of land in the personal possession of a collective farmer. Thus a peasant who increases the productivity of his plot of land or raises more livestock is no longer penalized by higher taxes; the new system actually favors peasants who take good care of their garden plots. This was one of the measures adopted by the Party to increase production.

The Statute of 1953, however, makes it quite clear that the Party does not intend to let things drift towards a return to private agriculture. To prevent the peasants from having any false hopes, Article 6 states that collective farmers who have not earned their annual minimum of labor-days through participation in collective work will be penalized by a 50 percent increase in the amount of tax from their adjoining plots.

Individual farmers have been "encouraged" to join the collective farms by heavier taxation. The agricultural tax for them is doubled, and they must pay a tax on horses, without which individual husbandry is impossible. In August, 1953, the taxes of peasants who have their own individual husbandry were increased by 100 percent to

"encourage" even more the remaining private farmers to join the collective farms.

PROTECTION OF SOCIALIST PROPERTY

Using the peremptory language of a landlord of old addressing his serfs, Stalin said in 1933:

Of you only one thing is demanded—and that is to work conscientiously; to distribute collective farm incomes according to the amount of work done; to take good care of collective farm property; to take care of the tractors and machines; to organize proper care of the horses; to fulfill the assignments of your Workers' and Peasants' State. . . .¹⁰

The severe penalties against those peasants who do not take good care of the collective farm property indicate, perhaps, that the collective farmers do not feel exactly like members of an autonomous co-operative and do not have much respect for the property of a "co-operative," which is basically a State institution.

Peasant discipline regarding collective-farm property was sanctioned with a "paternal" severity on August 7, 1932. A joint Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars stipulated that the penalty for pilfering of collective farm property was "death by shooting with confiscation of the whole property, or, in the case of extenuating circumstances, deprivation of freedom for a period of not less than ten years with confiscation of the whole property."¹¹

The same penalties were applied by the Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of January 30, 1933, to "persons who are convicted of having committed sabotage of agricultural work, stolen seeds . . . intentionally broken down tractors or machines, destroyed horses. . . ."¹²

The severity of the Decree of 1932 was somewhat moderated by the Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 4, 1947, which abrogated the Decree of 1932 and established the following penalties:

3. Theft, misappropriation, defalcation or other embezzlement of collective-farm . . . property is punishable by confinement in a correctional labor camp for from five to eight years with or without confiscation of property.
4. Embezzlement of collective-farm . . . property for the second time, as well as that committed by an organized group or gang or on a large scale, is punishable by confinement in a correctional labor camp for from eight to twenty years with confiscation of property.

5. Failure to denounce to the authorities an embezzlement [in preparation or having been committed] . . . is punishable by confinement for from two to three years or exile for from five to seven years.¹³

The new Criminal Code (1961) has extended the same protection to the collective-farm property as to the State property and has somewhat reduced the penalties (see above, Part Three, Chapter One).

However, one must recall that capital punishment has been applicable since 1961 for pilfering on a large scale of State or other public property. This includes the property of State and collective farms. Not only a dishonest collective or State farmer but also a careless one is threatened with criminal responsibility. The Edict of December 29, 1961, fixed the penalty of confinement for up to one year or correctional labor for the same period of time for persons who "carelessly handle or maintain tractors, trucks, combines or other agricultural machinery belonging to the State or collective farms or other State or cooperative institutions, if this has resulted in damage, breakdown, or loss of parts. The same acts, if committed more than once or if they have caused serious damage, are punished by the deprivation of freedom for up to three years." (*Vedomosti Verkhovnoy Soveta SSSR*, No. 1, January 5, 1962.) The peasant who is tempted to fell trees in a nearby forest (all forests are State property) is warned by Article 169 of the Criminal Code that if he does it as a business or, only once but causing serious damage, he will be deprived of freedom for up to three years or will be liable for fine of up to 500 rubles with the confiscation of the material he has illegally appropriated.

Stalin said on January 7, 1933:

If the capitalists after having previously achieved the firm establishment of their regime proclaimed private property to be sacred and intangible, then we, the Communists, must proclaim socialist property to be even more sacred and intangible in order to strengthen thereby the new socialist form of economy in all the branches of production and commerce.¹⁴

One must concede that the Communists protect socialist property much more diligently than capitalists ever protected private property.

RESTRICTED JURISDICTION OF COURTS

Soviet legislation encourages the courts to penalize peasants for various offenses but strictly limits their possible intervention in the cases where the peasant is the plaintiff.

Questions relating to the organization of production and work

on collective farms, to the distribution of work among collective farmers, to the determination of norms of output . . . belong to the jurisdiction of the board of management and of the general meeting. . . . Thus, the courts cannot examine, for instance . . . the questions of the assignment of a collective farmer to a particular task, or the problem of the imposition of a fine in labor-days. . . . The courts cannot examine a collective-farmer's complaint about his expulsion from a collective farm. . . .¹⁵

The exclusion of the courts from all such vital matters would not be important to the peasants if the general meeting were actually an independent body, if the board of management were truly elected by the general meeting, and if there were no collusion between the controlling state officials and the management boards and chairmen of collective farms.

Within the competence of the courts remain these matters of interest to the collective farmer: 1) controversies concerning the final settlement of accounts with a peasant who is allowed to leave the farm; 2) a collective farmer may sue the farm for payment for the labor-days credited to him by decision of the general meeting; 3) a collective farmer may also sue the farm for payment of an indemnity for injuries suffered in an accident connected with his work.¹⁶

THE SUBSIDIARY ESTABLISHMENT

A collective farmer has two sources of income: his participation in collective work and his subsidiary establishment (kitchen garden). This latter is a concession made by the Party to the peasants, but it is a temporary concession which is destined to disappear. Prior to 1929, or before the beginning of mass collectivization, an average peasant had the *use* of a certain amount of land (the whole land had been nationalized on the morrow of the October Revolution); he was a sort of tenant of the State, the sole owner of land. His allotment was divided into two main parts: the arable land and the plot immediately adjoining his cottage. Collectivization took away from the peasant all arable land and cut down the size of the plot adjoining his cottage to the maximum norms established by law. Therein lies the origin of the adjoining plots of collective farmers.

The adjoining plots must be small, according to Article 2 of the Standard Charter, because a peasant family must depend primarily for its income on its participation in the collective work. The subsidiary establishments must not, in the peasant's mind, rival his collective work. Any such effects would mean an indirect return to individual husbandry. Until the time of collectivization "the adjoining plot of

land played the role of economic center of the whole small economy of an individual peasant."¹⁷ This economic center of peasant life was undermined by collectivization—arable land plots were integrated into the fields of the collective farm, while the garden plot became from an "economic center," simply a "subsidiary establishment."

Although generations of the peasant's ancestors may have lived on this adjoining plot of land, it is neither considered his property nor need it remain forever in his possession. He may use the garden plot only for as long as he or other able-bodied members of his family belong to the collective farm and earn each year the minimum of labor-days on the collective fields.¹⁸

Even the Constitution of the USSR warns in its Article 7 that the adjoining plot of land should be "a small plot of household land." The first edition of the Standard Charter of 1930 did not determine the legal maximum size of the adjoining plot. But the second and present edition of 1935 states in Article 2:

Small plots (vegetable plots, gardens) are to be allotted out of the collective land for individual use of each collective-farm household. The size of such plots (exclusive of the site of the dwelling house) may vary from a quarter hectare to a half hectare, and in some districts to one hectare, in correspondence with local conditions, as determined by the [Ministry of Agriculture of the USSR].¹⁹

Since that time the effort of the Party and the Government has been directed toward cutting down the size of adjoining plots as much as possible below the levels fixed by the Standard Charter. One opportunity for doing so was the amalgamation of the collective farms.

The collective farmer has his home and sheds for his small number of livestock on the adjoining plot; the rest he must use as a yard for planting vegetables, fruit trees, berry bushes, etc. The subsidiary household may own only small agricultural implements, and must be "managed with hand tools."²⁰ A plough or harrow could remind the collectivized farmer of the bygone age when he was an independent farmer.

Article 3 of the Standard Charter established the maximum number of livestock which may be privately owned by a collective-farm household:

Each collective-farm household in the districts of cultivation of grain, sugar beets, cotton, flax, hemp, potatoes, vegetables, tea, and tobacco may have in individual possession one cow, not more than two calves, one sow with sucklings or, if the management board of the collective farm thinks it advisable, two sows

with sucklings, not more than ten sheep and goats together, an unlimited number of fowls and rabbits, and not more than twenty beehives.

Each collective-farm household in rural districts with developed stock-breeding may personally own two or three cows and calves, two or three sows with sucklings, twenty or twenty-five sheep and goats together, an unlimited number of fowl and rabbits, and not more than twenty beehives. . . .

Each collective-farm household in non- or seminomadic stock-breeding districts where . . . stock-breeding is the main occupation, may personally own four or five cows and calves, thirty or forty sheep and goats together, two or three sows with sucklings, an unlimited number of rabbits and fowls, not more than twenty beehives, and also one horse or one milking mare or two camels or two donkeys or two mules. . . .

Each collective-farm household in the nomadic stock-breeding districts where . . . stock-breeding is the general occupation, may personally own eight or ten cows and calves, one hundred or one hundred and fifty sheep and goats together, an unlimited number of fowls, up to ten horses, and five to eight camels. . . .²¹

This long enumeration in Article 3 takes into account the geographical variety of various parts of the Soviet Union with their diversified types of agriculture. Whatever the local variations, the livestock maxima may not be exceeded. "The supernumerary livestock must be necessarily alienated. One of the forms of the alienation is the transfer of this livestock to the collective farm at a price established by law."²²

Article 6 of the Standard Charter allows peasant families to use pastures belonging to the collective farm, though not the arable land, meadows, and hayfields, for grazing their own livestock.²³ As a rule, in districts where the individual possession of horses is not allowed, "if a collective farmer needs a horse to plough his adjoining plot of land or to go to the market or to visit someone, he must pay [the collective farm] for its use."²⁴

All members of the family are jointly tenants of the plot and joint owners of the house, sheds, implements, livestock, and crops. The size of a peasant family has no bearing upon the acreage of the adjoining plot of land.²⁵

Under the Soviet Constitution the means of production are, as a rule, collectively owned. There is only this exception: individual craftsmen and collective farmers may own their means of production; the former, whatever is necessary for the exercise of their craft, and the latter, whatever is indispensable for the economy of the subsidiary

establishment (sheds, small hand implements, livestock, seeds, etc.). This fact is confirmed by Article 7 of the Constitution. However, from the point of view of the Soviet economy, the personal ownership of some means of production by craftsmen and peasants represents an open wound. Craftsmen are eliminated either by being converted into factory workers or by being grouped into craft cooperatives. Non-cooperating craftsmen such as tailors, shoemakers, watch repairmen, electricians, painters, stovemakers, roofers, upholsterers, bookbinders, barbers, and photographers may exercise their profession alone or with the help of their family if they have received a permit issued by the city executive committee. The collective farmer who is a handicraftsman in his spare time also must register and obtain the permit. A nonregistered craftsman is liable to be fined in the administrative procedure or criminally prosecuted.

Peasants will continue to have limited ownership of their means of production as long as the Party does not altogether eliminate the subsidiary establishments. There is, however, one point of interest. These means of production belong to the whole family. Thus, the collectivist idea enters into the legal complex of the subsidiary establishment. Like a city dweller, a collective farmer owns individually only articles of personal use (clothing, for instance); also personally owned is the income of each collective farmer from the collective work.

All matters concerning the garden plot are decided jointly by all adult members of the family (those over 16 years old), while the head of the family acts as their legal representative. In the event one member of the family leaves the collective farm, he is reimbursed for his share in the subsidiary establishment, according to the evaluation determined by the courts. But the courts do not simply divide the total value of the subsidiary establishment by the number of a given family.

When apportioning the individual part, the courts are guided, on the one hand, by the amount of the contribution of the member concerned through his work and means to the household economy, and, on the other, by the necessity of ensuring for the remaining members of the family the possibility of continuing the economic activities of the household.²⁶

Other facts also reveal the collectivist nature of the subsidiary establishment.

The household answers with its whole property for the obligations of the collective-farm household itself, in the first place for

those toward the State and for the payment of taxes. . . . The death of one or several members of the collective farm household does not affect the joint property of the household, because the right to share in the property of the household does not include that of inheritance.²⁷

If all the members of a given household die or resettle in another area of the Soviet Union, or become industrial workers, the garden plot reverts to the collective-farm reserve fund of adjoining plots.

The peasant family cannot do whatever it likes on its garden plot, because its use of the adjoining plot of land is subject to constant control by the management board and by local State organs. "It cannot use the plot irrationally . . . or keep it in a neglected condition, or use it contrarily to its true designation."²⁸ Moreover, "the collective farmers who rent the adjoining plot or alienate its use in favor of other persons shall be liable to expulsion from the collective farm with the loss of their adjoining plot."²⁹ This prohibition extends to the lease of the adjoining plot to another family belonging to the same collective farm. Of course, the peasant family has no right to hire additional outside labor for work on its subsidiary establishment. Neither can they process the products for sale as manufactured goods, as, for instance, linen or clothing.³⁰

The peasant must also pay the agricultural tax in cash from the whole income originating in the subsidiary establishment. The products derived from the family plot may be consumed by members of the household or sold on the free market.

Apart from the organized market there is within the socialist economy another market—the collective-farm market. . . . The products are sold on the collective-farm markets at a price which fluctuates, while the volume of sales is not planned by the State. The State regulates the collective-farm market indirectly—through economic regulations, the level of prices in the State trade, and by its own supply of goods.³¹

Goods offered by the collective farms or by individual peasants are bought either by the consumers' or invalids' cooperatives, which may resell those products in the cities, workers' settlements, at the railroad stations, ports, etc., at prices freely fluctuating on the market, but never higher than those in the State retail trade, or by individual private buyers for their own consumption. Thus, the town market is the last trace of private trade: "On the collective-farm market the prices of goods are fixed by the mutual consent of the parties at the moment of conclusion of the transaction."³²

The present governmental policy aims at a gradual liquidation of collective-farm markets which are the last traces of private trade. The Decree of February 26, 1961, instructed the Consumer Cooperatives (actually State-controlled institutions) to purchase from the collective farmers surplus products at prices mutually agreed upon or to take over the sale of these products to urban consumers on a commission basis.

The household is "bound to organize the work of its members on subsidiary establishment so as not to hinder the public production of the collective farm. The members of the household may take care of their subsidiary establishment only during the time which is free from collective-farm work."³³ The only trouble is that the peasant does not seem to agree with the State's point of view and seems to prefer to devote his time and labor to his subsidiary establishment rather than to the collective farm. This fact is acknowledged in the organ of the Central Committee of the Party:

Before the war the adjacent plots of land of the collective farmers represented less than 5 percent in proportion to the socialized arable land of the collective farms. The specific weight, however, of the personal economy of the collective farmers, including livestock breeding, represented before the war approximately one-fifth of the gross agricultural production. . . . The livestock personally belonging to the collective farmers represented in the prewar years over half of the total livestock owned both by the collective farms and personally by the collective farmers.³⁴

Those figures are staggering. After more than ten years of collective farming and despite all the efforts of the Party, the peasant in 1940 stubbornly continued to be interested in his subsidiary establishment, this last vestige of a quasi-independent personal enterprise. He produced on his subsidiary establishment proportionately four times more products than on the collective fields and livestock farms. His personal livestock played an important role in the economy of the country, while "public livestock breeding could not then [before the war] play a decisive role in supplying the needs of the country."³⁵

Since the war the Party has pursued an energetic policy to reverse the livestock problem. The policy aiming at a proportionate increase in collective livestock and a decrease in personally owned livestock continued with the result that, unlike the situation in 1939, collective livestock represented in 1952 the majority of all Soviet livestock. However, the Party hostility to private ownership of livestock produced disastrous shortages of livestock products.

In the fall of 1953, the Party Central Committee was confronted

by Khrushchev with ominous statistics. The total number of cows had decreased between 1928 (this is the year prior to the collectivization of agriculture) and 1953 by 9 million heads, the number of all cattle by 10 million, the number of sheep and goats by 5 million; only the number of hogs had increased during those twenty-five years by one million. The Soviet population greatly increased during the same period of time owing to the annexations operated in 1939-1945 and to the natural increase; yet its meat and dairy supplies disastrously declined. The Party had no choice but to suspend for a few years its warfare against the subsidiary establishments and to make in September, 1953, several notable concessions to the peasants in order to increase their interest in production. The measures adopted in 1953 and later have greatly improved the situation, but the collective-and-State-farm stock-breeding always falls short of Khrushchev's announced goals.

The "bourgeois" propensity of the peasants is testified to by official statements concerning the illegal enlargement of adjoining plots of land to the prejudice of the collective fields. There has been, since the collectivization of agriculture, a struggle between the Party and the Government, which, on the one hand, want to cut down the size of the subsidiary establishment in order to eliminate it completely by the end of the process, and the peasants, who, on the other, have taken every opportunity to increase the size of adjacent plots, even though such action has been illegal. Ten years after the beginning of collectivization, the Decree of May 27, 1939, established various preventive measures to block the misappropriation of collective lands. The decree "forbade under criminal responsibility any transfers of collective lands to the personal use of the collective-farm households."³⁶ It further introduced the registration by each collective farm of the exact acreage of collective land and that of each garden plot, and also ordered the delimitation on the land by visible signs.

One would have expected the farmers to respect the collective fields after the energetic measures introduced by the Decree of 1939. But in 1946, a new investigation revealed that some 5 million hectares of collective land had been misappropriated by the collective farmers "with the tolerance of management boards of collective farms and the chairmen of the village and the district soviets. . . ."³⁷

Certain nonmembers of the collective farm residing on its territory are entitled to small plots of land. These are doctors, veterinarians, teachers, agronomers, and land surveyors. The Decree of July 28, 1939, established the maximum size of such adjacent plots at 0.15 hectare. This size was raised in 1945 to 0.25 hectare.

The acute agricultural crisis of the early fifties forced the Party to adopt temporarily in 1953 a less hostile attitude toward the subsidiary establishments. The collective farmers, however, were probably slow in responding to the concessions made to them. As a result, the Party began to shift its preference, at least partly, to the State farms.

Following the 20th Congress, a joint decision of the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers "advised" the collective farms to proceed with certain modifications of their charters along the following lines:

1. To calculate the size of the subsidiary plots according to the number of family members actually participating in collective farm work—not to count, in other words, any disabled, aged, or minor members of a family.

2. To cut generally the size of the subsidiary plots below the maxima fixed in the Standard Charter so that a plot would be used to produce only enough for family use, and not surpluses which might be sold to urban buyers.

3. Progressively to rid peasant families of privately owned cattle.

4. Sharply to increase the legally established seasonal and annual minima of labor-days to be worked by each collective farmer, under threat of strong penalties.

5. To revise the procedure concerning penalties. The decision of the general meeting of the collective farm to expel a member had to be approved by the district executive committee. This provided a certain opportunity to escape penalty. The collective farms were "advised" that decisions concerning expulsion, reduction of the size of the subsidiary plot of land, and other penalties should be reconsidered, at the request of the peasant concerned, by the general meeting and then become final without any recourse to the district executive committee. The new procedure is speedier but also harsher for the peasant, who, having no passport, cannot seek employment in the city if he is expelled from the collective farm.

This "advice" has been followed earnestly. The size of adjoining plots has been cut down. Khrushchev has never tired in "encouraging" the peasants to sell their cattle to collective farms; the privately owned cows will one day become only a memory of better times.

COMMUNIST DISTRUST OF THE "NEW" PEASANTRY

"The Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before," declared Stalin in 1936.³⁸ If this is the case, the persistent policy of the Party seems to indicate that Soviet leaders do not trust this "new peasantry"

very much. Many State organs control the collective farms and also supposedly check on each other.

The planning of production, although left now to the decision of each collective farm, is, however, greatly affected by the Party appeals to give first priority to the cultivation of certain crops such as corn and by the governmental orders for the procurement of specified products. The management board drafts a budget on the basis of the existing plan of production. The general meeting formally adopts the budget, and the collective-State-farm production agency ratifies it. As the collective farm must remain a self-supporting institution without assistance from the State, the board is authorized to spend only up to 70 percent of the total budgetary resources before the final results of the harvest are available. The use of cash resources is controlled by the State Bank, where each collective farm must keep a current account.

The collective-State-farm production agency controls the production and supply of products due the State, approves the farm's general plan of production and its budget, supervises all its activities and their concordance with the Charter and State instructions, and protects the farm property against misuses and embezzlement.³⁹

Other organs of control include the councils of ministers of the Union and Autonomous Republics, the territorial, regional, and district soviets' executive committees, the village soviets, the local Party organizations, and the procurators.

The present structure of State administration of agriculture is so complex that even the Soviet bureaucrat might encounter some difficulties in finding his way through this labyrinth. It is the product of several post-Stalinist reorganizations and probably will fall victim to a future reorganization. At the top is the Agricultural Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The former central department, the Ministry of Agriculture, was gradually deprived of all its important functions: the planning of agricultural production, administering of the procurements, and controlling of the M.T.S. and the State and collective farms. These functions have been distributed among various new governmental departments such as the Committee for Procurements or the Administration for Sales of Machinery. The Ministry survives mainly as the central administration for agricultural research and educational and extension institutions.

The Agricultural Committee was established in 1962 to supervise the production and procurement of agricultural products and was superimposed over the Federal Committee for Agricultural Procurements and the Federal Administration for Sales of Machinery. Its

composition includes its Chairman, who is also a Vice-Chairman of the Federal Council of Ministers; the chief of the Agricultural Department of the Party Central Committee; the Chairmen of the State Committee for Procurements and of the Administration for the Sales of Machinery; one of the Vice-Chairmen of the State Planning Committee; and one of the Vice-Chairmen of the Council of National Economy. In effect, it is a top-level coordinating body for all agricultural problems.

Similar Committees exist on the Union-Republican and regional levels and are headed by the republican or regional first Party secretary. As the Party now has two parallel organizations for urban and rural affairs, this is the first secretary of the regional organization for rural affairs. Other members of the Committee represent the various republican or regional State offices for agricultural matters.

On the level of the new and enlarged rural districts, over-all control is concentrated in the hands of the new administration called the collective-State-farm production agency (see above). Each of these agencies must include in its highest personnel a Party organizer, as he is called, whom the regional Party committee for rural affairs appoints. These Party organizers are responsible, in their dual capacity of State officials (as members of the production agencies) and Party functionaries, to the same person, the regional Party first secretary who is also the head of the regional Agricultural Committee. The Party organizer must supervise not only the production agency but also all State and collective farms within the agency's territorial jurisdiction. He has inherited the responsibility of the political assistant-manager of the former M.T.S. and answers to the Party not only for the economic efficiency of the farms but also for the political loyalty of the peasants. He is assisted at the grassroots level by the Party and Komsomol primary organizations which now exist on all State and collective farms.

The collective-State-farm production agency has its own advisory council. It includes the director of the agency, the Party organizer, the Komsomol organizer, the chairmen of collective farms and managers of State farms of the district, the district Party secretaries, the chairman of the district executive committee, and the heads of local offices for procurement and for sales of agricultural machinery, i.e., all the local dignitaries entitled to supervise, manage, or assist the agricultural enterprises.

The most interesting feature of this complex structure is the pivotal role assigned to the Party in the supervision of agriculture. This is typical of Khrushchev's era with its subordination of the State

bureaucracy to the Party which now reigns alone, neither the political police nor anyone else contesting its sovereignty.

Another characteristic feature of this era is the departure from the Stalinist policy which forbade any organized cooperation between the collective farms or the establishment of any subsidiary enterprises related to their production. Now the unions of collective farms and State farms are encouraged in carrying out useful joint projects such as founding plants for building materials or constructing power stations of local interest. However, even now the collective farms have no national organization of their own, probably so that the peasants as a class cannot voice their complaints and wishes.

MODERN SERFDOM OF SOVIET PEASANTS—THE PASSPORT SYSTEM

A stranger to the Soviet Union might ask this question: Why does the Soviet peasant not abandon the village and try to improve his lot by joining the ranks of the proletariat? The Soviet State answered this question by prohibiting the peasant from leaving his collective farm and native village. Soviet peasants are legally in the position of the serfs of old.

As a rule, a peasant may not leave his village or his collective farm without exposing himself to judicial prosecution, except in the following cases:

1. He receives permission from the board of management to transfer to another collective farm because of marriage or because of his participation in the State scheme of resettlement to distant areas of the Soviet Union. In the latter case "the collective farm sets apart a fraction of its capital for resettling members, this fraction corresponding to their share of the basic means of production, of the various funds in kind, of the investment capital, etc."⁴⁰

2. He is allowed to leave if the State recruiting agency has given him a one-year contract for work in industrial enterprises. The yearly contract may be prolonged indefinitely if he proves to be a good industrial worker. "The [recruitment authorities] must follow the national economic plan as approved by the Government of the USSR."⁴¹

3. A young peasant may be admitted to an industrial-trade school and become a skilled worker, or may be fortunate in acquiring technical-secondary or higher education and then join the urban lower-middle or middle class.

The peasant cannot leave his village on his own for another reason: One must have a (domestic) passport in order to be allowed to reside in the city, and peasants have no passports. The passport system is one of the many means for ensuring the political security of a regime

which pretends to be unanimously supported by the Soviet population, a regime which supposedly "no longer contains antagonistic, hostile classes."⁴²

A naïve person might ask why it is necessary in a country of "friendly collaboration of all social strata" to refuse (domestic) passports to the rural population, while in the capitalist societies, "torn by class conflicts," every citizen, be he a businessman, worker, or peasant, is free to change his place of residence, does not need to register each transfer to a new locality with the police, and has never heard of home passports. But in the land of "political and moral unity" the home passport system introduced in 1932 "is one of the most important means of protection of public order and State security."⁴³

Originally the passports were obligatory for residents of Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, and the immediate vicinity of the three cities. It was generalized for the whole Soviet territory by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of September 10, 1940. The passport system covers all citizens at least 16 years old who reside permanently in a city, a workers' settlement, the chief town of a district, any locality within the frontier zone, any locality (even rural) of the Moscow region, any place within 100-kilometer radius around Leningrad, and 50-kilometer radius around Kiev.

The following persons are exempt from the passport obligations: 1) minors under age 16; 2) members of the Armed Forces, who are provided with military identity documents; 3) rural residents hospitalized in a city hospital; 4) collective farmers who work temporarily at a State farm. Foreign residents have special identity cards, which must be registered on arrival and departure.

Certain employees in defense industries, coal mining, railroad, or other transport, and in banks if they are tellers or in charge of valuables, must surrender their passports to the enterprise. Whatever the cause, this exceptional treatment does not prove that the Soviet State has much trust in its citizens. Employees of the above-mentioned enterprises receive special identity documents for the duration of their employment.

Passports are of three types: for an indefinite period, for five years, and for periods shorter than three months. Passports of the first category are "issued to persons decorated with the orders of the USSR, to invalids of war or labor accidents, to pensioners, and to persons at least 55 years old. Temporary documents of identity are delivered to citizens who have lost their passports . . . and to those who have arrived from places where the passport system does not extend."⁴⁴

In other words, an ordinary city dweller receives a five-year passport, while a peasant who comes to an industrial center by virtue of a year's contract receives only a three-month passport, which is extended on a three-month basis.

Passports are issued by the militia of the place of one's residence. The applicant must submit a birth certificate, certificate of military status, certificate of residence, and certificate of employment. The recipient pays a 0.30-ruble fee to the militia.

A passport serves various purposes: it is a document of identity; a permit to reside in urban centers; and it allows a fast check on certain facts of the citizen's life, such as marriage and divorce, dates of hiring and of release from work, arrival at or departure from a place of residence, etc. A person arriving at a place within the passport area has to register his passport at the militia office within twenty-four hours. A person leaving must also register his departure with the militia. This tight control allows the militia to know of the existence of all persons at a given locality. A person must further register with the house management or the owner of a private house. This registration is entered in special books provided by the militia and checked by it.

Peasants and other residents of a rural area do not need to register with the militia if they visit a town of their own region for five days or less. The obvious conclusion is that a peasant cannot remain in town legally for more than five days. To stay longer he would have to register his passport (which he does not have!) with the militia. The five days' residence allowed to peasants in towns of their own region is a necessary exception. A peasant must go to a nearby town to sell his products on the market, to buy manufactured goods, to see local officials, or to appear in court.

Violations of the passport system are punished by various penalties: 1) Managers or heads of enterprises or offices who hire a person without a passport or without a duly registered passport, as well as militia commandants who tolerate unregistered residents in their towns, are fined by the administrative authorities up to 10 rubles for the first offense. 2) The fine up to 5 rubles is imposed on a person who resides in a passport area without a registered passport, or on a peasant who stays more than five days in such an area. 3) A second offense of the above persons is punishable with up to six months of correctional labor. 4) An intentional infraction of passport regulations, if it consists in residence without a passport in cities or industrial settlements, or in failure properly to register the passport with the militia, and if it is a third offense, is punished by deprivation

of freedom for up to one year or by correctional labor for the same period of time or by a fine of up to 50 rubles (Article 198 of the Criminal Code).

Let there be no illusions as to the actual application of these penalties. Soviet criminologists attach great importance to the passport system: "Infractions . . . represent a serious menace to public security because . . . criminal elements [may] hide from the courts and prosecution; moreover, such infractions promote infiltration into the capitals and other large cities of antisocial and hooligan people."⁴⁵ Whether the Soviet authors meant to include peasants among the "antisocial and hooligan people" is uncertain, but the passport system mainly stops collective farmers at the gates of the urban centers. Stalin once said, referring to prerevolutionary times: ". . . the village was for him [the peasant] a stepmother; he was ready to flee from it to the devil himself in order to obtain any other work."⁴⁶ Now the peasant cannot flee even to the devil because he has no passport!

AMALGAMATION OF COLLECTIVE FARMS

In the spring of 1950 the Soviet Government inaugurated an important reform of the collective-farm system, which is said to have been carried out by the peasants with the usual "unanimous and fervent enthusiasm" ordered from above and stimulated by vigilant local Party and State officials. This reform was the amalgamation of small collective farms into much larger units. It had both an economic and a social meaning. It was introduced with the accompaniment of loud propaganda trumpets whose sound was later somewhat subdued.

To understand the implications of the amalgamation program, one must keep in mind that the present collective farm represents, according to Party doctrine, only a provisional form of farming. The next form will be the agricultural commune. "The future agricultural commune will take shape when there will be plenty of grain, cattle, fowl, vegetables, and all other products . . . when the *artel* will have mechanized laundries, modern kitchen-canteens, bakeries, etc., when a collective farmer will convince himself that it will be more comfortable for him to receive meat and milk from the collective farm rather than to have his own cow and other livestock. . . ."⁴⁷

The commune probably will replace the collective farm when the Party, and not necessarily the peasant, is convinced that such reform would be to the interest of the State. The problem is not really of mechanized laundries or cafeterias and communal bakeries. It is that of the fate of the subsidiary establishment. The commune will differ from the present-day collective farm in one major respect: the peasant

will be deprived of his family garden plot and will have to devote all his time to collective work.

The severe housing shortage and the notorious scarcity of consumer goods in the Soviet Union, whose main industrial effort has been constantly directed toward heavy industry, do not allow one to expect in the near future an abundance of consumer goods which would make possible the realization of Stalin's dream of mechanized laundries, modern bakeries, and other devices for the peasants' convenience at the agricultural communes.

The amalgamation began in the Moscow region; later, it extended to the Leningrad region, to include finally the whole country. The Soviet authorities make no attempt to hide the fact that amalgamation was ordered and directed from above, exactly like the collectivization of agriculture two decades earlier.

The Party organizations, executing instructions of the Party and the Government, organized and directed the movement, assisting [*sic*] the collective farm peasantry in solving correctly and at the proper time this ripe question. . . . Before presenting the question of amalgamation to the general meeting of collective farmers, the representatives of the district Party and Soviet organs together with the directing personnel of the collective farms and the district *aktiv* [the most reliable farmers] of the collective farms carefully examined the expediency of uniting particular collective farms. In turn the collective farmers carefully considered the matter of amalgamation twice: for the first time at the general meeting of each collective farm scheduled to participate in the amalgamation, and for the second time at the general meeting of all collective farmers united in one amalgamated collective farm.⁴⁸

This description of the procedure leaves little room for illusions. The amalgamation was decided first by the central organs of the Party in Moscow; then the new policy was announced by Khrushchev for all to hear and obey. Such is the "new" democracy.

The pace of amalgamation was rapid from the start. According to the report of the Central Committee of the Party presented to the 19th Congress, in 1952 there were "97,000 amalgamated collective farms . . . instead of 254,000 small collective farms which existed on January 1, 1950."⁴⁹ Later new amalgamation drives reduced the total to the present 44,000 farms. The new amalgamated farms have 10,000 to 15,000 acres of land. The increase of the acreage of arable land was one of the purposes of the amalgamation, justified by the needs of mechanized agriculture. But the same operation had other purposes as well, one of them the whittling down of the garden plots.

When Khrushchev announced the amalgamation, he presented to the Soviet public an ambitious program. He talked about *agrorods*, agricultural towns which would replace old villages within the new giant collective farms. Each agrorod would have its cinema, canteen, and other modern conveniences of an urban center, with two- or four-family homes surrounded by small yards, the last remnants of the adjacent plots. This grandiose plan had to be abandoned only a few months after it had been announced. It still is not clear why it was proclaimed in the first place. Finally the amalgamation resulted only in the consolidation of every two, three or four small collective farms into one much bigger collective farm.

... In the majority of cases the size of the plots was fixed in the neighborhood of that which had been prevailing on the most progressive collective farms around which amalgamation was taking place. The latter farms had as a rule adjacent plots of the smallest size [*sic*]. . . .⁵⁰

One may easily imagine the "enthusiasm" of the collective farmers voting to accept smaller garden plots. But what could they do but raise their hands in a "unanimous" public vote?

Amalgamation of collective farms had other results besides cutting down the size of adjacent plots of land. One of them was the intensification of Party control through its primary organizations. The Party's elitism precludes mass membership; as a result primary Party organizations were absent in many small collective farms for lack of a sufficient number of Party members. With the amalgamation, it became possible to organize primary organizations on all amalgamated farms without any undue increase of actual membership among the peasants. A primary Party organization provides the Party and the Government with an additional instrument of control of rural life, and serves as a stimulus to greater productivity among the peasants.

... the most important condition of the success of the Party organization's work . . . consists in a correct distribution of available Party members . . . in all decisive sectors of the collective economy. If [this is done], Party organization acquires a real possibility of subjecting all collective farmers to Party influence.

...⁵¹

The control over the peasants was reinforced through another device. According to Khrushchev 20,000 urban Communists were "recommended" to collective farms for election as their chairmen.⁵²

The Party primary organization maintains discipline not only among the rank and file but also serves as an additional check on the

management of the collective farm. "Without the primary organizations the Party district committee would not be able to assure the direction of collective farms. . . ." ⁵³

Amalgamation made possible a better selection of qualified chairmen and a notable reduction of managerial-administrative staffs. The change is twofold: the chairmen are better educated but usually they are also members of the Party.

Amalgamation produced other results, like the stabilization of the brigades' personnel, which was difficult to achieve on small collective farms where the same peasants had to work in the fields and tend the livestock; it also helped in a more effective cooperation of the M.T.S. with one larger farm rather than with several smaller ones, and prepared the ground for the later sale of machinery to the collective farms and the liquidation of the M.T.S.

THE COLLECTIVE FARM: UNIVERSAL PATTERN FOR ALL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

The collective farm is conceived as a pattern for agriculture in all countries which fall under Communist influence. Molotov stated this idea as early as the 18th Congress of the Party in 1939:

The Stalinist Charter of the collective farm *artel* is not only the true constitution of the [peasants] collective-farm life and organization, but will remain for many years to come the banner of the collective-farm peasantry until the time of the victory of Communism. [This is true] not only for us, the people of the Soviet Union. As soon as the freed peasantry of capitalist countries will throw away the yoke of capitalism, and when they will wish to know how to build their new life, they will not have to spend a long time on enquiries but will discover in this Stalinist Charter of collective-farm life the answer to the questions of how to organize the life of a free peasant and how to introduce socialism in the villages. ⁵⁴

Eastern Europe learned after the last war that Molotov had correctly expressed the Party's program. Only the passive resistance of the local peasant and the fear that an enforced rapid collectivization of agriculture could provoke serious shortages and political crises caused the local Communist Parties to proceed by stages and without the exacting haste which characterized Soviet collectivization in the early thirties. But there could be no doubt as to the ultimate goal.

One of the most important tasks of the people's democracy consists in the reconstruction of agriculture on co-operative foundations with socialization of the means of production. . . . ⁵⁵

Unlike the Soviet Union where the land was nationalized from the outset, in the satellite countries, where peasants are vigorously attached to the title of ownership of their land, they were induced first to join all sorts of agricultural cooperatives for production, which were not yet collective farms but which paved the way to the latter. "The realization of those various measures [aiming at the introduction of productive cooperatives] will eventually result in the nationalization of all land in the countries of the people's democracy. . . ."⁵⁶

The cooperatives in Eastern Europe were of four types:

1. The association for the tillage of land. All plots of land of members were tilled collectively, and the crops were divided in proportion to the size of the plots owned by each member of the association. Draught animals and implements were owned individually but used jointly. Taxes were paid individually.

2. The agricultural productive cooperative. All plots owned by the members were tilled together. But they had to transfer to the cooperative horses, carts, cattle, except for two cows which they retained for their personal use. Each member also retained exclusive personal use of a small adjacent plot surrounding his cottage. A member had to work an annual minimum of 100 labor-days. The net income of the cooperative was divided as follows: 30 to 40 percent according to the initial contributions in land, livestock, and implements; the remaining 60 to 70 percent according to the labor-days earned by each member.

3. The agricultural cooperative team. This differed from the preceding cooperative in one respect: the entire net income was distributed according to the labor-days earned by each member of the team.

4. The agricultural cooperative union. The members retained the title of ownership, but they cultivated the land collectively. They did not consolidate their draught animals and implements but let the cooperative use them against a daily compensation. Of the net income 20 percent was distributed according to their contributions in land and 80 percent according to the labor-days earned.⁵⁷

None of the four types of agricultural cooperatives was identical with the Soviet collective farm. But all of them familiarized the peasants in the satellite countries with the concept of collective farming. Three types introduced the notion of the labor-day as a basis for the distribution of the collective income. The collective farm of Soviet type was the final culmination of the process.

The means used to "persuade" the peasants to join the cooperatives "voluntarily" were similar to those used in the Soviet Union: dis-

criminatorary taxation, easier State credits, and greater availability of the services of the M.T.S. The Communist Parties at their solemn meeting in Moscow in November, 1957, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, reaffirmed their conviction that collective farming was an indispensable feature of the socialist system.

NOTES

1. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
2. I. L. Braude *et al.*, *Zemel'noe Pravo*, p. 205.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 205-206.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
7. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 293.
8. Quoted in I. L. Braude *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 207.
9. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 307.
10. J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Foreign Languages Publishing House (Moscow, 1949), p. 461.
11. *Ugolovnyi Kodeks*, Ministry of Justice of the RSFSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 106.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
13. A. A. Gertsenzon *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 348ff.
14. J. Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma*, 11th edition, p. 393.
15. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 274.
16. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 284.
17. I. L. Braude *et al.*, *Zemel'noe Pravo*, p. 222.
18. *Loc. cit.*
19. The text of the Standard Charter is reproduced in *Izvestiia*, February 18, 1935.
20. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 336.
21. *Izvestiia*, February 18, 1935.
22. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
23. I. L. Braude *et al.*, *Zemel'noe Pravo*, p. 192.
24. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
26. V. I. Serebrovskii, Z. I. Shkundin, and M. V. Zimeleva, *Grazhdanskoe Pravo*, 3rd edition, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1947), p. 132.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
28. I. L. Braude *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-229.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 229.
30. V. I. Serebrovskii, Z. I. Shkundin, and M. V. Zimeleva, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
33. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 341.
34. I. Glotov, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
35. *Loc. cit.*

36. I. L. Braude *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
38. J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, p. 566.
39. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
40. N. D. Kazantsev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 166.
41. V. K. Grigoriev *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 281.
42. J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, p. 645.
43. I. I. Evtikhiiev and V. A. Vlassov, *Administrativnoe Pravo SSSR*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1946), p. 214.
44. S. S. Studenikin, *Sovetskoe Administrativnoe Pravo*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 200.
45. A. A. Gertsenzon *et al.*, *Ugolovnoe Pravo*, p. 235.
46. J. Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma*, 11th edition, p. 332.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 469.
48. S. S. Sergeev, *Organizatsionnoe—khoziaistvennoe ukrepleniie kolkhozov i ukrupleniie melkikh sel'skokhoziaistvennykh artelei*, State Publishing House of Agricultural Literature (Moscow, 1950), pp. 119-120.
49. *Pravda*, October 6, 1952.
50. S. S. Sergrev, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
52. *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.
53. N. Beliaev, "Podgotovka i vospitaniie predsedatelei kolkhozov," in *Bol'shevik*, No. 5, March, 1951, p. 65.
54. Quoted in V. K. Grigoriev, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
55. N. P. Farberov, *Gosudarstvennoe Pravo Stran Narodnoi Demokratii*, All-Union Institute of Juristic Sciences of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Moscow, 1949), p. 53.
56. N. D. Kazantsev, "Zemel'nye Reformy i Puti Preobrazovaniia Sel'skovo Khoziaistva v Stranakh Narodnoi Demokratii Tsentral'noi i Yugo-Vostochnoi Evropy," in *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Otdeleniie Ekonomiki i Prava*, No. 4, July-August 1950, Moscow, p. 257.
57. Franciszek Longchamps, "Rolnicze Spółdzielnie Produkcyjne w Systemie Prawa Polskiego," in *Panstwo i Prawo*, Nos. 8-9 (Warsaw, 1951), pp. 241-243.

Part Five: Conclusion

EVALUATION OF THE POST-STALINIST REGIME

TEN YEARS after Stalin's death, one can legitimately ask to what extent the present Soviet regime differs from the one known in his days. Like any other human venture, the political structure of every society cannot remain exactly the same forever, but only a revolution can change the basic nature of a social regime. There has been no revolution in the Soviet Union, and so the regime has remained basically the same; several reforms, however, have taken place.

There is no better way of comparing the Stalinist and post-Stalinist regimes than to recall the basic features of the Stalinist regime and to ask whether they have disappeared during the last ten years.

1. The Stalinist regime was founded on Lenin's elitist concept of society. Denying that all men had a comparable amount of political capability, Lenin believed that only certain people were able to discern the great historical trends and to discover the best road toward the advancement of human interests. These people, both knowledgeable and politically alert, were to form the leading social group, the Party. They should not attempt to follow the aspirations of the masses, but rather should guide the masses according to their own understanding of what was best for the people. Lenin contrasted the long-term interests of the people, which only a political elite could discover, to the short-term interests visible to the masses. It would be wrong, he thought, for the Party to sacrifice these long-term interests in order to please the masses by catering to their short-term desires. For him the just government was that *for* the people, but not that *of* the people. Hence the monopoly of power in the hands of a single Party was a logical conclusion.

The same elitist view led Lenin to a hierarchical concept of the Party itself. If political capability was very unevenly distributed among human beings, the same must be true of the Party itself. It was natural that the formulation of policies should be concentrated in the hands of the top leaders (the best), while the rank-and-file members should be confined to the role of implementing agents and channels of communication with the non-Party masses.

Stalin did not distort this elitist image, but rather developed its interpretation to the ultimate. The Soviet society was molded according to this elitist concept. The base was formed by the masses of non-Party citizens required only to accept in complete faith the policies formulated by the elitist Party which always represented a small percentage of the total population. The ordinary citizens were left with the doubtful pleasure of a passive participation in politics through the noncompetitive, one-slate and quasi-unanimous elections. The elitist concept, applied to the Party, resulted in a hierarchical order in the shape of a pyramid, the base of which was formed by the rank-and-file members who actually had as little say in the formulation of policies as ordinary citizens. The Party machine, composed of paid Party functionaries, was the main implementing agency. The highest Party hierarchy played an advisory role in its capacity of the Central Committee or its Political Bureau (Presidium). But the hierarchical-elitist concept led Stalin eventually to draw the ultimate conclusion, namely to reserve the power of final decision to the supreme leader, himself. The monopoly of political power required its logical complement, the claim to an infallible wisdom, because only an infallible leader could have the moral right to an indivisible power. The cult of Stalin was not his personal whim, but a logical consequence of the elitist concept. Only its absurd manifestations could be ascribed to his Oriental taste.

The post-Stalinist regime remains faithful to the same philosophy of society. The Communist Party is still the only political organization, and it brooks no legal opposition. The ordinary citizen continues to perform the same social functions: to implement Party policies specifically by his efficient work, and to voice his support in one-slate elections. It suffices to glance at the electoral returns during the years 1953-63 with their almost unanimous support for the Party-sponsored candidates, to see that this electoral pattern has been visible on all levels, from the federal Supreme Soviet down to the elections of people's judges and local soviets; there are many other evidences that the regime's basic requirement of unanimity with Party decisions has remained unaltered, for example, the never-ending succession of resolutions adopted by Soviet public organizations and public meetings, all of them infallibly supporting the already adopted Party policies and "enthusiastically" promising more and better work for the State, and the lack of any dissenting note in the Soviet press.

A new feature is the encouragement given to ordinary citizens to become activists and to participate in the various mushrooming committees for all sorts of public activities. The compulsory rotation,

ordered by the 22nd Congress, in the composition of Party, trade-union and Komsomol committees as well as committees of the Soviets and the Soviets themselves, also brings about a much wider participation of rank-and-file citizens in the public life of the country. This might consolidate the regime by giving to the ordinary citizen the feeling of being somebody, while he knew only too well that under Stalin he was treated as a nonentity. He is asked to help in devising the best means of implementing Party policies, although he continues to be debarred from any influence on their formulation. He probably feels that this is an improvement in his social importance.

The rank-and-file Party members are now encouraged to participate more actively in the meetings of their organizations. This means that their opinions are now welcome insofar as the best local means of implementing Party policies are concerned. It is also a practical procedure for stimulating the local Party functionary and forcing him to perform better by being subject to suggestions and possibly criticism on the part of other members of the local Party organization. However, it does not mean that either the local secretary or his fellow Party members have any influence on the decisions of the top Party leadership.

The Party has remained a closed organization with its door open only to the carefully selected "best." Its membership in 1961 has reached 10 million in a total population of 220 million (just below 5 percent). Membership is now more widely open to workers and peasants in order to establish better channels of communication with all social classes, but the truly important man, the Party functionary, continues to be recruited from among the intelligentsia.

One could wonder during the years 1953-57 whether the concept of supreme collective leadership could be reconciled with the hierarchical-elitist basis of the Party and Soviet society. The purge of the "anti-Party" group in June of 1957 and of Marshal Zhukov in the fall of the same year reestablished the logical pattern. There is no doubt that the quarrel between Khrushchev and his followers, on the one hand, and the "anti-Party group," on the other, concerned the merits of policies sponsored by Khrushchev, but the other vital problem was who should have the last word about the formulation of any policies. This contest was solved in favor of Khrushchev. If it were the other way round, Khrushchev and his supporters today would be just as violently denounced by Malenkov as the enemies of the Party. The elitist principle triumphed over collective leadership. The Party affirmed once again that it was not a debating club which could tolerate any legal opposition even within itself. The Presidium of the

time ranged itself in a crushing majority against Khrushchev and was defeated by the Central Committee. This fact points to the increased significance of the Central Committee which had been a rubber stamp in the later part of Stalin's life.

There is no doubt now who is the leader. As a matter of fact, there are increasing signs of a new cult of personality being built for Khrushchev. It is an irony of history that this cult is revived for the benefit of a man who had denounced so violently, in his secret speech of February 1956, and again in his interventions at the 22nd Congress in 1961, Stalin's cult and its grim consequences. The whole atmosphere of the 21st and 22nd Party Congresses was filled with the adulation of the new leader hailed as the author of all post-Stalinist policies and as a great theorist of Marxism-Leninism. As it did previously for Stalin, the Soviet press mentions his name daily, without fail. Khrushchev, however, prefers the image of a popular leader close to his people; his cult has nothing of the Stalinist pomp which made Stalin a distant demi-god. The present cult aims at making people feel that their leader is one of them, though an incomparably superior genius. Hence the absurdities of Stalin's cult are absent, but the naked fact remains that the supreme power is vested in one man. Of course, the supreme power of ultimate decision calls for consultation; the advice is probably tendered by a great many people, not only experts but also the highest politicians on the Presidium and the Central Committee.

2. The elitist structure was supported in Stalin's time by various devices: the monopoly on education and all the media of information, regimentation of all thought, and State coercion. A new development is a lesser reliance on the spell of fear which Stalin had generated through his mass purges. This spell paralyzed the citizen. After the arrest of Beria and the curtailment of the exorbitant police powers, the regime began to rely more on the political loyalty of the citizen rather than on his unmitigated fear. This loyalty is hedged by several guarantees. He has no access to free information, and his mind is constantly bombarded by the governmental propaganda channeled to him by all existing organizations, public meetings, radio, television, the press, school, and Party and Komsomol members. He can hardly know anything but what the Party wants him to know. His individual freedoms serve as before as the means of approving Party policy. Any deviation is met either by skillfully organized criticism by his own neighbors and colleagues or, in more serious cases, by judicial prosecution, the courts having at their disposal criminal codes of utmost severity for the political nonconformist. But the average citizen

is usually everywhere politically reliable. He might become disloyal if he knows that he may be penalized without cause, which was the risk of Stalin's policy of sowing the seeds of indiscriminate fear. Understanding this, Stalin's successors offered the loyal citizen a minimum of legal security. The repeal in 1953 of the powers of the Ministry of the Interior to arrest and exile or confine any person held to be socially dangerous permitted the innocent citizen to sleep at night without the ever-present risk of being awakened by the police and shipped away without trial to a forced labor camp. He feels secure. His release from anxiety not only encourages his loyalty, but also raises his labor productivity.

The system of coercion, with its Committee of State Security, prisons and correctional labor camps, severe criminal legislation, and courts no less severe when it comes to offenses against the State, continues to exist. But it threatens the individual only if he actually commits an offense.

The suspension of the former arbitrary powers of the Ministry of the Interior is not the only sign of this post-Stalinist desire to give the loyal citizen a feeling of security. The amnesties which had released very large numbers of correctional labor camp inmates (most of whom were interned there for no apparent or for a trifling reason), the elimination of the concept of crime by analogy, a more precise definition of crimes against the State given in the recent reform of legislation, point in the same direction.

It would be misleading, however, to forget the new arbitrary and nonjudicial procedure for exiling people and condemning them to correctional labor. The assemblies of neighbors, who have the right to arraign any man accused of being lazy or having an unearned income and to apply to him severe penalties without any supervision by courts, certainly do not increase the feeling of legal security among the citizens. The powers of these assemblies, which the Party can manipulate so easily and which can ship away any man or woman to forced labor in exile, are as arbitrary as those which the Ministry of the Interior formerly held.

3. Another feature of the Stalinist regime was the Party line as a binding rule for all thoughts and actions of Soviet citizens. This feature has not been altered at all. The Party line defined by the top leadership remains the supreme law. The social scientist, the writer, the painter, the sculptor, the composer, and the ordinary citizen are intellectually guided by the ruling politicians, not because the politicians prefer, for the time being, certain standards rather than others (for instance, their dislike for abstract plastic arts or modernistic mu-

sic), but because the *Party* standards are binding and all others are banned. If a Soviet painter were invited by a new *Party* line to abandon academic ways and to paint in an abstract manner, he would continue to be a servant because the choice would not be his own.

The *Party* line regarding literature, art, and music has so far remained basically the same as under Stalin, although a greater flexibility in its interpretation has been allowed at times.

4. Of course, the means of production are socialized. This gives the *Party* leaders enormous economic powers, added to their political monopoly. According to their wish, they regulate production, the amount of accumulation of capital for further investments, and the distribution of national income through the determination of prices and wages. The daily bread of every Soviet citizen depends as before on his Government. This is as true of a writer or a composer as of a factory worker or a peasant. This means of pressure is more effective than any State coercion.

5. The Stalinist preference for developing heavy industries is true today as before. Hence the Soviet economy continues to be unevenly developed. Measured by the yardstick of the Western industrially developed countries, it has not only achieved a quick development of industrial production but also a rate of development higher than the Western. This is counterbalanced by a slower progress in transportation, agriculture, and living standards, including housing.

Khrushchev's reforms—the decentralization of economic management and various changes pertaining to agriculture—have made Soviet economy more efficient and hence more productive.

6. Social stratification, fully developed during Stalin's long rule, remains the basic feature. The hierarchy of classes has not been altered. Depending on the State demand for each kind of labor and the cost of producing each type of manpower, Soviet citizens are divided into social classes by virtue of their education and incomes. The collective farmers remain as before at the bottom of the scale; the industrial workers come next; the intelligentsia, the new middle and upper classes, crown the pyramid.

However, social mobility has been increased by Stalin's successors. The elimination of fees for the upper grades of high school and for the university and the steady increase in available scholarships opened in principle the gates of higher education to every Soviet youngster. This is true despite the fact, often admitted by Khrushchev, that children of influential parents can somehow manage to have lesser difficulties than sons and daughters of ordinary citizens in being

admitted to the institutions of higher learning where the quota of openings is always limited.

While an able and industrious youngster can now reasonably hope that he will get his higher education diploma whatever his financial means, the State knows that it is able to tap all the talents for its upper and middle classes. There is no egalitarianism in the Soviet society, but there is now a basic equality of opportunity for youths insofar as their education and hence future careers are concerned.

7. The Stalin-sponsored Russian nationalism with its corollary, the relegation of other Soviet nationalities to a second-rank position, did not die with Stalin. As recently as January, 1959, the then top Party expert on nationalities, Mukhitdinov, a Russified Uzbek, reminded the 21st Party Congress of the current Party attitude. After humbly referring to the debt owed by other nationalities to "the mighty Russian people," he mentioned the progressing linguistic Russification: "All the peoples of our Fatherland respectfully and fondly use the Russian language which serves as a mighty means of communication among the peoples. . . . One should teach both local and Russian languages in Republican national schools." In 1956 he had gone even further, calling Russian the second "*native* language" of Soviet non-Russians.

Soviet sources indicate that the promotion of this second "native language" frequently ends in a situation where non-Russians, especially university educated, forget the language of their forebears. No doubt, Mukhitdinov realized that one of the greatest potential enemies of the regime was the nationalism of non-Russians, who are no less human beings than Asians and Africans and probably would prefer not be ruled at home by an alien nationality. Hence he warned of the necessity "of waging a tireless struggle against the remnants of nationalism and chauvinism which primarily manifest themselves in parochialism and in the revival in the consciousness of some people of harmful tendencies to place narrow national interests above general State interests." He detected a grave peril for the Russian-controlled Party in the tendency of other Soviet nationalities to hark to their historical past and seek inspiration in their distinctly national literature and arts: "National narrow-mindedness makes itself felt here and there in the field of literature, the arts, and historical science. Some individuals idealize, contrary to objective truth [the Party line], their feudal past [the pre-Soviet history of non-Russian nationalities]. . . . They do not pay sufficient attention to the . . . Soviet period of history. . . ."

The Party wants to limit the memories of non-Russians to the

postrevolutionary period and does not wish them to be reminded of the earlier time when they had been independent of Russian control. This would be excusable if the Russians were not at the same time constantly reminded of their own prerevolutionary history and encouraged to take a national pride in it. The national feelings of this non-Russian 40 percent of the Soviet population must continue to be alive if Mukhitdinov felt it necessary to call for "a constant and unremitting struggle against the remnants of the past, especially of nationalistic nature." Of course, he did not think that these statements for domestic consumption were in any way irreconcilable with his hailing, in the same speech, the Asian-African movement of national liberation. Yet the Soviet Union is itself a multinational Empire which, moreover, controls several quasi-colonial protectorates in Eastern Europe where it is imposing the Russian ways of life and fundamental values.

If one were to indulge in a most risky pastime and make a prediction, he would expect the Soviet Union to remain (excluding a revolution) a stratified society of unequal individuals ruled by the monopolistic Party, itself taking orders from its top leaders whatever their names will be in the future. Being an economically developed country with a huge industrial base, Russia will one day become an affluent society with living standards comparable to the Western. Its pace of advancement toward prosperity will be slowed down, however, by the armament race and by another, self-imposed race of surpassing the West in per-capita industrial production.

Nevertheless, a literate and prosperous society does not necessarily become a political democracy, as many people in the West hopefully expect. Nazi Germany was highly literate and was not threatened with starvation. The many centuries of absolutist regime, Tsarist and Communist, have not schooled the Soviet population in the operation of a political democracy and have failed to instill in this population the habits of thought without which no democracy may function.

Addendum: The Wage Reform

THE FULL EFFECT of the wage reform, carried out since 1956 at a slowly accelerated speed, became visible only in 1963. The reform was mainly caused by the growing influence of technological progress on the productivity of labor. New technological processes (automation is the best example) made the size of output dependent on the improvement in the technique of production rather than on the individual effort of each worker. The full and rational use of every technological improvement requires a concerted effort of the whole plant, shop, or brigade. Even if an individual worker is reasonably diligent and makes full use of technological facilities, he can by himself do little to increase the output in technically advanced industries.

The former system of wages, as described in Part Three, Chapter Two, was founded on the now obsolescent notion that the overall output of an enterprise depended on the individual efforts of its workers. Hence the piece rates and, even more, progressive piece rates were widely used in Soviet industries in order to offer that material incentive which was supposed to encourage the worker in overfulfilling his daily norm of output and thus making his individual contribution toward a larger output of his plant. Approximately 75 percent of all industrial workers were paid according to piece rates and about 40 percent according to progressive piece rates.

In actual practice the daily norms of output were frequently fixed at levels too low for the existing technological facilities. Workers were able to overfulfill their norms rather easily and increase thereby their basic wages by large supplements due to the piece-rate system of compensation. On the average the basic wages, paid for the fulfillment of the minimum norm, amounted a few years ago to one-half of the total monthly earnings (from 40 to 60 percent). The other half was made up of supplements for the overfulfillment of the norm and also of other bonuses and rewards such as for length of employment with the same enterprise or industry.

The main results of the wage reform, as they may be evaluated in 1963, are as follows:

1. The basic wages have been reestablished to their position of the main source of income of industrial workers. As the technological

processes of production are perfected in a given industry, the more its output depends on improvement in equipment, the larger is the transfer of workers from piece rates to time rates. At the present time about 60 percent of workers are still paid according to piece rates (a notable decline) and only 1 percent are compensated according to progressive piece rates. The percentage of piece-rate workers will continue to decline in step with the gradual improvement in the technology of production, i.e., with the increasing importance of the technological factor in the overall results.

The reform did not affect the existence of a difference in incomes between a piece worker and a time worker occupied in the same profession. This difference amounts now to from 10 to 15 percent. As long as the nature of production will allow for the survival of piece rates, this difference favoring the piece workers will continue.

The basic wages now represent no longer 40 to 60 percent of total monthly earnings but as much as 70 to 75 percent for piece workers and 80 to 85 percent for time workers.

The reduction in the relative weight of bonuses and supplements in the total earnings had to be compensated by a notable rise in the basic wages. Depending on the type of industry these basic wages were raised by from 50 to 100 percent. However, this rise was balanced by the simultaneous and sharp decrease in the supplements which used to be paid for the overfulfillment of the individual norm of output. The net result is a different composition of monthly earnings, but their total size has remained the same. The reform itself neither increased nor reduced the monthly earnings of industrial workers; only computation was altered. However, wages have been increasing, before and since the reform, by an annual rate of from 2 to 3 percent. This trend has been visible since 1947.

2. The wages of unskilled workers, for whom the minimum wage had been guaranteed since the middle 1950's, have been raised in the last few years from the former minimum of 27-35 new rubles up to 40-45 rubles per month. The monthly earnings of unskilled workers keep pace with the average earnings of collective farmers.

3. The workers continue to be divided into various categories of skills and of correspondingly different basic wages. The number of these categories varies from 6 to 10 depending on the type of industry. The wage differentials have been narrowed by the reform. Prior to it the highly skilled worker in the top category was earning basic wages 2.4 to 3.8 times larger than a worker belonging to the lowest category; now he earns 1.8 to 2 times more. This reduction in differentials reflects

the general improvement in the skills of Soviet workers and a lesser difference between the skills of various categories.

The average nominal monthly earnings of industrial workers amounted in 1963 to about 100 new rubles, basic wages and bonuses included. These earnings were supplemented by fringe benefits such as social insurance, low housing rent, free education for children, and various welfare services, including free medical assistance.

4. The worker continues to have the opportunity for increasing his earnings above the basic wages, but this opportunity gradually is related less to his overfulfillment of the individual norm of output and the effect of piece rates and more to the overall results in production of his plant, shop or brigade. The new bonuses are distributed for the achievements of the whole production unit (factory, shop, brigade) and in proportion to the basic wages and salaries of the employees. The worker receives a bonus of from 10 to 20 percent of his basic wages if his factory fulfills the plan of output. The percentage varies from one industry to another. The overfulfillment of the plan is recompensed by bonuses of from 1.0 to 2.0 percent of wages for each percent of overfulfillment. Bonuses for the improvement of the quality of production may amount up to 30 percent of basic wages. Other bonuses are paid for the savings on raw materials and fuel; all bonuses of this type, distributed to the employees of the plant or shop, may not exceed 40 percent of realized savings. Another upper ceiling limits the total amount of all bonuses; they may not exceed 30 to 40 percent, depending on type of industry, of the total sum of all basic wages and salaries paid to the employees of a given enterprise.

5. Individual norms of output have been increased to keep in step with improvements in equipment. They will continue to increase in proportion to the advances in technological processes of production.

6. The other differentials in wages remain. The wages are higher in the key (heavy) industries, in the occupations which are especially arduous or unhealthful, and in the remote areas where climate is harsh or which are only now being developed and suffer from the lack of amenities, including adequate housing accommodations. These wage differentials aim at attracting labor to occupations, industries, and areas of settlement where employees would not go of their own accord if the wages were the same as in other occupations, industries, or areas. Supplements for arduous or unhealthful occupations vary from 15 to 30 percent above the basic wages in comparable but less strenuous or less hazardous professions. Supplements for work in the remote areas vary from 10 to 30, 50 or even 70 percent of basic wages

in other parts of the country (the work in the Far North is recompensed by the maximum 70 percent increase in wages). Coal miners get 83 percent more than the average industrial wages, workers in nonferrous metal industries 29 percent more than the average, but workers in food-processing industries receive 24 percent less than the national average and textile workers 21 percent less. Wages continue to vary from industry to industry, light industries remaining the traditional Cinderella.

So far the incentive of higher wages has failed to produce the expected permanent settlement of distant areas of the Soviet Union. Employees are attracted for short periods of time by the prospect of higher wages and then go back a few years later to other parts of the country (i.e., mainly to European Russia) where existence is much more comfortable.

These migrations to and from the distant areas are part of the general picture of fluidity of labor. The high turnover of manpower confronts the government with the same grave and perennial problem which Stalin knew. Since his successors terminated in 1956 his "freezing" of all employees to their jobs and allowed the employees to give a two-week notice, they have been facing the problem in all its seriousness but have been unable to solve it.

7. The engineering-managerial staffs continue to be paid bonuses on top of their basic salaries. The present bonus system is calculated on the basis of the quarterly fulfillment or overfulfillment of the plan for the reduction of the cost of production. These bonuses are granted only if the other plans are carried out punctually and exactly. These other plans are: for total output, for quality and prescribed variety of production, for increase in labor productivity, and for regularly sending supplies to other enterprises and regions. In the key industries bonuses are paid for overfulfillment of the plan of production. Finally, the introduction of improved technological processes is rewarded by bonuses.

The main problem before the government is how to keep the rise in wages well below the rise in labor productivity. If the two curves were not separated by a wide margin, if the labor productivity were not increasing much faster than the cost of labor, the government would be short of sufficient means for financing capital investment (including agriculture), armaments, outer space exploration, general operations of the State administration, social welfare, and so forth. This problem has been aggravated by the shortening of worktime. One of the solutions is to maintain a careful balance between the rise in earnings of

State employees and the increase in welfare services supplied to them as well as between wages and the level of retail prices for consumer goods.

The total of State employees, including industrial workers, in 1963 reached 68 million.

Bibliography

I. SOVIET COLLECTIONS OF LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

- Albitskii, P. D. (ed.). *Sbornik Zakonodatel'nykh i Vedomstvennykh Aktov Po Sel'skomu Khoziaistvu Po Sostoiianiiu Na 1 Okt. 1957 g.* (Collection of Legislative and Administrative Acts on Agriculture as of October 1, 1957) Three vols. Moscow: 1957-58.
- Alekseev, T. D. (ed.). *Zhilishchnye Zakony: Sbornik Vazhneishikh Zakonov SSSR i RSFSR, Postanovlenii Instruktii i Prikazov Po Zhilishchnomu Khoziaistvu Po Sostoiianiiu na 1 Noiabria 1957 g.* (Housing Laws: Collection of the Most Important Laws of the USSR and the RSFSR, Decisions, Instructions and Decrees as of November 1, 1957) Moscow: 1958.
- Biulleten' Verkhovnogo Suda SSSR.* (Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the USSR).
- Bol'shakova, G. K. (ed.). *Ugolovno-Protsessual'noe Zakonodatel'stvo SSSR i Soiuznykh Respublik: Osnovnye Zakonodatel'nye Akty. Sbornik.* (Criminal Procedure Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics: Basic Legislative Acts. Collection) Moscow: 1957.
- Borisov, G. Ia. and Merkulova, V. I. *Pensionnoe Obespecheniie v SSSR: Sbornik Oftsial'nykh Materialov.* (Pension Social Insurance: Collection of Official Documents) Moscow: 1958.
- Gosudarstvennoe Sotsial'noe Strakhovanie: Sbornik Oftsial'nykh Materialov.* (State Social Insurance: Collection of Official Documents) Moscow: 1959.
- Karev, D. S. (ed.). *Sbornik Zakonodatel'nykh Aktov O Trude.* (Collection of Legislative Acts on Labor) Moscow: 1956.
- . *Ugolovnoe Zakonodatel'stvo SSSR i Soiuznykh Respublik: Sbornik—Osnovnye Zakonodatel'nye Akty.* (Criminal Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics: Collection of Basic Legislative Acts) Moscow: 1957.
- . *Ugolovno-Protsessual'noe Zakonodatel'stvo SSSR i Soiuznykh Respublik: Sbornik—Osnovnye Zakonodatel'nye Akty.* (Legislation on Criminal Procedure of the USSR and Union Republics: Collection of Basic Legislative Acts) Moscow: 1957.
- Kommunisticheskaia Partia Sovetskogo Soiuza v Rezoliutsiiakh i Resheniiakh S'ezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov TsK, 1898-1960.* (The C.P.S.U. in the Resolutions and Decisions of its Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Sessions of the C.C., 1898-1960) Four vols. Moscow: 1953-1960.
- Konstitutsiia (Osnovnoi Zakon) Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik.* (Constitution [Fundamental Law] of the USSR) Moscow: 1960.
- Konstitutsiia (Osnovnoi Zakon) SSSR. Konstitutsii (Osnovnye Zakony) Soiuznykh i Avtonomnykh Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik.* (Constitution [Fundamental Law] of the USSR. Constitutions [Fundamental Laws] of the Union and Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics) Moscow: 1960.
- KPSS O Rabote Sovetov: Sbornik Dokumentov.* (C.P.S.U. on the work of the Soviets: Collection of Documents) Moscow: 1959.

- Malinin, V. N. and Korobov, A. V. (eds.). *Direktivы KPSS i Sovetskovo Pravitel'stva Po Khoziaistvennym Voprosam, 1917-1957. Sbornik Dokumentov.* (Instructions of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government on Economic Problems, 1917-1957. Collection of Documents) Two vols. Moscow: 1957.
- Ministerstvo Iustitsii RSFSR. *Grazhdanskii Kodeks RSFSR.* (Civil Code of the RSFSR) Moscow: 1957.
- . *Kodeks Zakonov O Brake, Sem'ie i Opeke RSFSR.* (Code of Laws on Marriage, Family and Guardianship of the RSFSR) Moscow: 1957.
- Ministerstvo Sel'skovo Khoziaistva. *Upravlenie Organizatsii Truda i Zarobotnoi Platy: Oplata Truda v Sovkhozakh.* (Organization of Labor and Wages: Wages on State farms) Moscow: 1960.
- Partiia—Organizator Krutovo Pod'ioma Sel'skovo Khoziaistva SSSR: *Sbornik Dokumentov, 1953-1958.* (The Party, Organizer of the Sharp Rise in Agriculture of the USSR: Collection of Documents, 1953-1958) Moscow: 1958.
- Republican Statutes on the intensification of the struggle against antisocial and parasitic elements. Texts were published in:
- Uzbek SSR: *Pravda Vostoka*, April 26, 1957; statute enacted on May 29, 1957.
- Turkmenian SSR: *Turkmenskaia Iskra*, May 19, 1957; statute enacted on June 1, 1957.
- Latvian SSR: *Sovetskaia Latvia*, April 11, 1957; statute enacted on October 15, 1957.
- Tadjik SSR: *Kommunist Tadjikstana*, May 10, 1957; statute enacted on January 23, 1958.
- Kazakh SSR: *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, May 5, 1957; statute enacted on January 27, 1958.
- Armenian SSR: *Kommunist*, July 30, 1957; statute enacted on February 4, 1958.
- Azerbaijan SSR: *Bakinskii Rabochii*, April 17, 1957; statute enacted on June 18, 1958.
- Kirghiz SSR: *Sovetskaia Kirghiziia*, April 23, 1957; statute enacted on January 15, 1958.
- Sovetskaia Kirghiziia*, February 19, 1959, described the procedure followed in trying cases under the aforementioned statutes.
- English translation of the above statutes in: *Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe*, Vol. V, Nos. 9-10, September-October, 1957, pp. 405-409.
- Sakharova, I. M. (ed.). *Sbornik Zakonodatel'nykh Aktov o Trude.* (Collection of Legislative Acts on Labor) 2nd ed. Moscow: 1958.
- Sbornik Vazhneishikh Zakonov i Postanovlenii o Trude.* (Collection of the Most Important Laws and Decrees on Labor) Moscow: 1959.
- Sbornik Zakonodatel'nykh Aktov o Trude.* (Collection of Legislative Acts on Labor) 3rd ed. Moscow: 1960.
- Sbornik Zakonov i Ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1938-1956.* (Collection of Statutes and Edicts of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1938-1956) Moscow: 1956.
- Sobranie Postanovlenii Soveta Ministrov SSSR.* (Collection of Decrees of the Council of Ministers of the USSR)
- Spravochnik Partiinovo Rabotnika.* (Handbook of the Party Worker)
- Spravochnik Profsoiuznovo Rabotnika.* (Handbook of the Trade-Union Worker)

- Ugolovnyi Kodeks RSFSR* (Criminal Code of the RSFSR) Moscow: 1962.
- Ugolovno-Protsessual'nyi Kodeks RSFSR* (Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR) Moscow: 1962.
- Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR* (Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR)
- Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR)
- Vsesoiuznyi S'yezd Professional'nykh Soiuzov. *Ustav Professional'nykh Soiuzov SSSR*. (The Charter of Trade Unions of the USSR) Moscow: 1959.
- Zheleznov, B. I. and Marfenin, V. S. (eds.). *Okhrana Truda: Sbornik Postanovlenii i Pravil*. (Protection of Labor: Collection of Decisions and Rules) Moscow: 1958.

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF SOVIET LAWS AND DOCUMENTS:

- Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957.
- Guliiow, L. (ed.). *Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress and the Reorganization After Stalin's Death*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1953.
- . *Current Soviet Policies II: The Documentary Record of the Twentieth Communist Party Congress*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1957.
- . *Current Soviet Policies III: The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary Twenty-First Communist Party Congress*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.
- . *Current Soviet Policies IV: The Documentary Record of the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962.
- Highlights of Current Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress.

II. SOVIET BOOKS

- Abramov, Fyodor. *One Day in the "New Life."* (Translated by David Floyd) New York: F. A. Praeger, 1963.
- Abramov, S. N., Chapurskii, V. P., and Shkundin, Z. I. *Grazhdanskii Protsess*. (Civil Procedure) Moscow: 1948.
- Abramov, S. N. and Grave, K. A. *Novoe Zakonodatel'stvo o Brake i Sem'ie*. (The new legislation on marriage and family) Moscow: 1947.
- Akademiia Nauk SSSR. *Ot Sotsialisticheskogo Gosudarstva k Kommunisticheskomu Obshchestvennomu Samoupravleniiu*. (From the Socialist State to the Communist Self-Administration) Moscow: 1961.
- Akademiia Pedagogicheskikh Nauk RSFSR. *Vospitateľnaia Rabota v Shkole-Internate*. (Educational Work at the Boarding Schools) Moscow: 1959.
- Albitskii, P. D. *Voprosy Obshchevo Nadzora v Praktike Sovetskoi Prokuratury*. (Problems of General Supervision in the Practice of Soviet Procurators) Moscow: 1956.
- Aleksandrov, N. G. *Osnovy Gosudarstva i Prava*. (Fundamentals of the Theory of State and Law) Moscow: 1960.
- . *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*. (Soviet Labor Law) 2nd ed. Moscow: 1959.
- . (ed.). *Trudovye Prava Rabochikh i Sluzhashchikh v SSSR; V Voprosakh i Otvetakh*. (Labor Rights of Workers and Employees in the USSR; Questions and Answers) Moscow: 1959.

- Aleksandrov, N. G., Astrakhan, E. I., Dogadov, V. M., Moskalenko, G. K., and Pasherstnik, A. E. *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*. (Soviet Labor Law) Moscow: 1949.
- Aleksandrov, N. G., Astrakhan, E. I., Goliakov, I. T., Karinskii, S. S., and Moskalenko, G. K. *Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude. Kommentarii k Zakonodatel'stvo o Trude SSSR i Kodeksu Zakonov o Trude RSFSR*. (Labor Legislation. Commentary on the Labor Legislation of the USSR and the Code of Labor Laws of the RSFSR) Moscow: 1947.
- Aleksandrov, N. G., Dogadov, V. M., Kaminskaia, P. D., and Pasherstnik, A. E. *Voprosy Trudovogo Prava*. (Problems of Labor Law) Moscow: 1948.
- Aleksandrov, N. G. and Moskalenko, G. K. *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo*. (Soviet Labor Law) 2nd edition. Moscow: 1947.
- Anashkin, G. Z. *Narodnye Zasedateli v Sovetskom Sude*. (People's Assessors in Soviet Courts) Moscow: 1960.
- Antimonov, B. S. and Fleishits, E. A. *Avtorskoe Pravo*. (Copyright Law) Moscow: 1957.
- Antimonov, B. S. and Grave, K. A. *Sovetskoe Nasledstvennoe Pravo*. (Soviet Inheritance Law) Moscow: 1955.
- Antonova, L. A. and Volkov, A. I. *Praktika Vneseniia Izmenenii v Ustavy Kolkhozov*. (The Practice of Amending Collective-farm Charters) Moscow: 1958.
- Arakelian, A. *Industrial Management in the USSR*. (Translated by E. L. Raymond) Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950.
- Arkhipov, L. K. (et al.) *Sovetskoe Grazhdanskoe Pravo*. (Soviet Civil Law) Moscow: 1959.
- Arzhanov, M. A., Kechekiyan, S. F., Mankovskii, B. S., and Strogovich, M. S. *Teoriia Gosudarstva i Prava*. (The Theory of State and Law) Moscow: 1949.
- Askarkhanov, S. S. *Trudovoe Zakonodatel'stvo. Spravochnik Narodnogo Sudii*. (Labor Legislation. Handbook of the People's Judge) Moscow: 1949.
- Askerov, A. A., Durmanov, N. D., Kareva, M. P., Kotok, V. F., Levin, I. D., and Trainin, I. P. *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvennoe Pravo*. (Soviet State Law) Moscow: 1948.
- Asknazii, S. I. *Zhilishchnoe Pravo*. (Housing Law) Moscow: 1956.
- Banchenko-Liubimova, K. S. *Peresmotr Sudebnykh Reshenii, Vozshedsikh o Zakonnuiu Silu, v Poriadke Nadzora*. (Review of Final Judgments in the Procedure of Audit) Moscow: 1959.
- Baryshev, M. I. *Zakonodatel'stvo Po Zhilishchnomu Stroitel'stvu*. (Housing Legislation) Moscow: 1960.
- Boldyrev, V. A. *Nauchno-Prakticheskii Kommentarii k Osnovam Ugolovno Sudoproizvodstva SSSR i Soiuznykh Respublik*. (Theoretical and Practical Commentary on the Principles of Criminal Judicial Proceedings in the USSR and in the Union Republics) Moscow: 1960.
- Borisov, G. Ia. (et al.) *Grazhdanskoe Protssessual'noe Zakonodatel'stvo SSSR i Soiuznykh Respublik*. (Civil Procedure Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics) Moscow: 1957.
- Borodin, S. V. *Vybornost' i Podotchetnost' Narodnogo Suda*. (Eligibility to and Responsibility of People's Courts) Moscow: 1957.
- Borodin, S. V. and Dobrovolskaia, T. N. *Verkhovnyi Sud Soiuznoi Respubliki*. (The Supreme Court of the Union Republic) Moscow: 1960.
- Braude, I. L. *Pravo na Stroenie i Sdelki po Stroeniam po Sovetskomu Pravu*.

- (Building Rights and Building Transactions according to Soviet Law) Moscow: 1950.
- . *Pravovye Voprosy Individual'nogo Zhilishchnogo Stroitel'stva*. (Legal Problems of Individual Housing Building) Moscow: 1957.
- Braude, I. L., Fuchs, S. L., Gurvich, M. A., Kazantsev, N. D., Nikitin, A. N., Polianskaia, G. H., Pavlov, I. V., and Ruskol, A. A. *Zemel'noe Pravo*. (Land Law) Moscow: 1949.
- Chistov, I. A., Lavrov, V. V., Liubimov, N. N., Raykher, V. K., Rovinskii, N. N., Sorkin, B. A., and Valler, D. B. *Finansovoe Pravo*. (Financial Law) Moscow: 1946.
- Danev, A. M. *Narodnoe Obrazovanie. Osnovnye Postanovleniia, Priказы i Instruktii*. (National Education. Basic Decisions, Decrees, and Instructions) Moscow: 1948.
- Deineko, M. M. *Forty Years of Public Education in the USSR; Facts and Figures*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957.
- Denisov, A. I. and Kirichenko, M. G. *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvennoe Pravo*. (Soviet Constitutional Law) (2nd ed.) Moscow: 1957.
- . *Soviet State Law*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960.
- Dobrovol'skaia, T. N. *Narodnyi Sud—Osnovnoe Zveno Sudebnoi Sistemy SSSR*. (People's Court—A Fundamental Link in the Court System of the USSR) Moscow: 1956.
- Dobrovolskii, A. A. *Uchastiie Organov Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniia v Grazhdanskom Protseesse*. (Participation of Organs of State Administration in Civil Proceedings) Moscow: 1959.
- Dronikov, V. K. *Nasledovanie po Zaveshchaniuu v Sovetskom Prave*. (Inheritance by Last Will in Soviet Law) Kiev: 1957.
- Dudinstsev, Vladimir. (Translated by Edith Bone) *Not by Bread Alone*. New York: Dutton, 1957.
- Durmanov, N. D. *Osvobozhdeniie ot Nakazaniia po Sovetskomu Pravu*. (Exemption from Punishment According to Soviet Law) Moscow: 1957.
- Durmanov, N. D., Khal'fin, R. O., Karass, A. V., Kotok, V. F., Levin, I. D., Kleiman, A. F., Kazantsev, N. D., Pasherstnik, A. E., Serebrovskii, V. I., and Strogovich, M. S. *Osnovy Sovetskogo Gosudarstva i Prava*. (Foundations of the Soviet State and Law) Moscow: 1947.
- Dvornikov, I. S. *Tovarishcheskie Sudy i Ikh Rol' v Borbe za Ukreplenie Trudovoi Disziplin*. (Comradely Courts and Their Role in the Struggle for Strengthening Labor Discipline) Moscow: 1956.
- Dvornikov, I. S. and Nikitskii, V. I. *Novyi Poriadok Rassmotreniia Trudovykh Sporov*. (New Procedure of Settlement of Labor Disputes) Moscow: 1957.
- Ehrenburg, I. G. *Ottepel'*. (The Thaw) Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel', 1954. *The Thaw* (English Translation by Manya Harari) Chicago: H. Regnery, 1955.
- Evtikhiev, I. I., and Vlassov, V. A. *Administrativnoe Pravo SSSR*. (Administrative Law of the USSR) Moscow: 1946.
- Farberov, N. P. *Gosudarstvennoe Pravo Stran Narodnoi Demokratii*. (State Law of the Countries of the People's Democracy) Moscow: 1949.
- Fedoseyev, A. S. *Osnovy Sovetskogo Gosudarstva i Prava*. (Fundamentals of Soviet State and Law) Moscow: 1958.
- Fundamentals of Soviet Criminal Legislation: The Judicial System and Criminal Court Procedure*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960.
- Gafurov, B. G. *Partiinoye Prosveshcheniie i Zhizn': Iz Opyta Partiinoi Propagandy*.

- (Party Education and Life: From the Experience of Party Propaganda) Moscow: 1959.
- Gavrilov, A. *Vnutripartiinaia Demokratiia v Bol'shevitskoi Partii*. (Inner Party Democracy of the Bolshevik Party) Moscow: 1951.
- Gaziants, L. I. *Spory o Stroieniakh Prinadlezhashchikh Grazhdanam Na Prave Lichnoi Sobstvennosti*. (Lawsuits Regarding Buildings Belonging to Citizens as Their Personal Property) Moscow: 1960.
- Gertsenzon, A. A., Goliakov, I. T., Menshagin, V. D., Osherovich, B. S., Utevkii, B. S., and Vyshinskaia, Z. A. *Ugolovnoe Pravo*. (Criminal Law) 2nd edition. Moscow: 1947.
- Gertsenzon, A. A., Issayev, M. M., Menshagin, V. D., Piontkovskii, A. A., and Utevkii, B. S. *Ugolovnoe Pravo. Obshchaia Chast'*. (Criminal Law. General Part) 4th edition. Moscow: 1948.
- Gertsenzon, A. A., Menshagin, V. D., Osherovich, B. S., and Piontkovskii, A. A. *Ugolovnoe Pravo. Osobennaia Chast'. Gosudarstvennye Prestupleniia*. (Criminal Law. Particular Part. Crimes against the State) Moscow: 1938.
- Gertsenzon, A. A. *Ob Osnovakh Ugolovnogo Zakonodatel'stva Soiuzu SSR i Soiuznykh Respublik*. (Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics) Moscow: 1959.
- Glebov, A. M. *Tablitsa po Ischisleniiu Podokhodnogo Naloga i Naloga na Kholostiakov i Malosemeinykh Grazhdan SSSR*. (Computation Table of the Income Tax and of the Tax on Bachelors and Childless or Small-Family Citizens) Moscow: 1955.
- Gol'dshtein, M. Iu. and Korotkov, V. S. *Otpuska Rabochikh i Sluzhashchikh v SSSR*. (Vacations of Workers and Employees in the USSR) Moscow: 1956.
- Goliakov, I. T. *Sovetskii Sud*. (The Soviet Court) Moscow: 1958.
- Golunskii, S. A., and Karev, D. S. *Sudoustroistvo SSSR*. (The Organization of the Courts of the USSR) Moscow: 1946.
- Golunskii, S. A. (ed.). *Voprosy Sudoproizvodstva i Sudoustroistva v Novom Zakonodatel'stve Soiuzu SSSR*. (Problems of Court Proceedings and Court Organization in the New Legislation of the USSR) Moscow: 1959.
- Goncharov, N. K. and Korolev, F. F. *Novaia Sistema Narodnogo Obrazovaniia v SSSR: Sbornik Dokumentov i Statei*. (The New System of National Education in the USSR: Collection of Documents and Articles) Moscow: 1960.
- Gorokhovskii, B. P. *Pensii po Invalidnosti po Zakonu o Gosudarstvennykh Pensiiakh*. (Disablement Pensions According to the Law on State Pensions) Moscow: 1957.
- Gorokhovskii, B. P. and Trefilov, I. M. *Pensionnoe Obezpecheniie v SSSR*. (Pensions in the USSR) Moscow: 1956.
- Gorshenin, K. P. *Sovetskii Sud*. (The Soviet Court) Moscow: 1957.
- Grigor'ev, V. K., Kazantsev, N. D., Pavlov, T. V., Piatnitskii, P. P., Ruskol, A. A., and Turubiner, A. M. *Kolkhoznoe Pravo*. (Collective Farm Law) Moscow: 1950.
- Grigor'ev, V. K. (et al.) *Zemel'noe i Kolkhoznoe Pravo*. (Land and Collective-farm Law) Moscow: 1957.
- Grobovenko, I. V. *Peresmotr Prigovorov, Vstupivshikh v Zakonnuiu Silu v Sovetskom Ugolovnom Protssesse*. (Review of Final Judgments in the Soviet Criminal Procedure) Moscow: 1956.
- Gubanov, N. L. *Otechestvo i Patriotizm* (Fatherland and Patriotism) Moscow: 1960.

- Gureev, P. P. *Sudebnoe Razbiratel'stvo Grazhdanskikh Del.* (Judicial Examination of Civil Lawsuits) Moscow: 1958.
- Gurin, L. E. *Voprosy Organizatsii Zarabotnoi Platy na Mashinostroitel'nykh Predpriyatiakh.* (Problems of the Organization of Wages on the Mechanical-Engineering Enterprises) Moscow: 1950.
- Iakovets, I. V. *Teoriia i Praktika Sotsialisticheskogo Obobshchestvleniia Zemli.* (The Theory and Practice of Socialist Appropriation of the Land) Moscow: 1960.
- Ioffe, O. S. *Sovetskoe Grazhdanskoe Pravo; Kurs Lektsii.* (Soviet Civil Law: Lectures) Leningrad: 1958.
- Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bol'shevikov). Kratkii Kurs.* (History of the All-Union Communist Party [Bolsheviks]. Short Course.) Moscow: 1938.
- Iudel'son, K. S. *Sovetskii Grazhdanskii Protsess.* (Soviet Civil Procedure) Moscow: 1956.
- Ivanov, N. K., Karpinskii, V. A., Mikhailov, N. N., Semenov, P. S., and Glezerman, G. E. *Besedy o Obshchestvennom i Gosudarstvennom Ustroistve SSSR.* (Talks on the Social and State Regime of the USSR) Moscow: 1948.
- Ivanov, N. M. *Ugolovnaia Otvetstvennost' za Khishcheniie Gosudarstvennogo i Obshchestvennogo Imushchestva.* (Criminal Responsibility for Plundering State and Public Property) Moscow: 1955.
- Kaftanov, S. *Vysshee Obrazovanie v SSSR.* (Higher Education in the USSR) Moscow: 1950.
- Kaftanovskaia, A. M. and Livshits, R. Z. *Disiplina Truda v SSSR.* (Labor Discipline in the USSR) Moscow: 1959.
- Kalinin, V. N. (et al.) *Sovetskie Ispravitel'no-Trudovye Uchrezhdeniia.* (Soviet Correctional Labor Institutions) Moscow: 1960.
- Karev, D. S. *Organizatsiia Suda i Prokuratury v SSSR.* (Organization of Courts and of the Procurator's Office in the USSR) Minsk: 1960.
- Karev, D. S. (ed.) *Sovetskii Ugolovnyi Protsess.* (Soviet Criminal Procedure) Moscow: 1956.
- Karev, D. S. *Sovetskoe Sudoustroistvo.* (Organization of the Soviet Courts) 2nd edition. Moscow: 1951.
- Kareva, M. P. (ed.) *Osnovy Sovetskogo Gosudarstva i Prava. Uchebnik.* (Fundamental Principles of the Soviet State and Law: Textbook) Moscow: State Publishing House of Juristic Literature, 1956.
- Kareva, M. P. (et al.) *Teoriia Gosudarstva i Prava.* (The Theory of State and Law) Moscow: 1955.
- Karpushin, M. P. *Sotsialisticheskoe Trudovoe Pravo-Otnosheniie.* (Socialist Labor Law Relations) Moscow: 1956.
- Kashirin, P. *Reaktsionnaia Sushchnost' Religioznoi Ideologii.* (The Reactionary Essence of Religious Ideology) Moscow: 1951.
- Kazantsev, N. D., Nikitin, A. N., Pavlov, A. P., Polianskaia, G. H., Ruskol, A. A., and Turubiner, A. M. *Kolkhoznoe Pravo.* (Collective Farm Law) Moscow: 1947.
- Kazantsev, N. D. (ed.). *Sovetskoe Zemel'noe i Kolkhoznoe Pravo.* (Soviet Land and Collective Farm Law) Moscow: 1959.
- Kazantsev, N. D. *Zemel'noe Pravo.* (Land Law) Moscow: 1958.
- Khal'fina, R. O. *Pravo Lichnoi Sobstvennosti Grazhdan SSSR.* (Law of Personal Property of Citizens of the USSR) Moscow: 1955.

- Kirichenko, V. F. *Otvetstvennost' za Dolzhnostnye Prestupleniia po Sovetskomu Ugolovnomu Pravu.* (Responsibility for Service Offenses According to Soviet Criminal Law) Moscow: 1956.
- Kleinman, A. F. *Sovetskii Grazhdanskii Protsess.* (Soviet Civil Procedure) Moscow: 1958.
- Kogan, M. L. *Biudzhetyne Prava Soiuznykh Respublik.* (Budgetary Rights of Union Republics) Moscow: 1960.
- Kolibab, K. E. *Zakliucheniie Braka, Otnosheniia Mezhu Suprugami, Pooshchreniie i Okhrana Materinstva, Raztorzheniie Braka, Priznanie Braka Nedeistvitel'nykh.* (Marriage, Relations Between the Spouses, Encouragement and Protection of Maternity, Divorce, Annulment of Marriage) Moscow: 1960.
- Kolotinskaia, E. N. *Pravo Lichnoi Sobstvennosti Kolkoznovo Dvora.* (Right to Personal Property of the Collective-farm Household) Moscow: 1957.
- Konnov, B. F. and Orlovskii, Iu. P. *Trudovye Prava i Obiazannosti Molodykh Rabochikh i Spetsialistov.* (Labor rights and duties of young workers and specialists) Moscow: 1959.
- Korotkov, V. S. and Gol'dshtein, L. I. *Chto Nuzhno Znat' Rabochim i Sluzhashchim o Trudovom Zakonodatel'stve.* (What Workers and Employees Should Know About Labor Legislation) Moscow: 1960.
- Kovalenko, E. I. *Prava i Obiazannosti Kolhoznovo Dvora i Evo Chlenov.* (Rights and Duties of the Collective-farm Household and Its Members) Molotov: 1957.
- Kovalev, S. O. *Natsionalnoi Gordosti Sovetskikh Liudei.* (National Pride of the Soviet People) Moscow: 1950.
- Kozyr, M. L. and Krasnov, N. I. *Pravovye Voprosy Dalneishevo Razvitiia Kolhoznovo Stroia v SSSR.* (Legal Problems of the Further Development of Collective Farming in the USSR) Moscow: 1960.
- Kozyreva, T. I. *Administrativnoe Prinuzhdeniie i Evo Vidy.* (Administrative Coercion and Its Forms) Moscow: 1957.
- Kravtsev, L. E. *Chto Takoe Otechestvo i Patriotizm.* (Fatherland and Patriotism) Moscow: 1960.
- Kravtsov, B. P. *Sovetskaia Izbiratel'naia Sistema.* (Soviet Electoral System) Moscow: 1958.
- Kruger, G. A. *Otvetstvennost' za Khishcheniie Gosudarstvennogo i Obshchehestvennogo Imushchestva po Sovetskomu Ugolovnomu Pravu.* (Responsibility for Plunder of State and Public Property According to Soviet Criminal Law) Moscow: 1957.
- Kto i v Kakom Poriadke Mozhet Nasledovat'.* (Who and in What Order May Inherit) Moscow: 1960.
- Kucheriavyi, N. P. *Otvetstvennost' za Vziatocnichestvo po Sovetskomu Ugolovnomu Pravu.* (Responsibility for Bribery According to Soviet Criminal Law) Moscow: 1957.
- Kudriavtsev, P. I. (ed.). *Iuridicheskii Slovar'.* (Juridical Dictionary) 2nd ed. Moscow: 1958.
- Kuznetsov, A. M. *Sovetskoe Trudovoe Pravo.* (Soviet Labor Law) Leningrad: 1959.
- Kuznetsova, N. F. *Otvetstvennost' za Prigotovleniie k Prestupleniiu i Pokusheniie na Prestupleniie po Sovetskomu Pravu.* (Responsibility for the Preparation of, and the Attempt at the Commission of, Crimes According to Soviet Law) Moscow: 1958.

- Lebedinskii, V. G. *Prokurorskii Nadzor v SSSR: Ocherki po Kursu*. (Supervision by State Procurators in the USSR: Outline of Lectures) Moscow: 1957.
- Leikina, N. S. *Otvetstvennost' za Prestupleniia Protiv Sovetskoi Torgovli*. (Responsibility for the Offenses Committed against the Soviet Trade) Moscow: 1956.
- Lenin, V. I. *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940.
- . *The State and Revolution*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949.
- Levant, P. M. *Normativnye Akty Reguliruiushchiie Trud Rabochikh i Sluzhashchikh* (Legislative Acts on Labor of Workers and Employees) Leningrad: 1960.
- Levin, A. M. and Ogner, P. A. *Zashchitnik v Sovetskom Sude*. (Defence Attorney in Soviet Courts) Moscow: 1960.
- Losev, P. M. and Ragulin, G. I. *Sbornik Normativnykh Aktov Po Sovetskomu Ispravitel'no-Trudovomu Pravu, 1917-1959 gg.* (Collection of Legislative Acts on Soviet Correctional Labor Law) Moscow: 1959.
- Mendel'son, G. A. *Otvetstvennost' za Proizvodstvo Nezakonno Aborta po Sovetskomu Ugolovnomu Pravu i v Svete Ukaza Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ot 23 Noiabria 1955 g. "Ob Otmene Zapreshcheniia Abortov."* (Responsibility for Illegal Abortion According to the Soviet Criminal Law and in the Light of the Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 23, 1955: "On the Abolition of the Prohibition of Abortion") Moscow: 1957.
- . *Ugolovnaia Otvetstvennost' za Melkoe Khishcheniie Gosudarstvennogo i Obshchestvennogo Imushchestva*. (Criminal Responsibility for Petty Thefts of State and Public Property) Moscow: 1957.
- Men'shagin, V. D. (et al.) *Sovetskoe Ugolovnoe Pravo, Chast' Osobennaiia*. (Soviet Criminal Law, Particular Part) Moscow: 1957.
- Min'kovskii, G. *Okonchaniie Predvaritel'nogo Rassledovaniia i Osushchestvleniie Prava Obviniamaemo na Zashchitu*. (Closure of Preliminary Investigation and the Carrying Out of the Accused's Right to Defense) Moscow: 1957.
- Movshovich, M. I. *Vyshshaia Shkola, Osnovnye Postanovleniia, Prikazy i Instruksii*. (Higher School. Basic Decisions Decrees and Instructions) 2nd edition. Moscow: 1948.
- Novitskii, I. V. (ed.) *Grazhdanskoe Zakonodatel'stvo SSSR i Soiuznykh Respublik*. (Civil Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics) Moscow: 1957.
- . *Sovetskoe Grazhdanskoe Pravo*. (Soviet Civil Law) Moscow: 1959.
- Oridoroga, M. T. *Rastorzheniie Braka; po Materialam Sudebnoi Praktiki Ukrain-skoi SSR*. (Dissolution of Marriage According to the Judicial Practice in the Ukrainian SSR) Moscow: 1958.
- Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma*. (Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism) Moscow: 1959.
- Pankratova, A. M. *Istoriia SSSR*. (History of the USSR) Moscow: Vol. I, 1950, Vol. II, 1947.
- Panova, N. S. *Roditeliam Ob Oktobriatakh*. (To Parents on the Little Octobrists) Moscow: 1960.
- . *Oktobriata: Dlia Vozzhatykh Oktobriatskikh Grupp*. (Little Octobrists: For the Leaders of the Little Octobrists' Groups) Moscow: 1959.
- Pasherstnik, A. E. *Pravo na Trud*. (Right to Work) Moscow: 1951.
- . *Pravoye Voprosy Voznagrazhdeniia Za Trud Rabochikh i Sluzhashchikh*.

- (Legal Problems of Remuneration for Work of Workers and Officials) Moscow: 1949.
- Pavlov, I. V. *Kolkhoznoe Pravo*. (Collective Farm Law) Moscow: 1960.
- Pavlov, I. V. and Bakhovkina, L. N. *Pravo Kolkhoznoi Sobstvennosti v SSSR*. (Right of Collective-farm Ownership in the USSR) Moscow: 1957.
- Plotnikov, K. N. *Budzhët Sotsialisticheskogo Gosudarstva*. (Budget of the Socialist State) Moscow: 1948.
- Pokrovsky, M. N. *Brief History of Russia*. New York: International Publishers, 1933.
- Ponomarev, B. N. (ed.) *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960.
- . *Politicheskii Slovar'* (Political Dictionary) Moscow: 1958.
- Pribluda, A. S. *Kompetentsiia Sovnarkhoza i Evo Otrastel'nykh Upravlenii*. (The Jurisdiction of the Council of National Economy and of Its Departmental Agencies) Moscow: 1960.
- Radkov, V. P. *Sotsialisticheskaiia Zakonnost' v Sovetskom Ugolovnom Protsesse*. (Socialist Legality in Soviet Criminal Procedure) Moscow: 1959.
- Raikher, V. K. *Pravovye Voprosy Dogovornoï Diszipliny v SSSR*. (Legal Problems of Contract Discipline in the USSR) Moscow: 1958.
- Riakin, M. N. *Dva Goda Raboty Shkol-Internatov*. (Two Years of Work at the Boarding Schools) Moscow: 1959.
- Rivlin, A. L. *Peresmotr Prigovorov v SSSR*. (Review of Judgments in the USSR) Moscow: 1958.
- Romashkin, P. S. *Fundamentals of Soviet Law*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961.
- Rozofarov, M. S. *Trudovye Rezervy SSSR. Sbornik Oftsial'nykh Materialov*. (Labor Reserves of the USSR. Collection of Official Materials) Moscow: 1950.
- Savitskii, V. M. *Prokurorskii Nadzor Za Sobliudeniem Zakonnosti v Deiatel'nosti Organov Doznaniia i Predvaritel'nogo Sledstviia*. (The Procurator's Supervision Over the Legality of Activities of Agencies of Enquiry and of Preliminary Investigation) Moscow: 1959.
- Serebrovskii, V. I., Shkundin, Z. I., and Zimeleva, M. V. *Grazhdanskoe Pravo*. (Civil Law) 3rd edition. Moscow: 1947.
- Sergeev, S. S. *Organizatsionnoe-Khoziaistvennoe Ukrepleniie Kolhozov i Ukrepleniie Melkikh Selsko-Khoziaistvennykh Artelei*. (The Organizational and Economic Strengthening of the Collective Farms, and the Consolidation of Small Rural-Economic Artsels) Moscow: 1950.
- Sheinin, L. R. (Translated by George H. Hanna) *People's Courts in the USSR*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957.
- Shifman, M. L. *Predaniie Sudu v Sovetskom Ugolovnom Protsesse*. (Commitment for Trial in Soviet Criminal Procedure) Moscow: 1957.
- Smirnov, A. V. *Poriadok Otvoda Zemel'nykh Uchastkov Rabochim i Sluzhashchim v Sel'skoi Mestnosti*. (Procedure of Alloting Plots of Land to Workers and Employees in Rural Localities) Moscow: 1957.
- Solodkin, I. I. *Kontrevoliutsionnye i Voinskiie Prestupleniia*. (Counter-revolutionary and Military Crimes) Leningrad: 1956.
- Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I. *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*. (Translated by Ralph Parker) New York: Dutton, 1963.
- Sorok *Let Sovetskogo Prava* (Forty Years of Soviet Law) Leningrad: 1957.

- Sovetskoe Uголовnoe Pravo: Chast' Obshchaia.* (Soviet Criminal Law: General Part) Leningrad: 1960.
- Spravochnik Sekretariia Pervichnoi Partiinoi Organizatsii.* (Handbook for the Secretary of the Party Primary Organization) Moscow: 1960.
- Stalin, J. *Problems of Leninism.* Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940.
- . *Rech'i na Predvybornykh Sobraniiaakh Izbiratelei Stalinskovo Izbiratel'novo Okruga g. Moskvy.* (Speeches at the Pre-Electoral Meetings of the Electors of the Stalin Electoral Constituency of the City of Moscow) Moscow: 1950.
- . *Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the XVIIIth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bo!sheviks).* Delivered March 10, 1939. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1939.
- Starovoitov, N. G. *Poriadok Vyborov v Mestnye Sovety.* (Procedure of Elections to the Local Soviets) Moscow: 1957.
- Strogovich, M. S. *Kurs Sovetskogo Uголовnogo Protsessa.* (Lectures on the Soviet Criminal Procedure) Moscow: 1958.
- . *Uголовnii Protsess.* (Criminal Procedure) Moscow: 1946.
- Studenikin, S. S. (ed.) *Istoriia Sovetskoi Konstitutsii (v Dokumentakh), 1917-1956.* (History of the Soviet Constitution [Documents], 1917-1956) Moscow: 1957.
- Studenikin, S. S. *Sovetskoe Administrativnoe Pravo.* (Soviet Administrative Law) Moscow: 1949.
- Surov, S. V. *Svoiei Respubliki Storozha: Budni Dobrovol'nykh Narodnykh Druzhin Po Okhranie Obshchestvennogo Poriadka.* (The Sentinels of Their Republic: Weekdays of the Volunteer People's Brigades for the Protection of Public Order) Moscow: 1960.
- Sverdlov, G. M. *Sovetskoe Semeinoe Pravo.* (Soviet Family Law) Moscow: 1958.
- Tadevosian, V. S. *Prokurorskii Nadzor v SSSR.* (Supervision by Procurators in the USSR) Moscow: 1956.
- Tolstoi, Iu. K. *Zhilishchnye Prava i Obiazannosti Grazhdan SSSR.* (Housing Rights and Duties of Citizens of the USSR) Moscow: 1960.
- Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravleniie. *Uroven' Obrazovaniia, Natsional'nyi Sostav, Vozrastaniia Struktura i Rozmeshcheniie Naseleniia SSSR Po Respublikam, Kraiam i Oblastiam Po Dannym Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1959 Goda.* (Educational Levels, National Composition, Age Structure and Distribution of Population of the USSR by Republics, Territories and Regions, According to the All-Union Population Census of 1959) Moscow: 1960.
- Tumanov, P. V. *Poriadok Organizatsii i Provedeniia Vyborov v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR.* (Procedure of Organizing and Holding Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR) Moscow: 1958.
- Turubiner, A. M. *Pravo Gosudarstvennoi Sobstvennosti Na Zemliu v Sovetskom Soiuze.* (The Right of State Ownership of Land in the Soviet Union) Moscow: 1958.
- Umanskii, Ia. N. *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvennoe Pravo.* (Soviet State Law) Moscow: 1960.
- Utevskaia, B. S. *Uголовnoe Pravo. Biblioteka Narodnogo Sudii.* (Criminal Law. The Library of the People's Judge) 2nd edition. Moscow: 1950.
- Vaisfeld, L. D. and Karavaev, V. V. *Zakonodatel'stvo o Gosudarstvennykh Pensiiakh.* (Legislation on State Pensions) Moscow: 1959.

- Vassil'ev, A. N. (et al.) *Planirovanie Rassledovaniia Prestuplenii*. (Planning of Crime Investigations) Moscow: 1957.
- Vassil'ev, N. V. *Sotsialisticheskoe Sel'skoe Khoziaistvo na Putiakh k Izobiliiu Produktov*. (Socialist Rural Economy on the Road toward the Abundance of Products) Moscow: 1951.
- Vlassov, V. A. *Osnovy Sovetskogo Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniia*. (Fundamentals of Soviet State Administration) Moscow: 1960.
- . *Sovetskii Gosudarstvennyi Apparat*. (Soviet State Apparatus) Moscow: 1959.
- Vlassov, V. A. and Studenikin, S. S. *Sovetskoe Administrativnoe Pravo*. (Soviet Administrative Law) Revised ed. Moscow: 1959.
- Voilenko, E. I. (et al.) *Vysshaia Shkola. Osnovnye Postanovleniia, Prikazy i Instruksii*. (Higher School: Basic Decisions, Decrees and Instructions) Moscow: 1957.
- Vovk, Iu. A. *Pravo Priusadebnovo Zemlepol'zovaniia Kolkhoznovo Dvora*. (The Right of the Collective Farm Households to the Use of the Adjoining Plot of Land) Moscow: 1957.
- Vsesoiuznyi Iuridicheskii Zaonnyi Institut. *Sovetskoe Uголовnoe Pravo: Chast' Osobennaia*. (Soviet Criminal Law: Particular Part) Moscow: 1960.
- Vsesoiuznyi Leninskii Kommunisticheskii Soiuz Molodezhi. *Sbornik Dokumentov o Rabote Vsesoiuznoi Pionerskoi Organizatsii Imeni V. I. Lenina*. (Collection of Documents on the Activities of the All-Union V. I. Lenin Pioneer Organization) Moscow: 1958.
- Vsesoiuznyi Tsentral'nyi Sovet Professional'nykh Soiuzov. *Kratkii Spravochnik po Gosudarstvennomu Sotsial'nomu Strakhovaniiu*. (Concise Handbook on State Social Insurance) Moscow: 1957.
- Vyshinskaia, Z. A. *Ob Uголовnoi Otvetstvennosti za Khishchenie Gosudarstvennogo i Obshchestvennogo Imushchestva*. (Criminal Responsibility for Plundering State and Public Property) Moscow: 1948.
- Vyshinskaia, Z. A. *Prestupleniia v Oblasti Trudovykh Otnoshenii*. (Offenses in Labor Relations) Moscow: 1949.
- Vyshinskii, Andrei Ya. *Ucheniie Lenina-Stalina o Proletarskoi Revolutsii i Gosudarstve*. (Teachings of Lenin and Stalin on the Proletarian Revolution and State) Moscow: 1947.
- . *Voprosy Gosudarstva i Prava*. (Problems of State and Law) Moscow: 1949.
- Vyshinsky, Andrei Y. *The Law of the Soviet State*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1948.
- Zamiatina, K. G. *Prava i Obiazannosti Chlenov Sem'i*. (Rights and Duties of Family Members) Molotov: Molotov Book Publishing House, 1957.
- Zapisnaia Knizhka Partiinovo Aktivista*. (Notebook of a Party Activist) Moscow: 1960.

III. SOVIET NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS OF SPECIAL INTEREST FOR STUDENTS OF THE SOVIET REGIME:

A. NEWSPAPERS:

Izvestiia

Komsomol'skaia Pravda

Krasnaia Zvezda
Pravda
Trud

B. PERIODICALS:

Bloknot Agitatora
Ekonomiia Sel'skovo Khoziaistva
Kolkhoznoe Proizvodstvo
Kommunist (formerly *Bol'shevik*)
Literaturnaia Gazeta
Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn'
Molodaia Gvardiia
Molodoi Kommunist
Narodnoe Obrazovaniie
Novyi Mir
Oktiabr'
Partiinaia Zhizn'
Pionerskaia Pravda
Planovoe Khoziaistvo
Sotsialisticheskaia Zakonnost'
Sovetskaia Iustitsiia
Sovetskaia Pedagogika
Sovetskie Profsoiuzy
Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo
Uchitel'skaia Gazeta
Voprosy Ekonomiki
Voprosy Filosofii
Voprosy Istorii
Voprosy Literatury

IV. BOOKS IN ENGLISH ON THE SOVIET REGIME
AND RELATED SUBJECTS

- Armstrong, John A. *Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1962.
- . *The Politics of Totalitarianism: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the Present*. New York: Random House, 1961.
- . *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1959.
- Barghoorn, Frederick C. *The Soviet Image of the United States*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950.
- . *Soviet Russian Nationalism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Bauer, Raymond A. *The New Man in Soviet Psychology*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952.
- Baykov, Alexander. *The Development of the Soviet Economic System*. New York: Macmillan, 1946.
- Beck, F. and Godin, W. *Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confessions*. New York: Viking Press, 1951.
- Berdyaev, Nicholas A. *The Russian Idea*. New York: Macmillan, 1948.
- Bereday, George Z. F. (ed.). *The Changing Soviet School*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960.

- Bereday, George Z. F. and Pennar, J. *The Politics of Soviet Education*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1960.
- Bergson, Abram. (ed.) *Soviet Economic Growth*. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, and Company, 1953.
- Berliner, J. S. *Factory and Manager in the USSR*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.
- Berman, Harold J. *Justice in Russia: An Interpretation of Soviet Law*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.
- Black, Cyril E. (ed.) *Rewriting Russian History; Soviet Interpretations of Russia's Past*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1956.
- . *The Transformation of Russian Society*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.
- Blake, Patricia and Hayward, Max. *Dissonant Voices in Soviet Literature*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1962.
- Borkenau, Franz. *European Communism*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953.
- Brzezinski, Z. K. *The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956.
- Carew, Hunt, R. N. *The Theory and Practice of Communism*. New York: Macmillan, 1958.
- Caroe, Sir Olaf. *Soviet Empire; the Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*. London: St. Martin's, 1954.
- Carr, E. H. *Studies in Revolution*. London: Macmillan, 1950.
- Columbia University, Russian Institute. *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism: A Selection of Documents*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956.
- Conquest, Robert. *Power and Policy in the USSR: The Study of Soviet Dynasties*. New York: St. Martin's, 1961.
- . *The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities*. London: Macmillan, 1960.
- Counts, George S. *The Challenge of Soviet Education*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957.
- Counts, George S., and Lodge, N. *The Country of the Blind; The Soviet System of Mind Control*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949.
- Cressey, George B. *Soviet Potentials: A Geographic Appraisal*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962.
- Curtiss, John S. *The Russian Church and the Soviet State*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1953.
- Dallin, David J., and Nicolaevsky, Boris I. *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947.
- Deutscher, Isaac. *Prophet Armed: Trotsky, 1879-1921*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954.
- . *The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-1929*. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- . *Stalin, A Political Biography*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949.
- . *Soviet Trade Unions*. London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950.
- DeWitt, Nicholas. *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR*. Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1961.
- Dobb, Maurice H. *Soviet Economic Development*: (rev. ed.) New York: International Publishers, 1948.

- Ebon, Martin. *Malenkov—Stalin's Successor*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1953.
- Eliot, T. S. (preface) *The Dark Side of the Moon*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947.
- Fainsod, Merle. *How Russia Is Ruled*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Fischer, George. *Soviet Opposition to Stalin*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952.
- Fisher, Ralph T. *Pattern for Soviet Youth*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
- Florinsky, Michael T. *Russia: a History and an Interpretation*. New York: Macmillan, 1953.
- Gibian, George. *Interval of Freedom: Soviet Literature during the Thaw, 1954-1957*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960.
- Goldberg, Ben Zion. *The Jewish Problem in the Soviet Union*. New York: Crown, 1961.
- Granick, D. *The Red Executive: A Study of the Organization Man in Russian Industry*. New York: Doubleday, 1960.
- Grunwald, Constantin de. *The Churches and the Soviet Union*. New York: Macmillan, 1962.
- Gsovski, Vladimir and Grzybowski, K. (eds.) *Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*. Two volumes. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1959.
- Gsovski, Vladimir. *Soviet Civil Law*. (Two vols.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1948.
- Gurian, Waldemar. (ed.) *The Soviet Union: Background, Ideology, Reality*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1951.
- Gurian, Waldemar. *Bolshevism, an Introduction to Soviet Communism*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952.
- Gurian, Waldemar. (ed.) *Soviet Imperialism: its Origins and Tactics*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953.
- Hazard, John N. *Law and Social Change in the USSR*. Toronto: Carswell Company, 1953.
- Hazard, John N. and Shapiro, Isaac. *The Soviet Legal System*. Three volumes. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1962.
- Hazard, John N. *The Soviet System of Government*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
- Holzman, F. D. *Soviet Taxation: the Fiscal and Monetary Problems of a Planned Economy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955.
- Inkeles, Alex. *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, a Study in Mass Persuasion*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.
- Inkeles, Alex and Bauer, Raymond A. *The Soviet Citizen*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959.
- Inkeles, Alex and Geiger, Kent. (eds.) *Soviet Society*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961.
- Jasny, Naum. *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1949.
- . *The Soviet Economy During the Plan Era*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951.

- Jorré, Georges. (translated by Laborde) *The Soviet Union; The Land and its People*. (2nd ed.) London: Longmans Green, 1950.
- Kline, G. L. (ed.) *Soviet Education*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957.
- Kohn, Hans. *Pan-Slavism, Its History and Ideology*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953.
- Kolarz, Walter. *Religion in the Soviet Union*. New York: St. Martin's, 1961.
- . *Russia and Her Colonies*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1952.
- Konstantinovskiy, Boris A. (edited by H. J. Berman) *Soviet Law in Action: the Recollected Cases of a Soviet Lawyer*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953.
- Korol, A. G. *Soviet Education for Science and Technology*. Cambridge: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1957.
- Laird, Roy D., Sharp, D. E., and Sturtevant, R. *The Rise and Fall of the MTS as an Instrument of Soviet Rule*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1960.
- Leonhard, Wolfgang. *Child of the Revolution*. London: Collins, 1957.
- Lipper, Elinor. *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951.
- McCloskey, Herbert and Turner, John. *The Soviet Dictatorship*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.
- Mazour, Anatole F. *Russia, Past and Present*. New York: Van Nostrand, 1951.
- Mehnert, Klaus. *Soviet Man and His World*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1962.
- Meisel, J. H. and Kozera, E. S. (eds.) *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System: State and Party Constitutions, Laws, Decrees, Decisions, and Official Statements of the Leaders, in Translation*. (2nd ed.) Ann Arbor: G. Wahr Publishing Co., 1953.
- Milosz, Czeslaw. *The Captive Mind*. New York: Vintage Books, 1955.
- Monnerot, J. *Sociology and Psychology of Communism*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960.
- Moore, Barrington. *Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power; the Role of Ideas in Social Change*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.
- . *Terror and Progress USSR: Some Forces of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.
- Morgan, Glen G. *Soviet Administrative Legality: The Role of the Attorney General's Office*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.
- Nove, Alec. *The Soviet Economy*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1961.
- Pipes, R. *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.
- Possony, Stefan T. *A Century of Conflict. Communist Techniques of World Revolution, 1848-1950*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953.
- Rauch, Georg von. *A History of Soviet Russia*. New York: Praeger, 1957.
- Reavey, George. *Soviet Literature Today*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947.
- Rostow, W. W. *The Dynamics of Soviet Society*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1953.
- Russia Since Stalin: Old Trends and New Problems*. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. (Edited by P. E. Moseley) Philadelphia, 1956.

- Schapiro, Leonard. *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. New York: Random House, 1959.
- Schapiro, Leonard. (ed.) *The USSR and the Future: An Analysis of the New Program of the C.P.S.U.* New York: F. A. Praeger, 1963.
- Schlesinger, Rudolf. (ed.) *Changing Attitudes in Soviet Russia: Documents and Readings*, Vol. I. (The Family in the USSR) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949.
- Schlesinger, Rudolf. *Soviet Legal Theory; Its Social Background and Development*, London: Kegan Paul, 1945.
- Schueller, George K. *The Politburo*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951.
- Schwartz, Harry. *Russia's Soviet Economy*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950.
- Schwarz, Solomon. *The Jews in the Soviet Union*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1951.
- . *Labor in the Soviet Union*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1951.
- Scott, Derek J. R. *Russian Political Institutions*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1961.
- Seton-Watson, Hugh. *From Lenin to Malenkov*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1953.
- Shabad, Theodore. *Geography of the USSR*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.
- Simmons, Ernest J. *Through the Glass of Soviet Literature; Views of Russian Society*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953.
- Smal-Stocki, Roman. *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism*. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1952.
- Spinka, Matthew. *The Church in Soviet Russia*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Struve, Gleb. *Soviet Russian Literature, 1917-1950*. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951.
- Sumner, B. H. *A Short History of Russia*. (rev. ed.) New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949.
- Swayze, Harold. *Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1948-1959*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962.
- Timasheff, Nicolas S. *The Great Retreat*. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1946.
- Towster, Julian. *Political Power in the USSR, 1917-1948; The Theory and Structure of Government in the Soviet State*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948.
- Ulam, Adam B. *The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- U. S. Division of International Education. *Education in the USSR*. (U. S. Office of Education Bulletin, 1957, No. 14) Washington; U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, 1957.
- Vernadsky, George, and Karpovich, Michael. *A History of Russia*. (3 vols.) New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943-1953.
- Volin, Lazar. *A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture*. Washington: U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1951.
- Vucinich, Alexander S. *Soviet Economic Institutions: the Social Structure of Production Units*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952.
- Wolin, S. (ed.) *The Soviet Secret Police*. New York: Praeger, 1957.
- Zenkovsky, S. *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Zenkovsky, Vasilii V. *Russian Thinkers and Europe*. (Translation) Ann Arbor: J. W. Edwards, 1953.

———. *History of Russian Philosophy*. (Translated by G. L. Kline from the Russian original: *Istoriia Russkoi Filosofii*) Two volumes. Paris: YMCA Press, 1948-1950. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953.

Zirkle, Conway. *Death of a Science in Russia; the Fate of Genetics as Described in Pravda and Elsewhere*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949.

V. REVIEWS DEVOTED TO RUSSIAN AND SOVIET PROBLEMS

Current Digest of the Soviet Press (weekly). New York. The best source of translations and summaries of the Soviet press.

Problems of Communism (bimonthly). Washington, D.C.

Slavic Review (formerly *American Slavic and East European Review*) (quarterly). Seattle.

Soviet Studies (quarterly). Glasgow.

Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies (bimonthly). London.

The Russian Review (quarterly). Hanover, N.H.

Index

- Abortion, 156, 200, 201, 332
Active, 114, 115, 123, 220, 317, 396, 404
Agriculture, 84, 97, 99, 103, 120, 121, 339, 343, 348, 349, 365, 366, 375, 382, 408
 collectivization of, 340, 383, 388, 396, 398
 State administration of, 390-92
Albania, 54
Alimonies, 198, 201-03, 244, 268, 328
America, *see* United States
Annexations, 42, 44, 50, 56, 57, 133, 134
Annual vacation, 122, 225, 231, 237, 320, 322, 338, 350, 351
Architecture, Soviet, 19, 30, 31
Aristov, A. B., 110
Armed Forces, 1, 43, 45, 59, 69, 78, 103, 108, 109, 129, 140, 150, 154, 193, 275, 278, 289, 305, 393
 Main Political Administration, 116
 military offenses, 154, 155, 160, 162, 166, 167
 military schools, 279, 294, 299
 military service, 164, 199, 200
 officers, 78, 116, 193, 199, 200, 229, 278, 279, 285, 286, 330
Armenia, 128, 158
Arrest, 137, 140, 150, 153, 157, 160, 165, 172, 230, 240, 328, 407
Arts, abstract, 23, 26-29, 35
 Soviet, 13, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 32, 126, 407, 408
 Western, 16, 26
Associations, *see* Public organizations
Atheism, 72, 184, 185, 305; *see also* Religion
Attorneys at law, 171-74, 195, 196
Autonomous regions, 73, 128-30, 132
Autonomous republics, 73, 128-32, 136, 154, 172, 188, 189, 191, 390
Azerbaijan, 54, 60, 127, 158
Balkans, 39, 45, 54
Beliaev, N., 110
Beria, L. P., 25, 58, 78, 152, 406
Bonuses, *see* Collective farms, Labor
Bourgeois ideology, 15, 18, 20, 29, 90, 92, 126
Bourgeoisie, 12, 16, 17, 87, 106, 298
Brezhnev, L. I., 75, 110, 113
Britain, 9, 38, 42, 104
Budget of the USSR, 74, 75, 129, 325, 375
Bukharin, N. I., 24, 90, 127
Bulganin, N. A., 108, 127
Bureaucracy, 21, 78, 93, 103, 112, 116, 138, 224, 240, 258, 273, 280, 282-84, 319, 321, 322, 333, 334
 abuses, 85, 140, 230, 242, 358-62
Byelorussia, 67, 101, 127, 131, 134, 194
Byzantium, 9, 10, 33, 41
Capitalism, 11, 18, 20, 38, 60, 123, 145, 147, 184, 319-24, 342, 398
Catherine II, the Great (1729-1796), 47, 48, 294
Catholics, 9, 10, 33, 58
Caucasus, 42, 56, 154
Censorship, 8, 19, 87, 180
Central Asia, 42, 56, 57, 83, 99, 104, 134, 135, 295
China, 42, 53, 104, 105, 117, 123
Christianity, 10, 41
Churches, *see* Religion
Civil law, 129, 138, 201, 245, 288
Civil procedure, 129, 196
Colonial countries, *see* Dependent countries
Collective farmers, *see* Peasants

- Collective farms, 64, 68, 78, 83, 84, 97, 111, 145, 153, 177, 182, 244-47, 259, 292, 300, 308, 325, 337-400
- adjoining plots, 105, 120, 347-49, 377-79, 382-89, 396, 397, 399
- amalgamation, 343, 353, 357, 383, 395-98
- bonuses, 349, 355, 363-65, 367, 378
- brigades, 146, 345, 353-55, 357, 362-66, 398
- chairmen, 84, 343, 345, 349, 351, 353-62, 382, 391, 397, 398
- Charter, 340-42, 353, 355, 360-62, 378, 382, 383, 389, 398
- control commission, 353, 358, 361, 362
- funds, 350, 351, 372, 377-79
- general meeting, 341, 344, 345, 348, 351, 353-58, 361, 362, 378, 382, 389, 390, 396
- income, 121, 342, 345-47, 349-51, 354, 372, 377-80
- labor-day (trudoden), 121, 344-50, 352, 355, 357, 358, 361, 363-66, 372, 373, 378, 379, 382, 383, 389, 399
- labor discipline, 178, 347, 348, 351, 353, 355, 363, 382, 386, 389
- management board, 178, 301, 345, 347, 353-56, 358, 359, 361-63, 382, 386, 388, 390, 392, 398
- membership, 215, 341
- norm of output, 175, 344, 345, 347, 348, 353, 355, 382
- State procurement of agricultural products, 344, 349, 350, 360, 367, 368, 372-78, 390
- subsidiary establishment, 105, 120, 121, 382-89, 395
- Collective-State-farm production agency, 84, 97-99, 343, 390, 391
- Cominform, 54
- Communism, 4, 6, 18, 25, 29, 53-55, 71, 89, 100, 110, 123, 126, 184, 188, 206, 207, 209, 214, 281, 312, 337, 339, *see also* Communist millennium
- Communist bloc, 104
- Communist millennium, 106-08, 111, 118, 119, 144, 146, 169, 299
- Communist movement, 25, 91, 106, 110, 117
- Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.), 1, 6, 9, 11-13, 15, 17-19, 23, 25, 27-29, 34, 41, 45, 50-53, 55, 57, 59, 66, 68, 70-73, 77, 78, 84, 86-90, 124, 126, 130, 134, 135, 152, 156, 181, 182, 184, 188, 209, 214, 215, 220, 251, 273, 302, 312, 317, 325, 338, 390, 396
- admission, 94, 95, 100
- anti-Party group, 34, 90, 108, 109, 112, 126, 127, 162, 405
- Bureau for the RSFSR, 98, 101
- Central Committee, 13-16, 18, 21, 22, 24, 29, 43, 44, 76, 77, 79, 83, 86, 88, 89, 92-99, 101-03, 109, 110, 112-16, 146, 149, 150, 185, 189, 197, 213, 215, 217, 219, 251, 282, 283, 296, 297, 307, 312, 356, 374, 387, 389, 396, 403, 404, 406
- charter, 91, 94, 100-02, 111, 112, 114-16, 124, 208, 209
- city organization, 84, 95-97, 100, 101, 111, 115-17
- congresses, 96, 101-13, 398
- 18th, 101, 281
- 19th, 92, 101, 102, 133, 251, 283, 295, 396
- 20th, 19, 23, 24, 30, 101, 102, 108, 110, 295, 297, 355, 389
- 21st, 101-11, 118, 339, 406, 409
- 22nd, 23, 24, 91, 101, 102, 109, 111-14, 116-18, 120, 124-27, 213, 303, 338, 339, 405, 406
- Control Commission, 83, 114
- deviations, 24, 26, 29, 126
- district organization, 84, 95-98, 100, 101, 111, 115-17, 391
- expulsion, 89, 92, 93, 95, 96, 115
- membership, 83, 87-89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 98, 102, 103, 111, 114, 116, 208, 226, 313, 405
- organization, 96-102, 114, 115, 405
- Party line, 8, 11-36, 43, 73, 88-90, 94, 126, 132, 136, 164, 183, 407
- Political Bureau, 8, 404
- Presidium of the Central Committee, 1, 75-77, 79, 86, 98, 99, 108-10,

- 113, 115, 126, 132, 136, 139, 147, 404-06
- primary organization, 78, 84, 95-97, 99, 100, 111, 115, 216, 218, 219, 291, 391, 397, 398
- program, 90, 101, 102, 117-27, 214, 303, 337
- Regional organization, 84, 93, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 111, 115-17, 391
- Secretariat of the Central Committee, 86, 110, 113, 114, 126
- Secretaries, 93, 94, 99-102, 115, 391, 405
- Union-Republican Central Committee, 84, 95, 98, 99, 101, 115, 116
- Union-Republican organization, 100, 101, 111, 117
- zonal organization, 97
- Communists, non-Soviet, 23, 38-40, 46, 53, 55, 145
- Comradely courts, 85, 123, 127, 175, 177-79, 220, 238, 247, 289, 290, 304, 355
- Constitution of the USSR, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 75, 76, 85, 86, 128, 130-32, 144, 179, 181, 183, 188, 198, 199, 213, 215, 221, 222, 225, 246, 261, 337, 343, 350, 383, 385
- Consumer goods, 4, 105-07, 118, 120, 245, 267, 270, 277, 278
- Cooperatives, 68, 116, 181, 182, 215, 247, 285, 286, 325, 339, 344, 350, 378, 380, 385-87, 399
- Copyright, 198, 205, 245, 274
- Cosmopolitanism, 12, 30, 38, 40, 51, 53, 58
- Council of Ministers of the USSR, 74-77, 82, 83, 86, 114, 130, 132, 136, 217, 231, 240, 241, 251, 259, 272, 289, 296, 297, 318, 367, 373, 375, 376, 389
- Council of Ministers of Union Republics, 80, 82, 84, 99, 130-33, 136, 140, 150, 196, 231, 289, 375, 390
- Councils of national economy (sovnarkhozy), 79, 80, 82, 83, 217, 219
- Courts, 123, 129, 138, 152, 153, 155-57, 161, 162, 169, 170, 172, 175-77, 182, 188, 194-98, 202, 203, 229, 230, 233, 240, 246, 267, 285, 288-91, 320, 348, 351, 360, 361, 368, 376, 381, 382, 385, 395, 406, 407, *see also* Comradely courts, Supreme Courts
- appeal, 172, 173, 176, 181, 189, 190, 193, 196-98, 237
- judges, 172, 173, 188, 190-95, 198
- judicial review of final judgements, 173-75, 193, 194, 197, 198
- martial, 188, 191-93
- people's assessors, 172, 173, 188-92, 198, 220, 234, 236, 267
- people's courts, 138, 173, 176-78, 181, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 202, 203, 234, 236, 237, 321, 328, 348, 364
- regional, 173, 174, 188-92, 194, 203
- Craftsmen, 384, 385
- Crimea, 154
- Crimes, 80, 85, 96, 108, 139, 148, 153, 158-61, 171, 179, 219, 220, 229, 231, 233, 234, 243, 244, 289, 325, 360
- anti-Soviet organizations, 164, 165, 167, 169, 170, 183
- anti-Soviet propaganda, 163, 170, 179-81
- anti-State, 148, 153, 156, 159, 162-68, 170, 189, 407
- bribery, 85, 165, 167, 168, 242, 361
- by analogy, 158, 162, 407
- collective responsibility, 154, 155, 162
- departure abroad, 154, 164, 170
- escape abroad, 154, 155, 162
- escape from confinement, 153, 160, 161, 165, 177
- espionage, 159, 165, 167, 168, 170, 193, 199
- homosexuality, 200
- hooliganism, 159, 200
- misprision, 159, 165, 168, 170, 246, 247, 381
- parasites, 158, 169, 175-77, 348, 407
- sabotage, 163, 165, 167, 169, 170, 380
- speculation, 85, 158, 165, 166, 168-70, 175

- subversion, 159, 163, 165, 167, 169, 170
- terrorism, 159, 163, 165, 167, 168, 170
- treason, 154, 155, 159, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 170, 199, 241
- Criminal law, general, 108, 123, 129, 148, 149, 154, 156, 158, 160, 200, 201, 219, 238, 241, 247, 248, 281, 290, 381, 406, 407
- Criminal law, retroactive force of, 158
- Criminal penalties, 156, 175
 - capital punishment, 151-54, 156, 158-60, 162, 163, 166, 167, 168, 189, 241, 242, 245, 247, 380, 381
 - confinement, 137, 151-57, 159, 161-68, 171, 177, 184, 200, 201, 219, 220, 227, 231, 235, 236, 241, 242, 244, 246-49, 281, 380, 381, 394, 407
 - correctional labor, 137, 151, 155, 156, 159, 160, 166, 176, 177, 180, 183, 184, 200, 201, 219, 220, 228, 234, 236, 238, 241, 242, 244, 247-49, 268, 281, 290, 322, 328, 348, 380, 381, 394, 395, 407
 - correctional labor camp, 120, 140, 149, 152, 153, 157, 159-61, 165, 167, 168, 193, 407
 - deportation, 152, 154, 160, 348
 - exile, 151-53, 155, 157, 160, 163, 165, 168, 175-77, 184, 201, 242, 246, 247, 381, 407
 - prison, 140, 149, 152, 153, 159, 160, 168, 193, 407
- Criminal procedure, 129, 153, 169-75, 190
- Criticism and self-criticism, 92-94
- Cult of the individual, 25, 29, 34, 110, 126, 404, 406
- Cultural isolationism, 8, 11, 28, 32, 48
- Decembrists, 7, 8, 87
- Decorations, 73, 103, 112, 161, 205, 252, 281, 286, 298, 299, 304, 332, 352, 356, 393
- Democracy, 1-3, 5, 63, 64, 87, 91, 120, 145, 147, 148, 213, 214, 337, 410
- Democratic centralism, 136
- Dependent countries, 59, 60
- Detention, *see* Arrest
- Dictatorship of the proletariat, 89, 91, 145, 179, 213-15, 271, 337, 338
- Dimitrov, G. M., 54
- Divorce, 203, 394
- Dobrolubov, N. A., 38
- Dogmatism, *see* Communist Party, deviations
- Dudintsev, V. D., 21, 29
- Education, 29, 43, 44, 73, 90, 91, 100, 103-05, 118, 119, 122, 125, 126, 129, 134, 210, 274, 284, 291-307, 334, 408, 409
 - universal secondary, 294-97, 303
- Egalitarianism, 261, 272, 279, 333, 409
- Ehrenburg, Il'ya G., 20, 25-27
- Elections, 64-66, 68-71, 86, 89, 131, 147, 156, 157, 189, 192, 273, 404
 - communist non-Party bloc, 66, 67, 72, 135
 - electoral commissions, 67, 68, 70
- Elitism, 87, 88, 94, 113, 312, 397, 403-06
- Employment, compulsory transfer, 231, 232
 - discharge, 85, 219, 220, 229-31, 236, 238, 239, 241, 242, 244, 257, 320, 394
 - release from, 229, 231, 289, 325, 394
- Engels, Friedrich, 46, 51, 249, 273
- Engineers, 146, 217, 219, 231, 241, 250, 263, 269-71, 274, 302, 308, 318, 319, 321, 323, 327
- Enterprise fund, 266, 267, 271
- Estonia, 128
- Europe, 7, 10
 - Eastern, 53, 105, 398, 399, 410
- Evtushenko, E. A., 27
- Family, 100, 106, 123, 129, 159, 201-04, 206, 260, 261, 307, 315, 317, 327, 384, 385, *see also* Divorce, Marriage
 - guardianship, 204
 - illegitimate children, 205, 332
 - motherhood, 204, 205, 327, 352
 - mothers, lonely (unmarried), 204, 332

- Fascism, 6, 38
 Fatherland, 18, 38, 40, 41, 49, 51, 52,
 71, 100, 125, 188, 204, 207,
 285, 303, 305, 409
 Fines, 85, 137, 138, 151, 160, 161, 178,
 180, 181, 183, 200, 219, 228,
 234, 237, 249, 269, 281, 355,
 368, 381, 382, 394, 395
 Foremen, 216, 217, 219, 263, 265, 291
 300, 301, 308, 321
 Formalism, 14-16, 21, 22, 26-29
 France, 42, 43, 104, 294
 Freedoms of the individual, 5, 29, 70,
 144-85, 406
 assembly, 179, 181
 association, 64, 181
 circulation, 153, 155
 conscience, 183, *see also* Religion
 expression, 64, 148, 164, 179-81
 inviolability of correspondence, 153,
 171
 inviolability of homes, 150, 153, 170,
 171
 inviolability of person, 151-53
 Frontier, troops, 137, 149, 155
 zone, 137, 149, 153, 155, 393
 Furtseva, Ye. A., 109, 110

 Gafurov, B. G., 57
 Georgia, 54, 127
 Germany, 9, 45, 65, 104, 184, 410
 Volga Germans, 154
 Gorkin, A. F., 191
 Greek Orthodox, 9, 10, 33, 184
 Grishin, V. V., 113

 History, Soviet, 41-45, 47, 48, 52, 56,
 57, 126, 134
 Housing, 122, 156, 177, 178, 220, 227,
 228, 230, 231, 241, 250, 272,
 285-91, 314, 317, 318, 394, 408
 tenants, 84, 151, 285, 288-91
 tenants' committees, 151, 178, 290,
 291
 Hungary, 50, 60, 297

 Ignatov, N. G., 110
 Il'ychev, L. F., 24-26, 28, 89, 185
 Imperialism, 12, 40, 42, 54, 60
 Industrialization, 4, 64, 132, 257, 278
 Industries, 84, 97, 98, 103, 104, 120,
 267, 308
 Inheritance, 205, 386
 Intelligentsia, 19, 73, 83, 86, 91, 103,
 112, 134, 145, 146, 252, 261,
 262, 272, 274, 275, 281, 282,
 291, 298-304, 312, 408
 Iran, 55, 56
 Israel, 58
 Ivan IV, the Terrible (1530-1584), 46,
 47, 87

 Japan, 9, 42
 Jews, 56, 58, 128
 Juristic persons, 182, 185, 245, 324
 Juveniles, 150, 167, 168, 172, 184, 200,
 215, 216, 221-25, 228, 249, 300,
 322, 324, 326, 332, 348, 393
 criminal responsibility, 159, 160
 delinquency, 150

 Kaganovich, L. M., 89, 108, 127
 Kalmyks, 154
 Kalnberzin, Ya. E., 110
 Kameniev, L. B., 90
 Kataev, V. P., 27
 Kazakhstan, 44, 54, 60, 79, 101, 125,
 127, 130, 158
 Khachatryan, A. J., 16, 18, 19, 22
 Khrennikov, T. N., 21, 22
 Khrushchev, N. S., 19-21, 23-31, 34, 37
 (note), 77-79, 82, 83, 85, 92,
 97, 99, 102-08, 110-15, 126,
 127, 217, 231, 260, 295-98, 304,
 328, 339, 344, 346, 349, 350,
 366, 368, 374-76, 378, 388,
 389, 391, 396, 397, 405, 406,
 408
 Kirghizia, 67, 83, 99, 125, 128, 158
 Kirichenko, A. I., 110
 Kirilenko, A. P., 110
 Kirov, S. M., 42
 Komsomol (Communist Youth Union),
 68, 78, 83, 84, 95, 103, 112-14,
 116, 117, 123, 124, 150, 178,
 185, 207-10, 218, 220, 251, 284,
 291, 302, 304-06, 325, 391, 405,
 406
 Korotchenko, D. S., 110

- Kosygin, A. N., 110, 113
 Kozlov, F. P., 110, 113
 Kurbandsakhatov, K., 57
 Kutuzov, M. I., 45, 46
 Kuusinen, O. V., 110, 113
 Kuznetsov, V. V., 15, 251
- Labor, bonuses, 145, 217, 231, 250, 261, 265, 270-72, 275, 314, 326,
see also Collective farms
 book, 228, 229, 238
 brigadiers, 271
 collective agreements, 232, 314, 316-19, 324
 discipline, 3, 85, 147, 157, 177, 188, 199, 216-18, 229, 231-34, 236, 237, 239, 240, 289, 306, 313, 315, 318, 325
 disciplinary penalties, 85, 178, 217, 219, 220, 229, 232, 233, 238-40, 257, 260, 269
 disputes, 314, 317, 319-22
 Dispute Commission, 229, 230, 240, 244, 319-22
 duty, 215, 216, 297, 299
 night work, 223, 224, 226
 norm of output, 146, 218, 239, 256-58, 260, 264, 265, 271, 274, 314, 316, 320, 338, 339
 overtime work, 224, 226, 320, 324
 pecuniary responsibility, 242-44
 permanent production conference, 217-20
 productivity, 218, 219, 233, 250, 251, 256, 261, 313, 318, 319
 protection, 137, 220, 314, 316-18
 administration, 218, 323, 324
 rewards, 146, 239, 249-51
 shock workers, 49, 146, 218, 237, 251, 252, 257, 271, 274, 286, 332
 Standard Rules of Order, 222, 233, 238, 239, 256
 wages, 122, 146, 198, 221-25, 227, 232, 234, 235, 238, 250, 256-73, 312, 314, 317, 319, 320, 322, 324, 326, 329, 330, 338, 339, 408
 breakdown of production, 268, 269, 320
 deductions from, 219, 244, 268, 275, 328
 defective output, 268, 269, 320
 minimum, 260, 261
 personal salaries, 272, 275, 330
 piece-rates, 3, 221, 223, 224, 256, 260, 261, 263-66, 268, 326
 reform, 265, Addendum
 time-rates, 224, 264, 266, 268, 326
 willful absence, 223, 224, 229, 233-38
 willful dereliction, 227, 233, 235-38
 work-time, 76, 105, 122, 221, 222, 224, 239, 258, 300, 312, 314, 324
- Land, 129, 245, 287, 290, 342, 343, 382, 388
- Latvia, 127, 158
- Lenin, V. I., 27, 34, 38, 42, 47, 54, 55, 60, 87, 88, 90, 106, 110, 117, 148, 150, 155, 188, 197, 216, 232, 273, 279, 281, 334, 335, 403
- Leninism, *see* Marxism-Leninism
- Lenin prizes, 112, 252, 275
- Literature, Soviet, 19-21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 32, 35, 126, 407, 408
- Western, 17
- Lithuania, 127, 133, 134
- Little Octobrists, 207
- Living standards, 4, 5, 107, 120-22, 148, 267, 282, 313, 333, 408
- Lomonosov, M. V., 49
- Machine-Tractor Stations, 340, 343, 344, 365-68, 372-75, 390, 391, 398, 400
- Makarenko, A. S., 307
- Makarov, S. O., 45, 59
- Malenkov, G. M., 89, 102, 108, 109, 127, 405
- Malinovskii, R. Ya., 109, 110, 116
- Managers, Industrial, 3, 21, 80, 84, 123, 145, 146, 178, 216-19, 222-24, 226-29, 231-33, 235, 236, 238, 239, 241, 243, 244, 250, 251, 257, 258, 263, 265-72, 282, 287, 302, 308, 312, 314-24, 327, 328, 394
- Manpower, 105, 156, 263, 296, 297, 308
 fluidity of, 227, 231, 249, 289, 332, 348

- Marriage, 129, 201, 202, 394, *see also*
Family
- Marx, Karl, 46, 51, 60, 106, 249, 259,
273, 279, 280
- Marxism, 4, 9, 12, 13, 31, 32, 34, 42,
52, 53, 56, 89, 146, 148
- Marxism-Leninism, 4, 6, 22, 25, 28, 50,
59, 92, 100, 108-11, 125, 126,
130, 131, 209, 274, 298, 303,
406
- Material incentive, 260, 339, 349
- Materialism, 12, 16, 31
- Mazurov, K. T., 110, 113
- Michurin, I. V., 49
- Mikoyan, A. I., 110, 113
- Militia, 137, 149-51, 153-55, 165, 167,
170, 171, 176-78, 181, 200, 228,
234, 290, 364, 394
brigades of cooperation with, 124,
137, 150, 151, 165, 167, 178, 200,
220
- Ministries, Administrations and Com-
mittees, 80-82, 136
- Ministry of the Interior, 80, 82, 149,
150, 152, 157, 407
- Minors, *see* Juveniles
- Moldavia, 127
- Molotov, V. M., 89, 108, 127, 398
- Morality, Communist, 50, 51, 185, 307
legal enforcement of, 177, 178, 200
- Moslems, 56, 57
- Motion pictures, Soviet, 24, 27, 282,
283, 305
- Mukhitdinov, N. A., 110, 409, 410
- Muradelli, V. I., 13, 14, 16, 22
- Music, Soviet, 13-15, 19, 21-23, 26,
407, 408
western, 13-16, 22, 23, 26
- Mzhavanadze, V. P., 110, 113
- Nakhimov, P. S., 45, 294
- National areas, 73, 128, 130
- National self-determination, 54, 55, 59
- Nationalism, bourgeois, 24, 39, 57, 58,
125, 133, 134, 409
- Nationalism, Russian, 38, 39, 52, 53,
55, 56, 58, 59, 135, 409
- Nationalities, non-Russian, 44, 48, 50,
53-56, 58, 60, 124, 125, 128,
130-32, 134, 154, 409, 410
- Nationality, Communist definition of,
55, 56
- Nazism, 6, 38, 410
- Neizvestniy, E., 27
- Nekrasov, V. P., 27, 37 (note)
- Nicholas I (1796-1855), 87
- One-man command, 216, 217, 219
- Pankratova, A. M., 42, 48
- Party line, *see* Communist Party of the
Soviet Union
- Party-State control, 81, 83-85, 219,
220, 230
- Passports, 137, 145, 151, 154, 202, 227,
228, 308, 348, 389, 392-95
- Pasternak, B. L., 21
- Patents, 198, 205, 245, 275
- Patriotism, Soviet, 22, 38-40, 44, 51,
52, 125, 204, 206, 305, 314
- Paustovskii, K. G., 27
- Peaceful coexistence, 28, 29, 125
- Peasants, 8, 46, 47, 59, 64, 73, 86, 91,
101, 112, 120, 121, 145, 146,
153, 175, 176, 198, 227, 228,
244, 259, 272, 276, 278, 281,
282, 292, 300, 301, 308, 324,
328, 329, 331, 332, 334, 335,
337, 338, 340, 393-95, 408
discrimination against, 121, 292, 333,
334, 346, 350-52, *see also* Col-
lective farms
- People's democracies, 12, 54, 398
- Pervukhin, M. G., 109, 127
- Pestel, P., 87
- Peter I, the Great (1672-1725), 34,
35, 46, 47, 87
- Philosophy, Soviet, 12
- Pioneers, 207-09, 305, 315, 323
- Podgornyi, N. V., 110, 113
- Pokrovskii, M. N., 42
- Poland, 10, 33, 45, 54, 60, 294, 297
- Polianskii, D. S., 110, 113
- Political police, 78, 87, *see also* State
Security Committee
- Ponomarev, B. N., 113
- Popov, A. S., 49
- Poskrebyshhev, A. N., 284
- Pospelov, P. N., 15, 110

- Preliminary investigation, *see* Pre-trial investigation
- Presidia of the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, 69, 70, 130, 133, 182, 190-92, 195
- Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 74-77, 86, 129, 130, 132, 136, 139, 158, 190-92, 195, 221, 252, 276
- Pretrial investigation, 138, 161, 170-72, 175, 328
- Procurator General of the USSR, 74, 139, 140, 171, 174, 194
- Procurators, 85, 138-40, 151, 153, 170-74, 177, 178, 190, 194-98, 280, 321, 322, 390
- Production plans, 71, 74, 75, 79, 80, 85, 94, 100, 102, 104, 129, 145, 165, 216, 218-20, 241, 250, 251, 260, 262, 265, 270, 313, 314, 318, 319, 349, 390
- Prokofiev, S. S., 22
- Proletarian internationalism, 40, 53, 54
- Proletariat, 40, 45, 55, 86, 88, 91, 145, 147, 214, 215, *see also* Dictatorship of the
- Propaganda, 8, 10, 13, 15, 29, 31, 42, 43, 89, 106, 151, 183, 184, 314, 317, 318, 406
anti-Soviet, *see* Crimes
- Property, personal, 245, 285-91, 385
protection of, 159, 246-49, 380, 381
- Property, public (socialist), 118, 159, 197, 199, 245, 343, 351, 358-60, 362
protection of, 85, 100, 149, 159, 163, 165, 167, 168, 188, 189, 239, 246-49
- Protestants, 10, 33
- Public organizations, 19-21, 29, 68, 70, 77, 78, 84, 86, 88, 107, 112, 113, 115, 116, 123, 124, 139, 180-82, 189, 214, 247, 285, 302, 325, 404, *see also* Komsomol, Trade Unions
- Radio, 181
- Rashidov, Sh. R., 113
- Religion, 72, 106, 183-85, 202, 204, 209, 210, 307, 324, 325, *see also* Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Moslems, Protestants
- Revisionism, *see* Communist Party of the USSR, deviations
- Revolution, 7, 60, 144
1905, 59
October, 24, 34, 45, 58, 59, 117, 148, 158, 206, 222, 227, 272, 273, 279, 281, 282, 307, 333, 340, 382
Socialist (Communist), 5, 9, 40, 48, 50, 54, 55, 213
- RSFSR, 67, 69, 70, 79, 82, 98, 111, 114, 127, 128, 133, 157, 176
- Russia, 7-10, 32-34, 36, 40-43, 45, 46, 48, 56, 57, 87, 104, 111, 112, 117, 125, 127, 130, 133, 134
- Rykov, A. I., 24, 90
- Saburov, M. E., 109, 127
- Salaries, *see* Labor, wages
- Schools, 128, 134, 183, 206, 223, 227, 251, 307, 308, 335, 408
boarding, 106, 122, 123, 299
discipline, 304-07
elementary, 125, 207, 291, 293, 295, 299
higher learning, 134, 177, 235, 291, 292-306, 322, 392
junior high, 125, 207, 216, 291-93, 295, 299-301, 303
military, *see* Armed Forces
secondary, 125, 207, 252, 292-97, 299-304, 315
secondary-technical, 126, 134, 177, 235, 291, 292, 294, 296, 300, 301, 315, 392
trade, 299, 300, 392
- Sciences, natural, 31, 35, 302
priorities, 49, 53
social, 31, 32, 34-36, 126, 302
- Secession, 55, 131, 132
- Serfs, 7, 8, 47, 363
- Sharkov, B. S., 169
- Shcherbitskii, V. V., 113
- Shebalin, V. Ya., 16
- Shelepin, A. N., 114
- Shepilov, D. T., 89, 108, 127
- Shkiryatov, M. F., 283, 284
- Shostakovich, D. D., 16, 18, 19, 22
- Shvernik, N. M., 110, 113

- Slavs, 9, 43-45, 125
- Social equality, *see* Social stratification
- Social insurance, 120-22, 250, 312-17, 325, 333, 338, 339, 350, 365, 367
- administration, 220, 323, 324
- contributions, 324, 325
- dependents, 327, 328, 330, 331
- disablement, permanent, 323, 325, 328, 329, 351, 352
- disablement, temporary, 232, 237, 238, 325-28
- maternity, 232, 322, 331-33
- old age, 238, 289, 323, 329, 330, 350
- Social stratification, 21, 73, 118, 119, 281, 282, 286, 291, 296, 298, 325, 327, 333, 408
- Socialism, 9, 38, 48, 51, 53, 110, 131, 144, 146, 148, 215, 216, 260, 262, 342
- Socialist competition, 71, 100, 218, 250, 251, 270, 271, 291, 314, 316-18, 348, 355, 363
- Socialist realism, 13, 19, 23, 27, 28, 126
- Solzhenitsyn, A. I., 24
- Soviets, 72, 86, 116, 191, 214, 405
- deputies, 72, 73, 124, 220
- executive committees, 69-71, 83, 97, 99, 133, 136, 137, 176, 178, 179, 283, 288, 290, 291, 341, 353, 355, 357, 358, 361, 389-91, *see also* Supreme Soviets
- local, 68, 69, 75, 83, 84, 86, 97, 99, 133, 135, 136, 151, 185, 189, 191, 285-87
- Specialists, 103, 294, 295, 301, 303
- Spiridonov, I. V., 113
- Stakhanovites, *see* Labor, shock workers
- Stalin, J. V., 9, 18-20, 22-26, 28, 31, 34, 35, 40, 42, 43, 47, 48, 52, 55, 58, 59, 66, 67, 72, 77-79, 82, 86-88, 90, 91, 101, 102, 104-06, 108, 110-13, 115, 120, 123, 126, 127, 131, 144, 149, 152, 154, 157, 159, 208, 210, 214, 215, 226, 231, 238, 257, 260, 261, 273, 281, 295, 338, 341, 349, 376, 380, 381, 389, 395, 396, 403-08
- State administration, 77-83, 86, 99, 115, 116, 123, 124, 135-39, 178, 220, 251
- city, 69, 84, 99, 135
- district, 69, 84, 97, 99, 135, 373
- region, 69, 83, 84, 99, 128, 135, 373, *see also* Union Republics, Soviets, local
- State farms, 84, 97, 219, 220, 244, 300, 302, 313, 316, 326, 338, 339, 348, 350, 391, 392
- State investigators, 138, 153, 170-72, 178, 195, 243, 322, *see also* Pre-trial investigation
- State loans, 105, 276, 277
- State Planning Committee, 79, 81, 391
- State secrets, 162-64, 166, 167, 170, 172, 240, 241
- State Security Committee, 78, 82, 108, 149, 150, 153, 155, 166, 170, 193, 275, 279, 407
- State, withering away, 106-08, 123, 126, 144, 146, 214
- Statute of limitation, 161, 173, 174, 197, 198, 361
- Supreme Court of the USSR, 74, 172, 174, 188, 190-94, 222, 223, 237, 249, 360
- Supreme Courts of Union Republics, 172, 174, 188, 190-92, 194
- Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 59, 66, 67, 72-75, 77, 80, 190-92, 276, 298, 299
- Soviet of Nationalities, 67, 73-75, 133
- Soviet of the Union, 67, 69, 73-76, 85, 113, 129, 139, 190
- Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, 67, 72, 75, 99, 129, 132, 158, 173, 191
- Surkov, A. A., 20
- Suslov, M. A., 15, 113
- Suvorov, A. V., 45, 46, 294
- Tabeev, F. A., 134
- Tadjikistan, 57, 83, 99, 128, 158
- Tartars, 10, 33, 39, 41, 134, 154
- Taxes, 74, 122, 129, 386
- Taxes, agricultural, 379, 386
- collective-farm income, 377, 379

- income, 105, 268, 275-77
- inheritance, 278
- on bachelors, 268, 276
- on profits, 277, 278
- sales, 105, 122, 277
- Theatre, Soviet, 17, 18, 181
- Titles, 103, 112, 139, 251, 274, 275, 278-81, 285, 286, 356
- Tito, Broz, J., 54
- Tomskii, M. P., 24
- Trade Unions, 64, 68, 78, 83, 84, 88, 103, 112-14, 116, 123, 124, 137, 150, 181, 216, 219, 220, 230, 232, 251, 263, 285, 302, 312-18, 323, 325, 331, 338, 405
 - All-Union Central Council, 150, 217, 258, 314-16, 325
 - Charter of, 313-15, 317
 - Congress, 218, 312, 313, 315, 316
 - factory committee, 151, 178, 179, 215, 216, 218-20, 224, 239, 258, 267, 286, 290, 291, 299, 315-18, 320-23, 327, 328
 - membership, 315, 326, 327, 332
 - organization, 315, 316
- Trotsky, L. D., 24, 90, 127
- Turkey, 39, 56, 294
- Turkmen, 57, 58, 67, 83, 99, 128, 158
- Ukraine, 54, 56, 58, 60, 67, 79, 82, 101, 104, 111, 125, 127, 131, 134, 154
- Union Republics, 67, 69, 73-75, 79-81, 84, 99, 101, 111, 112, 127-34, 139, 140, 157, 172, 175, 194, 219, 220, 373, 391, *see also* Councils of Ministers, Presidia, Supreme Courts, Supreme Soviets
- United States, 9, 38, 42, 104, 119, 272
- Upper class, *see* Social stratification
- Ushakov, F. F., 45, 48
- Uzbekistan, 54, 57, 58, 60, 67, 79, 83, 99, 101, 127, 158, 409
- Voronov, G. I., 113
- Voroshilov, K. E., 110
- Voznesenskii, Andrei, 27
- Vyshinskii, A. Ya., 2, 48, 49, 145-47, 195, 337
- Wages, *see* Labor
- Wars, civil, 10, 42
 - First World, 45
 - just and unjust, 50
 - nuclear, 28
 - Russo-Japanese, 42, 59
 - Second World, 8, 9, 184, 278
- West, 6-10, 13, 17, 23, 28, 29, 32-35, 40, 41, 50, 52, 87
- Western civilization, 8, 10, 11, 32-34, 39, 48, 51
- White Russians, *see* Byelorussia
- Women, 69, 112, 160, 200, 201, 224-26, 232, 272, 307, 314, 324, 330, 332, *see also* Collective farms, Family, Labor
- Workers, 3, 21, 59, 64, 73, 83, 91, 103, 112, 121, 122, 145, 146, 148, 197, 213, 214, 216, 217, 222, 224, 227, 229, 233, 234, 239, 243, 251, 256, 258, 259, 261-63, 269, 272, 273, 275, 276, 278, 281, 282, 286, 288, 291, 292, 299-301, 306, 312, 313, 315, 316, 319, 324, 327, 330, 334, 337, 338, 408
 - categories of skill, 266, 273, 274, *see also* Labor
- Yablochkov, P. N., 50
- Youth organizations, 66, 88, 106, 123, 181, 206-10, *see also* Komsomol, Little Octobrists, Pioneers
- Yugoslavia, 54
- Yusupov, I., 130
- Zdanov, A. A., 8, 15, 16, 22, 23, 26, 42, 126
- Zhukov, G. K., 109, 405
- Zinoviev, G. E., 24, 90, 127
- Zionism, 58



W. W. KULSKI, born in Poland and educated at the Warsaw School of Law, received the Doctor of Laws degree from the Paris School of Law and served in the Polish diplomatic service between 1928 and 1945. In London, in August of 1939, he was the Polish negotiator of the British-Polish Treaty of Mutual Assistance which formed the basis for the British declaration of war on Nazi Germany.

Professor of Political Science at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, the author, now a naturalized American citizen, has lectured at other universities and for the Foreign Service Institute (Department of State) and the Army Strategic Intelligence School.

Foreign Affairs, American Journal of International Law, Journal of Central European Affairs, Problems of Communism, and Russian Review are among the specialized journals to which Prof. Kulski has contributed. He is the author of *Peaceful Co-Existence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy* and *International Politics*, and co-author of *Handbook on Communism* and *The Ethic of Power*.

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Reviewers' comments on **THE SOVIET REGIME**

COMMUNISM IN PRACTICE

"There are few aspects of Soviet Russian organizations, economics, culture and leadership apparatus left untouched in this massive tome. In cool, dispassionate fashion the author goes far toward unwrapping the riddle surrounding the enigma of the U.S.S.R."—*Current History*

"This is an indispensable reference work for every serious student of Soviet affairs . . . the most complete imaginable picture of the political, economic, social, and cultural conditions under which the upper, middle, and lower classes live in the Soviet Union."—*Christian Science Monitor*

"The author . . . lets the Soviets speak for themselves in quotations from their own published sources. He analyzes these sources, makes comparisons, and draws his conclusions exclusively from Soviet documents."—*The Bulletin of the National Association of Secondary-School Principals*

"He has compiled a devastating and virtually irrefutable record of Soviet officialdom betraying and condemning itself. This volume is a classic in the field, and should be on the bookshelves of every scholar and research organization studying the USSR."—*Slavic Review*

AT ALL BOOKSTORES

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS
University Station, Syracuse, New York